Introduction
The 1940 Lahore Resolution demanded:
- Muslim majority regions as in the north-west and eastern zone of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.
- Now Bengali Muslims believed that when independence came there would be an autonomous state centre in Bengal
- In 1946, the word ‘states’ became ‘state’
- And in 1947, Bengal was partitioned again, Calcutta (the financial hub) was gone to India and East Bengalis were governed from Karachi which was over 1000 miles away.
Social and cultural disparity
- Urdu spoken by 6% of population, Bengali by 56%
- Some in West Pakistan considered their culture to be superior to that of East Pakistan
Economic disparity
- Trade with West Bengal had been cut off since 1947
- Calcutta part of India now
- More than twice as much foreign aid and capital investment went to West Pakistan as East Pakistan
- Bengalis believed their earnings from trade in jute were used in West Pakistan
- Per capita income rose in West Pakistan, declined in East Pakistan; by 1970 East Pakistan was 40% poorer than West Pakistan
- Largest spending by the government was on defense to protect the border with India; mostly the border with West Pakistan
- Very less spending on health and education in East Pakistan
Political disparity
- East Pakistan was almost always ruled by West Pakistani elites
- Less than 20% military officers were from East Pakistan
- High level posts in Dhaka were filled by West Pakistanis or refugees from India who had become Pakistani citizens
General Yahya Khan
- Commander in Chief of the Army and the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA)
- He announced: (a) Basic Democracy failed (b) There would be a properly elected government (c) One Unit System was a failure (so there should be a return of provincial government)
- One Unit Plan annulled (Pakistan’s 4 provinces re-established)
- The 1962 Constitution annulled
- Yahya was committed to bringing democracy to Pakistan based on ‘one man, one vote’
- From January 1970 political activity resumed
- The proposed National Assembly was to have 300 members
- The Assembly would have 120 days (4 months) to draw up a new constitution
- 3 days after the National Assembly elections there would be provincial elections
- Elections were to be held in October 1970 (due to a natural calamity they were held on 7 December 1970)
The 1970 cyclone
- On 12 Nov 1970, East Pakistan was hit by the deadliest tropical cyclone ever recorded leaving 500,000 dead
- West Pakistan was slow to react
- This attitude made sentiments of people in East Pakistan very high against the West Pakistan
- Elections were held just weeks after the cyclone (it meant election results would be influenced by this incident)
Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman’s Six Points
- The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in its true sense on the Lahore Resolution, and the parliamentary form of government with supremacy of a Legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise.
- The federal government should deal with only two subjects: Defence and Foreign Affairs, and all other residuary subjects shall be vested in the federating states.
- Two separate, but freely convertible currencies for two wings should be introduced; or if this is not feasible, there should be one currency for the whole country, but effective constitutional provisions should be introduced to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Furthermore, a separate Banking Reserve should be established, and separate fiscal and monetary policy be adopted for East Pakistan.
- The power of taxation and revenue collection shall be vested in the federating units and the federal centre will have no such power on the issue. The federation will be entitled to a share in the state taxes to meet its expenditures.
- There should be two separate accounts for the foreign exchange earnings of the two wings; the foreign exchange requirements of the federal government should be met by the two wings equally or in a ratio to be fixed; indigenous products should move free of duty between the two wings, and the Constitution should empower the units to establish trade links with foreign countries.
- East Pakistan should have a separate militia or paramilitary force.
Monetary policy is a modification of the supply of money, i.e. “printing” more money, or decreasing the money supply by changing interest rates or removing excess reserves. This is in contrast to fiscal policy, which relies on taxation, government spending, and government borrowing as methods for a government to manage business cycle phenomena such as recessions.
Problematic results
- Main parties: the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Pakistan people’s Party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
- Awami League won: 160 of 162 seats for NA (all in East Pakistan)
- PPP won: 81 of 138 seats for NA (all in West Pakistan)
- The Awami League had contested the election on a manifesto calling for political and economic independence for East Pakistan. The League would have a (simple) majority in the National Assembly enough to form the government on its own. Yahya did not want to allow the traditional domination of West to be overturned
- Yahya and the West Pakistani politicians were not prepared to allow the Six Points to be put into action; Mujib believed they were negotiable. However, he had little chance to explain this.
The crisis deepens
- In February 1971, Bhutto announced that the PPP would not take up their seats in the National Assembly unless Mujib talked with the other parties and reached an agreement about power sharing
- On 1 March 1971, just 2 days before it was due to meet, Yahya was forced to postpone the opening of the Assembly without setting a new date
- The people of East Pakistan considered that they had been betrayed by Yahya and immediately began a campaign of mass civil disobedience, strikes, demonstrations and refusal to pay taxes
- When it became clear that the power of the central government had broken down in East Pakistan, Yahya recalled the provincial governor and appointed General Tikka Khan as Chief Martial law Administrator and the Governor (all it meant was a military solution to a political problem).
- From 15 to 25 March, Yahya and Bhutto met Mujib as the last resort, but no agreement was reached
Operation Searchlight
- Military operation began against the Awami League on 25/26 March; Bengali intelligentsia, academics and Hindus were treated with extreme harshness
- Mujib was arrested, thousands of Bengalis were murdered
- Press censorship was imposed, all political activity throughout Pakistan was banned
- On 26 March Bengalis announced in a secret radio broadcast from Dhaka the formation of the Sovereign People’s Republic of Bangladesh
- Yahya’s measures were supported by all political parties in West Pakistan and Bhutto claimed that Pakistan has been saved. Rather than being saved the reality was millions of Bengali refugees were fleeing across the border to India and civil war was now inevitable
- On 31 March India declared its support for the people of Bengal against West Pakistan
Pakistan versus India
- The Indian Army began to help and train a rebel Bengali Army, which called itself Mukti Bahini. As a result, relations between India and Pakistan deteriorated rapidly.
- By early April army had gained control of most of the major towns
- In August 1971, the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Commerce with India. All it meant was a Soviet promise of help for India if it went to war with Pakistan
- Pakistan’s own allies China and the USA were much less keen to be involved; they urge Yahya to negotiate an agreement with the Awami League
- Yahya believed that army could handle the situation and he could win any war with India
- On 21 November, the Mukti Baini launched an offensive on Jessore and captured the town.
- Yahya declared a state of emergency and told his people to be ready for war
- In response, the Indians began to build up their forces on the East Pakistan border.
- On 29 November, the Awami League announced the members of its provisional government
War with India
- On 3 December, Pakistan Airforce launched attacks on north India
- On 4 December India attacked East Pakistan from air, ground and sea simultaneously
- 2 days later (6 December) India official recognized Bangladeshi government
- Within 2 weeks the Indian forces had surrounded Dhaka
- The Pakistan Army tried to divert the Indian army from East Pakistan by launching attacks in Kashmir and Punjab, but they were not very successful
- Whilst the fighting was going on, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had been trying to find a solution to stop the war
- Bhutto attended UNSC session on behalf of Yahya Khan, on 15 December but refused to accept any of the 2 proposals and left the session.
- On 16 December Yahya accepted defeat and ordered the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan to surrender
- In Dhaka Mukti Bahini carried out massacres of anyone suspected of having collaborated with the Pakistan Army
- It is also alleged that in the final days before surrender the Pakistan Army wiped out large numbers of professional Bengalis to weaken the new country and make it less of a rival to Pakistan
- 93000 soldiers were taken as prisoners of war in spite of being well supplied for at least a month
Consequences of the war
- Defeat brought disgrace for the army and for Yahya
- On 20 December he was forced to resign and the Pakistan Army placed Bhutto as the President and (the civilian) Chief Martial Law Administrator
- On 21 December 1971 the Republic of Bangladesh was officially declared an two weeks later Bhutto released Mujib from prison
- He returned to Bangladesh where on 10 January 1971, he became the country’s first Prime Minister.
- Why did Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman present his Six Points? [7]
The Awami League and its East Pakistani supporters believed their province was not politically and economically independent. They complained that although they were a majority in the Constituent Assembly, Governor Generals and Prime Ministers were nearly always from West Pakistan. This was also true of appointments to senior positions in the armed forces (less than 20% of officers were from East Pakistan), to senior government positions and to posts in the civil service. Even high level posts in Dhaka were usually filled by West Pakistanis or refugees from India who had become Pakistani citizens.
The Bengalis also believed that West Pakistan’s economic growth had taken place as a result of transferring resources from East to West Pakistan. They argued that the single largest Pakistani export was jute, which was grown in East Pakistan. Whereas perhaps the largest spending by the government was on defense to protect the border with India. Since most of the border between the two countries lay in West Pakistan, some East Pakistanis considered that spending on the army was really to protect West Pakistan. There was no major border dispute between East Pakistan and India.
With regard to these arguments, Sheikh Mujib wanted to resolve the political problem through a directly elected government (formed by an election using universal adult franchise (suffrage)). To stop the supposed flow of resources, he demanded separate financial policies, separate reserve banks, and maximum provincial autonomy to the extent of freedom to sign their own trade agreements with other countries. Sheikh Mujib’s 6 Points were also endorsed by the Lahore Resolution of 1940 which demanded two sovereign states in India rather than just one. Precisely, the Six Points were calling for a loose federation with East Pakistan as one of the federating units.
- How was the Awami League able to win such a huge victory in the 1970 elections? [7]
The Awami League was able to win support by proposing a programme which called for a fairer share of government spending and more power to the provinces. It was able to exploit the sense of frustration felt by the people in East Pakistan towards their Muslim countrymen in West Pakistan. It won their huge victory by campaigning on the basis of the Six Points.
Another credit of this victory goes to Gen. Yahya Khan who all of a sudden attempted to bring democracy back to the country by announcing elections on the basis of direct vote for the very first time in Pakistan since independence.
Apart from the social, cultural, political and economic disparity, the tropical cyclone of November 1970 also influenced election results. This cyclone claimed 500,000 lives. The slow response from the central government for relief operations further pushed East Pakistanis towards Sheikh Mujib’s agenda. Indian reaction to the catastrophe in terms of relief operations created a soft image of India in East Pakistan while anti-West Pakistan sentiments ran high.
- Why did the victory of the Awami League cause a constitutional crisis? [7]
The reaction of the West Pakistani (military) establishment to the 1970 election results showed how incompetent and naïve they were in terms of politics and governance. When Yahya Khan allocated 162 seats to East Pakistan and 138 seats to West Pakistan, did he ever anticipate this situation in which East Pakistanis would be able to form a government on their own without sharing power with West Pakistanis in the Cabinet? Why had the Yahya Khan regime not presented a power sharing formula between East and West Pakistan when elections were announced for the country? Yahya Khan and Bhutto were struck by surprise when they saw the election results, which was so wrong. If no power sharing formula had been decided earlier, why it was being imposed upon Sheikh Mujib? If 6 Points were unacceptable why Mujib was allowed to contest the elections in the first place when he had made these points his election manifesto?
Yahya Khan had realized how big blunder he had made by announcing elections without any constitution to guide the formation of government. As per his plan the new Assembly would form the new constitution. This was very illogical rather nonsensical; because the new Assembly itself was going to become problematic.
No doubt, Mujib’s Six Points were scary and damaging to the federation of Pakistan. They were calling for political and economic independence for East Pakistan, in other words they were giving partial independence to East Pakistan, they were also going to begin a never ending tussle between both wings / provinces as they would weaken West Pakistan defense against India when East Pakistan was perhaps signing trade agreements with our archrival simultaneously. In other words, if Six Points were put into action, East Pakistan might have had good relations with India while India would still be unfriendly towards West Pakistan.
However, Yahya and West Pakistani politicians had not realized that Awami League could not have formed a constitution on its own with 160 seats in the Assembly. Therefore fears of a constitution which would allow separation of East Pakistan or weakening of federation were baseless. The most important reason was that they were not willing to accept a powerful Bengali Prime Minister and a Bengali Cabinet. Ayub and Yahya had ruled Bengal for 13 years but their comrades were not ready to live under Bengali rule for a single day!
- Why did civil war break out in East Pakistan? [7]
The most important reason was that there was an extremely incompetent leadership imposed upon Pakistan in the form of General Yahya Khan. Pakistan Army was directly responsible for this as it was providing the backing to this martial law regime.
Before Yahya Khan, there was another military general, Ayub Khan who did not allow the country to have democracy in 1958 when he illegally usurped power and imposed his own constitution which negated fundamental human rights to the people. Because of Ayub Khan’s recessive policies, election rigging in the 1964-65 elections, East Pakistan had been totally cornered. The martial law regime’s anti-East Pakistan measures fanned separatism among Bengalis which gave rise to Mujib’s 6 Points. Then Ayub’s mishandling of Mujib turned him into a national leader from a less popular figure.
Finally, when the military establishment and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto decided to reject election results of 1970 elections with an excuse of Mujib’s 6 Points and imposition of some power sharing formula, it made the people of East Pakistan believe that West Pakistan was not willing to give them their due rights. Operation Searchlight put the last nail in the coffin of united Pakistan. East Pakistanis were thus forced into a civil war, as they did not see a better option. At the same time, Indian role cannot be ignored; India fully exploited the situation against Pakistan by training a rebel force of Mukti Bahini as well as supplying necessary equipment for full fledge civil war.
- Why did India want to go to war with Pakistan in 1971? [7]
There’s no doubt that India wanted to go to war with Pakistan because the relations between the two countries had been at low ebb and perhaps India wanted to take a revenge of what happened in 1965. Interestingly both times, in 1965 and 1971, Pakistan was under a military dictator. In other words, both military dictators worked to worsen the relations between the two countries instead of improving them. India supported the East Pakistani rebels because it was not a friendly nation.
India had also realized that Pakistan was led by weak leadership which had little acceptance among the people, especially in East Pakistan. Perhaps Indians had also identified the weak areas of Pakistan Army from the 1965 War that almost all Pakistani advance and defense was concentrated in the West Pakistan and East Pakistan was almost unguarded. Therefore when a full scale war began, India neutralized Pakistan Airforce and Navy in East Pakistan and when the army surrendered on 16 December 1971, it was just 90,000 strong, which is a question mark for military leadership in West Pakistan.
India was led by a shrewd politician, Indira Gandhi, who had outclassed Pakistani foreign policy makers by signing a treaty with the USSR against Pakistan and by making sure that China and USA were not coming to support Pakistan in an event of war.
In short, India was quite confident to win a war in 1971 against Pakistan as they believed Pakistan was ruled by incompetent and ineffective rulers who were bound to lose.
- Why did Pakistan Army surrender to Indian Army in 1971? [7]
First of all, we know that surrendering on 16 December 1971 was not the decision of the commander of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan. Rather it was the decision of the Commander in Chief and the President of Pakistan who was based in West Pakistan. It meant that Yahya made this decision based on the reports coming from East Pakistan by the Pakistan Army sources. And Yahya making this decision also meant that he had lost hope for any success in the war.
He knew that Chinese and Americans were not willing to extend any help unlike India which was being aided by the Soviet Union diplomatically and with material support also.
Secondly, the public opinion in East Pakistan was in favour of the Awami League and against the West Pakistani establishment, army in particular. And it had happened because a political problem was mishandled by military generals who had no idea how to resolve such issues. Operation Searchlight had diminished all hopes of reconciliation with the Awami League. The military operation transformed a political movement into Bengali nationalist movement which forced the army to admit that it was not able to fight the people.
Thirdly, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s role was too negative and full of suspicions. It seems he did not want to resolve this issue. He probably facilitated the fall of Dhaka for his ambitions to come true as the ruler of West Pakistan. It was obvious that if East Pakistan had not broken off, Bhutto would never have become the most influential figure in the country. He’s the person directly getting benefited from the crisis and the tragedy!
Fourthly, there was a general incompetence on part of the army and its intelligence as well as the martial law administration. They did not know how to treat people and how to do politics. They just imposed themselves upon people by the backing of military and tried to dictate the masses with an iron fist like the British colonials did. They had forgotten in their arrogance that they were not equal to the British colonials of India in might and intelligence both.
- Do you agree that defeat in the war meant Yahya had to resign? [7]
Defeat in the war meant Pakistan Army had failed. It hadn’t only lost in the battlefield but it lost on the political front also. The army had been disgraced. It had no moral courage to face the nation. It had to go in the background and replace its leadership by some civilian figure, at least for a while. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the perfect choice for that.
Bhutto was basically trained as a politician by the quarters of military under Iskander Mirza and then Ayub Khan. He also seemed to be the favourite of Gen. Yahya Khan as he was sent to East Pakistan by Yahya to negotiate with Mujib. He was also sent to the United Nations Security Council in December 1971 by Yahya to represent Pakistan.
Defeat in the war also meant that there were 93000 prisoners of war in the Indian custody that needed to be brought home, as they were adding disgrace to the army and the country with every passing day. The army did not want to send a general to negotiate with Indians over this matter. They needed a civilian to do this job for them. It happened to be Bhutto who signed the Simla Agreement in 1972.
- Do you agree that Pakistan lost the 1971 civil war because of Indian intervention? Give reason for your answer. [14]
No doubt, the stated reason is very important as due to Indian intervention East Pakistani rebels were able to receive training and military equipment. However, it should also be noted that India got involved in this matter because of Pakistan’s poor relations with this neighbouring country. Military regimes in Pakistan since 1958 believed Pakistan could prosper by maintaining poor relations with India in the name of Kashmir, they were wrong. Events in 1971 proved that they were wrong. Had Pakistan and India had good relations, India would never have got involved in this issue.
Here we may ask a question. If India had not been involved in this matter, would the Awami League have been able to liberate East Pakistan? This is debatable. Theoretically, Pakistan Army would be able to maintain order in East Pakistan, rebellion would be crushed no doubt. Later on confidence building measures could be restarted. But the impact of denial of due rights to the east and that of the military operation would be long lasting. People of East Pakistan were gifted with political awareness and a passion of Bengali nationalism against Punjabi establishment. They would no more accept West Pakistani domination with an ease.
We could not also ignore the fact that people in East Pakistan had a sense of social, political and economic disparity with West Pakistan. They had started believing that they did not belong to West Pakistan at all. If religion was a uniting factor, then it existed with other parts in the world also in other Muslim countries. Religion alone was not enough to form a nation state in the modern world. The momentum and political heat in East Pakistan which began from Operation Searchlight was most likely to continue until a logical end was met.
On the battle ground there was an important factor going against Pakistan’s armed forces and it was the distance of over 1000 miles between east and west. This distance was affecting troop’s mobilization and their supplies. Fighting an armed resistance is not an easy job. It requires a strong economy to continue with such efforts in a civil war. Given the fact that Pakistan did not have an impressive economy in 1971, it was likely that Pakistan would lose the civil war in the end.
However, most importantly, it was Indian intervention which made things happen very fast, and Pakistan lost the war. Therefore I agree with the stated reason only partially that Indian intervention caused this failure.
- Operation Searchlight was justified. Do you agree? Explain your answer. [14]
Operation Searchlight was a military operation launched on 25 March 1971 which claimed lives of thousands of Bengalis who were considered a threat to the integrity of Pakistan by the then military government of General Yahya Khan.
From the perspective of the civilised world, it was totally unacceptable because of its legality, scale (thousands of people who were allegedly noncombatants killed), impact (it led to a civil war) and moral justification (a military force can’t be used against citizens of the same country). People targeted in the operation were considered traitors who were working on foreign (Indian) agenda. At this point, the question arises who gave the right to the military government for declaring who was loyal and who was not. If some people were involved in sedition, were they put on trial? If some of them were put on trial, would they be declared as Indian agents? Military operation against civilians also meant that there was no rule of law or the judicial system had failed. If it was true, did Yahya Khan’s government have any justification to exist any further? How come an incompetent and failed government decides that political opposition maybe handled with a military force?
We read that almost all West Pakistani politicians including Bhutto supported Operation Searchlight. The question is if approval from rival politicians could legalise oppression? Were rival politicians equal to judicial system?
Sheikh Mujib had won the election and achieved simple majority. He had all the right to form a government. Yahya’s and Bhutto’s efforts to stop him from doing so were not less than a crime.
The heated political atmosphere could be neutralized through a grand political dialogue between the East and West. West and East Pakistani politicians must have intervened and reached a workable solution to the crisis. Foreign ministry needed to be active and send their missions to talk to the Indian government, even the Soviet leadership so as to stop hostilities. Press and media censorship would be lifted so that common Pakistanis in both wings could be involved in peace keeping efforts. There would be no need of any military option then.
To give a fair analysis, I would also look at the possibility where this operation could be justified. This is true that Sheikh Mujib and his Awami League had publicly displayed themselves as separatists especially when Yahya Khan postponed the inauguration session of the elected Assembly. This behavior could not be expected from a seasoned politician like Mujib especially after winning such a landslide victory in East Pakistan. He must have given another chance and more time to the military government, as by law he deserved to be the Prime Minister of the united Pakistan. But he hurriedly cut off relations with the federation and began his campaign of noncooperation and civil disobedience which was bound to cause violence. Under these circumstances the military government was not left with many options.
If you ask my opinion, I shall never condone the use of military force against own countrymen. It was so unfortunate that East Pakistanis were treated as General Dyer treated Indians in the Jalianwala Bagh Massacre. Actually General Dyer did not kill his own countrymen but General Yahya/Tikka Khan did something worse, they killed their own countrymen after branding them as traitors.