Category: Kashmir

When Pakistan and India went to war over Kashmir in 1999

Updated Feb 17, 2017 02:32pm
Nawaz Sharif and Pervez Musharraf at Keil sector near Rawlakot on the Line of Control, February 1999 | AFP
Nawaz Sharif and Pervez Musharraf at Keil sector near Rawlakot on the Line of Control, February 1999 | AFP

Proving all claims and assessments wrong, a few hundred militants continue to control some of the most crucial mountainous positions in the Kargil-Dras region. As all attempts by the Indian ground and air forces to recapture the lost positions are frustrated by the well-equipped militants, the intensity in artillery duels between Indian and Pakistani troops along the Line of Control touches new heights.

Within weeks, the troop concentration along the LoC and the international border has increased manifold, and the naval fleets of the two countries have sailed out into the open seas to position themselves against each other. And as thousands of villagers living on the two sides of the border start to move out to safer areas, India and Pakistan once again appear to be at the brink of another more disastrous war.

This situation deteriorated further in recent weeks when the Indian administration, embarrassed at its army’s failure to flush out the militants from Kargil and Dras, looked for a military solution to the conflict. The Indian government’s snub to Pakistan’s proposal for talks, and its refusal to hold any dialogue until the withdrawal of the “Islamabad-backed infiltrators” from Kargil, and Pakistan’s categorical rejection of its direct involvement, has led to a new level of jingoism in India.

Although the Indian government did try to clarify that the American visit did not amount to third-party mediation, Delhi’s frustration over the pro-longed conflict in Kargil had ultimately sucked it into accepting some kind of US role in this affair.

As more and more bodies of Indian soldiers from the conflict zone reach their respective towns, the most popular war cry in Delhi now is to “teach Pakistan another lesson.” On the other hand, Pakistan’s army chief, General Pervez Musharraf has made it absolutely clear that the Pakistani armed forces are fully prepared to counter any aggression.

Already, the so-called ‘bus diplomacy’, which only a couple of months ago had created a fresh atmosphere of optimism in the region, looks like a thing of the past. Now there is renewed talk on both sides of settling the outstanding dispute through military means. Yes, despite all the official denials from Delhi and Islamabad about the possibility of a direct engagement on the battlefield, a war between the two proud nuclear powers does look imminent.

Also read: The pursuit of Kashmir—The untold story

As war clouds started to hover over the subcontinent, matters were made worse by the role of the media, particularly in India. Almost the entire battery of newspaper and satellite television networks in India appears to have fallen in line with the policy of the Indian ministry of external affairs and their military establishment, thus creating a tangible war-like atmosphere. There were statements, not only from politicians, but also journalists, wherein Pakistan was called a “rogue state”, and demands were made to inflict “lasting punishment” on Pakistan.

Of course, the Pakistani media has also not lagged far behind. State-run television (PTV) and the right-wing conservative press continue to project these few hundred militants as the true liberators of Kashmir. The press has also kept up constant pressure on the government against any “peace deal”. Some newspapers and analysts are now ridiculing the Indian army for its failure in Kargil, and are describing the present situation as “the most opportune time” to declare full-fledged war for the liberation of Kashmir.

Caught in the crossfire: villagers in Azad Kashmir | Archives
Caught in the crossfire: villagers in Azad Kashmir | Archives

Also read: In Kashmir, the young are paying for India’s lack of vision

These moves have been given further substance by statements and speeches made by members of the hard line Islamic parties. For instance, speakers at a rally in Rawalpindi, attended by several thousand supporters of the Pakistan-based militant group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, did not mince words in giving a warning to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif against pulling out of the conflict. And then there are the likes of the former ISI chief, Lt. General (retd.) Hamid Gul, who went to the extent of saying that any deal with Delhi at the cost of the militants offensive would amount to putting the last nail in the coffin of the present government. So, if anything was lacking in creating an atmosphere to start a greater conflict, the hawks amongst the politicians and the media on the two sides have done their bit to justify an all-out war.

As war clouds started to hover over the subcontinent, matters were made worse by the role of the media, particularly in India

With both sides locked in one of the worst conflicts since the 1971 war, it soon started to dawn on the international community that developments in South Asia were getting out of hand. When Pakistan downed two Indian combat aircraft which had crossed into its territory, and Delhi started to show signs of crossing the LoC in a counter-offensive, the international community responded with alarm and panic. The United States and other G-8 countries, despite their heavy involvement in the Kosovo crisis, were compelled to take time out and turn their attention towards the conflict in South Asia.

It did not take them long to realise that the possible escalation in the region could have catastrophic consequences. A resolution passed by G-8 leaders not only took notice of the long-standing dispute over Kashmir, it also expressed serious concern over the escalation in the Kargil region.

US President Bill Clinton went a step further and telephoned both the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers, asking them to show restraint. But both these developments signalled diplomatic setbacks for Pakistan. The G-8 and President Clinton clearly sided with the Indian version of cause and blame. In fact, President Clinton even asked the Pakistani prime minister to use his influence to withdraw the militants from Kargil — thus directly implying that Pakistan not only had the means to pull out these fighters but that it had in fact put them there in the first place.

The United States did not stop just there. Realising the seriousness of the Kargil conflict, which by all means had the potential of snow-balling into all-out war, Washington immediately rushed its senior most military commander in the region and a senior State Department official to Islamabad. General Anthony Zinni and the State Department official held extensive discussions with top Pakistani officials, including the prime minister and the army chief.

Although there were no positive statements from either side, the meetings did produce enough ground for the State Department official to undertake a trip to Delhi to hold talks with the Indian authorities. And although the Indian government did try to clarify that the visit did not amount to third-party mediation on Kashmir, Delhi’s frustration over the prolonged conflict in Kargil had ultimately sucked it into a situation where it had been forced to accept some kind of US role in this affair.

Along the LoC: Reluctant warriors? | Archives
Along the LoC: Reluctant warriors? | Archives

However, even as a small conflict in a remote mountainous region has resulted in a situation where a bloody war between the two known South Asian adversaries looks like a reality, very little is known about the circumstances which led to this development. Amidst allegations and counter-allegations, and claims and counter-claims by Islamabad and Delhi, the truth about the events of Kargil remains shrouded in secrecy.

The Indian establishment has directly blamed Pakistan’s armed forces for carrying out the present offensive, accusing the Light Infantry Battalion of being actively involved with the Pakistani and Afghan militants in Kargil. Pakistan’s foreign office and military establishment still maintain they have no active role in the Kargil conflict. But, does this also mean that they were unaware of the militants’ plans? There have also been strong suggestions in Delhi that perhaps Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was not even aware of the army’s decision to launch this operation, and many Western diplomats in Islamabad tend to agree with this theory.

Also read: Military has some serious misgivings about India—Mahmud Durrani

Despite the repeated claims by India about the active presence of Pakistani troops in the Kargil mountains, so far very little concrete evidence has been produced to substantiate such allegations. However, the Pakistan-based leadership of the various militant groups have not missed any opportunity to embarrass Islamabad. Their attempts to boost the activities of their comrades in Kargil and reports of sending in reinforcements belie the government’s claim about the indigenous nature of the present conflict.

If a former head of the ISI, Lt. General (retd) Javed Nasir is to be believed, the preparations for the Kargil operation started several months ago. The Kargil region has been traditionally used by the Kashmiri militants to enter the valley. However, this time the militants had more ambitious plans. They decided to move into the area and try to capture the strategically located mountains and ridges that overlook the Kargil-Srinagar road. The idea was to try and block the supply route for the Indian troops based at the Siachen glacier. Towards the end of last year, several hundred volunteers from four well-known militant groups began vigorous training sessions in mountainous areas to prepare themselves to brave rough, wintry conditions.

They were mainly from Tehrik-e-Jihad, an organisation that draws its cadres from Kashmir, Al-Badr, whose members include both Kashmiris and Pakistanis, Harkatul Mujahideen, which has in its fold a few Kashmiris but many Pakistanis and Afghans, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, whose members largely hail from Pakistan. Later on, when the conflict intensified in Kargil, two more groups, Hizbul Mujahideen and Harkat-e-Jihad, also joined to provide reinforcements. But according to a number of western diplomats, it is hard to believe that these militant groups could have launched such a major offensive without the active help and support of the Pakistan army.

Also read: Enforced disappearances: The plight of Kashmir’s ‘half widows’

By now, it has been established beyond doubt that this time the militants have completely shaken the entire Indian establishment. Many senior Indian journalists admit that the belligerency presently being witnessed in India is not only because the militants have badly bruised the Indian claim of being a mighty regional power; the sheer number of casualties from the present conflict have shaken the entire country. Television images beamed by Indian satellite net¬works, showing the arrival of the dead and wounded from the battle front, and the reactions from the family members and the local population capture the real mood of depression and anger in India.

A recent report by the French news agency AFP from Indian-held Kashmir gave a graphic account of the way the dead and wounded are being brought to Srinagar from the battle front, before being sent to Delhi. According to the report, the Indian Airline’s flight from Srinagar to Delhi these days has turned into an air ambulance service. Almost every day, it carries to the Indian capital dead bodies and injured soldiers from the battle front in Kargil in greater numbers than normal passengers. The passenger seats in the air¬craft are often removed to accommodate stretchers carrying the wounded, and a special section of the Delhi airport has been designated to accommodate the coffins arriving from the battle zone.

A few journalists covering the Kargil conflict who managed to get on the flight describe the atmosphere on the flight as a true reflection of the events in Kargil. According to Abu Maaz, who is a sector commander of the Tehrik-e-Jihad in Kargil, even now several bodies of Indian soldiers are lying decomposing on the mountains, and Indian troops dare not lift them for fear of coming in the line of fire. Abu Maaz, who recently came to Skardu for reinforcements, told journalists the number of casualties on the Indian side have been much higher that what is being claimed by New Delhi.

Rough estimates indicate that the Indian army has lost more officers and men in these few weeks of fighting in Kargil than it lost in the last full-fledged war with Pakistan in 1971. And according to a senior Indian journalist, this time the bodies are going to some of the remotest towns and villages in India, thus creating a nation-wide mood of anger, and encouraging hawks to go for an all-out war against Pakistan.

The Indian Army: facing heavy losses | Archives
The Indian Army: facing heavy losses | Archives

However, the question being asked by many senior observers is that can either India or Pakistan afford to engage in a full-scale war, even if it is limited to the use of conventional forces? Some Western diplomats in Islamabad are of the view that, even if there is a war, it will be fought along the LoC, and will remain confined to Kashmir. But are there any guarantees that the losing side is not going to launch an offensive on the international border? In either case, the level of destruction on the two sides will be immense, and despite Indian claims of military superiority, there is little chance that India can win a war against Pakistan in a decisive manner.

A report titled “South Asian Military Balance”, submitted by the US Deputy Secretary of Defence Bruce Riedel before the American Senate’s foreign relations sub-committee last year, clearly stated that while India enjoys a numerical advantage over Pakistan in conventional military capability, it is most unlikely that it would score a decisive victory over Pakistan. Recently reproduced excerpts from the report suggest that the internal security problems faced by India in Kashmir and East Punjab may also hamper India’s quantitative advantage over Pakistan.

While analysing comparative conventional forces in detail, the Riedel report argues that because of its more developed industrial capability and greater geographical expanse which provides strategic depth not available to the much smaller Pakistan, India could fight a longer war than Pakistan — thus a longer war would favour India. However, many analysts say that such a war would be a major blow to economic and social development in the two countries and may push them back to where they started more than 50 years ago.

Also read: Kashmir’s Neelum Valley — The sapphire trail

But is there really a way to prevent the present conflict from snowballing into an all-out war? Many analysts and western diplomats believe the key to ending the present conflict lies with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

However, it mainly depends on what the government’s real objectives, both strategic and diplomatic, are and the extent to which it wants to use the situation in Kargil to internationalise the Kashmir dispute. Some government leaders in favour of ending the present crisis believe the diplomatic advantage that Pakistan had in the initial stages of the conflict has gradually slipped away with the international community turning against Pakistan. This is precisely what the opposition leader, Aitzaz Ahsan, said in the Senate during the debate on the Kargil situation, and accused the government of isolating the country on the diplomatic front.

However, even if Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif wants to end the present impasse in an attempt to prevent a major escalation, his choices are quite limited, argue analysts. As things stand at the moment, the government is just one of the three elements in the entire conflict — the other two being the army and the militants and their parent political parties.

It is not clear how the army leadership will react if there is a serious proposal from Premier Sharif to try and end the present conflict by asking the militants to withdraw. There is another, equally important question: even if the militants’ initial offensive was launched with the active support from this side of the LoC, is it possible to force them into withdrawal? Militant leaders, both in Muzaffarabad and Pakistan, say they are fully committed to the present phase of the Kashmir struggle, and their sacrifices in the present fighting make it incumbent upon them not to agree to any diplomatic settlement.

Even if the militants’ initial offensive was launched with active support from this side of the LoC, is it possible to force them into withdrawal?

Those close to the prime minister say he is certainly aware of these complications, but this has not deterred his desire to use the process of dialogue to settle outstanding issues with India. Following the failure of his peace initiative, whereby foreign minister Sartaj Aziz was sent to Delhi for talks, Sharif now appears to be employing back-channel diplomacy to try and defuse the situation. Recently, former foreign secretary Niaz Naik was quietly sent to Delhi to hold talks with Indian leaders. During his brief stay, he met both Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh.

The visit was supposed to be kept secret as apparently it was a serious attempt to try and find a way out of the current impasse without drawing any media attention. However, some Indian officials deliberately leaked it to the local press, thus prompting Islamabad to also leak the move by Delhi to send senior Indian journalist, Mishra along with a ministry of external affairs official, to meet Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

Senior analysts in Islamabad say it is not only domestic problems that are creating difficulties for Sharif in his search for an agreeable solution to the current crisis. The level of belligerency being displayed by Delhi is also being described as a major factor in preventing a real diplomatic break¬through. However, some Pakistani analysts and Western diplomats in Islamabad are convinced that, since the visit by the US military and State Department officials to the region, things appear to be moving in the right direction. If this optimism is not misplaced, it is quite possible that the war, which at the moment appears to be imminent, may eventually be averted through diplomacy.


This was originally published in the Herald’s June 1999 issue under the headline “War?”. To read more subscribe to the Herald in print.


The writer was the Herald’s Bureau Chief in Islamabad in 1999. He is currently serving as the editor of daily Dawn.

http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153481

1965 War

Introduction

The Indian forces intruded into Pakistani area in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965. In a sharp and short conflict, the Indian forces were ejected. Both the armies had fully mobilized, with eyeball to eyeball contact. Pakistan proposed cease-fire, India accepted. An agreement was signed: the forces disengaged. The Award by the Arbitration Tribunal vindicated Pakistan ‘s Position.

Past midnight on 5/6 September, without a formal declaration of war, Indian Army crossed the international border and attacked Lahore and Kasur fronts. Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air Force halted the attack in its tracks, inflicting heavy casualties on the aggressor. On 7 September a single Pakistan Air Force Pilot, Squadron Leader M.M. Alam, Sitara-i-Juraat, in his F-86 Sabre shot down five Indian Air Force attacking Hunter aircraft in a single sortie, an unbeaten world record “On night 6/7 September three teams of our Special Services Groups were para-dropped on Indian Air Force bases at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara to neutralize them.

To relieve pressure on Lahore front, on night 7/8 September, after crossing two major water obstacles in a bold thrust, Pakistani armoured and mechanized formations supported by artillery and Pakistan Air Force overran area Khem Karn, 6 to 8 miles inside Indian territory. Vital Indian positions at Sulemanki and across Rajasthan and Sindh were also captured in bold, swift attacks.

On night 7/8 September, 1 Corps of Indian Army launched its main effort east of Sialkot with one armoured and three infantry divisions on our extended 15 Division front, screened only by gallant 3 Frontier Force and B Company 13 Frontier Force (Reconnaissance & Support). 24 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier A.A Malik, Hilal-i-Juraat) on the move in area Pasrur, rushed 25 Cavalry (Lieutenant Colonel Nisar Ahmad, Sitara-i-Juraat), on 8 September to delay and disrupt enemy thrusts. As soon as the presence of Indian 1 Armoured Division was confirmed, Pakistan Army rushed forward to stop the onslaught on a 30-mile front. The biggest tank battle since World War II was fought on the Chwinda front by 6 Armoured Division with under command 24 Infantry Brigade Groups and valiantly supported by 4 Corps Artillery (Brigadier A.A.K. Choudhry, Hilal-i-Juraat). The main effort of the Indian Army was blunted, inflicting heavy and troop casualties. Pakistan Air Force support helped turn the tide of the battle. Before a counter offensive by 6 Armoured Division on 22 September could be launched, Indian asked for cease-fire in the United Nations. India ‘s aggression against our international borders without a formal declaration of war had cost it, apart from heavy personnel, material land economic losses, 1617 sq. miles of territory as compared to 446 sq. miles of our open and undefended territory. Pakistan Army captured 20 officers, 19 Junior Commissioned Officers, and 569 Other Ranks.

https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=196

 

Kashmir War 1947 – 49

Introduction

By November 1947 Auchinleck, Supreme Commander based in New Delhi, being convinced that Indian Cabinet was seeking to destroy and undo Pakistan by economic and military means, was forced to resign. As the build-up of Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir continued, Pakistan Army units were being hurriedly organized and equipped without any base for manufacture of ammunition, signal stores, equipment or vehicles. Simultaneously, Pakistan National Guards were raised from ex-servicemen and other volunteers along border areas to provide a second line of defence. By February 1948 Indian build up in Jammu and Kashmir reached five brigades plus, under two full-fledged division Headquarters. Our 101 Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Akbar Khan was rushed into the critical front to forestall and halt the Indian offensive along Uri-Muzaffarabad axis. In April 1948, Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army appreciating the threats in the north along Muzaffarabad-Kohala axis, and in the south along Bhimber-Mirpur-Poonch axis further reinforced the front with elements of 7 Division to halt the Indian offensive at Chakothi. Reinforcements were rushed overnight to Tithwal sector to defend Muzaffarabad front 9(F) Division was also moved to reinforce 7 Division in Tithwal, Uri and Bagh sectors. 7 Division was thereafter moved to the southern front. In May Pakistan informed the United Nations of these moves. By June, Pakistan had five brigades in Jammu and Kashmir together with Azad Kashmir forces and elements of the para-military Frontier Corps, holding twelve Indian brigades (with 4 to 5 battalions each) supported by armour, artillery and Indian Air Force. Indian summer offensive was decisively beaten and halted. Some months later, two brigades of 8 Division from Quetta further reinforced Muzaffarabad-Uri front.

 On 14 August 1948 , the first anniversary of Pakistan , General Headquarters sent the following message to the Quaid-e-Azam, “Loyal and grateful greetings from the Army on the first anniversary of Independence Day. We serve and shall serve Pakistan with all our hearts and souls. Pakistan and its Creator, Zindabad.” The Quaid-e-Azam was at that time in Quetta , fighting his own battle for survival against a deadly affliction. In December, Pakistan Army planned to go on the offensive, ‘Operation Venus’, with 7 Division to cut off the main supply route at Beri Pattan Bridge area, and isolate Indian forces in Nowshera-Jhangar-Poonch sector. On 14 December, in a pre-attack artillery bombardment the Beri Pattan bridge area containing ammunition, rations, petrol and supplies in a two-mile area was totally destroyed together with Indian divisional Headquarter, isolating the Indian forces in that sector. The Indian Army was taken by surprise. At midnight on 30 December, India asked for ceasefire with effect from 1 January 1949 . Pakistan accepted, as the fate of Jammu and Kashmir had been taken over by the United Nations. By early 1949 Pakistan Army had completed its formative stage. It halted the Indian offensive and prevented it from totally over-running Jammu and Kashmir , and closing up to Pakistan ‘s vital border areas, thus ended the war in Jammu and Kashmir . Pakistan Army continued its reorganization. An ordinance factory to produce small arms and ammunition was established at Wah. The threat from India was by no means over. In spring of 1950 and again between July and October 1951 the Indian Army concentrated on Pakistan‘s borders and transgressed into Azad Kashmir and West Pakistan territory forty-eight times. The Indian Air Force violated Pakistan ‘s air space thirty times thus bringing the two countries very close to another all out war through India ‘s coercive diplomacy and interventionist strategy

.

https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=195&rnd=444

Kashmir: Pakistan’s ‘unfinished agenda’

Jockeying over Kashmir has caused two wars and several warlike crises between India and Pakistan since 1947.

by Shaheen Akhtar

Dr Shaheen Akhtar is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Regional Studies in Islamabad.

Growing water scarcity in Pakistan has meant that tensions over Kashmir currently revolve around the Indus basin [EPA]

Islamabad defines Kashmir as a “core” issue and the “root cause” of tension with India. The dispute has caused two of the three major wars between the South Asian nations – and several warlike crises.

The traditional narrative that has dominated Pakistan’s Kashmir policy, since its independence in 1947, has different strands – involving differences over territory, ideology, right of self-determination, security, sovereignty and now, increasingly, water. Besides, it has always remained a highly emotive issue in the domestic politics of Pakistan.

The unfinished agenda

Kashmir is invariably described as an “unfinished agenda” of partition, a shahrug[“jugular vein”], and is considered integral to the Islamic identity of the Pakistani state. It is a source of strategically important rivers that play a critical role in the food and energy security of the country.

As per the logic of the partition, with Muslim majority areas going to Pakistan, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir – then ruled by a Hindu maharaja – should have joined Pakistan. However, India forcibly occupied the state on the basis of an instrument of accession by the maharaja, Hari Singh. The legality of the maharaja’s claim was never accepted by Pakistan. At best it was considered “conditional” and “provisional”, subjected to ascertaining the will of the people. India never allowed Kashmiris to decide on the final status of Kashmir, however, so Kashmir continues to be “disputed territory”.

UN resolutions and the right to self-determination

The right to self-determination emerged as the bedrock of Pakistan’s principled stand on the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan strongly believes that the right of self-determination, in accordance with UN resolutions, is central to the solution of the Kashmir conflict. The UN resolutions in 1948-49 recognise this right and clearly stated that: “Future status of the state of J&K shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people … and through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite”.

The resolutions were not implemented and the vote never took place. This drove Pakistan to adopt a variety of strategies, comprising bilateral dialogue, third party mediation and military means to change “on-the-ground” realities in Kashmir in its favour. Besides, Islamabad pledged moral, political, diplomatic – and at times material – support to the armed Kashmir resistance movement.

Dialogue, mediation and military strategies

As the UN discussions reached stalemate, Pakistan tried a bilateral dialogue on Kashmir. In 1962-1963, six rounds of foreign minister-level talks were held between Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Swaran Singh but without any success. The dialogue took place against the backdrop of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, which exposed Indian vulnerability to China and to concerted pressure from the US and Britain. India used the opportunity to engage Pakistan, deflecting these pressures, yet not to resolve the Kashmir dispute.

The failure of talks drove Islamabad to resort to covert military means, resulting in the unsuccessful “Operation Gibraltar”, which escalated into the 1965 India-Pakistan war. The Soviet-mediated Tashkent agreement in 1966 stressed peaceful means to settle disputes – but also did not resolve the Kashmir dispute, other than noting its existence. This disappointed Pakistan and it continued to raise the issue at international fora, urging implementation of UN resolutions.

The 1971 war was not triggered by Kashmir, but it did affect Pakistan’s position and strategy on the disputed region. Under the 1972 Simla Agreement, both countries agreed to settle their differences “through bilateral negotiations or by other peaceful means mutually agreed upon”. It was interpreted differently in both capitals. India interpreted it as Pakistan’s commitment to solve the issue bilaterally – while Pakistan maintained that it did not exclude other means – read international mediation – if bilateral dialogue failed to settle the issue.

Furthermore, the ceasefire line was converted into the Line of Control (LoC) – to be respected by both sides and not to be altered unilaterally. India, however, emboldened by victory, refused permission to UN military observers (UNMOGIP) to operate from its side and violated the LoC by capturing Chorbatla. It then intruded upon the Sichen glacier in 1984 and seized Qamar sector in 1988. Given the severe political and territorial blow to Pakistan in the 1971 war, Kashmir was put on the back burner and there was no bilateral dialogue on Kashmir – though Islamabad continued to raise it at the UN, the Organisation of Islamic Countries, and, later, within the Non- Aligned Movement platform.

Pakistan supports ‘azadi’

The 1989-90 uprising in Indian-controlled Kashmir put the region back on Pakistan’s foreign policy agenda. It also aroused passion in domestic politics, especially among the religious right wing political parties and groups. Pakistan stepped up its support for the Kashmiri resistance – fighting for azadi “freedom” – and gave military support to fighters in Kashmir. Meanwhile, Islamabad strongly condemned the deployment of a massive number of Indian troops in Kashmir, who were bolstered by draconian laws, enjoyed impunity from accountability and indulged in grave breaches of human rights. Pakistani officials described Indian actions in Kashmir as “state terrorism”.

From 1990 to 2003, Pakistan’s political and material support to Kashmiri, Afghan and Pakistan-based fighters in Indian-controlled Kashmir became an instrument of its Kashmir policy. The main objective was to internationalise Kashmir, draw in third party mediation and pressure India to enter into meaningful negotiations on Kashmir. This was also done to assuage domestic political sentiments that were enraged by repression against the Kashmiri people, a substantive number of whom streamed into Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK).

‘The most dangerous place on earth’

During this period, Pakistan – as a result of retaliatory nuclear tests against India in 1998 – became a nuclear power, and Kashmir became a nuclear flashpoint. Former US president Bill Clinton described it as the “most dangerous place on earth”. The nuclear issue sparked the 1999 Kargil crisis, bringing two nascent nuclear powers to the brink of war. In the Kargil crisis, Pakistan tried unsuccessfully to cut off Indian supplies to the Siachen glacier, forcing it to demilitarise the region and involve the international community to play a mediating role. In reality, Kargil damaged Pakistan’s Kashmir cause. Pakistan lost international sympathy. It was not only forced to withdraw troops but the act also gave sanctity to the LoC, which in India was interpreted as the LoC practically acquiring the status of an international border.

Pakistan’s Kashmir cause suffered a further major blow following the September 11 attacks, as the US unleashed its global war on terrorism. The international context to the US fight against extremism and Muslim fundamentalism heavily impinged on the Kashmiri struggle, as the world became more responsive to the Indian position that Kashmiri resistance was a “terrorist activity” driven by Islamic fundamentalists, sponsored by Pakistan. India managed to exploit world opinion in its favour – and insisted that Kashmir be included in the US campaign against terrorism.

Against this backdrop, Pakistan tried to draw a distinction between the “freedom struggle” and “terrorism” – and struggled hard to win the argument that the “war on terrorism” should not affect the legitimacy of Kashmiris’ fight for the right to self-determination.

In 2002, in his address at the UN General Assembly, President Musharraf stressed: “The just struggles of a people for self-determination and liberation from colonial or foreign occupation cannot be outlawed in the name of terrorism.” Islamabad argued that, in the guise of “counter-insurgency operations” New Delhi was perpetrating “state terrorism” in Kashmir – and that the root causes of terrorism should be addressed as part of the US-led international campaign.

However, following 9/11, Pakistan condemned acts of terrorism in Kashmir, such as the October 1, 2001, attack on the Kashmir state assembly in Srinagar; the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian parliament and various attacks on the Hindu Pandits inside Indian-controlled Kashmir. In his speech on January 12, 2002, Musharraf defined parameters for the Kashmir struggle. He declared:

This was done to defuse the ongoing military standoff, and to assure India that Pakistan did not approve of any terrorist act in India.

Islamabad banned five extremist outfits, two of them – Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) – were accused by India of conducting terrorist activities in Kashmir and India. Drawing a balance, Musharraf kept the emotive discourse alive by saying that “Kashmir runs in our blood” and “we will never budge an inch from our principled stand on Kashmir”. Pakistan assured continued moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris and kept urging the international community to play an active role in resolving the Kashmir dispute – for the sake of durable peace in the region.

Thaw in relations

The changed regional-international realities led to a flexibility and pragmatism in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. This was reflected in Musharraf’s “out-of-the-box” proposals that he floated in 2003, 2004 and 2006. He offered to move away from the UN-mandated plebiscite and meet India “half-way”. This marked a seismic shift in Pakistan’s traditional policy on Kashmir, and showed its readiness to explore solutions that could be “acceptable to all parties”.

In October 2004, Musharraf suggested a three-phased solution along ethnic and geographic lines. This indicated that Pakistan was ready to move away from a solution based on religious-communal lines which India regarded as a threat to its unity and secular identity. In December 2005, he floated a four-point formula that envisaged soft borders, demilitarisation, self-governance and a joint mechanism for supervision of Kashmir. It was again close to the idea of the “soft borders” that India was looking at favourably.

The basic premise of Musharraf’s proposals was that the solution to Kashmir could not be found in the status quo, an insistence on a vote – or converting the LoC into a permanent border – but in a creative solution based on concessions by all sides, yet meeting the aspirations of the Kashmiris. This was in line with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s oft-repeated assertions that there would be “no redrawing of the boundaries on communal lines”.

Islamabad took several steps to further the new ideas. It extended support to the moderate faction of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), and distanced itself from the hardline faction led by Ali Shah Geelani. The “back-channel” diplomacy was used in arriving at a compromise on the issue of travelling documents, regarding the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service. Back-channel negotiations also began discussing the four-point formula – which many observed was secretive, but made significant progress in developing areas of aspirational convergence. The LoC was thrown open for travel and trade and intra-Kashmir dialogue got underway – albeit in a non-structured and sporadic manner.

But Musharraf’s “out-of-the-box” initiative lost steam, due to the slow response of New Delhi to Islamabad’s flexibility. As a new political government came into power in 2008, the back-channel dialogue came to a halt. Zardari’s government has gradually reverted to Pakistan’s traditional stance – but continues to support cross-LoC interactions, which is very much in line with the vision of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) for “soft LoC”.

In August 2008, President Zardari advocated a policy of “soft borders, so that the people of the two parts of Kashmir can meet, travel and do business” – but without compromising Pakistan’s traditional position on Kashmir. Zardari’s administration has pulled back its sponsorship of jihad in Kashmir, and has stated that it wants a solution through a tripartite dialogue that involves Kashmiris and “fulfills the aspirations of the Kashmiri people”.

Water wars

Water dominates the discourse. Since 2007, water has gained prominence within Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir. India is constructing an array of hydroprojects on the western rivers – Jehlum, Chanab and Sindh – that flow through Kashmir and were allocated to Pakistan under the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty. Islamabad strongly believes that Indian projects not only violate the technical parameters laid down in the treaty, but will have a cumulative impact on the flow of water to downstream Pakistan. Growing water scarcity in Pakistan and emerging climatic threats to water resources of the Indus basin are making water a core issue in Kashmir, and water is likely to dominate future dialogue with India.

Kashmir can become a bridge of peace if a viable solution is found that serves the interests of Pakistan, India and Kashmiris. There is no military solution to Kashmir. The struggle in Kashmir has become non-violent – but India is not yet ready to provide Kashmiris any relief, or to involve them in a tripartite dialogue process. Inclusion of Kashmiris is a necessity for a durable settlement in Kashmir. But if the conflict is settled, there is ample scope for the harnessing of the hydro-resources of Kashmir – which will benefit Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris themselves.

Dr Shaheen Akhtar is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Regional Studies in Islamabad.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

Source: Al Jazeera

India is blinding young Kashmiri protesters – and no one will face justice

Monday 18 July 2016 11.56 BST – Last modified on Monday 18 July 2016 16.51 BST

A Kashmiri youth with an eye injury sustained after he was hit by pellets fired by Indian security forces during a protest in Srinagar. Photograph: Tauseef Mustafa/AFP/Getty Images

Two sets of images have haunted me these last few days. One is a series of photos of people splashing bucketloads of water to wash away blood from the streets of Kashmir, where Indian forces have shot dead at least 45 people since 9 July. Thousands came out to protest and mourn the death of a rebel leader who was killed in an encounter with the Indian army and police.

The other set of images is that of scores of young men with bandages on their eyes, before or after undergoing surgery to remove tiny steel pellets from their retinas. Indian forces deployed in Kashmir now routinely use pellet guns to stymie roadside demonstrations.

The first image is of something I have witnessed nearly all my life. The Indian troops and state police who enforce India’s rule over Kashmir have been shooting at Kashmiri protesters for as long as there have been protests. And that is a long, long time: 27 years if you count from the start of the armed and popular uprising against India in 1989; 70 if you chart the history of the subcontinent from 1947 when Kashmir was left unresolved as the British departed; and more than eight decades if you go back to July 1931, when the then king’s troops killed 22 protesters.

The second set of images is relatively new, as it’s the fruit of “non-lethal” weapons introduced in Kashmir in 2010. But the pictures haunt you nonetheless, as you peer into the bloodied, plum-sized eyes of those who suspect they may never see again.

Such is the ferocity of the response of the Indian military occupation to the latest uprising that nearly 2,000 people suffered grievous or moderate injuries in just two days. In some kind of revanchist frenzy, paramilitaries attacked ambulances, shattered windows and cut off intravenous drips. The government of India and its loyalist representatives have clamped down on communications, social media and civil liberties; there is a near-total curfew everywhere. Phones don’t ring in south Kashmir, where most of the killings took place, and the internet is mostly blocked.

A friend who’s visiting Kashmir reported that the “gravely ill can’t get to hospitals and can’t find medicines”. In short, yet another crushing siege in the decades-long relay of sieges. The world doesn’t need to know. India is a democracy.

In its intransigence over Kashmir, the Indian state has, among other things, waged a narrative war, in which it tells itself and its citizens via servile media, that there is no dispute, that it’s an internal matter – and whatever troubles there are in the idyllic valley are the work of jihadis from Pakistan. This gives the state easy demons to portray and then slay.

The Indian state now appears to believe its own fantasies, which it acts out by shooting its way out of a crisis every time Kashmiris voice their anger or political demands. It’s as though India must perform rituals of brutal violence on the Kashmiri body to keep it tamed. In 2008, 60 people were shot when Kashmiris protested at the grant of hundreds of acres of land to a temple trust, because they believed this was an Indian attempt to change the demographic of their Muslim-majority region. In 2009, protests raged for weeks after the rape and murder of two female family members from Shopian in northern Kashmir was dismissed by the authorities as a drowning.

In 2010, 120 people, including teenagers, were butchered on the streets. Hundreds of families were devastated, gifted eternal grief by a draconian state. Not one member of the armed forces was charged, let alone convicted, for those killings. And that’s precisely why the soldiers kill again and again. That summer, when scores of adolescents were slain in the alleys, people gasped at the sheer scale of mayhem, but some also believed it might not happen again. It’s too much, I heard said.

Policymakers in Kashmir and Delhi then deliberated upon what kind of weapon to deploy on a people the majority of whom quite simply don’t want to be with India. They never have. The state came up with something that might thwart and injure protesters, but not kill them. A buckshot gun, a pellet grenade, a “non-lethal weapon”, we were told. The lexicon of conflict in a place such as Kashmir engenders normalisation of even the most ghastly thing. It felt to me then that many were relieved that Kashmir’s young would no longer face full-size deathly bullets, but tinier steel pellets instead. At least they won’t die, it was said.

Over the last week, doctors in Kashmir have performed about 150 eye surgeries to try to remove pellets from retinas. Most of the patients will lose their eyesight, one doctor said. “It’s a fate worse than death,” said another. No other country has wilfully blinded scores of youths.

Meanwhile the dead have been interred in martyrs’ graveyards. Most localities, in city and country, have one so as to remember their slain. Those wounded will live in partial or total darkness all their lives.

Kashmiris say Azadi – or independence – is an infinitely better option.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/18/india-blinding-kashmiri-protesters-justice-steel-pellets

A brief history of the Kashmir conflict

12:00PM BST 24 Sep 2001

The Kashmir dispute dates from 1947. The partition of the Indian sub-continent along religious lines led to the formation of India and Pakistan. However, there remained the problem of over 650 states, run by princes, existing within the two newly independent countries.

In theory, these princely states had the option of deciding which country to join, or of remaining independent. In practice, the restive population of each province proved decisive.

The people had been fighting for freedom from British rule, and with their struggle about to bear fruit they were not willing to let the princes fill the vacuum.

Although many princes wanted to be “independent” (which would have meant hereditary monarchies and no hope for democracy) they had to succumb to their people’s protests which turned violent in many provinces.

Because of its location, Kashmir could choose to join either India or Pakistan. Maharaja Hari Singh, the ruler of Kashmir, was Hindu while most of his subjects were Muslim. Unable to decide which nation Kashmir should join, Hari Singh chose to remain neutral.