Month: March 2017

A Leaf From History: Pakistan’s chequered association with the Commonwealth

PUBLISHED JAN 01, 2017 08:06AM

The 1971 debacle had a definite and profound impact on Pakistan. Society began to question itself, economic ties were abruptly severed, and political realities that had been denied by our rulers rose to the fore. Within the country, a heated debate ensued: did Bangladesh’s rise on the world map negate the Two-Nation Theory?

Indeed, the fall of Dhaka was not an end in itself.

The comity of nations was not concerned with such existential questions, however. A new country had emerged and soon many others began recognising Bangladesh as an independent nation. But Pakistan was reluctant to immediately follow their example as President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was not prepared to risk any internal political fallout.

After assuming power, Bhutto had found himself in a dilemma. India, the executioner of the Bangladesh plan, was the first country to recognise the new state. Many countries of the Commonwealth, including Australia and New Zealand, were to follow suit. Bhutto also wanted to accept Bangladesh but at the time the country faced two unresolved issues: withdrawal of the Indian troops from occupied Pakistani territories, and the release of prisoners of war (PoWs) being held captive by Indian forces.


Before a great fall comes pride. The story of the country’s diplomatic isolation is no exception to the rule


When Bhutto discussed the matter with political leaders, he discovered that his own party, the PPP, along with the National Awami Party and the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam supported the option of recognising Bangladesh. They thought that this move wouldn’t isolate Pakistan in the world community and would help resolve outstanding issues with India and Bangladesh.

Right-wing parties opposed the move. They argued that recognising Bangladesh would only legitimise the actions of those who sought independence from Pakistan. They also believed that this stance would delay the release of PoWs. These parties held public rallies in Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Gujrat against any move to recognise Bangladesh.

Bhutto decided to deliver his decision after public approval. He held a few public meetings where in his hysteric oratorical style he chanted slogans such as “Manzoor, Manzoor, NaManzoor!” It was at one of these rallies where he finally declared that Pakistan will not recognise Bangladesh. And as a mark of protest for recognising the new independent state, Bhutto announced that Pakistan would no longer be part of the Commonwealth.

At the time, many political analysts and economic advisers termed it an ill-advised decision. Most argued that Pakistan needed sound policies to refurbish its war-ravaged economy — dissociating from the Commonwealth would be disastrous since 35 percent of Pakistan’s trade was with the countries of the Commonwealth. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis living in the UK and other Commonwealth countries enjoyed many benefits by being citizens of a member country of the group. Pulling out of the Commonwealth would be insular and counter-productive.

But Bhutto forged ahead, till 1974, when he’d reverse his decision as part of posturing that called for greater solidarity among countries of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). Lahore played host to the OIC summit between February 22-24, 1974 and Pakistan needed a headliner to announce the occasion as a diplomatic masterstroke.

Bhutto extended an invitation to Bangladesh to join the OIC summit in Lahore. To ensure the participation of Shaikh Mujeebur Rahman, Bhutto promised recognising the new state of Bangladesh before the holding of the Islamic summit. On the first day of the summit, Pakistan formally recognised Bangladesh.

And yet, as one hatchet was seemingly buried, Bhutto’s grouse with the Commonwealth continued. He decided not to rejoin the 53-member countries group — an absence that lasted 17 years. Pakistan finally re-entered the Commonwealth on October 1, 1989. In a twist of history, Bhutto’s daughter Benazir would be the prime minister leading Pakistan away from isolation.

When Benazir had assumed power, she had inherited an economy that had suffered the impact of the war in Afghanistan. Already overburdened with economic debt as a result of a massive trade deficit, Pakistan had been ravaged by hosting more than three million Afghan refugees. During Gen Zia’s military rule (1977- 88), the Commonwealth was reluctant to hand any immediate benefits to Pakistanis. After Benazir’s move, however, there appeared hope that the revival of the economy would be slow and gradual but definite.

After a period of relative normalcy came the storm — General Pervez Musharraf would have the ignominy of being suspended by the Commonwealth twice.

The first time was on October 18, 1999 — about a week after General Musharraf overthrew the civilian government headed by Nawaz Sharif. The suspension sentence was delivered as Pakistan had violated the Harare Commonwealth Declaration (inked on October 20, 1991) that made it incumbent on signatories to ensure the existence of a democratic political system in their countries. Thus began the longest suspension that the Commonwealth had ever handed out to any country in the history of the organisation — about four-and-a-half years. It was lifted on May 22, 2004 after President Musharraf restored the Constitution of 1973.

But neither Musharraf nor his band of merry men learnt any lessons from the suspension doled out by the Commonwealth. Another suspension was slapped on Pakistan after the general imposed an emergency on November 3, 2007, held fundamental rights in abeyance, and ousted senior judges of the Supreme Court including Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary. As a consequence of this action, Pakistan’s membership from the Commonwealth was suspended on November 22.

The emergency was lifted on December 27, 2007 as Gen Musharraf finally restored the Constitution and fundamental citizen rights and brought back the ousted judges. After elections in Pakistan, the general finally decided to step down. On May 12, 2008, the Commonwealth restored Pakistan’s membership, noting that the decision was made in recognition of the democratic steps taken by the country ever since it slipped into emergency rule late last year. Since then Pakistan’s relationship with the Commonwealth has been sailing in smooth waters.

The story of Pakistan’s politics has many fascinating episodes. But the chapter on the country’s relationship with the Commonwealth is significant owing to certain political realities. In this chequered association also lies the story of Pakistan’s diplomatic inclusion and insolation.

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, January 1st, 2017

https://www.dawn.com/news/1305768

The idea that created Pakistan

UPDATED DEC 25, 2014 03:20PM

After decades of scuffles and strife, today, the idea behind Pakistan may not mean what it meant back when Jinnah led its creation in 1947.

There’s a war on in Pakistan and it’s largely existentialist in nature. It’s a war for the mind, body and soul of the idea that drove the ‘Pakistan Movement’ and succeeded in creating a separate and sovereign Muslim-majority enclave in South Asia.

It’s not a recent war. It’s been raging between various political, intellectual and religious sections of the enclave’s polity and society for over six decades now.

On numerous occasions, the governments of Pakistan claimed to have reached a synthesis from this tussle through various constitutional resolutions and conclusions, none of which have stuck.

On the contrary, they have only managed to open numerous Pandora’s Boxes that have been almost impossible to close.

Nevertheless, the evolution of the idea which all the fight is about, has seen a gradual retardation. Today, this idea may not mean what it meant when Mohammad Ali Jinnah led the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

To some, the idea was not allowed to freely evolve and deliver its promise of a prosperous and progressive Muslim homeland (in South Asia).

To others, however, it is not retardation at all but an ideological process bearing the kind of fruit that the idea was always destined to sprout.

The idea behind the momentum that gave birth to Pakistan was Muslim Nationalism.

Also read: Political Islam: Theory and reality

One section of Pakistanis considers it as an idea that was to evolve and shape Pakistan into a modern and progressive Muslim-majority society and state.

The other section sees it as an idea that was to grow and lay the foundation of a unique Islamic state; or a strong theocratic island in a sea of western ideas and of the ‘pseudo-secularism’ of Hindu-dominated India.

Though the state and governments of Pakistan have for long attempted to find a middle-ground in this context, such a ground has increasingly shifted towards the rightist sides of the existentialist divide.

This shift is lamented by those who explain it as the gradual retardation of the idea of Muslim Nationalism. Their opponents on the other hand have welcomed this swing to the right, explaining it as the natural direction Muslim Nationalism was destined to take.

So what was this idea destined to achieve?

The idea of nationalism as an ideology with which a man identifies with his nation (on the basis of shared political and cultural commonalities and borders) is largely an 18th century construct that emerged in Europe.

Its development was accelerated by the eventual expansion of the politics and economics associated with the rise of European colonialism and the assertion of the mercantile and trader classes.

Also read: Different narratives of Pakistan

Nationalism was first introduced in South Asia by British colonialists after they strengthened their economic and political grip in the region in the aftermath of the collapse of the 500-year-old Muslim rule in India.

Though 20th Century Islamic scholars such as Abul Ala Maududi almost completely rejected any linkage between nationalism and Islam, Pakistani author and researcher, Dr Nasim Ahmed Jawed, in his 1999 book, ‘Islam’s Political Culture’, suggests that ‘Islam in itself is a sort of nationalism in which the Muslim community (ummah) occupies the place of a nation.’

In this context, Jawed is actually echoing the basis of a Muslim Nationalism that was first set up and built upon by 19th century Indian Muslim scholars, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Syed Ameer Ali.

According to eminent Pakistani historian, Dr Mubarek Ali, when Muslim rule began to collapse in India, many prominent Muslim thinkers became alarmingly conscious of the minority status of the Muslims in the region.

Dr Ali adds that it was at this point that Muslim thinkers and reformers began to overtly talk about the ummah, suggesting that they were a part of the global Muslim community.

This thinking was a way to pad the reality that even though Muslims had ruled India for over 500 years, compared to the Hindus, they were still a minority in the region.

The creeping minority complex was offset by the notion that Indian Muslims were part of the large Muslim community — a universal nation of men and women who shared a common faith.

Muslim Nationalism for revival of Indian Muslims

This was the basis upon which men such as Syed Ahmed Khan and Syed Ameer Ali began to construct a Muslim Nationalism which would evolve into becoming the main engine behind the movement that created Pakistan.

Read on: The Pakistan Ideology: History of a grand concoction

The ummah factor was adopted from the Pan-Islamism of 19th Century thinker and activist, Jalaluddin Afghani. But as the state of the Indian Muslims began to degrade after the complete collapse of Muslim rule in India, Syed Ahmed Khan and Syed Ameer Ali concentrated more on improving the condition of India’s Muslim minority.

Both emphasised the importance of gaining ‘western education,’ and participating in the economic activity of British colonial rule. To ward off criticism from orthodox Muslim clerics and scholars, they also pleaded to understand Islam’s holy scriptures in a more rational and non-literalist manner, insisting that Islam was a modern, dynamic and enlightened religion.

 Syed Ahmed Khan
Syed Ahmed Khan

Though Ahmed and Ameer Ali often reminded the Muslims of India of their royal past as a ruling class, they paralleled this with a plea to look forward and regain this past through modern means ( i.e. mainly through modern education and the rejection of the superstition, obscurantism and anti-intellectual bias that they believed had crept into the thinking of India’s Muslim subjects).

The idea of this Muslim Nationalism was mainly to reinvent the region’s Muslims from being the degraded left-overs of a fallen empire into becoming a resourceful, enlightened, and above all a separate cultural entity of India.

 Syed Ameer Ali
Syed Ameer Ali

It was from this Muslim Nationalism that the All India Muslim League was formed in 1906.

But this nationalism still retained its initial seeds of Pan-Islamism and many Muslim Nationalists took an active part in the ‘Khilafat Movement’ that was launched in 1919 to halt the fall of the Ottoman Empire in Turkey.

Interestingly, though the movement did not succeed in saving the Ottomans, it did trigger one of the first battles among the Muslim Nationalists of the region over the essence of the ideology.

For example, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (who, was yet to become a prominent Muslim Nationalist), criticised the Khilafaf movement of being fuelled by religious fanaticism, whereas Muslim Nationalists such as Mohammad Ali Johaur and Shaukat Ali played a prominent role in it.

Johar and Shaukat saw Muslim Nationalism as an ideology that was to dismantle British rule in India through the formation of an Islamic caliphate. Ironically, the movement was also supported by Mahatma Gandhi’s Indian National Congress.

The collapse of the movement was a blow to the Pan-Islamic elements within the time’s Muslim Nationalism.

But that aspect of the idea of Muslim Nationalism that was first set into motion by Syed Ahmed Khan and Ameer Ali had been largely successful in rehabilitating the economic and social status of some Muslims (also giving birth to a Muslim bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie in India). It was still mostly an idea preoccupied by the social, academic and economic improvement of the region’s Muslims. It didn’t have any political pull as such.

To become this it required a coherent political philosophy and narrative. This eventually came through the mind and pen of a renowned Muslim philosopher and poet, Mohammad Iqbal.

‘Spiritual Democracy’ — Iqbal’s epic undertaking

But when Iqbal began to construct the political dimensions of Muslim Nationalism, the idea had already experienced its first schism.

Explore: Iqbal: The man and the existential quest

As mentioned earlier, the start and collapse of the Khilafat Movment (1919-1924) had fragmented the views of Muslim Nationalists, with one section looking at it as a universal Pan-Islamic idea whose epicentre was India, and the other faction holding on to the idea’s India-centricity, concerned only with the economic and social uplift of the region’s Muslims.

Iqbal’s writings in this context attempted to bridge the gap between the two poles. He expanded upon Syed Ahmed Khan’s pleas to liberate the Muslim mind from superstition and the anti-intellectual orthodoxy of the clergy, and on his (Syed’s) insistence that Islam’s scriptures should be read and understood in the light of reason.

But Iqbal also emphasised that Muslims need not be taken in by modern concepts such as secularism because Islam was inherently secular as there was no concept of the Church and/or official clergy (as a mediator between God and man) in Islam.

Iqbal’s Muslim Nationalism rejected the traditional Muslim clergy and hierarchal spiritual leaders (as mediators between God and man), but advocated the somewhat Plutonian enactment of a ‘spiritually enlightened’ and learned assembly of men who would decide the political, economic and legislative fate of the Muslims. Iqbal called this ‘spiritual democracy.’

 Muhammad Iqbal
Muhammad Iqbal

Just as Syed Ahmed Khan had done, Iqbal too saw the Muslims of India as a separate cultural entity. But he added that they should now politically strive to carve out their own sovereign abode.

However, he wasn’t quite clear exactly what would be the geographical shape of such an adobe because like the Pan-Islamists, Iqbal too saw the Muslims of India as being part of a universal Muslim nation.

Iqbal’s was a giant undertaking because he was constructing a politically relevant Muslim Nationalism by incorporating into it all that inspired and impressed him: From his intense interpretation of Islam’s holy texts, to Pan-Islam’s notion of religious and political (Muslim) universalism, to Syed Ahmed Khan’s idea of constructing a robust Muslim class in India, to even Kamal Ataturk’s secular Turkish nationalism and all the way to Nietzsche’s notion of ‘will to power.’

A lesser thinker would have exhausted himself in trying to weave together such distinct ideas into becoming one coherent indication of nationalism. But Iqbal largely succeeded in at least inspiring the growing number of Muslim bourgeoisie to begin seeing the All India Muslim League as a stirring expression of Muslim Nationalism.

Read through: Pakistan ka matlab kya – I and II

But Iqbal’s epic undertaking was such that it also attracted the admiration of the Pan-Islamists who by now had become to be known as ‘Islamic nationalists.’ These were prolific Islamic scholars such as Abul Ala Maududi who, however, rejected Muslim Nationalism’s new separatist tendencies (because it supposedly negated Islam’s essence of universality).

Instead, Islamic nationalists such as Maududi understood Iqbal’s ideas as allusions to the creation of a universal Islamic state that would mushroom from India and then spread.

  Abul Ala Maududi
Abul Ala Maududi

But the Muslim League, especially under Mohammad Ali Jinnah, understood and saw Iqbal in a different and more localised light.

Till even the early 1940s, Jinnah’s Muslim Nationalism was still embedded in the act of safeguarding the economic, cultural and political interests of India’s Muslims. He saw Iqbal as a contemporary extension of the enlightened endeavours of Syed Ahmed Khan and Syed Ameer Ali who wanted to mould the Muslims of the region into a robust community at par with India’s Hindu majority.

But as communal tensions between India’s Hindu majority and Muslim minority continued to rise, the League increasingly attempted to become the major political organ of the region’s Muslims.

The ‘idea’ assumes concrete political form

Till even the mid-1940s, India’s Muslims were being represented by a host of political and religious outfits that included the Muslim League, The Unionist Party, The Jamiat Ulema Islam Hind, the Khudai Khidmatgar, the Majlis-e-Ahrar, the Khaksar, and Jamat-i-Islami.

The Unionist Party was largely a pragmatist political group dominated by influential Muslim feudal, spiritual and business elites of the Punjab. It was also close to the Indian National Congress.

The Jamiat Ulema Islam Hind (JUIH) was a well organised party of Deobandi ulema and clerics who were opposed to the League’s notion of Muslim Nationalism, even though some of its leaders broke away and began to support the League’s calls for a separate Muslim homeland.

The Khudai Khidmatgar (also called the Red Shirts) was a left-leaning Pushtun nationalist party that was entirely opposed to Muslim Nationalism, believing it to be a construct of Punjabi and North Indian Muslim elites.

The Majlis-e-Ahrar and the Khaksar were radical right-wing Islamic groups that, along with the Jamat-i-Islami, rejected the idea of Muslim Nationalism, which, to them, was a secular colonial construct and detrimental to the political and spiritual interests of the Muslims of India.

It was during the legislative assembly elections of 1946 in India that the League was finally able to give a more articulate political dimension to its Muslim Nationalism.

Ideas from Syed Ahmed Khan and Iqbal’s notions of Muslim Nationalism were merged with the more contemporary political and ideological declarations largely authored by men such as Choudhry Rehmat Ali and Danial Latifi.

Rehmat, a graduate of the Cambridge University in the UK, authored a passionate pamphlet in 1933 titled ‘Are We to Live or Parish Forever.’ In it he openly called for the creation of a separate Muslim state carved out from the Muslim-majority regions of India (and even beyond).

Rehmat’s Muslim Nationalism was a direct response to what he perceived to be the rise of ‘Hindu Nationalism’ in the guise of the Indian National Congress. He urged the Muslims of India to follow the example of Islam’s Prophet who had united the Arab tribes in the 7th Century. To him, such a unity was the only way India’s Muslims would be able to challenge the onslaught of Hindu majority-ism.

 Chaudhry Rehmat Ali
Chaudhry Rehmat Ali

Jinnah gave Rehmat’s Muslim Nationalism a cool-headed spin when he advised a more pragmatic and patient approach. In 1944, Jinnah asked Danial Latifi to transform the Muslim Nationalism of the League into a coherent political, social and economic programme.

The final ‘idea’ — a patchwork of various ideas

Latifi was the leading socialist in the League at the time. In 1944, he authored and published the first complete manifesto of the All India Muslim League.

The manifesto was patronised by Jinnah and floated to attract Muslim votes in the 1945-46 legislative assembly elections, the results of which finally turned the League into the largest Muslim party in India. The very next year it succeeded in creating Pakistan.

Go through: Muslim modernism and Jinnah

Though a committed ‘scientific socialist’, Latifi married ideas of bourgeoisie Muslim economic advancement (through meritocracy) to Iqbal’s idea of ‘spiritual democracy’.

According to Latifi, the League would promote policies that would benefit and encourage the enterprising economic spirit of the Muslim middle-classes, and at the same time protect the Muslim masses from the oppression of the Hindu, Muslim and British Colonial elites.

Latifi also expressed the League’s idea of a separate Muslim state as an organ that would eventually transcend and resolve religious differences in the region, because a Muslim-majority state was inherently more equipped to appreciate religious plurality, harmony and diversity than a state dominated by a large Hindu majority.

This was strongly alluded to by Jinnah during his first major speech as the Governor General of Pakistan in August 1947.

 Muhammad Ali Jinnah
Muhammad Ali Jinnah

Furthermore, Latifi envisaged the League’s idea of the state as something that had a soul. According to him the state (under the League) ‘will be the alter-ego of the national being and in good time the two would merge to form an ordered and conflict-free society …’

During the 1945-46 election campaign, the League wielded Rehmat’s pleas for Muslim unity to gain a separate homeland and Latifi’s notion of the League being ‘the (political, economic and social) manifestation of the (Muslim) national soul.’

So the Muslim Nationalism that led to the creation of Pakistan was not quite a monolithic idea as such. Over a period of many decades it evolved as a patchwork of various ideas – from Syed Ahmed Khan and Syed Ameer Ali’s pro-assimilation pleas of Muslim progress (on the basis of adopting modern education and a rational understanding of the faith); to Iqbal’s philosophical mediations on the state of Islam in the 20th century and a nationhood based on an inspirational self-will of the Muslims; all the way to Rehmat Ali’s passionate call for the geographical separatism of the Muslims, and Danial Latifi’s promise of the creation of a progressive ‘state with a soul’ that would provide economic benefits and care across the classes.

Also read: Political Islam: An evolutionary history

Pan-Islamist ideas too informed the creation of this Muslim Nationalism, but once the idea rapidly moved towards the ambition of carving out a separate Muslim state in the region, Pan-Islamists and ‘Islamic nationalists’ decided to oppose it. They derided it as a myopic experiment that would be detrimental to the spiritual and political wellbeing of the Muslims of India and to the Pan-Islamist ambitions of reviving the concept of a universal caliphate.

Nevertheless, the later view was largely co-opted within the Muslim Nationalist tendency after the creation of Pakistan. But the co-option only managed to intensify the battle between the two poles of the ideology, leaving the nation locked in a constant battle between two sides of a single idea.

That is a conflict which is yet to enjoy a widespread consensual resolution.

https://www.dawn.com/news/1153105

Presidential address by Muhammad Ali Jinnah to the Muslim League Lahore, 1940

Ladies and Gentlemen:

[[1]] We are meeting today in our session after fifteen months. The last session of the All-India Muslim League took place at Patna in December 1938. Since then many developments have taken place. I shall first shortly tell you what the All-India Muslim League had to face after the Patna session of 1938. You remember that one of the tasks, which was imposed on us and which is far from completed yet, was to organise Muslim Leagues all over India. We have made enormous progress during the last fifteen months in this direction. I am glad to inform you that we have established provincial leagues in every province. The next point is that in every bye-election to the Legislative Assemblies we had to fight with powerful opponents. I congratulate the Mussalmans for having shown enormous grit and spirit throughout our trials. There was not a single bye-election in which our opponents won against Muslim League candidates. In the last election to the U.P. Council, that is the Upper Chamber, the Muslim League’s success was cent per cent. I do not want to weary you with details of what we have been able to do in the way of forging ahead in the direction of organising the Muslim League. But I may tell you that it is going up by leaps and bounds.

[[2]] Next, you may remember that we appointed a committee of ladies at the Patna session. It is of very great importance to us, because I believe that it is absolutely essential for us to give every opportunity to our women to participate in our struggle of life and death. Women can do a great deal within their homes, even under purdah. We appointed this committee with a view to enable them to participate in the work of the League. The objects of this central committee were: (1) to organise provincial and district women’s sub-committees under the provincial and district Muslim Leagues: (2) to enlist a larger number of women to the membership of the Muslim League: (3) to carryon an intensive propaganda amongst Muslim women throughout India in order to create in them a sense of a greater political consciousness — because if political consciousness is awakened amongst our women, remember your children will not have much to worry about: (4) to advise and guide them in all such matters as mainly rest on them for the uplift of Muslim society. This central committee, I am glad to say, started its work seriously and earnestly. It has done a great deal of useful work. I have no doubt that when we come to deal with their report of work done we shall really feel grateful to them for all the services that they have rendered to the Muslm League.

[[3]] We had many diffkulties to face from January 1939 right up to the declaration of war. We had to face the Vidya Mandir in Nagpur. We had to face the Wardha Scheme all over India. We had to face ill-treatment and oppression to Muslims in the Congress-governed provinces. We had to face the treatment meted out to Muslims in some of the Indian States such as Jaipur and Bhavnagar. We had to face a vital issue that arose in that littlc state of Rajkot. Rajkot was the acid test made by the Congress which would have affected one-third of India. Thus the Muslim League had all along to face various issues from January 1939 up to the time of the declaration of war. Before the war was declared the grratcst danger to the Muslims of India was the possible inauguration of the federal scheme in the central Government. We know what machinations were going on. But the Muslim League was stoutly resisting them in every direction. We felt that we could never accept the dangerous scheme of the central federal Government embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935. I am sure that we have made no small contribution towards persuading the British Government to abandon the scheme of central federal government. In creating that [state of] mind in the British Government, the Muslim League, I have no doubt, played no small part. You know that the British people are very obdurate people. They are also very conservative; and although they are very clever, they are slow in understanding. After the war was declared, the Viceroy naturally wanted help from the Muslim League. It was only then that he realised that the Muslim League was a power. For it will be remembered that up to the time of the declaration of war, the Viceroy never thought of me but of Gandhi and Gandhi alone. I have been the leader of an important party in the Legislature for a considerable time, larger than the one I have the honour to lead at present, the present Muslim League Party in the Central Legislature. Yet the Viceroy never thought of me. Therefore, when I got this invitation from the Viceroy along with Mr. Gandhi, I wondered within myself why I was so suddenly promoted, and then I concluded that the answer was the ‘All-India Muslim League’ whose President I happen to be. I believe that was the worst shock that the Congress High Command received, because it challenged their sole authority to speak on behalf of India. And it is quite clear from the attitude of Mr. Gandhi and the High Command that they have not yet recovered from that shock. My point is that I want you to realise the value, the importance, the significance of organising ourselves. I will not say anything more on the subject.

[[4]] But a great deal yet remains to be done. I am sure from what I can see and hear that the Muslim India is now conscious, is now awake, and the Muslim League has by now grown into such a strong institution that it cannot be destroyed by anybody, whoever he may happen to be. Men may come and men may go, but the League will live for ever.

[[5]] Now, coming to the period after the declaration of war, our position was that we were between the devil and the deep sea. But I do not think that the devil or the deep sea is going to get away with it. Anyhow our position is this. We stand unequivocally for the freedom of India. But it must be freedom of all India and not freedom of one section or, worse still, of the Congress caucus — and slavery of Mussalmans and other minorities.

[[6]] Situated in India as we are, we naturally have our past experiences and particularly the experiences of the past 2 1/2  years of provincial constitution in the Congress-governed provinces. We have learnt many lessons. We are now, therefore, very apprehensive and can trust nobody. I think it is a wise rule for every one not to trust anybody too much. Sometimes we are led to trust people, but when we find in actual experience that our trust has been betrayed, surely that ought to be sufficient lesson for any man not to continue his trust in those who have betrayed him. Ladies and gentlemen, we never thought that the Congress High Command would have acted in the manner in which they actually did in the Congress-governed provinces. I never dreamt that they would ever come down so low as that. I never could believe that there would be a gentleman’s agreement between the Congress and the Government to such an extent that although we cried [ourselves] hoarse, week in and week out, the Governors were supine and the Governor-General was helpless. We reminded them of their special responsibilities to us and to other minorities, and the solemn pledges they had given to us. But all that had become a dead letter. Fortunately, Providence came to our help, and that gentleman’s, agreement was broken to pieces~and the Congress, thank Heaven, went out of office. I think they are regretting their resignations very much. Their bluff was called off [=was called]. So far so good. I therefore appeal to you, in all [the] seriousness that I can command, to organise yourselves in such a way that you may depend upon none except your own inherent strength. That is your only safeguard, and the best safeguard. Depend upon yourselves. That does not mean that we should have ill-will or malice towards others. In order to safeguard your rights and interests you must create that strength in yourselves [such] that you may be able to defend yourselves, That is all that I want to urge.

[[7]] Now, what is our position with regard to [a] future constitution? It is that as soon as circumstances permit, or immediately after the war at the latest, the whole problem of India’s future constitution must be examined de novo and the Act of 1935 must go once for all. We do not believe in asking the British Government to make declarations. These declarations are really of no use. You cannot possibly succeed in getting the British Government out of this country by asking them to make declarations. However, the Congress asked the Viceroy to make a declaration. The Viceroy said, ‘I have made the declaration’. The Congress said, ‘No, no. We want another kind of declaration. You must declare now and at once that India is free and independent with the right to frame its own constitution by a Constituent Assemhly to be elected on the basis of adult franchise or as low a franchise as possihle. This Assembly will of course satisfy the minorities’ legitimate mterests.” Mr. Gandhi says that if the minorities are not satisfied then he is willing that some tribunal of the highest character and most impartial should decide the dispute. Now, apart from the impracticable character of this proposal and quite apart from the fact that it is historically and constitutionally absurd to ask [a] ruling power to abdicate in favour of a Constituent Assembly. Apart from all that, suppose we do not agree as to the franchise according to which the Central Assembly is to be elected, or suppose the the solid body of Muslim representatives do not agree with the non-Muslim majority in the Constituent Assembly, what will happen? It is said that we have no right to disagree with regard to anything that this Assemhly may do in framing a national constitution of this huge sub-continent except those matters which may be germane to the safeguards for the minorities. So we are given the privilege to disagree only with regard to what may be called strictly safe-guards of the rights and interests of minorities. We are also given the privilege to send our own representatives by separate electorates. Now, this proposal is based on the assumption that as soon as this constitution comes into operation the British hand will disappear. Otherwise there will be no meaning in it. Of course, Mr. Gandhi says that the constitution will decide whether the British will disappear, and if so to what extent. In other words, his proposal comes to this: First, give me the declaration that we are a free and independent nation, then I will decide what I should give you back. Does Mr. Gandhi really want the complete independence of India when he talks like this? But whether the British disappear or not, it follows that extensive powers must be transferred to the people. In the event of there being a disagreement between the majority of the Constituent Assembly and the Mussalmans, in the first instance, who will appoint the tribunal? And suppose an agreed tribunal is possible and the award is made and the decision given, who will, may I know, be there to see that this award is implemented or carried out in accordance with the terms of that award? And who will see that it is honoured in practice, because, we are told, the British will have parted with their power mainly or completely? Then what will be the sanction behind the award which will enforce it? We come back to the same answer, the Hindu majority would do it; and will it be with the help of the British bayonet or the Gandhi’s “Ahinsa”? Can we trust them any more? Besides, ladies and gentlemen, can you imagine that a question of this character, of social contract upon which the future constitution of India would be based, affecting 90 million of Mussalmans, can be decided by means of a judicial tribunal? Still, that is the proposal of the Congress.

[[8]] Before I deal with what Mr. Gandhi said a few days ago I shall deal with the pronouncements of some of the other Congress leaders — each one speaking with a different voice. Mr. Rajagopalacharya, the ex-Prime Minister of Madras, says that the only panacea for Hindu-Muslim unity is the joint electorates. That is his prescription as one of the great doctors of the Congress organisation. (Laughter.) Babu Rajendra Prasad, on the other hand, only a few days ago said, “Oh, what more do the Mussalmans want?” I will read to you his words. Referring to the minority question, he says: “If Britain would concede our right of self-determination, surely all these differences would disappear.” How will our differences disappear? He does not explain or enlighten us about it.

“But so long as Britain remains and holds power, the differences would continue to exist. The Congress has made it clear that the future constitution would be framed not by the Congress alone but by representatives of all political parties and religious groups. The Congress has gone further and declared that the minorities can have their representatives elected for this purpose by separate electorates, though the Congress regards separate electorates as an evil. It will be representative of all the peoples of this country, irrespective of their religion and political affiliations, who will be deciding the future constitution of India, and not this or that party. What better guarantees can the minorities have?”

So according to Babu Rajendra Prasad, the moment we enter the Assembly we shall shed all our political affiliations, and religions, and everything else. This is what Babu Rajendra Prasad said as late as 18th March, 1940.

[[9]] And this is now what Mr. Gandhi said on the 20th of March, 1940. He says: “To me,  Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, Harijans, are all alike. I cannot be frivolous” — but I think he is frivolous — “I cannot be frivolous when I talk of Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah. He is my brother.” The only difference is this that brother Gandhi has three votes and I have only one vote. (Laughter.) “I would be happy indeed if he could keep me in his pocket.” I do not know really what to say of this latest offer of his. “There was a time when I could say that there was no Muslim whose confidence I did not enjoy. It is my misfortune that it is not so today.” Why has he lost the confidence of the Muslims today? May I ask, ladies and gentlemen? “I do not read all that appears in the Urdu Press, but perhaps I get a lot of abuse there. I am not sorry for it. I still believe that without Hindu­Muslim settlement there can be no Swaraj.” Mr. Gandhi has been saying this now for the last 20 years. “You will perhaps ask in that case why do I talk of a fight. I do so because it is to be a fight for a Constituent Assembly.”

[[10] He is fighting the British. But may I point out to Mr. Gandhi and the Congress that you are fighting for a Constituent Assembly which the Muslims say they cannot accept; which, the Muslims say, means three to one; about which the Mussalmans say that they will never be able, in that way by the counting of head, to come to any agreenwnt which will be real agreement from the hearts, which will enable us to work as friends; and therefore this idea of a Constituent Assembly is objectionable, apart from other objections. But he is fighting for the Constituent Assembly, not fighting the Mussalmans at all! He says, “I do so because it is to be a fight for a Constituent Assembly. If Muslims who come to the Constituent Assembly” — mark the words, “who come to the Constituent Assembly through Muslim votes” — he is first forcing us to come to that Assembly, and then says — “declare that there is nothing common between Hindus and Muslims, then alone I would give up all hope, but even then I would agree with them because they read the Quran and I have also studied something of that holy Book.” (Laughter.)

[[11]] So he wants the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of ascertaining the views of the Mussalmans; and if they do not agree then he will give up all hopes, but even then he will agree with us. (Laughter.) Well, I ask you. ladies and gentlemen, is this the way to show any real genuine desire, if there existed any, to come to a settlement with the Mussalmans? (Voices of no, no.) Why does not Mr. Gandhi agree, and.I have suggested to him more than once and I repeat it again from this platform, why does not Mr. Gandhi honestly now acknowledge that the Congress is a Hindu Congress, that he does not represent anybody except the solid body of Hindu people? Why should not Mr. Gandhi be proud to say. “I am a Hindu. Congress has solid Hindu backing”? I am not ashamed of saying that I am a Mussalman. (Hear, hear and applause.) I am right and I hope and I think even a blind man must have been convinced by now that the Muslim League has the solid backing of the Mussalmans of India (Hear, hear.) Why then all this camouflage? Why all these machinations? Why all these methods to coerce the British to overthrow the Mussalmans? Why this declaration of non-cooperation? Why this threat of civil disobedience? And why fight for a Constituent Assembly for the sake of ascertaining whether the Mussalmans agree or they do not agree? (Hear, hear.) Why not come as a Hindu leader proudly representing your people, and let me meet you proudly representing the Mussalmans? (Hear, hear and applause.) This all that I have to say so far as the Congress is concerned.

[[12]] So far as the British Government is concerned, our negotiations are not concluded yet, as you know. We had asked for assurances on several points. At any rate, we have made some advance with regard to one point and that is this. You remember our demand was that the entire problem of [the] future constitution of India should be examined de novo, apart from the Government of India Act of 1935. To that the Viceroy’s reply, with the authority of His Majesty’s Government, was — I had better quote that — I will not put it in my own words: This is the reply that was sent to us on the 23rd of December. “My answer to your first question is that the declaration I made with the approval of His Majesty’s Government on October the 13th last does not exclude — Mark the words —  “does not exclude examination of any part either of the Act of 1935 or of the policy and plans on which it is based.” (Hear, hear.)

[[13]] As regards other matters, we are still negotiating and the most important points are: (1) that no declaration should be made by His Majesty’s Government with regard to the future constitution of India without our approval and consent (Hear, hear, and applause) and that no settlement of any question should be made with any party behind our back (Hear, hear) unless our approval and consent is given to it. Well, ladies and gentlemen, whether the British Government in their wisdom agree to give us that assurance or not, but. I trust that they will still see that it is a fair and just demand when we say that we cannot leave the future fate and the destiny of 90 million of people in the hands of any other judge. –We and we alone wish to be the final arbiter. Surely that is a just demand. We do not want that the British Government should thrust upon the Mussalmans a constitution which they do not approve of and to which they do not agree. Therefore the British Government will be well advised to give that assurance and give the Mussalmans complete peace and confidence in this matter and win their friendship. But whether they do that or not, after all, as I told you before, we must depend on our own inherent strength; and I make it plain from this platform, that if any declaration is made, if any interim settlement is made without our approval and without our consent, the Mussalmans of India will resist it. (Hear, hear and applause.) And no mistake should be made on that score.

[[14]] Then the next point was with regard to Palestine. We are told that endeavours, earnest endeavours, are being made to meet the reasonable, national demands, of the Arabs. Well, we cannot be satisfied by earnest endeavours, sincere endeavours, best endeavours. (Laughter.) We want that the British Government should in fact and actually meet the demands of the Arabs in Palestine. (Hear, hear.)

[[15]] Then the next point was with regard to the sending of the troops. Here there is some misunderstanding. But anyhow we have made our position clear that we never intended, and in fact language does not justify it if there is any misapprehension or apprehension, that the Indian troops should not be used to the fullest in the defence of our own country. What we wanted the British Government to give us assurance of was that Indian troops should not be sent against any Muslim country or any Muslim power. (Hear, hear.) Let us hope that we may yet be able to get the British Government to clarify the position further.

[[16]] This, then, is the position with regard to the British Government. The last meeting of the Working Committee had asked the Viceroy to reconsider his letter of the 23rd of December, having regard to what has been explained to him in pursuance of the resolution of the Working Committee dated the 3rd of February; and we are informed that the matter is receiving his careful consideration. Ladies and Gentlemen, that is where we stand after the War and up to the 3rd of February.

[[17]] As far as our internal position is concerned, we have also been examining it, and you know. there are several schemes which have been sent by various well-informed constitutionalists and others who take interest with [=are interested in the] problem of India’s future Constitution; and we have also appointed a sub­committee to examine the details of the schemes that have come in so far. But one thing is quite clear: it has always been taken for granted mistakenly that the Mussalmans are a minority, and of course we have got used to it for such a long time that these settled notions sometimes are very difficult to remove. The Mussalmans are not a minority. The Mussalmans are a nation by any definition. The British and particularly the Congress proceed on the hasis, “Well, you are a minority after all, what do you want!” “What else do the minorities want?” just as Babu Rajendra Prasad said. But surely the Mussalmans are not a minority. We find that even according to the British map of India we occupy large parts of this country where the Mussalmans are in a majority, such as Bengal, Punjab, N.W.F.P., Sind, and Baluchistan.

[[18]] Now the question is, what is the solution of this prohlem between the Hindus and the Mussalmans? We have been considering, and as I have already said, a committee has been appointed to consider the various proposals. But whatever the final scheme of constitution, I will present to you my views, and I will just read to you in confirmation of what I am going  to put before you, a letter from Lala Lajpat Rai to Mr. C. R. Das. It was written, I believe, about 12 or 15 years ago, and that letter has been produced in a book recently published by one Indra Prakash, and that is how this letter has come to light. This is what Lala Lajpat Rai, a very astute politician and a staunch Hindu Mahasabite, said. But before I read his letter it is plain from [it] that you cannot get away from being a Hindu if you are a Hindu. (Laughter.) The word ‘nationalist’ has now become the play of conjurers in politics. This is what he says:

“There is one point more which has been troubling me very much of late and one [about] which I want you to think carefully and that is the question of Hindu-Muhammadan unity. I have devoted most of my time during the last six months to the study of Muslim history and Muslim law and I am inclined to think it is neither possible nor practicable. Assuming and admitting the sincerity of Mohammadan leaders in the non-cooperation movement I think their religion provides an effective bar to anything of the kind.”You remember the conversation I reported to you in Calcutta which I had with Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Kitchlew. There is no finer Muhammadan in Hindustan than Hakim Ajmal Khan, but can any Muslim leader over-ride the Quran? I can only hope that my reading of Islamic law is incorrect.

I think his reading is quite incorrect.

“And nothing would relieve me more than to be convinced that it is so. But if it is right then it comes to this, that although we can unite against the British we cannot do so to rule Hindustan on British lines. We cannot do so to rule Hindustan on democratic lines.”

[[19]] Ladies and gentlemen, when Lala Lajpat Rai said that we cannot rule this country on democratic lines it was all right; but when I had the temerity to speak the same truth about eighteen months ago, there was a shower of attacks and criticism. But Lala Lajpat Rai said fifteen years ago that we cannot do so — viz., rule Hindustan on democratic lines. What is the remedy? The remedy, according to Congress, is to keep us in the minority and under the majority rule. Lala Lajpat Rai proceeds further:

“What is then the remedy? I am not afraid of the seven crores [=70 million] of Mussalmans. But I think the seven crores in Hindustan plus the armed hordes of Afghanistan, Central Asia, Arabia, Mesopotamia and Turkey, will be irresistible.” (Laughter.)”I do honestly and sincerely believe in the necessity or desirability of Hindu-Muslim unity. I am also fully prepared to trust the Muslim leaders. But what about the injunctions of the Koran and Hadis? The leaders cannot over-ride them. Are we then doomed? I hope not. I hope your learned mind and wise head will find some way out of this difficulty.”

[[20]] Now, ladies and gentlemen, that is merely a letter written by one great Hindu leader to another great Hindu leader fifteen years ago. Now, I should like to put before you my views on the subject as it strikes me, taking everything into consideration at the present moment. The British Govemment and Parliament, and more so the British nation, have been for many decades past brought up and nurtured with settled notions about India’s future, based on developments in their own country which has built up the British constitution, functioning now through the Houses of Parliament and the system of [the] cabinet. Their concept of party government functioning on political planes has become the ideal with them as the best form. of government for every country, and the one-sided and powerful propaganda, which naturally appeals to the British, has led them into a serious blunder, in producing a constitution envisaged in the Government of India Act of 1935. We find that the most leading statesmen of Great Britain, saturated with these notions, have in their pronouncements seriously asserted and expressed a hope that the passage of time will harmonise the inconsistent elements in India.

[[21]] A leading journal like the London Times, commenting on the Government of India Act of 1935, wrote that “Undoubtedly the difference between the Hindus and Muslims is not of religion in the strict sense of the word but also of law and culture, that they may be said indeed to represent two entirely distinct and separate civilisations. However, in the course of time the. superstitions will die out and India will be moulded into a single nation.” (So according to the London Times the only difficulties are superstitions). These fundamental and deep-rooted differences, spiritual, economic, cultural, social, and political havc been euphemised as mere “superstitions.” But surely it is a flagrant disregard of the past history of the sub-continent of India, as well as the fundamental Islamic conception of society vis-a-vis that of Hinduism, to characterise them as mere “superstitions.” Notwithstanding [a] thousand years of close contact, nationalities which are as divergent today as ever, cannot at any time be expected to transform themselves into onc nation merely by means of subjecting them to a democratic constitution and holding them forcibly togdher by unnatural and artificial methods of British Parliamentary statutes. What the unitary government of India for one hundred fifty years had failcd to achieve cannot be realiscd by the imposition of a central federal government. It is inconceivable that the fiat or the writ of a government so constituted can ever command a willing and loyal obedience throughout the sub-continent by various nationalities, except by means of armed force behind it.

[[22]] The problem in India is not of an inter-communal character, but manifestly of an international one, and it must be treated as such. So long as this basic and fundamental truth is not realised, any constitution that may be built will result in disaster and will prove destructive and harmful not only to the Mussalmans, but to the British and Hindus also. If the British Government are really in earnest and sincere to secure [the] peace and happiness of the people of this sub-continent, the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into “autonomous national states.” There is no reason why these states should be antagonistic to each other. On the other hand, the rivalry, and the natural desire and efforts on the part of one to dominate the social order and establish political supremacy over the other in the government of the country, will disappear. It will lead more towards natural goodwill by international pacts between them, and they can live in complete harmony with their neighbours. This will lead further to a friendly settlement all the more easily with regard to minorities, by reciprocal arrangements and adjustments between Muslim India and Hindu India, which will far more adequately and effectively safeguard the rights and interests of Muslim and various other minorities.

[[23]] It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders; and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality; and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of more of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literature[s]. They neither intermarry nor interdine together, and indeed they belong to two different civilisations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects [=perspectives?] on life, and of life, are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and different episode[s]. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent, and final. destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state.

[[24]] History has presented to us many examples, such as the Union of Great Britain and Ireland, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. History has also shown to us many geographical tracts, much smaller than the sub-continent of India, which otherwise might have been called one country, but which have been divided into as many states as there are nations inhabiting them. [The] Balkan Peninsula comprises as many as seven or eight sovereign states. Likewise, the Portuguese and the Spanish stand divided in the Iberian Peninsula. Whereas under the plea of unity of India and one nation which does not exist, it is sought to pursue here the line of one central government, when we know that the history of the last twelve hundred years has failed to achieve unity and has witnessed, during these ages, India always divided into Hindu India and Muslim India. The present artificial unity of India dates back only to the British conquest and is maintained by the British bayonet, but the termination of the British regime, which is implicit in the recent declaration of His Majesty’s Government, will be the herald of the entire break-up, with worse disaster than has ever taken place during the last one thousand years under the Muslims. Surely that is not the legacy which Britain would bequeath to India after one hundred fifty years of her rule, nor would Hindu and Muslim India risk such a sure catastrophe.

[[25]] Muslim India cannot accept any constitution which must necessarily result in a Hindu majority government. Hindus and Muslims brought together under a democratic system forced upon the minorities can only mean Hindu Raj. Democracy of the kind with which the Congress High Command is enamoured would mean the complete destruction of what is most precious in Islam. We have had ample experience of the working of the provincial constitutions during the last two and a half years, and any repetItion of such a government must lead to civil war and [the] raising of private armies, as recommended by Mr. Gandhi to [the] Hindus of Sukkur when he said that they must defend themselves violently or non-violently, blow for blow, and if they could not they must emigrate.

[[26]] Mussalmans are not a minority as it is commonly known and understood. One has only got to look round. Even today, according to the British map of India, out of eleven provinces, four provinces where the Muslims dominate more or less, are functioning notwithstanding the decision of the Hindu Congress High Command to non-cooperate and prepare for civil disobedience. Mussalmans are a nation according to any defmition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory, and their state. We wish to live in peace and harmony with our neighbours as a free and independent people. We wish our people to develop to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, economic, social, and political life, in a way that we think best and in consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our people. Honesty demands [that we find], and [the] vital interest[s] of millions of our people impose a sacred duty upon us to find, an honourable and peaceful solution, which would be just and fair to all. But at the same time we cannot be moved or diverted from our purpose and objective by threats or intimidations. We must be prepared to face all difficulties and consequences, make all the sacrifices that may be required of us, to achieve the goal we have set in front of us.

[[27]]  Ladies and gentlemen, that is the task before us. I fear I have gone beyond my time limit. There are many things that I should like to tell you, but I have already published a little pamphlet containing most of thc things that I have said and I have been saying, and I think you can easily get that publication both in English and in Urdu from the League Office. It might give you a clearer idea of our aims. It contains very important resolutions of the Muslim League and various other statements. Anyhow, I have placed before you the task that lies ahead of us. Do you realise how big and stupendous it is? Do you realise that you cannot get freedom or independence by mere arguments? I should appeal to the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia in all countries in the world have been the pioneers of any movements for freedom. What does the Muslim intelligentsia propose to do? I may tell you that unless you get this into your blood, unless you are prepared to take off your coats and are willing to sacrifice all that you can and work selflessly, earnestly, and sincerely for your people, you will never realise your aim. Friends, I therefore want you to make up your mind definitely ,and then think of devices and organise your people, strengthen your organisation, and consolidate the Mussalmans all over India. I think that the masses are wide awake. They only want your guidance and your lead. Come forward as servants of Islam. organise the people economically, socially, educationally, and politically, and I am sure that you will be a power that will be accepted by everybody. (Cheers.)

http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_jinnah_lahore_1940.html

A leaf from history: Cricket diplomacy checks war pitch

UPDATED NOV 15, 2015 11:40AM

With Indian troops am­a­ssed along the Pakistani border in early 1987, the morning of Feb 21, 1987, presented an altogether different surprise: a Pakistan Air Force jet landed at Delhi airport, with the visitor none other than Pakistan President General Ziaul Haq.

The general had flown to Delhi on the pretext of watching a test match between Pakistan and India in Jaipur, with his arrival putting Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in a spot of bother. In an article published by India Today, Behramnam, special adviser to Rajiv Gandhi, claimed that the Indian prime minister was not prepared to receive the General at the airport but had to be convinced by his associates to do so. With the match being played in Jaipur, Behramnam was deputed by Rajiv to accompany Gen Zia and tend to him.

As quoted in the India Today article, Behramnam states: “Before departure for Chennai, General Ziaul Haq, while saying goodbye to Gandhi said, ‘Mr Rajiv, you want to attack Pakistan, do it. But keep in mind that this world will forget Halaku Khan and Changez Khan and will remember only Ziaul Haq and Rajiv Gandhi, because this will not be a conventional war but a nuclear war. In this situation, Pakistan might be completely destroyed, but Muslims will still be there in the world; but with the destruction of India, Hinduism will vanish from the face of this earth.’”

Gen Zia had left Rajiv shaken.

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Gen Zia’s unannounced arrival in New Delhi paves the way for peace, but only after another threat of absolute destruction in South Asia is delivered to PM Rajiv Gandhi


“These were only few minutes, but Gen Zia seemed to us a very dangerous man. With a stern-face, Gen Zia’s eyes showed that he meant business. I was astonished, that after this stern warning, in a flash, Gen Zia started smiling as if nothing happened and warmly shook hands with other hosts. Except Rajiv Gandhi and myself, [nobody knew] that Gen Zia had created problems for the Indian PM by threatening him with nuclear war,” said Behramnam.

Wisdom ultimately prevailed, and the next day, Rajiv met Gen Zia for dinner. They spoke briefly but with definite intention of reducing tensions at the border. They agreed that in the first phase, both countries would withdraw 80,000 troops from each side. To discuss the mechanics of further withdrawals, an Indian team would visit Pakistan and carry talks.

Why had the general decided to deliver his viewpoint to the Indian leadership directly?

It so happened that the US had warned Pakistan in 1984 that India was planning to attack its nuclear installations in a fashion similar to how the Israelis attacked Iraq’s Osiraq facility. This information was conveyed to Gen Zia in a confidential letter written by President Ronald Reagan on Sept 12, 1984, delivered by Ambassador Hinton, US ambassador to Islamabad.

Details about this exchange were disclosed in the recently declassified US State Department documents. Both the “Talking points for use in delivering letter to General Zia” (a four-page undated secret document) and President Reagan’s letter to General Zia (a three-page secret and sensitive document) were only revealed recently; neither had been revealed or published before.

Reagan’s fear was based on a CIA analysis, which noted in July 1984 that some sections of the Indian government viewed a Pakistani nuclear threat as imminent. The CIA analysis also noted that “an Indian attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities would almost certainly prompt retaliatory strikes against Indian nuclear facilities and probably lead to a full scale war.” The US also wanted Pakistan to restrict its uranium enrichment to a maximum of five per cent, a breach of which would trigger sanctions on Pakistan.

In reply to Reagan’s letter of November 7, 1984, Gen Zia did not mention Reagan’s request to limit uranium enrichment. Instead, he flatly denied Pakistan having uranium enrichment capability. “Pakistan has no intention whatsoever to manufacture or detonate a nuclear device,” the general told the American president.

Meanwhile, off the cricket field, Gen Zia told media personnel, “Cricket for peace is my mission, and I have come with that spirit.”

By March 1987, tensions between the two countries had diminished appreciably. They reached an agreement to withdraw 150,000 troops in Kashmir followed by withdrawal of more troops from Rajashthan desert. India stuck to its decision of holding military exercises, telling Pakistan that it had nothing to worry about. India delayed the last phase of the exercise to communicate the same message.

In the context of Pakistan and India, cricket diplomacy has a special place. After Gen Zia’s visit, General Pervez Musharraf also visited India on the pretext of watching a cricket match, and ultimately led to more dialogue and better friendly ties between the two neighbouring countries. In 2011, after democracy returned to Pakistan, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh invited his Pakistani counterpart to visit India and witness a cricket match between the two countries. PM Yousuf Raza Gilani accepted the invite, and went to Mohali which helped defuse tense situation between the two countries after the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, November 15th, 2015

https://www.dawn.com/news/1219397

THE RETURN OF BENAZIR BHUTTO: STRUGGLE IN PAKISTAN

THOUSANDS OF ROSE petals showered the path of Benazir Bhutto as she entered a packed auditorium in Karachi this summer. As the 33-year-old Pakistan opposition leader grinned and waved, the crowd stomped, clapped and chanted ”Benazir! Benazir!” Miss Bhutto brushed the petals from her auburn hair and adjusted her chiffon scarf to keep it modestly covering her head. A rhythmic song blasted from the loudspeaker, half disco and half tribal beat from Baluchistan, sung in Urdu by a local pop music queen. Listen, all you holy warriors, Look at Benazir, the nation joins her, Long live Bhutto, long live Bhutto!

At the podium, Miss Bhutto peered from wide-framed glasses and spoke confidently, with a forceful jab of her hand, promising higher wages for workers and more land for peasants. Dropping her text, she denounced as an evil usurper Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan’s President. An army general in 1977, he had overthrown her father, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, ending the only period in history in which Pakistan was governed by a popularly elected leader. Two years later, Mr. Bhutto was hanged on a disputed murder conspiracy charge.

”Will you workers and laborers help to destroy this man?” Miss Bhutto now asked. ”Yes, yes!” the crowd shouted. ”Will you join our campaign to bring him down this autumn?” ”Yes, yes,” the crowd called again.

Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has been dismembered once and has seen three military coups, three wars with India, untold riots, assassinations and turmoil – but it has never seen anything like this.

In an Islamic state in which women are generally expected to be subservient, the 33-year-old unmarried woman, educated at Radcliffe and Oxford universities, has established herself as Pakistan’s most popular opposition leader – indeed its most popular politician. The antigovernment activity she has helped foment since her return from voluntary exile last spring poses the most serious threat to the Zia regime in years.

Responding to the crisis, General Zia has proved himself to be a formidable and resourceful foe. In August, his Government cracked down by arresting Miss Bhutto and 2,000 dissidents, and deployed police and army troops to suppress the ensuing antigovernment riots in Karachi and rural Sind province, her home territory. For nine years, General Zia had ruled in just this authoritarian fashion, but last year he surprised many by shifting course, lifting martial law and turning the day-to-day functioning of the Government over to an elected Parliament and Prime Minister, Mohammed Khan Junejo. Having again proved its ability to use force, the Government this month released Miss Bhutto and said she could continue her politicking so long as it remained peaceful.

Miss Bhutto has been hampered by defections, splits and a lack of discipline in her organization. And she is widely criticized for offering no overarching purpose in seeking power, beyond vindication of her father. Nevertheless, most politicians agree that Miss Bhutto might win a national election today. But the Government stands firm in refusing to hold one until 1990.

Still, Miss Bhutto is in a position to help shape the future of Pakistan. She has proved her ability to draw crowds like no one else in the country’s short history. Her political organization, the Pakistan People’s Party, is the biggest and most powerful mass-based group in the country, drawing strength from peasants, students, labor unions, many professionals and wealthy landed interests. She is widely recognized as a symbol of hope for masses of workers and peasants, and she has an organization that can create sufficient disruptions to force a new crackdown at a time when it would prove embarrassing both to General Zia and to Washington.

THE UNITED STATES has an unusual stake in the drama being played out in Pakistan. Since the 1950’s, Pakistan has been a key element in American policy toward South Asia. It has been a valued, Western-oriented ally on the borders of the Soviet Union. And in 1971 it played an important role in facilitating America’s opening to China under Richard M. Nixon, whose controversial ”tilt” toward Pakistan during the India-Pakistan War later that year enraged India and its supporters.

In the 1970’s, Pakistan was a difficult friend because of the 1977 coup, the Bhutto execution, allegations that it was producing a nuclear bomb and the destruction of the United States Embassy by a mob in Islamabad in 1979.

But after the massive Soviet intervention in Afghanistan at the end of 1979, Washington came to see Pakistan as a ”frontline state” against Communism; the Reagan Administration granted it $3.2 billion in military and economic assistance – one of the largest United States aid commitments.

This month, President Reagan praised Pakistan for its decision to use force if necessary to block a hijacked American jetliner from leaving Karachi, although Pakistani commandos got to the scene too late to prevent the hijackers’ shooting spree, in which at least 21 persons eventually died.

American officials have long encouraged the Zia regime to move toward representative government, and many are concerned that Miss Bhutto’s aggressive tactics may jeopardize that process. Although Miss Bhutto carefully avoids direct criticism of the United States, American diplomats worry that many of her supporters resent Washington’s backing of the Zia government and may prove hostile to American interests in the region.

The violent unrest that has accompanied Miss Bhutto’s challenge to General Zia has raised the larger question of whether Pakistan can ever peacefully resolve the competing demands of its political factions. Pakistan has experienced some years of stability, and some years of representative government, but rarely both at the same time.

In Pakistan, some say Miss Bhutto’s challenge may leave the country stronger than before. Others fear that her demands for fresh elections next year cannot be reconciled with the Government’s determination to hang on, and that her drive might produce more turmoil, forcing the army to intervene and reimpose martial law.

”If that happens, the people will be demoralized and they will give up on this country altogether,” says a Karachi politician. ”It will be the last nail in the coffin of Pakistan.”

MISS BHUTTO IS NOTHING IF NOT a protegee of her father, who doted on her and always hoped she would pursue a career of public service. Son of a wealthy feudal landholding family in the southern Sind province, the late Prime Minister, who was elected to power in 1971, was an arrogant, charismatic, brooding and suspicious politician who governed with great flair and ruthlessness.

The slogan of the Pakistan Peoples Party of Mr. Bhutto was simple -”bread, clothing, shelter” – and it helped make him the only Pakistani leader in history to have broad appeal among peasants and workers. He was revered further for rebuilding national pride after the 1971 military debacle in which East Pakistan broke away to become the nation of Bangladesh.

In an effort to consolidate his rule, Mr. Bhutto was determined to break the power of the army, the government bureacracy he had inherited, big businesses and the old tribal and regional leaders he felt were strangling Pakistan and threatening national unity.

But this meant that when opposition parties gained strength, Mr. Bhutto outlawed them and jailed their leaders and thousands of their workers. He nationalized banks, insurance companies and most industries. He ordered press censorship and abolished the elite civil service, replacing government employees with his own loyalists.

Of the army, Mr. Bhutto said, ”I don’t take my eyes off them.” He filled its upper ranks with officers he thought he could trust, reaching down in 1976 to elevate a self-effacing lieutenant general named Mohammed Zia ul-Haq as the army chief of staff – ”the biggest mistake of my life,” he said later.

In 1977, at what seemed to be the peak of his power, Mr. Bhutto called for elections. All the other political groups – from left-wing socialists to right-wing religious parties – united against him. After a chaotic election day of stolen and stuffed ballot boxes and voter intimidation, the parties rose in protest, denouncing the Bhutto landslide as a fraud. Hundreds were killed in clashes with the police. And in 1977, led by General Zia, the army stepped in to oust Mr. Bhutto.

Like generals taking their cue from the last war, Miss Bhutto and her associates are trying to force history to repeat itself. Miss Bhutto hopes the army will defy General Zia in similar circumstances and agree to call immediate elections. If it simply cracks down and reimposes martial law, she can argue that the army was running things behind the scenes all along.

”It’s a risk,” says a Bhutto associate. ”But it’s the only route we can take. The Government will never let us into power any other way.”

MISS BHUTTO MAY HAVE AN IM-probable background for such political combat. But few children of privilege have been steeled by seeing their world crumble and collapse and then having to fight for their father’s life. Fewer still have had to suffer solitary confinement in a squalid prison cell where daytime temperatures hovered near 120 degrees.

The question today is whether these experiences strengthened Miss Bhutto’s character or transformed her into a distrustful, imperious loner striving for vindication.

As a child, Miss Bhutto was called Pinky, a nickname her oldest friends still use. She went to convent schools and grew up with servants, governesses and family dinners at the Bhutto mansion in the Karachi suburbs and the ancestral home in Larkana. There in the scrublands and farm fields of the Indus River Valley, the Bhuttos are said to own thousands of acres cultivated by poor but loyal peasants.

Feudalism remains a potent factor in Pakistan, and feudal landlords are often successful in politics. With her hauteur, a longtime acquaintance says, Miss Bhutto ”is feudal to the core.”

At Radcliffe and Oxford, friends say, she studied politics but never developed a distinct set of views. Instead, she excelled at campus politics and at the Oxford Union, the prestigious debating society that she served as president, as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had.

Since returning to Pakistan, Miss Bhutto has given up most social engagements, and has told friends that for now she has no plans to marry. But at college, she drove a sports car, went to parties and had many male friends who speak of her today with affection and even awe. As a debater, she was known for the quick, sarcastic put-down, especially when the subject was whimsical and form was prized over content.

In the summer of 1977, Miss Bhutto planned to return to Pakistan and take up a career in government, perhaps in the Foreign Service. But within days of her arrival, the army seized control.

As Miss Bhutto recalls it, former advisers began to visit the ousted Prime Minister, demanding money and threatening to defect. Then one day an ex-Cabinet minister urged Miss Bhutto to leave the country. In the evening, she discussed the incident with her father. That night, the police seized him on a murder charge.

With Miss Bhutto’s younger sister and brothers still in school, it fell to her and her mother to fight against his conviction. They exhausted every legal avenue, including a plea to the nation’s Supreme Court. In the end, General Zia rejected the appeals of leaders around the world and authorized the execution. It was in the last year and a half of her father’s life, says Miss Bhutto, that she learned about the harsh realities of Pakistan’s politics. In the shadows of his prison cell, she and her father talked about all that had gone wrong.

”These were the bitter, bitter experiences . . .” Miss Bhutto recalled recently, her voice trailing off. ”All those ministers who betrayed us, the people who made hay while the sun was shining. I decided I didn’t want such men around me – ever.”

Two years after her father’s execution, Miss Bhutto was herself jailed after some antigovernment rebels hijacked a Pakistani jetliner and flew to Afghanistan and Syria. The hijackers said they were from a shadowy guerrilla organization run by Miss Bhutto’s two younger brothers. Investigators then charged that this group had backing from Libya, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

Miss Bhutto spent the summer of 1981 in solitary confinement in a prison on the scorched plains of Sind. After her release, she looked emaciated and had headaches and fainting spells. Finally, in 1984 the Government let her leave the country for medical care and recuperation in England.

”Benazir was transformed by the fights in those difficult years,” says Peter W. Galbraith, a college friend who is the son of the former United States Ambassador to India John Kenneth Galbraith, and who now works on the Democratic staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. ”Nothing in her background suggests that she would have had such courage to see it through.”

But her experiences also took their toll. Before the hanging in 1979, Miss Bhutto was asked what she thought would occur if her father was executed. ”Civil war, the breakup of Pakistan, a massive and total outburst from the people,” she said. It didn’t happen. Today, Miss Bhutto is certain why – the same party elders who were trying to save themselves earlier wanted to avoid trouble.

Many other politicians around at the time recall the situation differently. Their version is that Mr. Bhutto did himself in by his own greed for power. They note that politics in Pakistan, like politics everywhere, has its share of opportunists and that it is unrealistic to blame people for acting in their self-interest.

After the coup against her father, Miss Bhutto inherited the leadership of his party. In their grief and confusion, party leaders and workers felt that the Bhutto dynasty could keep them unified and strong. But while in England the last two years, Miss Bhutto fought with many of her father’s loyalists over party strategy.

”They treated her like a little punk girl,” asserted a colleague. The squabbles culminated when Miss Bhutto returned to Pakistan last year to bury her younger brother, Shahnawaz, at the family estate in Larkana. He had mysteriously died of poison at his luxury apartment on the French Riveria – another blow to Miss Bhutto and to her mother, who was ill herself.

”I thought to myself, my brother is dead, my mother has got cancer, I have suffered and made sacrifices – and for what?” Miss Bhutto said recently. But she came back to Larkana in August 1985 for a brief stay, to be greeted by tens of thousands of supporters. It was the biggest antigovernment demonstration in years, and Miss Bhutto took it as a sign to persevere.

”I realized that it was for those people that I fought,” Miss Bhutto said. ”I thought that if they accepted me, there should be some discipline in the party, and we will rule. The mood of the country was ready, even if the so-called party leaders were not.”

When Miss Bhutto was named party leader, the real power in the party was in the hands of the elders, who expected Miss Bhutto to serve merely as a symbol. When she returned this year, however, her supporters among the workers did such an effective job in organizing her rallies and bringing out hundreds of thousands in trucks and buses that they felt entitled to make her the leader in fact. Miss Bhutto used her support among the rank and file to dismiss key party chiefs, and installed her own young loyalists in their place. As a result, Miss Bhutto has a better grip on her party, and she may be able to improve its effectiveness. But she has also fueled fears that she will indulge in her father’s excesses. Politicians throughout Pakistan now criticize Miss Bhutto for impetuousness and intolerance of dissent. One of the dismissed leaders, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, a highly respected former Chief Minister of Sind Province under Bhutto, moved this fall to found his own political party, posing a potentially serious challenge.

”She is arrogant and has no practical experience in politics,” says Khwaja Kharuddin, a prominent antigovernment politician. ”She is repeating all her father’s mistakes by turning against her own people. We’ll never have an election unless we’re all allied.”

Miss Bhutto insists that she must do things her own way. In conversation, a shadow crosses her face when she is asked about her father’s record of repression, the stories of jailings and torture documented by Amnesty International and other human-rights groups. Friends say that Miss Bhutto cannot accept any criticism of her father. ”You can never bring it up with her,” said a senior party leader. ”She won’t accept it. Her demand for loyalty is total.”

GOD GIVE US MEN!” reads the opening of a prayer issued by the Pakistan Army a few years back, shortly after the army carried out its third military coup since independence. Men whom the lust of office does not kill, Men whom the spoils of office cannot buy, Men who possess opinions and a will, Men who have honor . . . men who will not lie.

Such is the self-proclaimed ethos of the institution that has governed Pakistan for most of its history.

In its early years, Pakistan was more of an amalgam of competing and conflicting loyalties than a nation commanding the allegiance of its people. Historians note that whereas India was founded on democratic and egalitarian ideals, Pakistan was formed because of a fear by Moslems of being swallowed up in a Hindu raj. The British agreed to partition their empire only at the last minute, a decision that in many parts of India is still bitterly regretted. In any case, for Pakistan’s leaders, representative government and civil liberties were secondary to preserving a cultural and religious identity that had long emphasized authority, faith and discipline.

Soon after independence, Pakistan’s founding father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, known as ”The Great Leader,” died of cancer, leaving the country bereft and overwhelmed by chaos and the problems of a nearly bankrupt treasury. For the next decade, a succession of prime ministers scrambled for power until the army moved in for the first time.

Perhaps it was inevitable that Pakistan would then fall back on the ”great leader syndrome” and on the dynastic, aristocratic and feudal tradition in southern Asia. The British had left a powerful Asian-populated civil bureaucracy that had in the viceregal tradition become used to enforcing the law ruthlessly – plus an army that had developed a deep distrust of politicians.

General Zia today seems to epitomize that attitude. Relaxing in his study at Army House, the official residence of the chief of staff in Rawalpindi, he portrays himself as a humble officer who had no choice but to intervene in 1977 and rescue Pakistan from chaos and civil war.

”Why is it that Pakistan has not been able to bring stability to its political life?” he said in a conversation recently. ”At independence, our goal was clear. No sacrifice was too great. But thereafter, unfortunately, we did not have the kind of political leadership which the founder envisaged. Our political parties were not strong enough.”

The man who rose to the top of the army and stayed there for the last decade is an unassuming, affable and stolid career soldier with a habit of being in the right place at the right time. The son of a shopkeeper and religious-school teacher in what is today the Indian part of Punjab, he served with British troops during World War II in Burma, Malaya and Indonesia. When partition with India occurred, his family uprooted itself and walked across the state to the west with nothing but the bundles they carried and the clothes on their backs. When Pakistan experienced the military debacle and loss of Bangladesh in 1971, Mr. Zia escaped being tainted because he was on loan to Jordan, advising King Hussein. In Pakistan, he was just another army corps commander and tank warfare specialist when Mr. Bhutto picked him to become army chief of staff.

At 62, General Zia is short and stocky with a drooping mustache that gives his face the look of a comic-book villain, but he actually has a friendly manner and a famous ability to listen politely to almost any guest or visitor.

The general’s supporters have always asserted that he carried out the coup d’etat in 1977 only after his own commanders demanded it and threatened to mutiny if he refused, and that he intended to permit Mr. Bhutto to run in a future election until evidence arose connecting him with corruption and the murder of a politician. Included in the evidence, according to the General’s supporters, was a list of Bhutto political foes with the Prime Minister’s handwriting in the margin next to one name saying ”Eliminate him.”

”I said to him, ‘Sir – I still called him that – Sir, why have you done all these things, you whom I respected so, you who had done so much?’ ” General Zia once recalled. ”And he only said that I should wait, and he would be cleared. It was very disappointing.” Later, General Zia refused to stay the Bhutto execution, asserting that ”politicians, like anybody else, have to answer for their deeds.”

At first, the General portrayed himself as a temporary custodian of power in Pakistan, working hard to smooth the way for new elections and civilian rule. He was praised for freeing thousands of Bhutto’s political prisoners, and the streets that were in turmoil for months suddenly turned quiet. But after promising and then cancelling elections for the second time in 1979, General Zia cracked down, banning political parties, imposing censorship and jailing opponents. Human-rights organizations had said that over the ensuing years, thousands have been jailed, tortured and mistreated. General Zia seemed to single out the Pakistan People’s Party for repression, as if determined to destroy the Bhutto organization as a force in national politics.

It is often said that power in Pakistan has three principal sources – the army, the feudal landlords and the religious leaders – and Zia has cultivated all three.

Like his predecessor, he has tried to keep an eye on his main flank, the army, replacing dozens of senior army officers with loyalists to his liking. Army officers have done well under General Zia, who has made them provincial governors and heads of government ministries, where they receive many perquisites – including, many experts say, frequent opportunities for kickbacks.

There have been reports of at least three mutiny plots among middle-level officers supported by left-wing civilians, and several officers were tried and convicted for one such plot in 1983. But diplomats and other analysts credit General Zia with keeping the army loyal. But his decision last December to return Pakistan to civil rule is testing the willingness of generals to return to their barracks. Pakistan is rife with rumors of discontent and willingness of some in the army to seize power again if circumstances permit. Politicians fear turmoil created by the opposition could provide such an opportunity. To placate the feudal leaders in the countryside, General Zia initially established an advisory council, nearly half of which was composed of wealthy landlords, and used foreign assistance to hasten adoption of modern agricultural methods and to increase farm production.

And for Pakistan’s religious leaders, General Zia embarked on a sweeping ”Islamization” drive to make Pakistani laws conform with Moslem teachings. Even as a corps commander, he was known for sponsoring classes on the Koran for his men. But the Islamization program has also cemented the support of the mullahs, who are now represented in large numbers in the councils of government.

Much of the Islamization has been cosmetic. No one has ever had his hand chopped off for stealing or been stoned for adultery, although such punishments were put on the books. In addition the Government ordered interest-free banking, although banks now pay a ”profit” on deposits instead of interest.

The main critics of Islamization have been professional women who fought against curbs on the testimony by women in legal cases from rape prosecutions to financial transactions. But many of them acknowledge that their earlier fears that women would be required to wear veils or stay out of sight as they are in other Islamic countries have not materialized.

Most of all, Mr. Zia has established his power by rallying the country in what has widely been perceived as a genuine national security crisis resulting from the 1979 Soviet invasion of neighboring Afganistan. Surrounded by hostile neighbors, Pakistan has always felt the need for military preparedness. Today, its cornerstone is the $3.2 billion military and economic aid package that President Reagan signed in 1981, and which he wants to renew with a $4.02 billion package next year.

Many Pakistanis have become alarmed by the number of Soviet-Afghan-sponsored bombings and air incursions that have increased recently in Pakistani territory near the Afghan border. And Pakistan has become enmeshed in the Afghan conflict because of the supposedly covert American aid – now reportedly $470 million a year – to Afghan ”freedom fighters” operating from bases in Pakistan, Backing for the freedom fighters appears to be generally popular throughout Pakistan, except among the educated classes that form a major part of Benazir Bhutto’s power base. They argue that the support of the rebel cause means that the three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan already straining social services and taking up jobs can’t go home and that their presence in the northwest could encourage secessionism there. Miss Bhutto cites just this argument in assailing the Zia regime for its handling of the situation. She has, however, never called for a unilateral cutoff in aid to the rebels.

American policymakers are wary of Miss Bhutto’s position on Afghanistan, remembering perhaps that her father was less than a friend of the United States and once accused the Central Intelligence Agency of involvement in his downfall.

Washington is also concerned that Pakistan is producing a nuclear bomb. Both General Zia and Miss Bhutto assert they oppose building such a weapon, but many experts in the United States feel that the country is close to that goal.

General Zia’s current political scheme began in 1983, when he announced another timetable for parliamentary elections in which parties were to be barred from participating. The elections last year were thus boycotted by Miss Bhutto’s organization and all other opposition parties making up the antigovernment Movement for the Restoration of Democracy.

But the election was perhaps General Zia’s greatest political triumph. Most voters ignored the boycott appeal and went to the polls. The new Parliament, not surprisingly, represents the usual establishment landlords, religious groups, businessmen and bureaucratic elite.

Responsibility for the whole new apparatus has fallen on the shoulders of Prime Minister Junejo, a soft-spoken, former Cabinet minister and landlord. By all accounts, Mr. Junejo is running the Government day to day now, so much so that General Zia calls himself an ”elder statesman” with plans to retire by the end of the decade. Few doubt that he wields decisive influence behind the scenes, even though Mr. Junejo has ignored his advice on occasion.

FEW POLITICAL AN-tagonists have ever had as many reasons to oppose each other as General Zia and Miss Bhutto. Their confrontation carries deep historical and psychological significance for themselves, their supporters and enemies – and for Pakistan itself. Lawrence Ziring, a political-science professor at Western Michigan University, in Kalamazoo, who specializes in Pakistan, argues that it is among the world’s ”weaker political entities” because of its internal divisions, its vulnerability to hostile neighbors, and its place in superpower politics. And Mr. Ziring argues that Pakistan’s politicians have been their own worst enemies. The country’s politics, he writes, have left ”little opportunity for give and take,” and elections in Pakistan have produced more conflict than they have ever resolved.

American experts point out that, for better or worse, Pakistan is the United States’ most important friend in one of the world’s most populous and turbulent regions. And American diplomats who support General Zia and Prime Minister Junejo argue that he is best equipped to nurse the country toward stability, freedom and representative government.

In recent years, Pakistan has enjoyed unusual stability. Its economy is performing well, the middle class is growing and more people seem to have a stake in political continuity. Perhaps because people have been numbed by the violence of the last decade, they seem reluctant to bring the country to its knees in order to achieve political change.

But many also doubt that Pakistan can maintain that stability, and Miss Bhutto’s challenge may prove to be a decisive test. There is no evidence of any groundswell of support for General Zia, and although Prime Minister Junejo has instilled hope among some, it is too early to know how well he will succeed in establishing his legitimacy.

How far Miss Bhutto can ultimately press her campaign to unseat General Zia remains an open question. The crackdown of August, in which army troops and police crushed the protest and violence after her arrest, belied her earlier claims that the party would be prepared to sacrifice or that people would rise up against the mistreatment of their leader. Yet there is little doubt that she and her supporters are prepared to push even harder in the months ahead.

”There’s no use crying over spilled milk,” Miss Bhutto said after her release earlier this month, admitting that she had ”underestimated” the Government’s ability to suppress opposition activity. ”We have to come to terms with that. In the future, we have to outplay them, outsmart them and outmanipulate them.”

Photo of Benazir Bhutto at rally in Province of Sind (Peter Charlesworth/Contact); Photos of President Zia and Islamic worshipers in Rawalpindi (Peter Charlesworth/Contact) (Pg. 42); Photos of demonstration in Karachi and Afghan refugees in camp near Peshawar (Peter Charlesworth/Contact; Leloup/Collectif/J.B. Pictures) (Pg.44-5)

 http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/21/magazine/the-return-of-benazir-bhutto-struggle-in-pakistan.html?pagewanted=all

A leaf from history: Zia’s fears not unfounded

SHAIKH AZIZ — UPDATED Mar 06, 2016 12:50pm

After removal from office as prime minister, Mohammed Khan Junejo did not leave the PM House immediately, nor did he express his anguish. He remained calm, as though he was aware of what was transpiring while a number of friends and associates called on him.

On May 30, Junejo called a meeting of his former ministers and close friends who expressed profound regret. He recalled all the advice that he had received from them as the former premier. As he sat quietly, his mind raced over matters of the past and he couldn’t decide where exactly he had gone wrong.

Apparently, there were many factors for his dismissal. Some people close to Gen Zia believed that Junejo would have struck if Gen Zia had not hit first. At the same time there were indications that Gen Zia had planned to dismiss Junejo as early as February, much before the Ojhri Camp disaster, since Junejo had become unbearable for him.

It may have been on the general’s mind for some time, but the final decision came in the wake of the Ojhri camp explosion. Before leaving for Philippines and South Korea — his last official visits — Junejo had presented the report prepared by Aslam Khattak to Gen Zia saying: “Saeen, keep the report. We can take a decision after my return.” Gen Zia had actually received the report even before it was presented to the prime minister, a fact that was never discussed during assessment of the causes of Junejo’s dismissal.

Junejo became the first prime minister of Pakistan to leave the capital in an honourable manner post dismissal


Besides the above mentioned report, Junejo had also remarked that the Ojhri camp had been unlawfully used as a passage of arms and ammunition although there was a system to record where the arms and ammunition needed to be used. There had been reports in the press that Stinger missiles were being used by Iran then at war with Iraq, and since Iran did not have any channel for receiving them it was suspected that the missiles had been stolen or sold to Iran from the Ojhri camp.

Another factor for Gen Zia’s action is said to have been his own behaviour in the final deal on Afghanistan in Geneva. Gen Zia wanted an interim government that represented all factions of Afghanistan after removal of Najibullah’s government. Suspecting that Gen Zia wanted a fundamentalist pro-Islamic government reflecting his own political perception, the US considered it to be a dangerous move and thought it necessary to go ahead with the removal without accepting Gen Zia’s demand. Ziaul Islam Ansari says that in mid-April, the general had told a group of his men that the US wanted to replace him for not toeing American policies anymore.

Many close observers believe that Gen Zia also wanted to teach Junejo a lesson for his ‘austerity campaign’ that prohibited the use of big cars by civilian and military officials, forcing them to use small local cars which, many believe, was humiliating for the military commanders.

Junejo’s dismissal was also attributed to a more pertinent domestic move. Some National Assembly members had been pressing Junejo to present the Ojhri camp inquiry report for debate in the house. Zia’s supporters later claimed it was planned that when Gen Zia would proceed on his US visit in June, the report would be presented to the National Assembly with the aim of approving a resolution by calling upon Gen Zia to: a) punish those found responsible for the tragedy and, b) calling upon Gen Zia to step down as chief of army staff (COAS). The general had already been voted through a (farcical) referendum to stay as president till 1990. Moreover, stepping down as COAS would have brought an unsung end to his career.

However, Junejo did not accept this charge. In the midst of claims and counterclaims, he said it was the brainchild of Gen Rafaqat, Gen Zia’s staff officer, and Gen Akhtar Abdur Rahman to save himself from the criticism in the National Assembly against him. Of course, Gen Zia was there to outplay Junejo and save Gen Akhtar Abdur Rahman, at all costs.

All these reports, mostly contributed by Zia’s intelligence, put the general in a defensive position, and he decided to take a quick pre-emptive shot at the Prime Minister House.

In the capital, political circles were trying to visualise the new situation while the general wanted to clarify things with the prime minister. After addressing the nation on May 30, the general went to Junejo’s residence and told him that the caretaker government should include Muslim League workers. To this Junejo said that they should be staunch supporters of the Muslim League.

Meetings with various political leaders, including Hamid Nasir Chattha followed, with the aim to make Junejo quit as Pakistan Muslim League president and hand over the party to some appropriate person. Chattha also told Junejo that Pir Pagara had agreed to visit Islamabad the following week where he would probably hold talks with Gen Zia and other important people.

While efforts were being made to make Pakistan Muslim League a functional party, at Gen Zia’s insistence, Nawaz Sharif took the responsibility to try to make the party an active political force. Before Pir Pagara’s arrival in the capital, Mian Nawaz Sharif announced that the PML would think about joining the government at an appropriate time.

Meanwhile, on June 1, Junejo finally bid farewell to friends and staff members. He was allowed to use the VVIP room at the airport for the last time. There was a rush of his friends but the VVIP attendants did not allow anybody to enter. In Pakistan’s history he was the first prime minister to have been allowed to leave the capital in an honourable manner after dismissal.

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, March 6th, 2016

https://www.dawn.com/news/1243505