A leaf from history: Bhutto nabbed

Shaikh Aziz

May 25, 2014

At 4am on September 3, 1977, as the Bhutto family slept in their 70-Clifton residence, commandos broke the main gate open and dashed upstairs to the deposed prime minister’s bedroom. Telephone lines had already been severed. The deposed premier did not react. He knew why the commandos had arrived: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was under arrest.

Charged under sections 302 (premeditated murder), 120 (criminal conspiracy) and 109 (Abetment) for the murder of Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Kasuri, Bhutto calmly walked downstairs with the commandos. This arrest was in the making ever since Murree, when Bhutto had warned General Ziaul Haq that he had committed the act of “high treason” for toppling an elected government.

Ever since that moment, Gen Zia had become haunted by the perpetual fear of being punished by Bhutto were he and his party ever able to rule the country again. This fear was consolidated after Bhutto repeated his threat in speeches made at various railway stations during his journey home from his detention in Murree. Multitudes had gathered to see and hear Bhutto.

Now Zia had two options: either to allow a free Bhutto to contest the elections; or to have him apprehended and embroiled in cases. As an American news magazine put two years later, there was one grave and two bodies —only one had to be buried. A worried Zia thought it best not to occupy the spot.

Civil and military officials then began hunting for any substantive evidence to implicate Bhutto in some crime. The first case prepared against the deposed prime minister was that he had used government-owned tractors on his personal land; the charges did not carry enough punitive weight and the case was not persuaded.

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No one believed Zia would uphold his promise of elections.

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By mid-August, the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) had prepared its findings for Gen Zia: the murder of a Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) lawmaker, Dr Nazir Ahmad, was an old charge and was difficult to prove. But the murder of Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Kasuri, as per the FIA, bore sufficient evidence to implicate Bhutto.

Zia appeared content with that finding.

In the meanwhile, General F.A. Chishti, General Rao Farman Ali and General K.M. Arif appeared busy with preparations for the imminent election. Gen Zia had promised allowing political parties to resume political activities from Aug 1, 1977, but nobody took his claim seriously.

In fact, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) held its first post-ban meeting on Aug 7. At the Lahore meeting, it became clear that divisions among the PNA’s constituent parties ran quite deep. The dispute over the allocation of seats continued as a core issue. As with Gen Zia, the main issue before PNA leaders was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. On the last day of filing nominations, Aug 18, about 18,000 candidates had filed their papers — this included Bhutto, who wanted to contest from Lahore as well as Larkana, his home constituency.

Meanwhile, the Election Cell continued to meet various leaders, including those of the PPP. On Aug 30, the Cell met with JI’s Mian Tuffail Mohammad. More important was the meeting with former defence minister and former chief minister of Sindh, Muhammad Ayub Khuhro. A seasoned politician who hailed from Larkana, he was of the view that Bhutto’s arrest would not cause mass rioting and disturbances.

Khar and Jatoi, in other meetings, thought that perhaps the duo could get a chance to run the show; the two men met the Cell’s officers and told them that in the absence of Bhutto, they could run the affairs. Asghar Khan also expressed similar views, but the Cell officers did not show any interest.

As Zia’s men looked for sound evidence, Gen Chishti told Gen Zia about Masood Mahmood, an FSF man who had sought mercy and also pledged to become an approver in Nawab Kasuri’s murder case. Mahmood had already written a long confessionary statement. Convinced, Gen Zia thought that there was solid enough evidence with which Bhutto could be charged.

The moment to arrest Bhutto had finally arrived.

On Sept 2, Gen Zia called Gen Chishti at his residence, and asked him to head to Karachi and convey a message to General Arbab: arrest Bhutto in Kasuri’s murder case. Gen Chishti first declined, but was persuaded by Gen Zia to do it. Chishti flew from Chaklala air base to Karachi, where he conveyed the message. After executing the task, he flew back to Rawalpindi the same evening.

In Karachi, the FIA seemed to act very efficiently. By 10pm, all the officials and other staff had arrived at the Sindh Martial Law Headquarters. The military action was kept closely guarded; no official or staff member would know what had been planned until the last moment.

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On Sept 2, Gen Zia called Gen Chishti at his residence, and asked him to head to Karachi and convey a message to Gen Arbab: arrest Bhutto in Kasuri’s murder case.

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Once arrested, Bhutto was first transported to an army centre, and then flown to Lahore. In a twist of fate, Bhutto was taken to Lahore on the same Falcon aircraft that he used as prime minister. By 7.30am, the plane landed at Lahore airport. He was taken to a bungalow in the Cantonment area for a seven-day remand. From there, Bhutto was shifted to Kot Lakhpat jail.

No protest took place, as was anticipated by the Zia regime. In Sindh, Bhutto’s home province and where the PPP commanded great majority, no such protest was registered which could have forced the military government to consider the potential threat of street power.

With Bhutto arrested in Karachi, Khar and Jatoi flew to Islamabad to urgently meet with the Elections Cell. The Cell also met with some other politicians after Bhutto’s arrest, and after some consultations, decided to brief Gen Zia on the country’s law and order situation.

The Cell’s purpose was to brief Gen Zia that there was ample reason for postponing elections. When the proposal was presented to him, the General did not want to assume the entirety of this responsibility; he suggested convening a conference of all political leaders in the near future.

As the Cell officers and other relevant staff engaged into preparations, one question perturbed all: whom to invite and whom to leave out?

Next week: All parties’ moot

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, May 25th, 2014

https://www.dawn.com/news/1108023

A leaf from history : Zia re­neg­es on poll pledge

Shaikh Aziz

Updated May 18, 2014

— Photo courtesy of BBC

Amidst the over­haul in­sti­tu­ted by General Ziaul Haq’s re­gime, the fu­ture of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) had ap­peared un­cer­tain. There were two main rea­sons for this: first, be­cause of Bhutto’s ous­ter from gov­ern­ment for the time be­ing; and sec­ond, the sim­mer­ing dis­pute among com­po­nent par­ties over the al­lo­ca­tion of seats in the next elec­tions.

Asghar Khan of Tehrik-i-Istiqalal and Maulana Noorani of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam were un­re­lent­ing on their stance. They wan­ted a ma­jor share in gov­ern­ment, hop­ing that the Military Council would be in­clined to­wards them form­ing a gov­ern­ment. Khan at­ten­ded the first PNA meet­ing held on Aug 7 but did not show up lat­er — this sparked the spec­u­la­tion that the PNA had died a nat­u­ral death.

As the po­lit­i­cal sce­nar­io be­gan to heat up, some PNA lead­ers tried their best to keep the al­li­ance in­tact. At last, dur­ing the August 25 meet­ing, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam’s Mufti Mahmood had to de­ny those ru­mours. He was fol­lowed by Asghar Khan, Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, Begum Nasim Wali Khan and Pir Pagara in quel­ling news of in­fight­ing.

And yet, dif­fer­en­ces among the Alliance lead­ers were quite con­spic­u­ous.

On Aug 8, PNA chief Mufti Mahmood called on Gen Zia to seek some clar­i­fi­ca­tions. Gen Zia re­af­firmed that elec­tions would be held as sched­uled, that the ar­my would be with­drawn from Balochistan one month be­fore poll­ing, a gen­er­al am­nes­ty would be ex­ten­ded to all in Balochistan and that po­lit­i­cal de­tain­ees would be ac­quit­ted and le­gal ca­ses against them with­drawn.

Gen Zia then de­ci­ded to ad­dress the cit­i­zen­ry di­rect­ly to as­sure peo­ple that polls will be held on Oct 18, as sched­uled. He chose Independence Day (Aug 14, 1977) for his ad­dress: “If any par­ty in­ter­rupts the proc­ess of at­tain­ing the ob­jec­tive for which the armed forces had tak­en ac­tion, it would be trea­ted as an­ti-state and will be dealt with se­vere­ly. … My le­ni­en­cy should not be trea­ted as weak­ness.”

Referring to an in­ci­dent in Peshawar on August 11, when PPP work­ers had be­come un­ru­ly, the gen­er­al warned Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that no such in­ci­dents would be tol­er­ated in fu­ture and that po­lit­i­cal lead­ers would be held re­spon­si­ble for row­dy mobs.

On Aug 27, Bhutto called on Gen Zia — a meet­ing that las­ted a lit­tle less than three hours, with is­sues such as the mech­a­nism for hold­ing fair and free elec­tions sans any vic­tim­i­sa­tion al­so on the agen­da. Bhutto had of course been trav­el­ling from one town to an­oth­er, speak­ing about the coup and the prev­a­lent sit­ua­tion that the coun­try found it­self in.

By then, Gen Zia seemed to have made up his mind up re­gard­ing the coun­try’s fu­ture: he told Bhutto that there was im­mense pres­sure on him to have le­gal ca­ses against him (Bhutto) de­ci­ded by the courts be­fore the polls. Bhutto was al­so told that if some ca­ses were sent to the ju­di­cia­ry, he should re­frain from cre­at­ing any hin­drance. In fact, Gen Zia wan­ted to show that he bore no ill will to­wards Bhutto, but in­sis­ted that if the ca­ses were there and nee­ded to be de­ci­ded on mer­it.

After the meet­ing, how­ev­er, it ap­peared that all of Gen Zia’s as­sur­an­ces of hold­ing elec­tion on October 18 were on­ly meant for pub­lic con­sump­tion.

In a press in­ter­view with a US news agen­cy on Aug 17, Gen Zia pro­vi­ded a hint of post­pon­ing polls: “If ev­ery­thing is ac­com­plish­ed as plan­ned, pow­er can be trans­fer­red by Oct 28.”

Two days lat­er, Asghar Khan was the first to in­di­cate that the elec­tions were be­ing post­poned, that too in­def­i­nite­ly. On Aug 30, as he spoke to me­dia rep­re­sen­ta­tives in Lahore, he de­man­ded that all le­gal ca­ses against Bhutto and oth­er lead­ers should be de­ci­ded be­fore the elec­tions. Mahmood Ali Kasuri sup­por­ted him im­me­di­ate­ly, as oth­ers weigh­ed the sug­ges­tion.

On Sept 1, 1977, Gen Zia called a press con­fer­ence that las­ted for about five hours. While tack­ling a range of top­ics — po­lit­i­cal and oth­er­wise — Gen Zia ap­peared more in­clined to­wards pol­i­tics this time around. Like Ayub Khan be­fore him, Zia, too, showed lit­tle re­spect for pol­i­ti­cians and said that the na­tion could on­ly be uni­ted by the ar­my and not by pol­i­ti­cians.

He al­so de­clared that a new law was be­ing pro­mul­ga­ted, through which all can­di­dates of the pro­vin­cial and na­tion­al as­sem­blies would have to de­clare their as­sets, from Jan 1, 1970 till date. They would have to fur­nish an af­fi­da­vit to the ef­fect that if they had held a pub­lic of­fice, they did not use the po­si­tions for any per­son­al gain.

Journalists were al­so told about fresh meas­ures be­ing plan­ned to ex­tend great­er fa­cili­ties to the peo­ple. These in­clu­ded de­na­tion­al­i­sa­tion, more loans to farm­ers and lift­ing of the ban on trade un­ions.

But per­haps, more im­por­tant to Gen Zia was talk of elec­tions. He said that polls could be post­poned for some days or weeks, but not months. Justifying the post­pone­ment of polls, he said, “It is not in the Holy Quran nor has it been sent as a rev­e­la­tion that elec­tions will be held on Oct 18 and that noth­ing will hap­pen there­after. In my opin­ion, the pres­i­den­tial sys­tem is clos­er to Islam and is more suit­a­ble for Pakistan. I will put it up to the National Assembly on Oct 28, and leave the de­ci­sion to the next gov­ern­ment.”

Sardar Sherbaz Mazari and Mairaj Mohammad Khan (once a PPP stal­wart) joined the cho­rus of “ac­count­a­bil­i­ty first”. Asghar Khan had al­ready de­man­ded tri­al fol­lowed by elec­tions.

There was no im­me­di­ate re­ac­tion to Gen Zia’s an­nounce­ment, but two days lat­er, Maulana Maududi re­jec­ted the post­pone­ment and de­man­ded that elec­tions be held on Oct 18 and all le­gal ca­ses against pol­i­ti­cians de­ci­ded be­fore that. Many right-wing par­ties backed the post­pone­ment fol­low­ing Maududi’s dec­la­ra­tion.

Next week: Bhutto’s dra­mat­ic ar­rest in a mur­der case shai­kha­ziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, May 18th, 2014

https://www.dawn.com/news/1106517

A leaf from history: Was Asghar tipped as premier?

Shaikh Aziz

Updated July 13, 2014

Asghar Khan’s visit to the three Islamic countries was apparently part of the scheme and aimed at showing to the heads of the friendly states the person who would be the next prime minister of Pakistan. — Courtesy photo

From the day the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) came into being, Tehreek-i-Istiqlal chief retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan’s role had been debated by his colleagues of the coalition and by political observers. He also came under the spotlight when before the coup he sent a letter (May 1977) to the armed forces asking them not to obey the orders of their superiors blindly and not to follow any unlawful commands.

When the accord between the (PNA) and the PPP was reached on July 4, 1977 and only the signatures were to be put, Asghar Khan rejected the accord and asked other members of the alliance to refuse to sign, too. He pledged with complete confidence that he would bring martial law in the country followed by general elections within 90 days. At that time, a vague question was raised: on what grounds did he give such assurance and asked the alliance to reject the accord?

After the promulgation of martial law and arrest of Bhutto, his role became markedly important. On Oct 28, 1977, he left on a visit to Iran, Libya and the United Arab Emirates. On Oct 29, he called on Shah of Iran Mohammad Raza Pahalvi and again had a meeting with the Shah the next day. At Tehran, addressing a press conference he said that elections could be held in seven or eight months, and praised Gen Zia as being honest in his pledges.

The most noticeable point was his assertion that Bhutto would not return to power. He also said that his party, Tehreek-i-Istaqlal, was thinking of leaving the alliance because it joined the PNA for ousting Bhutto from power and since the objective had been achieved, it was a good time to leave the alliance. Perhaps he remembered the pledge made by Gen Zia that after the polls he would be asked to take over as prime minister. Perhaps he thought that his PNA colleagues might demand a share.

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With Bhutto incarcerated, Tehreek-i-Istiqlal bids farewell to the Pakistan National alliance

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From Iran, he proceeded to Libya and the UAE. Many observers ponder over the logic of visiting friendly countries when his own country was faced with many issues. Rao Rashid, special secretary to Z.A. Bhutto as prime minister, in his work, Jo mien ne dekha, wrote that Asghar Khan was sent by Gen Zia who had previously tipped him as the next prime minister if Bhutto was removed from the scene. According to the author, there were some elements in the army who wanted to bring Asghar Khan because they thought that Bhutto was responsible for the fall of Dhaka. Rashid also said that the army could not rule the country and so Asghar Khan could be the ‘best choice’.

After Bhutto’s hanging, Asghar Khan felt satisfied as Gen Zia had put the election team in full gear and it appeared that elections were around the corner. Like many other political aspirants who were getting new sherwanis tailored, the former air chief also got some new suits made — suitable for a prime minister.

Rao mentions that at one press conference when Mahmood Ali Kasuri said that “… when we will come to power…” Asghar Khan became angry and immediately snubbed him by asking “what do you mean by saying ‘when we came to power’.” In fact, Asghar Khan had developed a feeling that he could replace Bhutto.

Much before the promulgation of martial law on July 5, 1977 Asghar Khan had shown little interest in the PNA movement. However, when it gained some momentum, he became overactive. His insistence on failing to reach an accord with the PPP was a clear indication of who he was working for. Some quarters were of the opinion that he had been in agreement with a faction of the army. He was under the impression that after the promulgation of martial law, he would contest the elections as Zia promised and would become the next prime minister. His visit to the three Islamic countries was also apparently part of the scheme and aimed at showing to the heads of the friendly states the person who would be the next prime minister of Pakistan, latently also seeking their approval. In his close circles it was generally believed that he was the next prime minister.

When Begum Nusrat Bhutto’s petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court (Nov 10, 1977) Asghar Khan felt dejected with the PNA and announced the separation of his party from the alliance. In this regard, he sent a letter to PNA chief Mufti Mahmood, in which he criticised the alliance’s policies by saying that these were part of the ambiguous programme and termed it a reactionary group with an unclear plan incompatible with the 20th century situation.

The letter said that the component parties had suffered from internal contradictions and some parties even had regional interests. At the same time it was not capable of evolving a well-coordinated programme to run a government. He also wrote that the PNA did not contradict some revelations made in the Supreme Court. He also complained that the secretary of the alliance had raised objection to his going abroad. Narrating some unimportant events he said he was quitting the PNA.

Two days later, the alliance called a meeting of the central committee to discuss the letter. As Asghar Khan broke with the alliance, some other parties such as the Pakistan Democratic Party of Sardar Sherbaz Mazari and Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan of Maulana Noorani were also thinking of parting ways.

On the day Asghar Khan severed ties with the PNA, the CMLA issued a martial law regulation banning all student unions and professional organisations; the punishment for violation was jail and lashes.

Next week: Khar tricks Gen Zia

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, July 13th, 2014

https://www.dawn.com/news/1118553

What goes around: the movement against Bhutto

From InpaperMagazine

August 31, 2014

Illustration by Abro

Between March and June 1977, Z.A. Bhutto had to face a protest movement against his government the kind he had himself triggered and then led 10 years earlier against the Ayub Khan regime.

But even though the movement against Bhutto in 1977 was as strong, impactful and effective as the one that ousted Ayub, this movement’s class and ideological make-up was squarely different from that of the 1968 movement.

In 1968, a wide cross-section of the society had participated — left-wing middle-class youth, blue-collar workers, peasants, etc. The1977 movement on the other hand, largely revolved around right-wing student groups, middle-class/white-collar professionals, traders and urban and semi-urban petite-bourgeoisie.

The PPP had contested the 1970 election on a populist socialist manifesto and the first three years of his regime were spent in repairing the morale of the armed forces and the civilians that was deeply damaged by the separation of East Pakistan and the defeat of Pakistani forces at the hands of the Indian army.

It was also during these years that his regime implemented large-scale populist policies that included the nationalisation of a number of industries. Also during this period, the Bhutto regime drafted a brand new constitution (1973) and managed to get it passed in the national assembly by gaining the approval of all political parties.

By 1973, the regime had also successfully managed to somewhat restore the economy. Contrary to popular perception, and according to political economists such as S. Akbar Zaidi, Asad Sayeed, V.Y. Belokren­it­sky and V.N. Moskalenko, Pakistan’s economy actually rebounded after the beating that it had received during the later years of the Ayub regime and especially after the economic fall-out of the conflict in East Pakistan.

However, it is also true that the economic restoration could not withstand the stress generated by the 1973 international oil crises that raised the inflation rate in the country and Bhutto had to devalue the rupee. This got a negative response from traders and businessmen who then began to ship out their capital, creating a new economic crisis.

The incompetency and inexperience exhibited by the new managers in the nationalised industries further deepened the crisis and the Bhutto regime now decided to look towards the oil-rich Arab countries that had begun to make large profits due to the unprecedented hike in oil prices after 1973.

By 1974 Bhutto had overtly become the pragmatist that he actually was and began to ease out the hard line leftists from his cabinet. Conscious of the early moves made by oil-rich Arab states to begin funding a mainstream revival of ‘Political Islam’ in Muslim countries, Bhutto began manoeuvring a delicate balance between his socialist/populist policies and the emerging interest in Political Islam to attract ‘Petro-Dollars’ from Arab countries.

He cracked down on radical labour and student outfits (calling them ‘impractical’ and detrimental to Pakistan’s recovery), and tried to appease right-wing opposition by agreeing to address some of their demands to ‘Islamise the Constitution’.

Bhutto was sitting easy in 1976 as the petro dollars began to come in and he had quietened opposition from the left as well as the right (one through arrests and the other through pragmatic appeasement). He also seemed to have the military’s support and backing after he initiated a military operation in Balochistan against supposed Baloch separatists.

Feeling confident, he announced elections almost a year before they were due only to be left feeling surprised when he saw a fractured and battered opposition unite on single electoral platform to compete against the PPP in the 1977 election.

The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) was made-up of nine anti-PPP parties. It included three of the country’s main religious parties, some moderate conservative parties and a few small left-wing outfits.

PNA largely represented the frustrations and aspirations of those groups that had been affected the most by Bhutto’s policies. These included industrialists, businessmen, traders, shopkeepers, the anti-Bhutto landed gentry and urban middle-classes.

The PNA denounced the government for being detrimental to the cause of Islam in Pakistan and for turning Pakistan into a ‘land of sin’. They also accused Bhutto of being a ‘civilian dictator’, an ‘oppressor’ and ‘a drunkard’ who had let loose a reign of hooligans on the streets of the country.

Bhutto’s party which, by now, had toned down its socialist rhetoric and tried to prove that its Islam was more enlightened than that ‘of the capitalist and feudal mullahs of the PNA’, won the election, which were marred by allegations of rigging.

The PNA cried foul, boycotted the provincial election and decided to start a protest movement. Today, according to various analysts and historians, rigging took place on not more than a dozen seats (in the Punjab) but resentment against the regime in certain sections of the society had been brewing so strongly that the movement that Bhutto thought would fizzle out, erupted in the most devastating fashion.

According to a detailed study of the movement done (in 1980) by historian and author Ahmad B. Syeed, the main participants/protesters of the movement included disgruntled urban middle and lower-middle class youth (mostly belonging to Karachi and Lahore); traders, shopkeepers and white-collar office workers.

According to Syeed’s study, the working classes and the peasants largely remained away from the movement. The agitation against the regime and the police crackdowns mostly took place in Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi. Government buildings, police stations, homes of the members of the PPP, nightclubs, bars, cinemas and hotels were attacked by mobs demanding Nizam-i-Mustafa.

Bhutto called in the army and imposed long curfews but even this failed to stem the protests. Cops frequently opened fire on the rampaging mobs but some military personnel refused to follow the orders of their superiors to fire and this became a major concern within the military.

Wealthy industrialists who had been stripped of their perks and power by Bhutto were accused of funding the movement and the regime also alleged that the United States was bankrolling the protests. Many PPP leaders also pointed the finger towards the large amounts of Saudi Riyals that (according to them) had reached the coffers of the religious parties.

After a month of violence, Bhutto invited the PNA for talks. The PNA demanded fresh elections and the implementation of Shariah Laws. To stall the first demand, Bhutto agreed to conditionally implement the second request and in April 1977 he ordered the closure of all nightclubs and bars. He also banned the sale of alcohol (to Muslims) and replaced Sunday with the Muslim holy day (Friday) as the weekly holiday. PNA decided to stay in the talks.

More than a decade later, veteran JI leader, late Prof Ghafoor Ahmed, who played a leading role in the movement, told journalists that the talks went well and just when Bhutto had agreed to hold fresh elections, Gen Zia decided to impose the country’s third Martial Law (July 1977).

He said that most PNA leaders were happy at how the talks had gone but some leaders, such as Asghar Khan (of the moderate conservative, Tehreek-i-Istaqlal) and Begum Wali (wife of the left-wing Pukhtun nationalist, Wali Khan), desired military intervention.

When asked why then did JI join Zia’s first cabinet whereas most PNA parties opposed the Martial Law, Prof Ghafoor claimed that joining Zia was the decision of the party’s Punjab leadership.

Zia, who adopted PNA’s ‘Islamic’ rhetoric and agenda, went on to rule Pakistan for the next 11 years. Bhutto was arrested and in 1979, through a highly controversial trial, he was sentenced to death for a political murder he was alleged to have ordered, and hanged.

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, August 31, 2014

https://www.dawn.com/news/1128830

A leaf from history: The opposition alliance

Shaikh Aziz

July 28, 2013

With the announcement of election dates, the opposition parties sprang into action. It was much awaited, but the time between the official announcement and the poll date was too short — a part of Z. A. Bhutto’s strategy for giving the opposition the shortest time for electioneering. The PPP government had already begun preparations and when the date was announced the party leaders were extremely happy. There were two reasons for that: one, the United Democratic Front (UDF) still lacked coordination; secondly, every opposition party wanted to contest on every seat, dividing the opposition vote bank.

On Dec 31, 1976 Bhutto convened a meeting of all provincial governors, during which a new commission comprising chief justices of the high courts was to be formed to discuss the issue of water apportionment to prevent the opposition from exploiting the issue during electioneering.

On Jan 2, 1977, the chief election commissioner (CEC), Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan, announced the details of seats over which contests were to be held: Punjab 115 NA, 240 PA; Sindh 43 NA, 100 PA; KP (NWFP ) 26 NA, 80 PA; Balochistan 7 NA, 40 PA; Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) 8 NA, Federal Capital 1 NA. In all, 200 seats in the National Assembly and 460 seats in provincial assemblies were to be fought over.

The PPP team was sure that it would bag a two-thirds majority easily. Some opposition leaders outside the UDF were busy drawing new lines for the upcoming encounter. Among them Asghar Khan appeared very serious. But the problem with him was that he was not prepared to join the UDF. The former air force chief had opposed Bhutto since the 1970 elections. He was against Bhutto in all respects and wanted him to vanish. For that he could go to any level. This was proved later when as a result of the 1977 elections and failure of talks he asked the armed forces to act (in other words to take over). He also thought that he could prove to be a better leader than Bhutto. With that background he seemed poised to take a solo flight rather than join the UDF. If at all he could work with some party it was Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP). Behind the curtain, hectic efforts were underway to bring as many parties as possible to form a wider platform to contest the next polls; however, Asghar Khan’s standpoint proved to be a stumbling block till one day he broke down and showed his intention to sit with the other parties but with certain reservations.

Immediately after the CEC’s press conference the opposition parties began evolving a strategy on two fronts: one to create a unified platform; two, to choose suitable candidates for all 660 seats — a difficult task to attain in a few days before landing into a real electioneering campaign. Lahore became the centre of all activities. On Jan 10, 1977 when the National Assembly was dissolved, a meeting of the opposition parties took place at the residence of Rafiq Ahmad Bajawa. It was a long session with all opposition leaders deliberating upon the possible structure of a united platform, its aims, objectives and working. The main hurdle was allocation of seats to parties in a possible united front.

After a lengthy session lasting for almost the whole day, it was announced that nine parties had agreed to form a joint election forum and contest on all seats by pitching one candidate against the PPP candidate. The decision of the opposition was delayed by some reservations put forward by Asghar Khan who in consonance with the JUP demanded 50pc of the total seats and the office of the secretary general for JUP. After heated discussion these demands were conceded and both the parties joined the forum called Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), replacing the UDF. The PNA comprised: Muslim League, Jamaat-i-Islami, Tehreek-i-Istaqlal, National Democratic Party, Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, Khaksar Tehreek and the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. The nine-party alliance was called nau sitare (nine stars) and its flag too bore nine stars.

The next day all the component parties held another meeting in which the remaining details were discussed; the meeting concluded with a press conference at which Asghar Khan formally announced the formation of the PNA, its decisions, and selection of plough as the election symbol. A committee comprising Rafiq Ahmad Bajawa, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Malik Nazir Ahmad was formed to decide the hierarchy of the alliance without losing any time. On Jan 16, Mufti Mahmood of JUI was elected its President, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan as Vice President and Rafiq Bajawa of the JUP as secretary general, as pressed by Asghar Khan.

Against all assurances of the secret agencies which were assigned the task of keeping the PNA parties away from getting closer, Bhutto was quite annoyed at the speed with which the alliance had come into being. To calm him down, the Rao Rashid team assured him that the PNA would soon fall apart.

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

https://www.dawn.com/news/1032515

Audrey Truschke on row over Aurangzeb book: ‘I remain committed to dispassionate history’

Rohini Nair May 06, 2017 10:10:46 IST

Scrolling through Audrey Truschke’s Twitter timeline is somewhat exhausting. The assistant professor of South Asian History at Rutgers University-Newark has been at the receiving end of a social media backlash ever since her book — Aurangzeb: The Man and The Myth — was published earlier this year. Truschke, however, seems unfazed, and responds to nearly every point that is addressed to her regarding her tome.

Truschke studied Sanskrit and majored in Religious Studies at the University of Chicago, before pursuing a PhD at the Department of Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African Studies at Columbia University. Her research focuses on early modern India, especially the Mughal period and cross-cultural interactions therein.

Before Aurangzeb, she authored Culture of Encounters: Sanskrit at the Mughal Court (2016).

In an email interview with Firstpost, Truschke spoke about the row over her book:

Did you expect quite the backlash there’s been to Aurangzeb? The response to your remarks in The Hindu in 2015 must have given some indication…

I expected a backlash to Aurangzeb. But I didn’t write it for my critics, especially those who dismiss the book on the basis of reviews or simply the subject matter. Rather, I wrote Aurangzeb because I thought that there was a hunger among some in India for a more balanced, historically-based view of Aurangzeb. I have been heartened to hear from a number of readers who have substantive questions about my arguments in the book and desire to learn more about one of the most crucial political figures of early modern India.

You said in an interview that it was the response to The Hindu piece that had prompted you to start working on Aurangzeb… what particularly was the exchange that convinced you this was a project you needed to engage with?

People wrote letters to the editor for days after I gave (the) interview to The Hindu in 2015. I did not even know that one could write letters to the editor regarding an interview. The sustained response to my brief comments on Aurangzeb prompted me to see an opportunity to provide interested readers with a more nuanced, compelling story regarding this crucial king.

What are the common themes you’ve observed in the stories about Aurangzeb that are in popular circulation?

The strongest thread in popular stories about Aurangzeb is anti-Muslim sentiments. People repeatedly reduce everything that Aurangzeb did to his piety — as they imagine his piety anyway — and then condemn him as too Muslim. Such arguments have little to do with Aurangzeb but a great deal to do with current biases against Muslims in India.

What’s been the hardest myth about Aurangzeb to debunk, for you as a historian?

The most difficult point for me to get across is that I am not asking the question of whether Aurangzeb was a good or bad guy. Many of my critics have trouble seeing beyond the dichotomy that he must have been a sinner or a saint. I do not want to judge Aurangzeb by modern standards because that tells us nothing interesting about the emperor or his world. But many people have trouble wrapping their heads about the concept of asking questions about a historical figure other than — was he a villain or a hero.

Does it ever get to you, responding to the unending stream of criticism on Twitter?

I have rather thick skin, which serves me well in dealing with public criticism and hate speech. However, many of my colleagues in the academy do not share my stomach for hostility. The vicious atmosphere on social media drives many scholars away from public engagement, which is to the detriment of everyone, in my view.

One of the reviews for Aurangzeb stated, “In fact, one suspects she first decided to humanise, secularise Aurangzeb and then went about finding documents supporting it”. Do you find criticisms like that trying, as an academic?

I find such criticisms flimsy. This particular argument insinuates a dishonest process of researching and writing on my part but fails to provide any evidence for the claim. As a historian, I am far more interested in substantive arguments.

(Among the rebuttals to Aurangzeb), is this blog post that has received some amount of attention. What is your opinion of it?

To me, blog posts such as this exemplify the need for historians to continue educating an interested public about what constitutes a compelling historical argument and good-faith use of historical evidence.

You’ve said in a previous interview: “The past is rarely, if ever, only about the past. But when we allow modern interests to constrain and dictate our view of the past, then we are engaging in mythology that, however powerful, is not history.” In the post-truth, ‘fake news’ era, how do you see the role of the academic?

Our approach to the past is always preceded by and conditioned by the present. That is as true for me as it is for those who wish to rewrite India’s past. The difference is that I remain committed to dispassionate history, meaning an honest attempt to recover the past and understand historical figures and events on their own terms. One challenge going forward, for historians, is to better articulate why the historical project holds value and why it is a mistake to treat the past as a blank canvas upon which we can write present-day concerns.

https://www.firstpost.com/living/audrey-truschke-on-row-over-aurangzeb-book-i-remain-committed-to-dispassionate-history-3426424.html

Aurangzeb, a stranger no more

Akshaya Mukul

A historian retells the complex and contested life of the sixth Mughal emperor, keeping away from hagiography or undue resurrection

Among the Mughal rulers, Babur and Aurangzeb are the most popular in social media among Bhakts of an ideology that has been working hard for the last three years to foist Hindi, Hindu, Hindustan as the sole narrative of a country where custom, costume and customary beliefs change every few kilometres. Social media is the new battleground where anyone holding a divergent view is quickly labelled anti-national or aulads(descendants) of Babur and Aurangzeb. Happily aided by the government, Aurangzeb’s name is being defaced from central vistas and who knows even from school textbooks tomorrow.

Therefore, it is interesting that the idea of Audrey Truschke’s magnificent biography of Aurangzeb took seed on Twitter where firmans are made and executed in 140 characters. Fortunately, some firmans, in this case a request to write on Aurangzeb, got implemented through a scholarly work.

Sticking to facts

Coming a year after her magisterial Culture of Encounters: Sanskrit at the Mughal Court, in Aurangzeb Truschke employs the tools of an ace academic researcher but makes it accessible to everyone through her racy language that never loses sight of facts and history. It is history that has been unkind to Aurangzeb, painting him all in grey, a terrible ruler who undid the legacy of his great-grandfather Akbar, grandfather Jehangir and father Shah Jehan by razing temples and ordering mass murders of Hindus.

Mindful of extreme emotions that Aurangzeb evokes in India today, Truschke keeps herself away from either hagiography or undue resurrection. Rather, she ‘recovers’ Aurangzeb from the heap of fiction and lies. In the process, she does not mince words and challenges the scholarly, the popular and the bazaar versions of the life and reign of the sixth Mughal emperor. Be it Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Pakistani playwright Shahid Nadeem, or Jawaharlal Nehru, Truschke establishes how each viewed Aurangzeb through a flawed lens, overemphasising his religiosity or ‘adherence to Islam’ as reasons why he became what he became. Nehru called him ‘a bigot and an austere puritan.’ Truschke bemoans such sweeping generalisations and points out how this image of a ‘reviled’ Emperor is often used against the Muslims.

Truschke does not lose her way through the complex and contested life of Aurangzeb. Her focus is on facts and she looks at Aurangzeb in a clinical fashion. Yes, he did destroy some Hindu temples and banned Holi but, as she points out, he also gave grants for maintaining temples and liberally donated land to Brahmins. Also, along with Holi, Muharram and Eid too faced action. Most important, Hindu bureaucrats were at the core of the Mughal empire during Aurangzeb, the period when it expanded the most.

Facts are not the only tools with Truschke nor does she indulge in a slanging match with those who revile Aurangzeb. Instead, she chooses a scholarly path of mapping his 50-year rule through three themes that comprehensively sum up the enigma of Aurangzeb: one, imperial bureaucracy; two, why he thought of himself as a moral leader; and three, Aurangzeb’s policies on Hindu and Jain temples. In addition, her racy account of Aurangzeb’s reign looks at all the flashpoints that have gone into the making of his image. For instance, Truschke provides an insight into Aurangzeb’s handling of the so-called Rajput rebellion that, she argues, was more in the nature of a power struggle between the Mughals and Rajputs. Moreover, she establishes that the Rajput themselves were not united in their opposition to Aurangzeb. Also, Aurangzeb was even-handed in meting out punishment to his uncle Shaysta Khan for failing to put up a defence against Shivaji, as to his son Prince Akbar who had rebelled and, aided by a section of Rajputs, declared himself Mughal emperor.

Truschke is unsparing while dealing with the moral world of Aurangzeb, be it conversion of Hindus or destruction of temples like Vishwanath Mandir in Varanasi or of Keshava Deva in Mathura. But she does not fall for the oft-repeated reasons for Aurangzeb’s act. Instead, she asks why most temples were left untouched, especially in South India. Similarly, she points that the ban on alcohol was not specific to Aurangzeb’s reign but merely an extension of what Akbar and Jehangir had done. Not to mention that the policy of prohibition was a big failure.

Minor quibbles

Truschke mildly disappoints while discussing the Hindu bureaucrats in Aurangzeb’s reign. Three leading lights of his court, Raja Raghunatha, Chandar Bhan Brahman and Bhimsen Saxena, are part of her narrative but without the attention they deserve. Much of the criticism against Aurangzeb is based on his alleged anti-Hindu bias, and for a biography that successfully recovers the Mughal emperor for contemporary readers, it would have helped to flesh them out further since most of them were not merely officials but scholars in their own right. Chander Bhan Brahman’s classic historical biography by Rajeev Kinra proves this.

Overall, Aurangzeb is a fascinating biography of an emperor who continues to dominate the contemporary discourse on the Hindu-Muslim relationship and beyond. Strongly recommended for everyone, scholars, students and general readers, Aurangzeb is an example of how historical biographies of complex characters can be written.

The book addresses Aurangzeb’s concern at the time of his death that he came as a stranger and would leave as a stranger. Truschke has helped take away much of that strangeness.

Aurangzeb: The Man and the Myth; Audrey Truschke, Penguin Random House, ₹ 399.

http://www.thehindu.com/books/books-reviews/aurangzeb-a-stranger-no-more/article17408332.ece

 

Past present: Understanding Aurangzeb

Mubarak Ali

May 24, 2015

Illustration by Abro

Being a repository of past events, history preserves the record of those individuals who played an important role in shaping the history of their time and are resurrected and used from time to time by politicians to accomplish their interests. In the subcontinent, Akbar and Aurangzeb contributed significantly in creating social and political orders, although both were antithetical to each other.

Akbar was a believer of Sulh-i-kul (peace with all), tolerant to followers of all religions. He made attempts to cut off cultural relations with Central Asia and Indianise the Mughal court by adopting Indian customs, traditions and festivals. On the other hand, Aurangzeb tried to subvert this policy and Islamise the Mughal State by introducing Islamic provisions.

The role of these two emperors was analysed critically during the colonial period and in the process of the freedom struggle. When in the 1920s Indian history was communalised, Aurangzeb was considered as an orthodox Muslim ruler of India who alienated his Hindu subjects through his religious policies. As a result, he became a hero for the Muslim community of India, admired for being the man who restored the prestige of Islam, defending it against opposing forces. This process picked up pace when the two-nation theory became a cornerstone of the Pakistan movement.

After the Partition in 1947, Pakistani historians supporting state ideology in the two-nation theory reconstructed the historical narrative by critically examining Akbar and Aurangzeb. I.H. Qureshi condemned Akbar and his religious policy as being against the interest of the Muslims of India. He accused Akbar of being the major cause of the downfall of the Mughal empire as he had granted concessions to the Hindus thereby alienating the support of the Muslims. To promote the image of Aurangzeb and to popularise his policies, ‘Alamgir Day’ was observed on May 3, 1965 under the patronage of Dairah-i-Muin-al-Marif.

In his lecture on Aurangzeb, Moinul Haq, Secretary Pakistan Historical Society, stated that “the Indian and Western historians had tried to create a wrong impression by wrong interpretation of the benign policies of Aurangzeb Alamgir, which he had initiated for the welfare of the people and the progress of his empire … it was not true that Jizyah was a poll tax or that its incidence was heavy. This twist was given by the so-called impartial Indian and Western historians to taint the reputation of Aurangzeb who was also a worker for restoring the Islamic ideal of life.”

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Our nation needs the right kind of heroes

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Pakistani historians tried to make Aurangzeb a model for Pakistani politicians. There are several instances where Aurangzeb shrewdly twisted religion for his own political interests. For example, Dara Shikoh was not executed for being a political rival but as an apostate, based on a fatwa which was issued by the ulema to suit the interests of the emperor.

Once some Hindu and Muslims prisoners were brought before the qazi of the court, who issued a fatwa that the Hindus would be released if they were converted to Islam, while the Muslim prisoners would be kept imprisoned. When Aurangzeb found out about it, he reprimanded the qazi for issuing a fatwa based on Hanafi jurisprudence, while there were other schools of thought which he could have consulted. When the qazi realised that the emperor wanted to execute the prisoners, he researched a valid reason for execution by studying other schools of religious jurisprudence and re-issued the fatwa ordering the execution of the prisoners.

On the one hand Aurangzeb demolished temples, while on the other he granted financial aid to the Hindus, Sikhs and Jain for their temples. Whether to favour other religions or to oppose them depended on the prevailing political conditions. For example, in order to ensure the support of his Hindu subjects in South India where he stayed 17 years, he did not impose Jizya.

When the ulema raised objections on the employment of Shias and Hindus in important offices of the state, Aurangzeb asserted that politics and religion were two separate entities. He ignored the ulema’s disapproval on not marrying his daughters according to the Islamic tradition, his attack on the Muslim state of Deccan and execution of Dara on religious grounds; however, he banned music, ‘un-Islamic’ celebrations and reduced court expenses to demonstrate his piousness, despite which he failed to reform the Mughal society that was entrenched in corruption and debauchery.

It seems that Pakistani politicians have been following the policy of Aurangzeb by politicising religion and exploiting people in its name. From Liaquat Ali Khan to the present leaders, religion has been used to promote the self-interest of politicians and to hide their crimes.

Through his policy of Islamisation, Ziaul-Haq changed the whole fabric of Pakistani society but like Aurangzeb, the Islamisation failed to reform the society. When a nation adopts a culture that does not suit the relevant times, it leads the whole nation into disorder and chaos.

Adopting Aurangzeb as a model is hardly a good policy as it blocks the process of enlightenment and progress. Our society needs a policy of tolerance and pluralism, not a culture of intolerance and extremism. Nations make mistakes when they do not study history in its true perspective.

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, May 24th, 2015

https://www.dawn.com/news/1183540

Mughal Empire (1500s, 1600s)

Introduction

The Mughal Empire

The Taj Mahal houses the jewelled tomb of Mumtaz Mahal, much loved wife of emperor Shah Jehan ©The Mughal (or Mogul) Empire ruled most of India and Pakistan in the 16th and 17th centuries.

It consolidated Islam in South Asia, and spread Muslim (and particularly Persian) arts and culture as well as the faith.

The Mughals were Muslims who ruled a country with a large Hindu majority. However for much of their empire they allowed Hindus to reach senior government or military positions.

The Mughals brought many changes to India:

• Centralised government that brought together many smaller kingdoms
• Delegated government with respect for human rights
• Persian art and culture
• Persian language mixed with Arabic and Hindi to create Urdu
• Periods of great religious tolerance
• A style of architecture (e.g. the Taj Mahal)
• A system of education that took account of pupils’ needs and culture

Muslims in India

There had been Muslims in India long before the Mughals. The first Muslims arrived in the 8th century.

Ahmedabads Jama Masjid (Grand Mosque) was built in the 15th century in Gujarat ©In the first half of the 10th century a Muslim ruler of Afghanistan invaded the Punjab 11 times, without much political success, but taking away a great deal of loot.

A more successful invasion came at the end of the 12th century. This eventually led to the formation of the Delhi Sultanate.

A later Muslim invasion in 1398 devastated the city of Delhi.

The Mughal Empire grew out of descendants of the Mongol Empire who were living in Turkestan in the 15th century. They had become Muslims and assimilated the culture of the Middle East, while keeping elements of their Far Eastern roots.

They also retained the great military skill and cunning of their Mongol ancestors, and were among the first Western military leaders to use guns.

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Babur

Babur

Jewelled archway in Humayun’s tumb in Delhi ©Babur the first Mughal Emperor, was a descendent of Genghis Khan and Tamerlaine.

Babur succeeded his father as ruler of the state of Farghana in Turkestan when he was only 12, although he was swiftly deposed by older relatives.

Babur moved into Afghanistan in 1504, and then moved on to India, apparently at the invitation of some Indian princes who wanted to dispose of their ruler. Babur disposed of the ruler, and decided to take over himself.

He captured the Turkic Ghur’iat Sultanate of Delhi in 1526, imposing his rule on most of Northern India.

The Empire he founded was a sophisticated civilisation based on religious toleration. It was a mixture of Persian, Mongol and Indian culture.

Under Babur Hinduism was tolerated and new Hindu temples were built with his permission.

Trade with the rest of the Islamic world, especially Persia and through Persia to Europe, was encouraged.

The importance of slavery in the Empire diminished and peace was made with the Hindu kingdoms of Southern India.

Babur brought a broad-minded, confident Islam from central Asia. His first act after conquering Delhi was to forbid the killing of cows because that was offensive to Hindus.

Babur may have been descended from brutal conquerors, but he was not a barbarian bent on loot and plunder. Instead he had great ideas about civilisation, architecture and administration.

He even wrote an autobiography, The Babur – Namah. The autobiography is candid, honest and at times even poetic.

Babur was followed by his son Humayun who was a bad emperor, a better poet, and a drug addict. He rapidly lost the empire. He did eventually recover the throne but died soon afterwards after breaking his neck falling downstairs.

While Humayan was certainly disastrous as a ruler, his love of poetry and culture heavily influenced his son Akbar, and helped to make the Mughal Empire an artistic power as well as a military one.

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Abu Akbar

Abu Akbar

Itimad-ud-Daulah’s tomb in Agra is considered a landmark in Mughal architecture ©The third Emperor, Abu Akbar, is regarded as one of the great rulers of all time, regardless of country.

Akbar succeeded to the throne at 13, and started to recapture the remaining territory lost from Babur’s empire. By the time of his death in 1605 he ruled over most of north, central, and western India.

Akbar worked hard to win over the hearts and minds of the Hindu leaders. While this may well have been for political reasons – he married a Hindu princess (and is said to have married several thousand wives for political and diplomatic purposes) – it was also a part of his philosophy.

Akbar believed that all religions should be tolerated, and that a ruler’s duty was to treat all believers equally, whatever their belief.

He established a form of delegated government in which the provincial governors were personally responsible to him for the quality of government in their territory.

Akbar’s government machine included many Hindus in positions of responsibility – the governed were allowed to take a major part in the governing.

Akbar also ended a tax (jizya) that had been imposed on non-Muslims. This discriminatory tax had been much resented, and ending it was a popular move.

An innovation was the amount of autonomy he allowed to the provinces. For example, non-Muslims were not forced to obey Islamic law (as was the case in many Islamic lands), and Hindus were allowed to regulate themselves through their own law and institutions.

Akbar and Godism

Akbar took the policy of religious toleration even further by breaking with conventional Islam.

The Emperor proclaimed an entirely new state religion of ‘God-ism’ (Din-i-ilahi) – a jumble of Islamic, Hindu, Christian and Buddhist teaching with himself as deity. It never spread beyond his court and died when he did.

Fatehpur Sikri was the new capital built by Akbar, as a part of his attempt to absorb other religions into Islam. Fatehpur Sikri is a synthesis of Hindu and Islamic architecture.

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Jahangir and Jahan

Jahangir

Akbar’s son, Emperor Jahangir, readopted Islam as the state religion and continued the policy of religious toleration. His court included large numbers of Indian Hindus, Persian Shi’a and Sufis and members of local heterodox Islamic sects.

Jahangir also began building the magnificent monuments and gardens by which the Mughals are chiefly remembered today, importing hundreds of Persian architects to build palaces and create magnificent gardens.

Jahangir’s approach was typified by the development of Urdu as the official language of Empire. Urdu uses an Arabic script, but Persian vocabulary and Hindi grammatical structure.

Jahan

The architectural achievements of the Mughals peaked between 1592 and 1666, during the reign of Jahangir’s successor Jahan.

The Taj Mahal, commissioned by Emperor Jahan, marks the apex of the Mughal Empire ©Jahan commissioned the Taj Mahal. The Taj Mahal marks the apex of the Mughal Empire; it symbolises stability, power and confidence.

The building is a mausoleum built by Jahan for his wife Mumtaz and it has come to symbolise the love between two people.

Jahan’s selection of white marble and the overall concept and design of the mausoleum give the building great power and majesty.

Jahan brought together fresh ideas in the creation of the Taj. Many of the skilled craftsmen involved in the construction were drawn from the empire. Many also came from other parts of the Islamic world – calligraphers from Shiraz, finial makers from Samrkand, and stone and flower cutters from Bukhara.

By Jahan’s period the capital had moved to the Red Fort in Delhi, putting the Fort at the heart of Mughal power. As if to confirm it, Jahan had these lines inscribed there: “If there is Paradise on earth, it is here, it is here.”

Paradise it may have been, but it was a pricey paradise. The money Jahan spent on buildings and on various military projects emptied his treasury and he was forced to raise taxes, which aggravated the people of the empire.

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Aurangzeb

Aurangzeb

Jahan’s son Aurangzeb was the last great Mughal Emperor.

Itimad-ud-Daulah’s tomb in Agra is considered a landmark in Mughal architecture ©History’s verdict on Aurangzeb largely depends on who’s writing it; Muslim or Hindu.

Aurangzeb ruled for nearly 50 years. He came to the throne after imprisoning his father and having his older brother killed.

He was a strong leader, whose conquests expanded the Mughal Empire to its greatest size.

Aurangzeb was a very observant and religious Muslim who ended the policy of religious tolerance followed by earlier emperors.

He no longer allowed the Hindu community to live under their own laws and customs, but imposed Sharia law (Islamic law) over the whole empire.

Thousands of Hindu temples and shrines were torn down and a punitive tax on Hindu subjects was re-imposed.

In the last decades of the seventeenth century Aurangzeb invaded the Hindu kingdoms in central and southern India, conquering much territory and taking many slaves.

Under Aurangzeb, the Mughal empire reached the peak of its military power, but the rule was unstable. This was partly because of the hostility that Aurangazeb’s intolerance and taxation inspired in the population, but also because the empire had simply become to big to be successfully governed.

The Muslim Governer of Hydrabad in southern India rebelled and established a separate Shi’a state; he also reintroduced religious toleration.

The Hindu kingdoms also fought back, often supported by the French and the British, who used them to tighten their grip on the sub-continent.

The establishment of a Hindu Marathi Empire in southern India cut off the Mughal state to the south. The great Mughal city of Calcutta came under the control of the east India company in 1696 and in the decades that followed Europeans and European – backed by Hindu princes conquered most of the Mughal territory.

Aurangzeb’s extremism caused Mughal territory and creativity to dry up and the Empire went into decline. The Mughal Emperors that followed Aurangzeb effectively became British or French puppets. The last Mughal Emperor was deposed by the British in 1858.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/mughalempire_1.shtml

Context of ‘1987: Pakistan Secretly Builds Nuclear Weapon’

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May 18, 1974: India Tests First Nuclear Device

India detonates a nuclear device in an underground facility. The device had been built using material supplied for its ostensibly peaceful nuclear program by the United States, France, and Canada. The test, and this aspect of India’s nuclear program, is unauthorized by global control mechanisms. India portrays the test as a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” and says it is “firmly committed” to using nuclear technology for only peaceful purposes.
Kissinger: ‘Fait Accompli’ – Pakistan, India’s regional opponent, is extremely unhappy with the test, which apparently confirms India’s military superiority. Due to the obvious difficulties producing its own nuclear bomb, Pakistan first tries to find a diplomatic solution. It asks the US to provide it with a nuclear umbrella, without much hope of success. Relations between Pakistan and the US, once extremely close, have been worsening for some years. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tells Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington that the test is “a fait accompli and that Pakistan would have to learn to live with it,” although he is aware this is a “little rough” on the Pakistanis.
No Punishment – No sanctions are imposed on India, or the countries that sold the technology to it, and they continue to help India’s nuclear program. Pakistani foreign minister Agha Shahi will later say that, if Kissinger had replied otherwise, Pakistan would have not started its own nuclear weapons program and that “you would never have heard of A. Q. Khan.” Shahi also points out to his colleagues that if Pakistan does build a bomb, then it will probably not suffer any sanctions either.
Pakistan Steps up Nuclear Program – Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto then decides that his country must respond to this “grave and serious threat” by making its own nuclear weapons. He steps up Pakistan’s nuclear research efforts in a quest to build a bomb, a quest that will be successful by the mid-1980s (see 1987). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 11-14; ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 39-40]

1981: Pakistan Begins Digging Tunnels for Nuclear Program; Work Noticed by India, Israel

At some time in 1981, Pakistan begins digging some tunnels under the Ras Koh mountains. The work is apparently related to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, which begins preparation for a cold test of a nuclear weapon this year (see Shortly After May 1, 1981). This work is noticed by both India and Israel, who also see other signs that work is continuing on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Tunnels in these mountains will be used when Pakistan tests nuclear weapons in 1998 (see May 28, 1998). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 86, 275]

1985: Secretary of State Schulz Says Pakistan Will Not Get Bomb, but Knows They Already Have Nuclear Program

George Schulz, secretary of state in the Reagan administration, says, “We have full faith in [Pakistan’s] assurance that they will not make the bomb.” However, the US, including the State Department, is already aware that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program (see 1983 and August 1985-October 1990). [GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007]

August 1985-October 1990: White House Defies Congress and Allows Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program to Progress

In 1985, US Congress passes legislation requiring US economic sanctions on Pakistan unless the White House can certify that Pakistan has not embarked on a nuclear weapons program (see August 1985 and August 1985). The White House certifies this every year until 1990 (see 1987-1989). However, it is known all the time that Pakistan does have a continuing nuclear program. For instance, in 1983 a State Department memo said Pakistan clearly has a nuclear weapons program that relies on stolen European technology. Pakistan successfully builds a nuclear bomb in 1987 but does not test it to keep it a secret (see 1987). With the Soviet-Afghan war ending in 1989, the US no longer relies on Pakistan to contain the Soviet Union. So in 1990 the Pakistani nuclear program is finally recognized and sweeping sanctions are applied (see June 1989). [GANNON, 2005]Journalist Seymour Hersh will comment, “The certification process became farcical in the last years of the Reagan Administration, whose yearly certification—despite explicit American intelligence about Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons program—was seen as little more than a payoff to the Pakistani leadership for its support in Afghanistan.” [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993] The government of Pakistan will keep their nuclear program a secret until they successfully test a nuclear weapon in 1998 (see May 28, 1998).

1987: Pakistan Secretly Builds Nuclear Weapon

Pakistan successfully builds a nuclear weapon around this year. The bomb is built largely thanks to the illegal network run by A. Q. Khan. Pakistan will not actually publicly announce this or test the bomb until 1998 (see May 28, 1998), partly because of a 1985 US law imposing sanctions on Pakistan if it were to develop nuclear weapons (see August 1985-October 1990). [HERSH, 2004, PP. 291]However, Khan will tell a reporter the program has been successful around this time (see March 1987).

March 1987: A. Q. Khan Says Pakistan Has Nuclear Weapons, then Retracts Claims

A. Q. Khan. [Source: CBC]A. Q. Khan, father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, tells an Indian reporter that the program has been successful (see 1987). “What the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct,” he says, adding, “They told us Pakistan could never produce the bomb and they doubted my capabilities, but they now know we have it.” He says that Pakistan does not want to use the bomb, but “if driven to the wall there will be no option left.” The comments are made during a major Indian army exercise known as Brass Tacks that Pakistanis consider a serious threat, as it is close to the Pakistani border. In fact, at one point the Indian commanding general is reported to consider actually attacking Pakistan—an attack that would be a sure success given India’s conventional superiority. According to reporter Seymour Hersh, the purpose of the interview is “to convey a not very subtle message to the Indians: any attempt to dismember Pakistan would be countered with the bomb.” This interview is an embarrassment to the US government, which aided Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan War, but has repeatedly claimed Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons (see August 1985-October 1990). Khan retracts his remarks a few days later, saying he was tricked by the reporter. [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

June 1989: Bush Administration Decides to Cut Off Aid to Pakistan over Nuclear Weapons Program Next Year

President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker decide that the US will cut off foreign aid to Pakistan because of its nuclear weapons program. Pakistan was a major recipient of foreign aid during the Soviet Afghan war, when the US channeled support to the mujaheddin through it, but Soviet forces began withdrawing from Afghanistan in February (see February 15, 1989). It is decided that aid will be provided for 1989, but not for 1990 (see October 1990). [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

August 4, 1989: Analyst of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program Alleged to Be ‘Security Risk’ and Fired from Pentagon

Richard Barlow, an analyst who has repeatedly insisted that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program (see July 1987 or Shortly After and Mid-1989), is fired from his position at the Pentagon. Barlow will later say, “They told me they had received credible information that I was a security risk.” When he asks why he is thought to be a security risk, “They said they could not tell me as the information was classified,” but “senior Defense Department officials” are said to have “plenty of evidence.” His superiors think he might leak information about Pakistan’s nuclear program to congressmen in favor of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He spends the next eighteen months in the Pentagon personnel pool, under surveillance by security officers. Apparently, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby and two officials who work for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz are involved in the sacking. It is also rumored that Barlow is a Soviet spy. Barlow’s conclusions about Pakistan’s nuclear program are unpopular with some, because if the US admitted the nuclear program existed, this would lead to a break between the US and Pakistan and endanger US aid to the anti-Soviet mujaheddin and US arms sales (see August 1985-October 1990 and August-September 1989). After he is fired, rumors are started saying that Barlow is a tax evader, alcoholic, adulterer, and in psychiatric care. As his marriage guidance counseling is alleged to be cover for the psychiatric care, the Pentagon insists that investigators be allowed to interview his marriage guidance counselor. Due to this and other problems, his wife leaves him and files for divorce. [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993; GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007] Barlow will later be exonerated by various investigations (see May 1990 and Before September 1993).

Fall 1990: US Tells Pakistan to Destroy Nuclear Weapon Cores, but It Does Not Do So

In a letter handed to Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, the US demands that Pakistan destroy the cores of its nuclear weapons, thus disabling the weapons. Pakistan does not do so. The US then imposes sanctions on Pakistan (see October 1990), such as cutting off US aid to it, due to the nuclear weapons program. However, it softens the blow by waiving some of the restrictions (see 1991-1992). [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993] The US has known about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program for some time, but continued to support the Pakistanis during the Soviet-Afghan War (see August 1985-October 1990).

October 1990: US Imposes Sanctions on Pakistan

Since 1985, US Congress has required that sanctions be imposed on Pakistan if there is evidence that Pakistan is developing a nuclear weapons program (see August 1985-October 1990). With the Soviet-Afghan war over, President Bush finally acknowledges widespread evidence of Pakistan’s nuclear program and cuts off all US military and economic aid to Pakistan. However, it appears some military aid will still get through. For instance, in 1992, Senator John Glenn will write, “Shockingly, testimony by Secretary of State James Baker this year revealed that the administration has continued to allow Pakistan to purchase munitions through commercial transactions, despite the explicit, unambiguous intent of Congress that ‘no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan.’” [INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 6/26/1992] These sanctions will be officially lifted a short time after 9/11.

September 10, 1996: UN Adopts Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; US First to Sign

The United Nations adopts the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) banning the testing of nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly votes 158-3 to adopt the CTBT, with India (see June 20, 1996), Bhutan, and Libya voting against it, and Cuba, Lebanon, Syria, Mauritius, and Tanzania abstaining. US President Bill Clinton will be the first to sign the treaty, followed by 70 other nations, including Britain, China, France, and Russia. By November 1997, 148 nations will sign the treaty. [NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, 4/2003; FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, 12/18/2007] In 1999, the Times of India will observe that from the US’s viewpoint, the CTBT will primarily restrict India and Pakistan from continuing to develop their nuclear arsenals (see May 11-13, 1998 and May 28, 1998), and will delay or prevent China from developing more technologically advanced “miniaturized” nuclear weapons such as the US already has. It will also “prevent the vertical proliferation and technological refinement of existing arsenals by the other four nuclear weapons states.” [TIMES OF INDIA, 10/16/1999] Two years later, the US Senate will refuse to ratify the treaty (see October 13, 1999).

May 11-13, 1998: India Tests Five Nuclear Devices

India, which has refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) banning nuclear testing (see September 10, 1996), shocks the world by testing five nuclear devices over the course of three days. The largest is a 42-kiloton thermonuclear device. [FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, 12/18/2007] India’s rival Pakistan will conduct its own nuclear tests two weeks later (see May 28, 1998). Indian political scientist and nuclear critic Kanti Bajpai will later say: “Whatever Indians say officially, there is a status attached to the bomb. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council are all nuclear powers.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/4/2003]

May 28, 1998: Pakistan Tests Nuclear Bomb

Pakistan’s first nuclear test take place underground but shakes the mountains above it. [Source: Associated Press]Pakistan conducts a successful nuclear test. Former Clinton administration official Karl Inderfurth later notes that concerns about an Indian-Pakistani conflict, or even nuclear confrontation, compete with efforts to press Pakistan on terrorism. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003] Pakistan actually built its first nuclear weapon in 1987 but kept it a secret and did not test it until this time for political reasons (see 1987). In announcing the tests, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declares, “Today, we have settled the score.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/4/2003]

May 30, 1998: Pakistan Conducts Last of Six Nuclear Bomb Tests, Plutonium Possibly Used

Pakistan conducts the sixth and last of a series of nuclear bomb tests that started two days earlier (see May 28, 1998). Samples taken by US aircraft over the site indicate that the test may have involved plutonium, whereas uranium bombs were used for the other five. After the US learns that the tests are witnessed by Kang Thae Yun, a North Korean involved in that country’s proliferation network (see Early June 1998), and other North Korean officials, it will speculate that the final test was performed by Pakistan for North Korea, which is better known for its plutonium bomb program. Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will comment, “In terms of nuclear readiness, this placed North Korea far ahead of where the CIA had thought it was, since [North Korea] had yet to conduct any hot tests of its own.” [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 278]

July 1998: US Unfreezes Agricultural Aid to Pakistan

The US again begins to provide agricultural aid to Pakistan, although its provision had been frozen in the wake of Pakistani nuclear weapons tests in May (see May 28, 1998 and May 30, 1998). The US will again begin to provide military and technological assistance three months later (see October 1998). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 286]

July 15, 1998: Rumsfeld’s Ballistic Missile Committee Says Chief Threat to US Is from Iran, Iraq, and North Korea

Congressional conservatives receive a second “alternative assessment” of the nuclear threat facing the US that is far more to their liking than previous assessments (see December 23, 1996). A second “Team B” panel (see November 1976), the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, led by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and made up of neoconservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz and Stephen Cambone, finds that, contrary to earlier findings, the US faces a growing threat from rogue nations such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, who can, the panel finds, inflict “major destruction on the US within about five years of a decision.” This threat is “broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly” than previously believed. The Rumsfeld report also implies that either Iran or North Korea, or perhaps both, have already made the decision to strike the US with nuclear weapons. Although Pakistan has recently tested nuclear weapons (see May 28, 1998), it is not on the list. Unfortunately for the integrity and believability of the report, its methodology is flawed in the same manner as the previous “Team B” reports (see November 1976); according to author J. Peter Scoblic, the report “assume[s] the worst about potential US enemies without actual evidence to support those assumptions.” Defense analyst John Pike is also displeased with the methodology of the report. Pike will later write: “Rather than basing policy on intelligence estimates of what will probably happen politically and economically and what the bad guys really want, it’s basing policy on that which is not physically impossible. This is really an extraordinary epistemological conceit, which is applied to no other realm of national policy, and if manifest in a single human being would be diagnosed as paranoia.” [GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007; SCOBLIC, 2008, PP. 172-173] Iran, Iraq, and North Korea will be dubbed the “Axis of Evil” by George W. Bush in his 2002 State of the Union speech (see January 29, 2002).

October 1998: US Unfreezes Military and Technological Assistance to Pakistan

The US again begins to provide Pakistan with military and technological aid, which had been frozen in the wake of Pakistani tests of nuclear weapons in May (see May 28, 1998 and May 30, 1998). The US also froze agricultural aid after the tests, but began to provide it again in July (see July 1998). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 286]

December 2, 1998: Clinton Meets Pakistani Leader but Bin Laden Not Top Priority

Nawaz Sharif meeting with US Defense Secretary William Cohen at the Pentagon on December 3, 1998. [Source: US Department of Defense]Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif comes to Washington to meet with President Clinton and other top Clinton administration officials. The number one issue for Clinton is Pakistan’s nuclear program, since Pakistan had recently illegally developed and exploded a nuclear weapon (see May 28, 1998). The second most important issue is Pakistan’s economy; the US wants Pakistan to support free trade agreements. The third most important issue is terrorism and Pakistan’s support for bin Laden. Author Steve Coll will later note, “When Clinton himself met with Pakistani leaders, his agenda list always had several items, and bin Laden never was at the top. Afghanistan’s war fell even further down.” Sharif proposes to Clinton that the CIA train a secret Pakistani commando team to capture bin Laden. The US and Pakistan go ahead with this plan, even though most US officials involved in the decision believe it has almost no chance for success. They figure there is also little risk or cost involved, and it can help build ties between American and Pakistani intelligence. The plan will later come to nothing (see October 1999). [COLL, 2004, PP. 441-444]

March 14, 2003: President Bush Waives Last Remaining US Sanctions on Pakistan

President Bush waives the last set of US sanctions against Pakistan. The US imposed a new series of sanctions against Pakistan in 1998, after Pakistan exploded a nuclear weapon (see May 28, 1998), and in 1999, when President Pervez Musharraf overthrew a democratically elected government (see October 12, 1999). The lifted sanctions had prohibited the export of US military equipment and military assistance to a country whose head of government has been deposed. Some other sanctions were waived shortly after 9/11. Bush’s move comes as Musharraf is trying to decide whether or not to support a US-sponsored United Nations resolution which could start war with Iraq. It also comes two weeks after 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was captured in Pakistan (see February 29 or March 1, 2003). [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 3/14/2003]

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