The missing pages of history: 70 years of Pakistan and Dawn

The policies of a powerful state never consented to the unveiling of the truth.

ZAFFAR ABBASUpdated Aug 20, 2017 09:02am

VER the decades, Dawn has come to be known as ‘the paper of record’. This is not without reason. Although historians seldom regard newspapers as primary source material, since the early years of Pakistan’s creation, extraordinary efforts have been put in by Dawn’s editors to cover as much as possible of national and international events. Before the advent of the internet this newspaper used to regularly publish the text of most landmark court judgements, speeches by leaders and important gazette notifications. This renders its archives a unique and rich research resource.

But to be considered a paper of record, more than news coverage is required. The contextualisation of developments through editorials and analyses is also important. Were Dawn’s editors able to faithfully cover the news and analyse it? Indeed, were they allowed to do this? They certainly strove to do all they could. But I doubt that they were able to record many crucial events in this country’s chequered history.

DISTORTED HISTORY

General Zia-ul-Haq in a mood of characteristic bonhomie is seen in conversation with senior journalists in Islamabad on July 9, 1977. From left to right: Mir Khalil-ur-Rehman (Jang), General Zia-ul-Haq, Sharif Farooq (Jihad), M.A. Zuberi (Business Recorder), Altaf Hassan Qureshi (Pakistan Digest) and Mumtaz Tahir (Aftab Multan). — Hasan Bozai/Dawn/White Star.

There were already pressures on the media, exerted by civilian set ups in the early years. Matters worsened when the country came under direct military rule. Military rulers, including Gen Ayub Khan and Gen Ziaul Haq, had no tolerance of a free press and little appetite for dissent.

Draconian laws such as the Press and Publications Ordinance, 1960, direct and indirect censorship, detention of journalists, and the banning of various publications all contributed to the muzzling of the press. These were phases when truthful reporting was considered almost a crime — sometimes even treated as one. So, the archives of Dawn — though one of Pakistan’s most valuable assets — do not do full justice to history.

Even a cursory look at some of the newspaper’s old files indicates that either some events went unreported, or were presented in a distorted form. For instance, going through the reports of those times, it is difficult to make out that young communist leaders Hassan Nasir and Nazeer Abbasi died of torture (during the tenures of two different military regimes). It would also be difficult to determine the number of political opponents behind bars during Gen Zia’s time, or how many insurgents were extra-judicially eliminated during various periods of the Baloch insurgency. Or even to know the details of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s execution.

These are some of the missing pages of history. The policies of a powerful state never consented to the unveiling of the truth.

PRE-CENSORSHIP AND ‘PRESS ADVICES’

When I joined the profession, Gen Zia’s martial law rule was at its height. Hundreds of political opponents were behind bars. Scores of journalists were quartered in prisons, and several publications banned. The regime regarded the free press as one of its biggest enemies.

Curbs on the media in the form of the notorious ‘press advice’ system run by the military-controlled information ministry were already de rigueur. Soon direct censorship was in place. Under martial law regulations, all newspapers were to be vetted; the entire content of the paper was to be approved before printing.

One of my duties was to occasionally take the copy of The Star, the Karachi newspaper for which I worked, to the censor’s office. The memory is difficult to erase. The semi-literate officials behaved like butchers. Any news item even remotely critical of the government or the military, or that concerned opposition politicians, was ripped out.

Leaving blank space on news pages depict the manner in which the national press tried to convey its plight to the readers during the Zia era.

On occasion, even routine crime stories were removed if the officer thought it put the military regime in a bad light. At one point, an entire edition of The Star was confiscated because it carried a photograph of a wedding where Benazir Bhutto was one of the guests.

Within the first two weeks of the promulgation of the censor order, Dawn, its sister publication The Star, and many other newspapers had begun leaving blank spaces that indicated the removal of news items or editorials; it was clear that what was being printed was not the complete picture.

The response of the regime was to prohibit newspapers from leaving blank spaces. The spaces left by the censored news items needed to be filled with innocuous material, making newspapers even less truthful. This tragedy was compounded when, later, some overzealous civil servants decided to either mark as ‘classified’ and then hide the official archives of news stories and editorials censored over the years or destroy them completely, thus leaving no evidence of what the newspapers had attempted to report.

SYSTEMATIC CONTROL

Military rulers were not the only ones to muzzle the media. Elected prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto also had little tolerance for criticism. His period witnessed many journalists being jailed and publications banned. However, the foundation for the systematic control of the media was laid during Ayub Khan’s period in the form of the controversial Press and Publications Ordinance, 1963.

His attempt to turn Pakistan into a praetorian state left little room for a free press. The government not only assumed ownership of several progressive newspapers, it also subjected others to the worst kind of curbs. Sadly, some newspapers and their editors — due to either pressure or out of conviction — saw in Ayub an enlightened military ruler, and unconditionally supported many of his policies. The real casualty was the independent media.

Gen Yahya Khan’s rule is also a dark chapter in the history of press freedom. Together with the media blackout of the events leading to the country’s dismemberment and the creation of Bangladesh, the front pages of most Pakistani newspapers of Dec 17, 1971 — the day after East Pakistan was lost — are a sad reminder of the kind of press curbs that existed.

Dawn’s own banner headline read, ‘War till Victory,’ based on Yahya Khan’s address to the nation. Tucked away was the real news of the day, in a mere double-column spread and restricted to a couple of sentences. With the vague headline, ‘Fighting ends in East Wing’, the officially cleared report from Rawalpindi read: “Latest reports indicate that following an arrangement between the local commanders of India and Pakistan in the Eastern theatre, fighting has ceased in East Pakistan and Indian troops have entered Dacca.”

This, and nothing more, was the news that was allowed to reach citizens to inform them that Pakistan had lost its eastern wing.

Various forms of pressure on the media have existed in Pakistan since the early years of its independence.

As far back as 1953, the then Dawn editor, Altaf Husain, became so frustrated that in one edition, he left blank the space for the editorial.

Pressure from official quarters came early. In 1953, Editor Altaf Husain protested against the trend by leaving the editorial space blank in Dawn’s December 25 issue.

At the bottom of where the column should have been published, the following lines were scrolled in his own hand: When the truth cannot be freely spoken, and patriotism is held almost a crime, this editorial space is left blank on Quaid-i-Azam’s birthday, to speak more eloquently than words.

FREE ONLY IN NAME

If truth was in short supply earlier, things are not very different today. True, the media can take a critical view of an elected government, scrutinise its policies and expose its corrupt practices. The uncontrolled debate on political issues witnessed on dozens of privately owned television networks, and in large sections of the print media, is testimony to this fact.

This is no mean achievement. However, it is also true that during this period the state (or certain segments of it) have not only become more powerful, but have also adopted innovative methods to keep the media — or large sections of it — on a tight leash.

Scratch beneath the surface, and you’ll discover that the number of no-go areas in terms of reporting has increased — phenomenally. As the tentacles of the segment of the establishment that some refer to as the ‘deep state’ spread, the monster is escaping honest scrutiny.

The demands are unending: ‘Do not report on what’s going on in restive Balochistan’; ‘do not question the claims of casualties in incidents linked to religious extremists or suspected terrorists’; ‘it’s not a good idea to raise the issue of enforced disappearances’; and ‘there’s absolutely no need to highlight extra-judicial killings’. Even reports on differences between the government and security officials on handling militancy are unacceptable — as demonstrated by Dawn’s story of Oct 6, 2016written by Cyril Almeida. Such reports may, and often will, be categorised as a national security breach.

Media that follows these instructions is called ‘patriotic.’ The few who dare to raise their voice are subjected to the worst treatment, including vicious campaigns at the hands of social media trolls.

Recently, such unwritten rules have been extended to areas that have little to do with national security, for example highlighting corruption in commercial enterprises including the National Logistics Cell or Defence Housing Authority. These even extend to critical reviews of ‘sponsored movies’. In a new push for a self-designed ‘national narrative’, critical reporting on all such issues is being made synonymous with ‘unpatriotic behaviour’. The result is a submissive media, mostly indulging in involuntary or voluntary self-censorship — far more deceptive and damaging than direct censorship.

EMERGENT THREATS

Attempts to curb truthful journalism are not simply confined to the news-amending activities of state institutions. Another major anti-media player to have emerged is the unnumbered army of violent extremists. If the seeds of strong-armed tactics were sown by the MQM in the 1980s, such methods are now being openly employed by sections of Baloch insurgents and, more violently, by various factions of the Islamist militants.

Caught between the narrative being promoted by the military and the militants, it is almost impossible to expect any district correspondent in Balochistan or Fata to report objectively. With scores already being punished for their ‘crimes’, and many other journalists quitting the profession, no editor would dare ask these correspondents to report objectively.

And then there are commercial interests that continue to force the media, or at least a large section of it, into submission.

Successive governments have used the advertising budget at their disposal as a tool to project their activities, or to have stories killed. Imbued with a similar passion, large commercial enterprises use the leverage of their huge advertisement potential to put pressure on newspapers that dare to expose the scandals they are found involved in. On occasions, Dawn has lost hundreds of millions of rupees in advertising revenues, and continues to do so, because the government or some sections of it, or certain big commercial enterprises, is not happy with the newspaper’s coverage.

Today’s Pakistan may not be a praetorian state, but the desire of some state institutions to transform it into one persists. The powerful state is simply not prepared to accept that a free press is crucial to the orderly evolution of a democratic society.

Unfortunately, the proponents of a praetorian state have failed to draw a distinction between truthful journalism and propaganda and fake news.

Journalism is not free speech. In fact, it is constrained expression. Journalism works within a set of values, the most essential of these being truthful, fact-based, impartial and accountable reporting. And that is what Dawn has always stressed on, having now established even a ‘Readers’ Editor’, or an internal ombudsman, to curtail violations of ethical practices.

Where it’s true that due to years of censorship and other restrictions, Dawn may not always qualify as a paper of record, it is still the closest such entity. As the struggle to achieve unfettered freedom continues, one can only hope that despite all the constraints and pressures, this newspaper will live up to the challenges by refusing to compromise on the standards it has helped set for ethical and truthful journalism in the country.

The writer is Editor, Dawn

https://www.dawn.com/news/1352579/the-missing-pages-of-history-70-years-of-pakistan-and-dawn

Land reforms in Pakistan

FROM THE NEWSPAPER — PUBLISHED OCT 11, 2010 12:00AM

LAND reforms in Pakistan have a long and somewhat chequered history. The British had less of an interest in the matter as they relied on the support of several influential landlords. Although there had been some limited reforms in the years leading up to 1947, all major reforms date from the years after independence. Almost immediately the various provincial legislatures passed several statutes whereby the jagirdari systems were abolished and tenants protected. The major reforms, however, came in three stages: the first during Ayub Khan’s martial law in 1959; the second and third during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s rule in the 1970s.

Ayub Khan’s government passed the first major piece of legislation concerning land reforms in Pakistan. This legislation was the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation 1959 (Regulation 64 of 1959). The salient features of this regulation included a ceiling on individual holdings. No one individual could own more than 500 acres of irrigated and 1,000 acres of unirrigated land or a maximum of 36,000 Produce Index Units (PIU), whichever was greater. It further allowed that land be redistributed amongst tenants and others. In addition, the regulation contained provisions which provided for security of tenants as well as for preventing the subdivision of land holdings.

These land reforms stayed in force until 1972 and the next great wave of land reforms.

Bhutto, despite being a major landowner himself, was determined to institute reforms, having been a minister under Ayub Khan. Bhutto, seeing the former’s land reforms as inadequate, was responsible for two major land reform regimes. The first was by way of a martial law regulation, the Land Reform Regulation 1972 by which the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation 1959 was repealed through paragraph 32.

As per paragraph 8(1) no individual holdings were to be in excess of 150 acres of irrigated land or 300 of unirrigated land, or irrigated and unirrigated land the aggregate area of which exceeded 150 acres of irrigated land (one acre of irrigated land being reckoned as the equivalent of two acres of unirrigated land), or an area equivalent to 15,000 PIU of land, whichever was greater. Paragraph 18(1) of the regulations also provided for excess land to be surrendered and utilised for the benefit of tenants shown to be in the process of cultivating it.

By 1977, the country had an elected parliament. It would be this body which passed the last major piece of legislation dealing with land reforms; the Law Reforms Act 1977 (Act II of 1977) and the only one ironically which came the way of a democratically elected legislature as opposed to a military junta. It did not repeal the 1972 regulations, but was designed to operate concurrently with the same.

The most important and relevant change it made was that individual holdings, including shares in shamilat , if any, in excess of 100 acres of irrigated land or 200 acres of unirrigated land, or irrigated and unirrigated land the aggregate of which exceeded 100 acres of irrigated land (again, one acre of irrigated land being reckoned as equivalent to two acres of unirrigated land). Furthermore, notwithstanding the above, no land holding could (per section 3) be greater than an area equivalent to 8,000 PIU of land calculated on the basis of classification of soil as entered in the revenue records for kharif.

The end of the Bhutto era also signalled the end of the era of statutory land reform in Pakistan.

During Ziaul Haq’s reign only major new laws were passed. Only two amending ordinances came into being. The first in 1979 declared that where the provincial government had decided to lease out surrendered land, the person who surrendered it would have first priority, and the second allowed the federal government to exempt any educational institution or cooperative farming society from the operation of the 1977 act.

Land reforms were always controversial. It was alleged by opponents that they were un-Islamic and that they infringed on the right to own, use and enjoy property as protected by the constitution. Matters finally came to a head before the Supreme Court in the case of Qazalbash Waqf v Chief Land Commissioner in which both the 1972 regulations were attacked as being against Islamic injunctions and unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed.

Of the 1972 regulations, the Supreme Court declared that paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 13 and 14 and thus consequently 18 were unconstitutional as being against Islamic injunctions. The striking down of paragraphs 8 and 18 overturned the main reforms achieved.

Similarly in the same case the Supreme Court overturned the entire sections — 3, 4, 5, 6, 7(5), 8, 9, 10 — and consequently sections 11-17 of the act as being unconstitutional and against Islamic injunctions. The striking down of sections 3 and 17 undid the main reforms promulgated in the act. The laws stated to be unconstitutional ceased to have effect on March 23, 1990 (the day the judgement was handed down).

The net result of the Qazalbash Waqf v Chief Land Commissioner is that land reforms in Pakistan are now at the same level as they were in 1947, as the 1972 regulations and the 1977 act have seen their main provisions being struck down and the 1959 regulations have been repealed.

To commence land reforms and to ensure they contain at least the same measure of reforms as the 1972 regulations and the 1977 act did will at the very least require a constitutional amendment which allows parliament to enact legislation regarding land reform notwithstanding the relevant constitutional provisions.

Failing the above, any proposed reforms would have to be more limited in their ambit than the previous reforms to avoid unconstitutionality or their lordships would have to overrule the judgment in the Qazalbash Waqf v Chief Land Commissioner in another case.

The writer is a barrister.

http://www.dawn.com/news/570487/land-reforms-in-pakistan-by-afan-khan

How golden was Ayub Khan’s era?

By Farooq Tirmizi Published: May 14, 2012

The numbers do not lie: in terms of economic growth, former President Ayub Khan was not the best ruler Pakistan ever had.

Admittedly, he is in second place and beaten only very narrowly by former President Ziaul Haq: Ayub averaged 5.82% growth during his eleven years in office compared to Zia’s 5.88%. Still, the myth of Ayub’s “Decade of Development” persists and so it is worth examining (on what would have been his 105th birthday), what his record was and how he compared to the rest of Pakistan’s rulers.

Perhaps the single biggest reason people remember Ayub’s era fondly is because it was the time when Pakistan first acquired a relatively sizeable manufacturing base. And indeed, manufacturing growth in Pakistan during his time was 8.51%, far outpacing any other time in Pakistani history.

It was the time when Pakistan first got an automobile industry, a cement industry and few other heavy manufacturing industries.But is that enough to remember it with misty-eyed fondness?

The answer really depends on one’s perspective, but one can conjecture that most economists would say no. The left would rightly castigate Ayub for doing nothing to prevent income inequality, a phenomenon that was eloquently captured in the famous “22 families” speech given Ayub’s own Planning Commission chairman, Dr Mehboodul Haq, in 1969.

The right will also convincingly argue that Ayub used (or abused) state resources to create an oligopolistic structure of the economy that largely persists to this day, creating highly uncompetitive industries that benefit only a few, stifle entrepreneurship and cannot compete without state subsidies and support.

But Ayub’s supporters will come to his defence and make the argument that – though not comforting – is at least compelling: that at least he tried.

At a time when corruption is very visible and rampant, people are willing to forgive mistakes that were made by his government and give him credit for what they perceive to be a sincere effort to do the right thing.

My own personal view: he laid rotten foundations to Pakistan’s economy that achieved growth, but have made us a highly uncompetitive economy dominated by rent-seeking industrial lobbies, all of whom want government subsidies but cry bloody murder when asked to pay taxes.

Indeed, if the economy was really doing so well during Ayub Khan’s era, why was tax collection so low (averaging less than 10% of GDP)?

Why did the government continue to rely on American aid if Pakistani businesses were raking in so much money?

And if Pakistan was trying to emulate Japan, why were we exporting raw cotton instead of trying to develop higher-end export-competitive sectors?

But the crime that I will never forgive Ayub for is this: why was East Pakistan forced to pay tariffs on its products coming to West Pakistan but West Pakistani goods had to pay nothing to access East Pakistani markets?

That right there was economic colonialism, the heart of the grievances of Bengalis, and the foundation of the massacre that followed soon after Ayub left office.

So yes, Ayub’s numbers look good, but they present an incomplete picture.

There is much more to the man’s legacy than a few factories.

And not all of it is particularly pleasant.

http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/11584/how-golden-was-ayub-khans-era/

Ayub Khan’s Basic Democracies

These were replaced in 1962, reduced to four-tier hierarchical structure of union council / union committee, tehsil council / town committee, district council and divisional council.

Basic Democracy Structure, 1965

Salient features of the system are presented below.

 

1. a) Indirect democracy

 

1. b) Broad mass of people would elect an electoral college

 

1. c) 80,000 Basic Democrats or Union Councillors

 

1. d) Non-party basis elections

 

1. e) These local leaders would elect the legislature and the President

 

1. f) Constitution of 1962 linked the office of the President to the local bodies.

 

1. g) System of guided democracy comprised elected and non-elected representatives with a local administration acting as the eyes, ear and stick for the central government enabling it to maintain sufficient authority over the politicians (Siddiqa, 2007).

 

1. h) Under the system each province would have to elect 40,000 Basic Democrats each representing at that time, about one thousand populations, out the total of 80,000 was eventually raised to 120,000.

 

1. i) These councils were to have developments responsibilities so that the overall political plans would be built upon the views and needs of the local areas (Islam, 1990). Law and order duties eventually encompassed some powers under the Family Law Ordinance and some ability to tax. Despite the splendid administration about decentralization of power, the bureaucratic control over Basic Democracies System remained firmly in place.

 

1. j) Because the civil servants were responsible for selecting candidates there by extending detailed administrative control over political issues (Noman, 1988).

 

1. k) Initially Deputy Commissioners were appointed Chairman of higher tier of local bodies. Their continued dominance of the Tehsil/Thana; the District and the Division left their influence unimpaired (Kim & Ziring, 1977).

 

Critical Analysis

 

Following points give the summary of the critical study of the system.

 

1. a) This system ruled out the political activity. This is the key to the in-depth analysis of the system. The presentation of the people was not in the political arena rather they were involved in the economic development. This was not the case that they were given the political independence or training.

 

1. b) This system offered avoidance in the decentralization of powers as far as the political power is concerned. Only the developmental authority was decentralized to some extent.

 

1. c) This system in its core was based on the political system without any politicians.

 

1. d) This system negated the so far achieved progress in the area of democratic culture or political participation in the country.

 

1. e) This system provided stability and security to the President but did not strengthen the political system itself.

 

1. f) Institutionalization of the political system did not happen.

 

1. g) Political culture was not developed.

 

1. h) Restrictions and bans on freedom of expression and media etc made sure that the democracy could not prevail in the country.

 

1. i) Controlled structure of local government offered no good to the people of Pakistan.

 

1. j) It was portrayed that bureaucracy and colonial practices were to be abolished but in fact it was more strengthened.

 

1. k) Basic Democracies showed more capability and capacity in economic field rather than the political field.

 

1. l) It showed the pattern of western political concept.

 

1. m) Ayub Khan‟s concept of democracy found expression in the shape of Basic Democracies which infect was more basic than democratic. It may be said that it made easy to bribe and buy the voters.

 

1. n) Due to the system a disparity between the East and West Pakistan emerged that East Pakistan had more population than the West Pakistan but the equal representation in the Basic Democracies system increased the sense of disappointment among the people of the Eastern wing. According to Craig Baxter (1988) “East Pakistan was of course under represented as it had been under the parity arrangement”.

 

1. o) This „guided‟ and controlled democracy allowed the bureaucracy to override council proceedings, overrule their resolutions and decisions and even suspend elected members of the councils.

 

1. p) The government used the bureaucratic control from the center to limit political competition at the local level.

 

95. q) In February, 1960 elected representatives assumed their responsibilities. In February 1960, Basic Democrats were asked to say yes or no on a simple question; “have you confidence in President Ayub Khan?” General Ayub Khan was elected President by a 95.6 % of yes votes, an exercise which made East European elections look glamorous (Noman, 1988).

 

1. r) Politicians criticized that the use of elected officials as an electoral college denied the population of their right to directly elect the President. In this way elections could be bribed, bought and paid for and their rules easily compromised.

 

1. s) Under the system of Basic Democracies the President established autocratic rule in Pakistan with the help of bureaucracy.

 

1. t) Provincial autonomy was circumscribed further through the appointment of governors, answerable to the center.

 

1. u) General Ayub Khan‟s intent was not to decentralize or devolved authority to grass roots level but to extend centralized control over the federal units through a grass root political base.

 

Conclusively speaking, the Basic Democracies system was remarkably well orchestrated for extending direct patronage to, and manipulation of local power structure.

 

Journal of Public Administration and Governance ISSN 2161-7104 2012, Vol. 2, No. 1 www.macrothink.org/jpag 129

Power and empowerment

MANZOOR CHANDIO — PUBLISHED JUN 21, 2015 07:01AM

Every time a democratic government has been overthrown, local government has been used to create an illusion of power being transferred to the grassroots

With local government a key priority, President Gen Pervez Musharraf chairs a meeting on the local government system

King James II might not have imagined that the municipal system he had exported to India in 1687 for handling civic issues such as cleanliness, water supply and sanitation would be used four centuries later by Pakistani dictators seeking legitimacy and popular support.

Through a royal charter issued on Dec 30, 1687, the King had established the Corporation of Madras as the first municipal body. Members of this body used to be selected by the East India Company while the mayor was elected by the members. The municipal corporations of Calcutta and Bombay were formed in 1726, while the system of elected municipal institutions came into being in 1882. By 1935, hundreds of local body institutions were added across India.

While the municipal bodies were not democratic in nature, they were nonetheless aimed at handling civic issues. The basic functions of the local body system throughout the British era remained water supply, sewerage, sanitation, street lights, recreation, building regulations, controlling encroachment on public places, birth and marriage registrations, and issuance of death certificates.

After Partition, India improved the system, conducted regular elections and used the local body institutions to resolve basic everyday issues of the citizens. But in Pakistan, as with many other institutions established during the colonial period, local municipal bodies did not see any continuity after Partition. The local body system was effectively abandoned.

Worse, while local body systems in other parts of the world have served as a basis for grassroots governance, in Pakistan it has historically been used to reinforce power hierarchies and create perceptions of empowerment.

Ayub Khan’s Basic Democracy

The first ‘new’ local body system was created by General Muhammad Ayub Khan under the Basic Democracies Order-1959. He was of the view that democracy was as alien a concept to the Pakistani masses as the English language, and thus, it needed to start from a very basic level.

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This line of thought was first introduced by Iskandar Mirza, who believed that “overwhelmingly illiterate masses were bound to act foolishly. Having no training in democracy, they could not run democratic institutions, but needed a controlled democracy.” Thus began the concept of experimenting with democracy.

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In fact, this line of thought was first introduced by Iskandar Mirza, who believed that “overwhelmingly illiterate masses were bound to act foolishly. Having no training in democracy, they could not run democratic institutions, but needed a controlled democracy.”

Thus began the concept of experimenting with democracy, which later on became a readymade mantra for successive dictators.

Gen Ayub Khan introduced four tiers of local governance: union, taluka, district and divisional councils. Elected union councillors (80,000) were the “basic democrats” in this system; they were to elect the president, members of the National Assembly, as well as members of the provincial assemblies (East and West wings). The rest of the country had no right to direct voting.

Ayub Khan ensured that no opponent of his was elected as a basic democrat. A number of politicians were disqualified under the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO).

Going apolitical with Zia

The local body system remained inactive till 1979, when it was revived by General Ziaul Haq, again in a quest for legitimacy. Local body elections held by his regime empowered those traditional political families who had switched loyalties and pledged support for the regime.

As with Gen Ayub before him, the Zia government disqualified all candidates who were thought to be opposition loyalists (in this case the PPP) or even sympathisers. To achieve this task, Gen Zia set up a parallel election authority for conducting local body elections, called the Local Government Election Authority (LGEA). Headed by pro-regime judges and run by pliant officials, this body superseded the Election Commission of Pakistan.

Devolution of power with Musharraf

Upon assuming power, General Pervez Musharraf unveiled a seven-point agenda to ‘fix’ the country. A key component of his scheme was the devolution of power to the local level, but in doing so, the General bypassed the federating units who are the de jure creators of the federation.

Critical to Musharraf’s plan was the creation of a coterie of loyalists at the local level. The new system was to produce a large number of councillors, nazims and naib nazims, all of whom were only effectively answerable to the General. Accountability now rested not with people’s representatives, but with the General’s person; district governments were given immense powers to the extent that they could defy provincial governments.

The local body system was so important for Gen Musharraf that he visited 18 districts in the country’s four provinces to create his clique of loyalists. The general pledged unprecedented powers to local body institutions and he was true to his word: district administrations not only enjoyed more fiscal autonomy, but even subjects that constitutionally fell under provincial domains at the time — education and revenue, for example — were handed to the districts.

Members of the Councillors Alliance, Peshawar at a protest camp outside the district council’s hall

In the 2001 local body polls, most candidates went unopposed because the General’s opponents were discouraged from filing nomination papers for the polls; there were 20,076 councillors’ seats in 18 districts and about 2,041 seats were uncontested. As a result, 3,937 candidates won unopposed.

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All dictators tweaked the system as per the needs of their time. Their survival was tied to excluding the common man from governance and decision making, even though the illusion created by all dictators was that they were now including the common man in the processes of governance… The concentration of power at the higher echelons of the government led to authoritarianism that also suited the traditional ruling class.

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There were 5,734 seats for women and no one contested the election for 3,106 seats; some 1,710 women were elected unopposed. While Musharraf’s team argued that they actually wanted to empower women, labourers and peasants, in reality, 48pc of women’s seats remained uncontested in 2001 while 65.48pc of labour seats remained vacant.

The 2001 local body polls were held in an extremely restrictive atmosphere. In an attempt to bring only loyalists to power, the military government placed a ban on normal electoral activities. Candidates were given only 10 days for electioneering. No corner meetings were allowed, displaying banners and pasting wall posters were barred too. Even the use of loudspeakers was banned. It was not possible for candidates to go door-to-door for seeking votes.

Only handbills were allowed to be circulated among masses in a country with 60-70pc illiterate people. The voting process was so confusing that in some constituencies, the majority of votes cast were cancelled or rejected.

Another dynamic to emerge from the 2001 elections was that 90pc of the nazims, naib nazims and councillors came from traditional powerful political families. In practice, Gen Musharraf’s local government system had created fiefdoms for local landlords and influential people. Several district assemblies came into being, and money was doled out directly. Many misappropriated and misused funds, but there was no auditing and monitoring system to keep any checks on this.

Delaying democracy?

There is an American aphorism which says “bad politicians are sent to Washington by good people who don’t vote”. If we change this in the Pakistani context, it should read: “Bad politicians are sent to Islamabad by good people who manoeuvre votes.” The local body systems introduced by various dictators withered away as soon as these men were dislodged from power.

No one can deny the importance of the local body system because it is a tier of the government through which the day-to-day problems of the people relating to water supply, street light and cleanliness, maintenance of recreational places, issuing birth, marriage and death certificates, etc. can be solved at the local level.

But the local body systems introduced by military regimes were flawed and self-serving. They not only created political crises but also delayed the natural growth of this very important tier of the government. The biggest drawback of the systems introduced by Gen Ayub Khan, Gen Ziaul Haq and Gen Pervez Musharraf was that power never trickled down to the people because the military regimes wanted a unitary system of governance at the national level.

Ayub Khan hinged on the idea of ‘basic democracy’, Zia spearheaded an apolitical local body system and Musharraf harped on ‘devolution of power’ to a grassroots level. Ayub, Zia and Musharraf’s local body systems brought new loyalists, proxies and protégés of old established parties but by and large excluded the masses from the political process and administrative affairs. The so-called third tier of the government that the military rulers introduced headed for disastrous consequences because of this self-centric approach of the dictators.

All dictators tweaked the system as per the needs of their time. Their survival was tied to excluding the common man from governance and decision making, even though the illusion created by all dictators was that they were now including the common man in the processes of governance. Thus they used the local body electoral landscape to forestall the entry of protagonists to the power corridors.

The concentration of power at the higher echelons of the government led to authoritarianism that also suited the traditional ruling class. The entire political discourse was lost in a maze of structural problems because of absence of the primary tier of the government.

Past experiences in local governance have also taught us that there is a strong need to improve the relationship between provincial governments and local body institutions. The military rulers’ love for over-centralisation undermined the federating units. The military rulers gave provincial powers to the local administrations and local powers to the provincial governments. During the earlier phases, there were no clear spheres of administration because the local body systems imposed by the military rulers infringed on provincial powers.

For example, during the Musharraf regime, municipal administrations were given funds to initiate mega projects like expressways, flyovers and underpasses while the provincial governments were slammed for not providing funds for garbage collection, maintenance of public recreation facilities and urban planning. Meanwhile, the city administrations absolved themselves of their responsibilities and demanded provision of more funds instead of enhancing capacity to cope with rain-related and fire emergencies.

There is a need for clear demarcation between jurisdictions of provincial and local body administrations. This is necessary because the district nazims, who mostly were influential people of their areas, victimised their political opponents. The irony was that civic amenities like public parks and playgrounds, etc. remained in shambles while the nazims kept demanding that the powers of the chief minister — for example, controlling the police — be given to them. The districts and city nazims were so powerful administratively and resourceful financially that even former MNAs and MPAs preferred to be nazims.

After the landmark 18th Amendment, the local body system has become a provincial subject. Balochistan made history in 2013 by conducting the country’s first ever local body polls on party basis. It was also the first local body election held under a political dispensation. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa held polls on May 30 with additional features of village and neighbourhood councils. Sindh and Punjab have completed necessary legislation in this connection and are planning to hold LB elections by the end of this year.

But for these systems to work, the enforcement of an effective monitoring and accountability mechanism is imperative for the strong local body system. When power is devolved from the top echelons to the lower tiers of government, there must be check and balances to know how public money was spent. And this is not possible till the local communities are made strong and local administration is run from the local body institutions, instead of from the autaqs of waderas, pirs and mirs as has been the historical practice.

The much cherished objective of good governance can be achieved when the local body system is deeply rooted among village communities and adapted to modern needs. The third tier of the government can then be a platform to improve local politics, economy, culture and society at large.

The writer is a member of staff.

He tweets @manzoor_chandio

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, June 21st, 2015

http://www.dawn.com/news/1189382

Decentralization Reforms in Pakistan During Ayub and Zia Era

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