An overview of 1988 general elections: Triumph but no glory

TAHIR MEHDI — PUBLISHED Apr 11, 2013 01:10pm

On Aug 13, 1988, Gen Ziaul Haq reiterated that the coming elections would be held on a non-party basis.

Earlier, in June, the Supreme Court (SC) had accepted Benazir Bhutto’s constitutional petition declaring non-party elections a violation of the fundamental right to freedom of association. The decision implied that the country would return to the party-based electoral system but the general vowed to resist. He was killed in a plane crash four days later.

His death, however, did not undo the changes that he had made in the country’s electoral and governance system. It is unfair to club all of these together as just the 8th Amendment. That misrepresents the numerous and sweeping changes he introduced, defacing the 1973 Constitution beyond recognition. Instead of a thriving parliamentary democracy, it now stood for non-party elections on the basis of a separate electorate to give birth to a parliament that was allowed only to play second fiddle to a president who drew legitimacy from the fact that he was the head of the army.

The political discourse of the decade following the general’s death is a story of the struggle to bring the system back to normalcy. The 1988 general elections were the first major step in this direction.

Ms Bhutto went to court again to secure an order to make elections party-based and the government finally accepted this on Sept 16, two months before polling day. She had dominated the political landscape since her return to the country in April 1986. Martial law had been lifted on Dec 30, 1985, after the non-party parliament and the government of the then prime minister, Mohammad Khan Junejo, had provided constitutional cover to all of Gen Zia’s acts since July 5, 1977. The restoration of the amended constitution offered very little space for political activities. The Junejo government was being suffocated by the overbearing general whose obsession with power was turning into paranoia. Mr Junejo’s manoeuvres stretched Gen Ziaul Haq’s patience to its limits in May 1988, when the latter turned the tables on the elected government using the constitutional tool of Article 58(2b), which he had himself fashioned. With Mr Junejo gone, the military government came face to face with the PPP of Benazir Bhutto.

The geopolitical leverage from which the military regime had benefited over the past decade was disappearing fast. A dejected Soviet army had started pulling out of Afghanistan in May 1988.

One of the military establishment’s main strategies to contain the rise of the PPP was to unite everyone who had anything against the latter under one umbrella. The Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) was thus an alliance of those who had benefited from the military rule.

The main components of the IJI were the Muslim League and the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI). The Muslim League was dominated by the affluent middle class of central Punjab while the JI was its ideologue. The National People’s Party of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam of Sami-ul-Haq (JUI-S) and the Jamiat Ahle Hadith of Maulana Lakhvi were worth around a single seat each in the parliament.

The other components had no direct electoral significance. Some were probably added just to bring the total to nine that was the same as the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) of 1977. The PNA had contested against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s party and lost, but subsequent protests by the alliance had culminated in the imposition of martial law.

Yet the IJI was not the only challenge the PPP had to face. A number of changes in laws and procedures introduced into the electoral system obstructed the free and fair character of elections.

The new electoral rolls prepared in 1987 had 40 per cent more voters than the ones used for the non-party elections of 1985 (32.5 million in 1985 compared to 47.9 million in 1987). This should have resulted in a higher voter turnout in polling stations. But the then president Ghulam Ishaq Khan made it mandatory, through an ordinance, for voters to present an identity card. The Lahore High Court declared the rule void but the SC ruled in its favour on November 12, four days before the polling. The poor and the marginalised who formed the biggest part of the PPP vote bank were also the ones who did not possess an identity card. The population census conducted in 1998 showed that half of the country’s women and a third of its men did not have an identity card; one small amendment in the rules disenfranchised millions of people. It is now no secret that the presidency also housed a cell that manipulated election results.

Despite the odds, Ms Bhutto triumphed. Her party won 93 seats and polled 38.5 per cent of the vote, becoming the single largest party. Her 7.5 million votes were almost a quarter more than the 6.1 million votes secured by Z.A. Bhutto’s PPP in 1970. More importantly, the party won seats and polled substantial percentages of the votes in Balochistan and what is now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where it had no presence earlier. The centre-right and far-right alliance consolidated its vote bank under the banner of IJI. Their 5.9 million votes translated into 54 seats in the National Assembly but, more importantly, the alliance won a majority in Punjab and formed government there.

Their success in Punjab stole the shine from the PPP’s victory at the federal level.

http://www.dawn.com/news/801774

The ‘dawn of a new era’ that remained a dream

SHAIKH AZIZ — PUBLISHED Aug 21, 2016 06:57am

Benazir Bhutto with Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 / White Star

For over 28 years, no Indian premier had visited Pakistan — a situation underscored by recent hostilities between the South Asian neighbours. On December 29, 1988, the status quo changed: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi set foot in Islamabad in an attempt to usher in a new, more peaceful era for Indo-Pak relations.

Gandhi arrived in the capital on the morning of the 29th, seemingly to attend the fourth summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc) which was to be held the December 29 to the 31.

But behind the scenes, both the Indian and Pakistani governments had been working overtime to ensure that the visit did indeed take place.

For Benazir, who had assumed the office of prime minister only four weeks ago, this was the first opportunity to host leaders from across the region and liaise with them. After she had been sworn in, Rajiv had sent her a message of felicitation and expressed hope that their mutual efforts could bring about peace and prosperity to both countries and the region at large.

Indeed, the last Indian premier to visit Pakistan was Rajiv’s grandfather, Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru, who had arrived in 1960 to pen the historic Indus Basin Water Treaty between the two countries. The treaty had cooled political temperatures back then, and diplomatic circles were hopeful that Rajiv’s visit would thaw the ice in bilateral relations ever since.

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Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Pakistan in 1988 was heralded by Benazir Bhutto as a historic departure from over 40 years of hostility

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The Saarc moot therefore was an opportunity that couldn’t be squandered by either leader. Security of the presidents and prime ministers of Saarc countries was paramount and appropriate arrangements were therefore being made in the fortnight leading up to the Saarc moot.

Five days before the conference was to begin, a special messenger of Rajiv Gandhi arrived in Islamabad to review security details being made for the Indian premier’s visit. He also called on the prime minister and spoke to her about the extent of normalisation of relationship and the issues she would bring up in the meeting with Gandhi.

On behalf of Rajiv, an invitation was also extended to Benazir to visit India. She duly accepted the request but was advised to delay announcing her decision till the meeting between the two leaders was held; the announcement would be made by her later on.

On the first morning of the moot, December 29, the Indian prime minister and his team arrived. The delegation included Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, his wife Sonia, son Rahul and daughter Priyanka. A reception chamber had been set up at the airport to welcome them; the reception party included President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, various political leaders, as well as high-ranking military and civilian officials.

Within two hours of their arrival, Rajiv and Benazir had the first of their meetings. Held in a cordial atmosphere, this meeting would set the tone for their respective teams to iron things out.

In the evening, while other guests were being hosted by other high officials, Rajiv and his family enjoyed Benazir’s hospitality at a dinner hosted at the PM House. Bhutto’s spouse, Asif Zardari, and mother, Begum Nusrat Bhutto, were also present.

This dinner paved the way for the normalisation of bilateral relations as Bhutto later remarked: “I am sure each of us will give our best and I hope the time would come when historians would point to your time in India and my time in Pakistan for heralding the dawn of a new era.” The Indian negotiating team beamed at this comment.

At the Saarc meeting, attended by leaders from India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives, discussions were held as per the agenda that had been agreed upon. All leaders emphasised the need for such meetings and called for action on the decisions taken.

Some speeches, however, somewhat embarrassed Benazir Bhutto. For instance, General Irshad Hussain of Bangladesh and President J.R. Jayawardene of Sri Lankan paid tributes to Pakistani despot Gen Ziaul Haq and expressed their condolences on his death. Gen Irshad went on to say that Gen Zia was the founder of the Saarc.

Being the host, it was not easy for Bhutto to sit there and hear praise for the man who hanged her father. When she rose to deliver her address, she ignored the remarks about Gen Zia and paid rich tributes to Shaikh Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh and former Sri Lankan leader Bandaranaike. The first day ended on a positive and encouraging note.

On the second day of the moot, after attending regular business, Benazir and Rajiv met separately and were later joined by their respective foreign ministers. During the two-hour meeting, they discussed many issues including Kashmir.

Rajiv did not budge from the traditional Indian stand on the disputed territory; however, he emphasised that they should talk openly on the subject. But as the meeting progressed, he did not find much to support or concede in the Pakistani viewpoint on Kashmir. Rajiv concluded the discussion by calling the Kashmir issue a “dead horse.”

Besides general agreements on various issues, the two leaders inked the Nuclear Non-aggression Agreement between the two countries. Both India and Pakistan suffered a great sense of insecurity about their nuclear plants, and with this accord, both prime ministers pledged not to attack or assist foreign powers to attack either country’s nuclear installations and facilities.

On December 31, the last day of the Saarc summit moot, the two prime ministers met without aides. Later, they held a joint press conference to inform the press that two key issues had not been brought up during discussions: namely, India’s withdrawal from Siachen and Pakistan’s alleged support to the Khalistan movement.

Despite some disappointments, it was widely believed that Rajiv-Benazir meetings held on the sidelines of the Saarc summit were the dawn of a new era in Pakistan-India ties.

Almost 28 years later, we still wait for that new era.

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine August 21st, 2016

http://www.dawn.com/news/1278747/the-dawn-of-a-new-era-that-remained-a-dream

A leaf from history: ‘We, the people …’

SHAIKH AZIZ — PUBLISHED Jun 26, 2016 07:09am

After taking the oath of office on Dec 2, 1988, Benazir Bhutto addressed the crowd at the prime minister’s secretariat. “We gather to celebrate freedom, to celebrate democracy, to celebrate the three most beautiful words in the English language: ‘We, the people’.”

Both joyous and traumatic memories,of the time she had spent as ‘Pinky’ with her father, haunted her. Despite her solitary years in jails and in exile, Benazir Bhutto appeared calm and sombre, reflecting that she had perhaps changed as a person.

Undoubtedly, the oath-taking was a milestone in her life as well as for Pakistan, as it marked the end of Gen Zia’s 11-year military rule. At the time, in the 41 years of the country’s existence, democracy had prevailed for only 17 years; out of which most of the time went towards developing the Constitution. Despite the struggle made by liberal forces for the restoration of democracy, Benazir assuming post of the prime minister led to a debate within the PPP about her accepting premiership with certain conditions.

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Despite Gen Beg’s hostile attitude, another Bhutto takes oath as PM

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But she had reasons for it — the most compelling being that she believed she had no option. If she had refused, then there might have been a long, unpredictable wait. Likewise, the establishment had no choice either, as after Bhutto’s hanging and the dismissal of Junejo’s government, there had to be a prime minister from Sindh, as per the decision by the military leadership after the Bahawalpur aircraft crash.

After assuming power, Benazir was repeatedly reminded by Gen Aslam Baig that it was because of him, he claimed, that Benazir had become the prime minister, and that if he had set forth stricter conditions Benazir could not have become the prime minister. There were some comments in the press as well about the army hijacking foreign policy. Gen Baig did not deny this and said that they could have hijacked much more if they so desired.

When Zia found himself pressured from all quarters to restore democracy, he chalked out a plan to keep the PPP out of governance even if it won the polls. To ensure the success of that objective, Gen Zia decided to carve out a niche for himself and let governance matters revolve around him, no matter who became the prime minister, as in the case of Mohammad Khan Junejo. But on second thought about the possible re-entry of Benazir in the political scenario, he improvised his earlier plan.

Gen Zia had considered the holding of 1985 general elections on non-party basis a fruitful experience and he wanted the 1988 elections to also be held on a non-party basis, but Benazir had managed to get this move annulled by the Supreme Court. Equally important was the issue of presentation of NIC at polling booths. However, this hindrance was also removed by the court, adding considerable voting strength to the election.

Following the Bahawalpur crash, a shaky and indecisive environment prevailed at the Presidency. There was a possibility of promulgating Martial Law and putting political activities on hold. Since the top brass had been wiped out in the crash, leaving only Gen Aslam Baig as the senior-most officer in the army, he could have done away with the constitutional process. He decided to follow the Constitution, but ensured that liberal forces were kept out of the power race. His intention was to restore the democratic process and at the same time restore the army’s prestige.

Contemporary historians would record that the transfer of power in 1988 was part of a bigger plan set into action since Gen Zia had decided to keep liberal elements away from power. Perhaps he feared that if the PPP came to power again, it would avenge Bhutto’s hanging. He believed that a segment of armed forces subscribed to his political perception. The overthrow of July 5, 1977, was part of the plan which was to be followed by a personal dictatorship extending beyond a decade.

After consulting with his colleagues, Gen Zia decided to dispel the common feeling in regard to the army’s continued intervention in political administration. With Pakistan’s crumbling economy and a society plagued by ills, it was believed that democracy could bring stability and revive economic reforms. Pakistan’s action as a front state to defeat the (now defunct) Soviet Union had brought an influx of 7m Afghan refugees to an already ailing economy, plus a drug and Kalashnikov culture.

The selection of a prime minister from Sindh was a commendable idea, and since other contenders for the position, like Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and Illahi Bakhsh Soomro were rejected at the ballot box, Benazir was the best option.

Another compelling factor was the upcoming presidential election. On Aug 17, the armed forces chiefs had decided to name the Senate chairman as acting president, in accordance with the Constitution. This was part of a process to get him elected as president after the election of a prime minister. The PPP did not have absolute majority to get the premiership outright, but it had the strength, without which Ghulam Ishaq Khan could not have been elected. Considering all these realities, the establishment decided to redo its roadmap.

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, June 26th, 2016

http://www.dawn.com/news/1266921/a-leaf-from-history-we-the-people

A leaf from history: Democracy returns to the driving seat

SHAIKH AZIZ — PUBLISHED Jun 12, 2016 07:06am

Despite knowing that it would get sympathy votes, the PPP had to work hard to plug the cracks that had appeared in the 11-year alienation period. Benazir Bhutto took the bull by its horns. She chartered a small plane and visited the entire country, addressing election rallies — sometimes four to five in a day.

In her speeches, she spoke about the losses that society had suffered during the dictatorial era of Gen Zia. Many analysts expected her to exploit her father’s hanging, but she vowed that her party did not believe in revenge; instead she pledged that democracy would be her party’s guiding principle. Her approach evoked a positive reaction from the public. Seemingly, unfatigued, she utilised as much time as was possible in canvassing and when the day finally came to an end, her election staff and the crew of the chartered aircraft would be relieved to go home.

Nawaz Sharif, too, was making a lot of effort and likewise chartered a plane. However, he could not match Benazir’s speed and often remarked: “Iss de dandaan wich peer naeen pendi; boli jandi, ay boli jandi ay” (Why doesn’t she feel the pain in her teeth as she speaks on and on). No matter how busy he was, he did not change his routine. Before embarking on the plane, he would make sure that his supply of cold milk bottles had been loaded. He would sit at the front seat of the small plane, where a small wooden plank served as a table. He wanted the party workers and members accompanying him to occupy the narrow aisle between the seats so that more workers could be accommodated on the plane, but alas, the captain did not allow it. After addressing the rallies, he would often be late for the return journey, with the captain sending him reminders that the late flight would make landing difficult and dangerous.

Since these elections were supposed to be a turning phase in the country’s history, all newspapers were diligently assessing the situation. Being associated with the daily Dawn and monthly Herald, I was assigned the task of monitoring the voting trends in Sindh, especially in Nawabshah, Khairpur and Larkana districts. Here, former PPP stalwart and NPP chief Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, PPP chairperson Benazir Bhutto and the spiritual leader of the Hur Jamaat, Pir Sahib Pagara were contesting. After evaluating the trends there, I reported that Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi contesting on an IJI ticket had no chance of winning. When the report appeared in the Herald’s special election issue, acting president Ghulam Ishaq Khan called Sabhago Khan Jatoi, the then deputy commissioner (DC) of Nawabshah district, inquiring about Jatoi’s position. Though he was assured that the NPP leader would win with a big margin, the DC was asked to work hard and ensure Jatoi’s victory in the light of the report published in the newsmagazine. Sabhago Khan Jatoi had been transferred to Nawabshah district in a bid to secure the former chief minister’s home seat. Despite all efforts, when the results came Jatoi was wiped out as predicted. Similar was the fate of other heavyweights, including Mumtaz Bhutto (Z.A. Bhutto’s talented cousin), Pir Sahib Pagara and former prime minister Mohammad Khan Junejo.

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Promising to comply with three conditions set by GIK, Benazir takes oath as prime minister

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The PPP came out as the single largest party securing 94 seats, while the official alliance, the IJI, bagged 54 seats. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) boycotted but took part as observers, bagging 13 seats.

In the final countdown PPP bagged 94 seats, while IJI got 55, the Independents 37 and other parties 19 seats. Among other parties JUI-F secured seven seats, ANP got two seats. The breakdown was for 237 seats (207 general, 20 seats for women and 10 for minorities).

The election results shocked the acting president, who began exploring a way out for the IJI to form the government by manoeuvring a coalition. He even asked the splinter groups to join the IJI, an attempt that went in vain. Even if all the 39 Independents would have supported the IJI, the total number of seats would have been much less than the required majority for forming the government. Instead of calling for the election of the leader of the house, Ishaq Khan thought of requisitioning the National Assembly session and call for the election of the speaker, which would indicate the majority; but the idea was dropped for fear of a political fallout. After a lapse of 14 days, Ishaq Khan finally asked Benazir Bhutto to take oath as prime minister; of course, after arriving at an agreement.

Many observers claimed that it was a deliberate attempt on the part of Ishaq Khan to delay transfer of power. No doubt Ishaq Khan delayed it, but it was the Revival of the Constitutional Order (RCO) enacted by Gen Zia which empowered the president to appoint, at his discretion, any member of the National Assembly as prime minister. He had no intention of offering power to the PPP chief but the RCO offered him a chance to play a trick.

For this purpose, Ishaq Khan laid down three conditions, and the task was awarded to Mirza Aslam Baig, the COAS, to approach Benazir. The first condition was: Ishaq Khan would stay; so would Sahibzada Yaqoob Ali Khan as foreign minister; and she would neither cut the defence budget unilaterally nor would interfere in defence matters. BB accepted all three conditions.

To form the government was easy but to run it was difficult. She did not want strained relations, but it was unavoidable. Just a few minutes before the oath taking, as BB entered the room for the ceremony, Ishaq Khan, who was to receive her at the rostrum, went up to her and politely asked Ms Bhutto to proceed ahead by saying: “Beti, after you.” “I am not Beti. I am the prime minister of Pakistan,” was the quick retort by the would-be prime minister. This baffled Ishaq Khan and he proceeded before her. Clad in a green shalwar kameez, her head covered, she took oath as the Muslim world’s first woman prime minister. After the oath, she was led to the official car by Ishaq Khan, the president who had the power to dismiss her government, and which he did, 20 months later.

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, June 12th, 2016

http://www.dawn.com/news/1263730/a-leaf-from-history-democracy-returns-to-the-driving-seat

A leaf from history: The polls of strained nerves

SHAIKH AZIZ — PUBLISHED May 29, 2016 06:55am

Since its inception in September, 1988, the nine-party right-leaning alliance, Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), had been insisting on holding elections and allowing all parties to participate. While there was great fervour around elections, the uncertainty regarding which party the people were going to vote for also generated much pre-poll trepidation throughout the country.

All possible players were canvassing in their style. In Punjab, Nawaz Sharif, the businessman-turned-politician who had served as chief minister during Gen Ziaul Haq’s era, now wanted to reap the dividends. Nawaz had been prompted by Gen Zia to create his constituency to ensure the continuation of his vision of governance.

For the PPP, it was time to woo people again and earn sympathy votes. But Benazir Bhutto, who had been waiting for the past 11 years for such an electoral contest, was troubled by two factors: first, holding of elections on non-party basis; and second, the requirement of showing national identity cards (NIC) at the time of casting votes.

As PPP party workers activated the camp offices, Bhutto assured them that both issues would be resolved before the voters actually went to poll. Both these conditions had been planned by Gen Zia with the intention of keeping away the PPP — led by the daughter of the man whom he had hanged. Even after his death, both conditions stayed in place as acting president Ghulam Ishaq Khan decided to hold elections in a way that suited him.

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Amid great uncertainty after the Bahawalpur crash, Gen Zia’s proxies went up against the force that was Benazir Bhutto

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Senior PPP leaders wondered why Bhutto was so confident while launching her party’s election campaign. Before the Bahawalpur air crash, she had discussed various political possibilities — whether Gen Zia was honest this time around about holding polls or if he’d go back on his word again.

There was also the matter of meeting some of Gen Zia’s conditions. The first was the registration of the party with the Election Commission (EC). Bhutto told her aides that she was prepared to meet this condition, as it was only a question of filling a form before the EC. “There is no harm in it, on the contrary it would show our commitment to democracy,” she had argued.

To a query by one of her party leaders about whether she was prepared to work with the Gen Zia if he continued as president and she became the prime minister, she replied in the affirmative. Her rationale was that if Junejo could work with him and find his way, why couldn’t she.

“We want to move step-by-step. Our first objective is to restore the 1973 Constitution,” Bhutto had asserted. Her party leaders had no objection as many of them had also been waiting for the past 11 years to return to power. During this period, her uncles such as Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Jam Sadiq Ali, had all deserted her and the party.

Gen Zia, too, was not ill-informed and had other ideas. In an attempt to block the PPP’s entry into governance and to prevent a situation where he might have to work with Bhutto as prime minister, he convened a meeting of some religious men and sought their opinion regarding a woman being the head of the state in a Muslim country.

The clerics initially supported Gen Zia, saying there was no room for a woman to head a Muslim state. But soon, they realised that they may be accused of having mala fide intentions and dropped their stance.

Once this ploy failed, it was planned to enforce a law to make it compulsory for the prime minister to be at least 40 years of age; this was intended to disqualify Bhutto as she was only 35 at the time. However, the Aug 17 crash in Bahawalpur completely changed the political landscape.

Although Ghulam Ishaq Khan and some other players were there to act as Gen Zia’s proxy, they faced successive defeats in their attempts to prevent Bhutto’s rise.

On Sept 16, for example, exactly two months before the polls, the Supreme Court handed a verdict in favour of holding elections on party basis. Ghulam Ishaq and his supporters saw the first failure of their workmanship.

The second obstacle, of presenting NICs at the time of casting votes, was a little more problematic. Electoral rolls had been prepared in 1987 by the EC under the instructions of Gen Zia. They contained the names of voters prepared for the 1985 elections and did not include about 40pc voters who had reached voting age by that time but did not possess the ID cards.

These rolls contained 32.5 million votes as compared to the revised rolls in 1987 with 47.9m votes, which meant that 15.4m genuine voters were not included as voters. In the presence of the ordinance on ID cards these voters would have been deprived of the right to vote.

This ordinance had caused much hopelessness among the political parties and constituents, as not all voters had been able to obtain their ID cards. Again Bhutto challenged the ordinance and the Supreme Court ruled it as illegal on Nov 12, only four days before the poll date, paving way for a large number of voters to join the elections process.

Electioneering began on a slow note but soon gained momentum. It was quite smooth except some scattered incidents of violence. The IJI candidates, particularly those backed by Nawaz Sharif and the Jamaat-i-Islami, enjoyed smooth sailing while PPP supporters did not have to make sturdy efforts as the force of Bhutto’s personality weaved its magic. Electioneering also brought many underdogs into the limelight who benefited from the laborious campaigns of Sharif and Bhutto.

This was undeniably a phase of strained nerves that had to pass without any unpleasant incident. This time, though, there was renewed enthusiasm — in the politics of the country and indeed its future.

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, May 29th, 2016

http://www.dawn.com/news/1261036/a-leaf-from-history-the-polls-of-strained-nerves

A leaf from history: Friends and enemies

SHAIKH AZIZ — PUBLISHED May 15, 2016 07:08am

Benazir Bhutto, Naseerullah Babar and Hameed Gul -Courtesy Hamid Mir

One evening in September 1988, the Mall in Lahore witnessed a number of people arriving at a bungalow, apparently to attend a meeting. They were eagerly received and led to their respective seats, where they sat listening to lofty speeches sketching out the political scenario of the country.

For Lahore this was not unusual. But this particular gathering was however different, as there were no roaring slogans or heated speeches, nor did it culminate into a rally.

After a dozen or so speeches, the formation of Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), or Islamic Democratic Alliance was announced. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi — a former PPP stalwart and the chief of National People’s Party (NPP), a breakaway of PPP — was elected as the IJI chief. Interestingly, the man behind him was Nawaz Sharif, who had been Gen Zia’s man previously.

Though the main components of the alliance were Muslim League-Junejo and Jatoi’s NPP, there was a conscious effort to bring more right-wing parties in order to reach the figure of nine; equating the number of parties in the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) of 1977, which launched an agitation against Zulifikar Ali Bhutto resulting in the overthrow of his government, promulgation of martial law and takeover by Gen Zia. For the following 11 years Gen Zia ruled the country in the name of religion and false promises, punishing the politicians for their past corrupt deeds.

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A political alliance was formed to confront the PPP, which enjoyed a substantial sympathy vote bank

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After Gen Zia’s death, the establishment covertly took upon itself the responsibility of implementing his vision of governance. With PML and NPP in the forefront, the other parties brought to the IJI fold were Jamaat Islami, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, Nizam-i-Mustafa group, Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith (Lakhvi group), Jamiat-i-Mashaikh Pakistan, Azad Group and Hizbullah Jihad. Other mainstream religious parties, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Fazl and Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan Noorani, stayed away from the alliance, as did some nationalist parties like Awami National Party and Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party, opting to contest polls from their own platforms.

Since the first post-Zia polls were only a few weeks away this was a pre-election exercise. Those who were aware of the major actors behind the scenes also knew of what was going on in the background. The alliance was the brainchild of Gen Hamid Gul, the then director general of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He was not in favour of the left-leaning PPP, then led by Benazir Bhutto, daughter of Z.A. Bhutto, winning the elections. Instead, he preferred Nawaz Sharif, a businessman-turned-politician, who was mollycoddled by Gen Zia for his political ends, and who had by now grown into a politician, acceptable to the establishment.

As the intelligence reports indicated that an increase in the PPP’s sympathy vote threatened to push it into power, the top military leadership decided to bring forth the alliance of rightist parties and Gen Hamid Gul ensured that all went well. With little pursuance, the acting president Ghulam Ishaq Khan also fell in line with them and allowed IJI to establish a cell at the Presidency to monitor and assist the alliance with their plan. The flag of the alliance was designed to match the PNA (Pakistan National Alliance) flag of 1977.

Whether this kind of interference had ethical or legal support was a question to be decided by the people at the top; however, it was disliked by all democratic elements. Many years later when, after retirement, Gen Hamid Gul faced severe criticism over this overture, he proved too rigid and had no regret about it; instead he proudly stated that he would readily face any prosecution in this regard. On Oct 11, 2012 while being criticised for his role Dawn News, he said that the politicians in Pakistan were corrupt and if they continued to tread on the same path, the military would continue to intervene in affairs of the state. Admitting that he was responsibility for creating IJI, he said that he was not afraid of any case filed against him. During the interview, he said that he didn’t do anything against his conscious nor did he have any regrets. He was very vocal about the military’s role and said: “The army cannot be controlled by politicians as it has complete control on itself.”

Sharp criticism followed the airing of his interview. Two days later, the minister for information and broadcasting, Qamar Zaman Kaira (PPP), asked for a report of his activities during his time as a serving general. “If his office, home and institution were used in the formation of IJI, then he is responsible to the nation … no one has the right to become the security adviser of the nation himself. This is the job of the state.” Kaira added that IJI was formed to steal the mandate of the people through ulterior motives that prevented PPP from winning the elections.

The election schedule was tight. Almost all parties began canvassing in their own way, refreshing old contacts. PPP leader Benazir Bhutto did not pay any attention to Sindh, as its provincial leadership claimed that they were well aware of what they had to do; however, she made quick visits to the rest of the country and at times addressed public meetings, while PML chief Nawaz Sharif, too, tried to match her speed. Foreign monitors and media observers who had come to Pakistan to watch the important elections marked the indicators which showed an unclear picture, as there were still some legal handicaps for both parties that had to be removed before going to the polls on Nov 16, 1988.

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, May 15th, 2016

http://www.dawn.com/news/1257904/a-leaf-from-history-friends-and-enemies

A leaf from history: Slaves to Ghulam

SHAIKH AZIZ — PUBLISHED Jul 10, 2016 07:09am

Despite the return of democracy, Benazir Bhutto wasn’t too pleased about the fact that she did not have complete executive power as the prime minister. Since the moment she became prime minister, she had been telling her associates to be very cautious. It was only later that her inexperience, negligence and self-centred approach proved to be disastrous for her premiership.

On the other hand, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, armed with draconian laws including the Eighth Amendment, came across as politically impotent, did not want to be (soft?) like Fazl Ilahi Chaudhry, president in the PPP’s first government. He conveyed his concern through various channels, which was actually a message to Benazir that she did not have a free hand. Under the Constitution, Khan had taken oath as acting president the day Gen Zia’s plane crashed but the Constitution required a permanent president. However, the strained relations between the president and prime minister meant that an election for a new president were on hold.

Ishaq Khan enjoyed the support of Nawaz Sharif, the businessman-turned politician from Punjab. Shocked at the election results and the PPP’s victory, Sharif began campaigning for Ishaq Khan. In order to run a hassle-free administration, Benazir had to mend fences with Ishaq Khan.

She therefore had accepted the proposition of working alongside Ishaq Khan, after obtaining a pledge from him, that he too would reciprocate with his support. In the same manner, she agreed to extend her party’s support to him for the presidential election.

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Benazir’s second premiership began with presidential polls and ended with dismissal of her government

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It might have been an easy victory for Ishaq Khan, but Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, a senior politician and a former opposition leader who was not in favour of Ishaq Khan being elected unopposed, decided to contest for the august office.

The presidential polls were scheduled for December. Nawabzada was a highly respected political leader committed to democracy and would never let anti-democratic forces go unchallenged. Earlier, during Ayub Khan’s era, he had opposed the creation of the National Assembly through indirect elections (the Basic Democracy system) in 1962. It was during these days when there was a lull on the political horizon that he began his speech in the National Assembly with the couplet Har shakh pe oloo betha hai, anjam-i-gulistan kiya hoga, applauded greatly following the pin drop silence.

Similarly, he had persuaded Fatima Jinnah to contest presidential elections in 1964 and expose the tactics played by Ayub Khan to win the presidential race. In 1969, he successfully formed the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), a five-party alliance which became instrumental in the removal of Ayub Khan. In 1977, too, he played a significant role in forming the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) which finally led to the ousting of Z.A. Bhutto’s government.

Nawabzada had hoped that smaller parties and groups in the National Assembly would support him outright but they were so few that he could bag only 91 votes, while Khan with the support of two major parties secured 348 votes.

In the centre, Benazir formed a coalition with Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the Awami National Party (ANP). However, in the provinces too, the results were not favourable for her. In the NWFP, the IJI won 28 seats, the PPP 20 and the NAP 12 out of 77 seats. In Balochistan’s 34-seat house, the PPP won three seats while IJI and JUI-F won eight seats each, while the rest went to independent candidates.

The governor of Balochistan, Lt-Gen (rtd) Musa Khan dismissed the assembly even before a provincial government could be formed. However, in January 1989, Balochistan High Court restored the assembly. The dissolution of the Balochistan Assembly did not augur well and needed careful handling.

The worst show of politics was seen in the Punjab, where Muslim League-Nawaz emerged as the largest party with 108 seats in a house of 260 members. The PPP lagged behind with 93 seats. In a strange manner of voting in Punjab, 41 members were elected as independents.

In Sindh, the home province of Benazir, the PPP won 67 seats in a house of 114 members, with the MQM bagging 26 seats followed by 16 independent members. Since the IJI had not found a footing in the province till then, it could only secure one seat.

Although the PPP could have formed an independent government in Sindh, the situation there was quite different from the rest of Pakistan. With the MQM having won 26 seats in urban Sindh, it was the obligation of the majority party to include the MQM in the government. After a number of consultative meetings, the PPP and MQM agreed on a long charter of cooperation with the latter pledging support to PPP in both federal and provincial governments.

The agreement resolved that the coalition government would protect and safeguard the interests of all the people of Sindh, irrespective of language, religion or origin of birth as well as stamp out violence and support the rule of law. However, the coalition moved with certain difficulties which affected the overall administration in Sindh.

Urdu-speaking students had begun taking part in activities under the banner of All Pakistan Muhajir Students Organisation in 1984. They contested local politics in 1987 a and after the 1988 elections, their party became a part of the PPP-led coalition government. Reports of continued violence from Karachi and other parts of Sindh put pressure on the leadership of both parties. With no end in sight to the violence, the coalition government came to an end on May 1,1989 —just six months into the partnership. Three MQM ministers resigned but the party leadership decided that it would continue to support the PPP in the centre. The cooperation continued till Aug 6, 1990 when the PPP government was dismissed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on charges of misgovernance and corruption.

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, July 10th, 2016

http://www.dawn.com/news/1269385/a-leaf-from-history-slaves-to-ghulam

A leaf from history: A taste of defeat

SHAIKH AZIZ — PUBLISHED Jul 24, 2016 06:50am

Wasim Sajjad -Photo courtesy: newsletter.senate.gov.pk

From the very beginning of her term, Benazir Bhutto was aware that she had been elected in an unfriendly environment and would have to sail through rough waters. Just three weeks into the Prime Minister House, she was confronted by the election of the chairman of the Senate, scheduled for Dec 24, 12 days after the presidential vote on Dec 12.

The election to the prestigious office, which had fallen vacant when Senate chairman Ghulam Ishaq Khan had assumed the responsibility of acting president after Gen Zia’s crash, had become a point of prestige for Benazir Bhutto and the opposition leader Nawaz Sharif.

Bhutto did not have enough seats in the Senate to enable her to elect a Senate chairman of her choice without support from any other party or group. While she was still looking for a perfect candidate, Senator Tariq Chaudhry, a PPP supporter at the time, despite having no support in the house decided to contest the election.

Senator Wasim Sajjad however stood a better chance as he enjoyed support of other leaders and was a popular person. He belonged to a respectable family from Jalandhar, India. His father Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan was a jurist and had served as chief election commissioner for the 1977 elections. Wasim Sajjad was well-educated and had served as federal minister for interior in Mohammad Khan Junejo’s government. He had been elected member of the Senate in 1980 during Gen Zia’s dictatorial regime.

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Wasim Sajjad’s victory in the Senate elections came as Benazir’s first defeat in the early days of her premiership

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In 1988, supported by President Ghulam Ishaq, the opposition leader Nawaz Sharif and other IJI component parties, Sajjad was ready to contest election for the Senate chairman.

Benazir did not want Tariq Chaudhry to contest the election because Wasim Sajjad had a better chance of winning but Chaudhary took a decision without her approval. Consequently, Wasim Sajjad bagged 53 votes while Tariq Chaudhry got 24 votes — Bhutto’s first defeat in her nascent political career.

As chairman, Wasim Sajjad played a positive role in the house, consolidating his position. He was elected four times till 1999, and with 12 years in the office he became the longest serving chairman of the Senate.

Meanwhile, Benazir Bhutto was trying to tackle the issues confronting her as best as she could. She hoped that more democratic elements would come to the assemblies after the next elections so that it would be possible to scrap the Eighth Amendment.

The situation in Punjab was most challenging for Benazir. As she waited for a favourable time, rumours spread that the PM was going to introduce a new strategy that would give her government a fresh boost. Before the ruling party could confirm or reject it, Chief of Army Staff Gen Aslam Baig called on her and advised her to make a broad-based government by inducting some members of the opposition parties in order to come out of political instability. Apparently, this advice had some sinister undercurrents. Benazir Bhutto took the advice, along with additional recommendation from the COAS to invite the opposition party leaders to nominate their members, instead of picking them out by herself. This was aimed at stopping Benazir’s attempts to woo members of the opposition to her government so that she could form a multi-party government.

On the other hand, it had become quite obvious that Nawaz Sharif was persistently trying to end the PPP government through a mid-term elections and had been meeting with leaders of various parties in this regard. In response, Benazir Bhutto initiated a move to destabilise Nawaz Sharif in Punjab, where he had formed a provincial government without any external help. It was purely a numbers game and to dislodge Nawaz Sharif in Punjab was not as simple as she thought.

The result of the Senate chairman election was no surprise for Benazir Bhutto and she was more concerned by reports of other moves being contemplated by Nawaz Sharif, presumably supported by President Ishaq Khan and the COAS Gen Aslam Baig. There were rumours that President Ghulam Ishaq might ask Benazir Bhutto to seek a vote of confidence. This was the brainchild of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, once a PPP stalwart and now head of a faction supported by his allies Nawaz Sharif and Ishaq Khan.

Benazir was surrounded by a political mess that could only be dealt with shrewd political skills. She wanted to create a smooth, working atmosphere.

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, July 24th, 2016

http://www.dawn.com/news/1272448/a-leaf-from-history-a-taste-of-defeat

A Leaf From History: (Im) balance of power

SHAIKH AZIZ — PUBLISHED Oct 02, 2016 07:20am

With 94 seats in a house of 207, Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) had assumed the reigns of power in 1988 knowing that a hung parliament might prove to be a thorn in the side for the new government. And so it proved, as Benazir struggled to assert herself or her party’s mandate on the status quo.

In the corridors of power, there was deep-rooted opposition and skepticism to Benazir’s person and to her party that claimed to espouse liberal and progressive values. Politics was firmly considered a man’s game and Benazir would have to fight the age-old perception that it was un-Islamic for any woman to be the head of state (though in her case she was head of goverment).

She countered this view by claiming that despite having been raised as a modern woman, she was a true Muslim. After entering active politics, she began wearing a dupatta (head scarf), shalwar kameez and supported moves to adhere to an Islamic code of life. Her wedding ceremony too was conducted according to Islamic traditions. And yet, her efforts to change biases fell on deaf ears.

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Although democracy had returned in 1988, Benazir soon discovered that her powers as prime minister were severely clipped

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But perhaps, this demonisation of her person was just the tip of the iceberg.

Benazir decided to adopt a conciliatory position because she believed that she would not be tolerated by the various power players she was surrounded by. Her first move was to maintain amicable ties with the powerful president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, as well as the army. Central to her disagreements was the matter of power — how much of it could be exerted by the prime minister and how much of it was to be exercised by the president.

Since Gen Ziaul Haq’s time, the balance of power had constitutionally been skewed towards the president. Through the Eighth Amendment, for example, Gen Zia had given the president the right to unilaterally dissolve the National Assembly and the incumbent government.

Benazir attempted to redress the imbalance but found many obstacles in her way. In his book Trial and Error (2002), Iqbal Akhund, one of Benazir’s confidantes who also served in the foreign office during her first regime, argues that Benazir could have prevailed had she adhered to her principles without caring for the fragile support she’d receive in the National Assembly.

This was a difficult path to tread, although it was also a more probable way to succeed in the long run. She began to follow this guideline but soon lost control of things. Ties with the presidency, army, and judiciary all went sour, and everything was lost before the brakes could be applied.

Among the first disagreements between Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan was over the appointment of judges to higher courts and the appointment and transfers of senior officers in the armed forces. In both cases, the prime minister could only recommend changes but not make them.

Many of Benazir’s proposed changes to internal policy were rejected by the president, who asked her to have them passed through the parliament instead. The president knew full well that the prime minister would never head to the National Assembly because she did not have enough support in the house.

Then there was the issue of the army chief. Gen Mirza Aslam Baig, who had been promoted as the chief of army staff (COAS) immediately after the Bahawalpur crash, was scheduled to retire in August 1991. Traditionally, the outgoing chief of a service recommends the name of his potential successor to the government. In case of a difference of opinion, the prime minister or president (as the case may be) can nominate another officer of their choice.

When discussions came about regarding Gen Baig’s future, Benazir recalled that he was instrumental in having constitutional rule restored after the Bahawalpur air crash. He was the first senior military officer to reach Islamabad and he was the one who immediately called the other two service chiefs — Admiral Iftikhar Ahmad Sirohey and Air Chief Marshal Hakeemullah Khan Durrani — into a three-hour-long meeting.

Gen Baig convinced the other two to restore the constitution and subsequently, power was handed over to Senate Chairman Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who was to hold elections to the national and provincial assemblies as scheduled. Later on, Gen Baig would tell PPP leaders that it was he who brought Benazir Bhutto to power.

Although Gen Baig was confirmed as a four-star general by Benazir, and also awarded the Tamgha-i-Jamhooriat, the prime minister did not recommend an extension to his service. This move was supported by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who promptly appointed Gen Asif Nawaz as the new COAS.

The appointment of the chief of the joint staff committee (CJSC) also widened the fissures between the PM and the president. Benazir wanted to extend the tenure of Admiral Sirohey after the completion of his first stint but she ran into constitutional wrangles once again. Admiral Sirohey had been appointed on November 10, 1988 — a month before Benazir’s ascension as the PM — and was to retire on August 17, 1991.

The post of CJSC practically does not offer any authority over the three combating forces; the service chiefs retain charge of their command authority. The position had been created in March 1976 by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in an attempt to better coordinate the actions of the three staff chiefs and to tend to their operational requirements.

After taking oath as the prime minister, Benazir believed that she was the authority to appoint the CJSC. She was wrong. Gen Zia had amended this clause and handed decision-making authority to the president. When the communiqué from PM Bhutto about Admiral Sirohey’s extension reached President Ishaq Khan, it was shot down. After completing his tenure on August 17, Admiral Sirohey was relieved and Gen Shamim Alam Khan was appointed in his place.

Even though the Benazir-Ishaq row over the balance of power eventually reached a settlement, the tussle did not end there. With one hatchet buried, many more were set to swing in the days to come.

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, October 2nd, 2016

http://www.dawn.com/news/1287132/a-leaf-from-history-im-balance-of-power

A Leaf From History: Benazir’s angels

SHAIKH AZIZ — PUBLISHED Dec 18, 2016 07:01am

Despite the deck being stacked against her government, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto survived the November 1, 1989 vote of no-confidence moved by Nawaz Sharif and his Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI). Before the vote, the presidency, army chief and intelligence agencies had forged unity and decided to act decisively, which they did. But while the establishment had held up its end, Nawaz failed to push the vote through.

An inquest was needed and Nawaz wanted answers for the debacle.

A total of 119 votes were needed to dislodge Benazir. With 92 seats in the National Assembly, the PPP needed at least another 27 votes to survive. The IJI had 54 votes but sought an extra 65 votes to oust the government. With both parties in need of additional votes, a battle to woo parliamentarians to their respective sides began in earnest.

In reinforcing party loyalties, PPP planners swung into action much before the tabling of the no-confidence resolution on October 23. During this hectic period, all efforts were geared towards reinforcing the ranks of the party, luring votes by securing the perfect deal and making up the requisite numbers.

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The PPP government might have survived the 1989 vote of no confidence but who saved her?

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On the other hand, the IJI focused most of their efforts on wooing the 37 independent candidates to their side. Allegedly, a lot of money was thrown around in horse-trading by both parties. The situation was such that many observers termed the politics of the time a lucrative business. In the final count, the IJI-led opposition could only bag 107 votes, falling short by 12 votes.

For the IJI, the vote result pointed to an uncomfortable reality: five of its members stayed away from what was going down. Among them was an old Nawaz loyalist, Humayun Akhtar, and his absence was noticed. As punishment, he was denied a party ticket in the October 1990 elections.

Meanwhile, the PPP wanted to know who the 37 members who had rescued their government were. One explanation was that the independent candidates whom Nawaz was banking on had broken down and voted in favour of the PPP government. This factor came as a rude shock to Nawaz given the identity of those who had joined forces to oust the Benazir government.

Before the vote of no confidence, Benazir had accused the president, the army chief and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of conspiring to bring down the government. This was termed a political statement at the time but 24 years later intelligence officials testified before higher courts that they had been involved in political manoeuvering.

In a case heard by a three-member bench of the Supreme Court in February 2013 regarding the misappropriation of Intelligence Bureau secret funds during 1989, former IB director general Masood Khan Khattak claimed that non-political forces were behind the vote. He named President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and army chief Gen Mirza Aslam Baig as the men who wanted to dislodge the Benazir government in the shortest possible span of time.

During the testimony, he also spoke about pre-poll rigging in the November 1988 elections which began with the formation of the IJI. According to him, the establishment was only forced to hand over power to Benazir on December 2, 1988 due to the weight of 92 PPP MNAs-elect at that time.

Meanwhile, independent assessments of the vote and its fallout attributed the opposition’s failure in dislodging the government to terrible political timing. It was argued that the political situation had not yet developed to such a crescendo to prompt a vote. Nor had the allegations against the PPP government built the kind of momentum that could create cracks in the ruling party. PPP loyalists too were largely satisfied with their leaders and there appeared no cause of dissention or fissures within.

Lateral entrants to the PPP had no interest in the party ideology either; their loyalty depended on personal favours that were being extended to them. In fact, there were some disgruntled elements whose loyalty to the party leadership was under question. But despite the opposition’s efforts to lure these members to their side, the members stayed put.

The independents that the IJI leadership thought would be keen on joining forces seemed inclined not to believe in mere promises. Believing that a bird in the hand is better than two in the bush, many chose to side with Benazir to gain immediate benefits.

Though the government of Benazir Bhutto was sent packing eight months later, it was not through a parliamentary vote but by presidential decree. For the time being, Article 58 2 (b) would hold greater sway than the popular mandate. It would later be removed by the one man who was adamant that it be employed in 1989: Nawaz Sharif.

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, December 18th, 2016

http://www.dawn.com/news/1302495/a-leaf-from-history-benazirs-angels