Context of ‘1987: Pakistan Secretly Builds Nuclear Weapon’

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May 18, 1974: India Tests First Nuclear Device

India detonates a nuclear device in an underground facility. The device had been built using material supplied for its ostensibly peaceful nuclear program by the United States, France, and Canada. The test, and this aspect of India’s nuclear program, is unauthorized by global control mechanisms. India portrays the test as a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” and says it is “firmly committed” to using nuclear technology for only peaceful purposes.
Kissinger: ‘Fait Accompli’ – Pakistan, India’s regional opponent, is extremely unhappy with the test, which apparently confirms India’s military superiority. Due to the obvious difficulties producing its own nuclear bomb, Pakistan first tries to find a diplomatic solution. It asks the US to provide it with a nuclear umbrella, without much hope of success. Relations between Pakistan and the US, once extremely close, have been worsening for some years. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tells Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington that the test is “a fait accompli and that Pakistan would have to learn to live with it,” although he is aware this is a “little rough” on the Pakistanis.
No Punishment – No sanctions are imposed on India, or the countries that sold the technology to it, and they continue to help India’s nuclear program. Pakistani foreign minister Agha Shahi will later say that, if Kissinger had replied otherwise, Pakistan would have not started its own nuclear weapons program and that “you would never have heard of A. Q. Khan.” Shahi also points out to his colleagues that if Pakistan does build a bomb, then it will probably not suffer any sanctions either.
Pakistan Steps up Nuclear Program – Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto then decides that his country must respond to this “grave and serious threat” by making its own nuclear weapons. He steps up Pakistan’s nuclear research efforts in a quest to build a bomb, a quest that will be successful by the mid-1980s (see 1987). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 11-14; ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 39-40]

1981: Pakistan Begins Digging Tunnels for Nuclear Program; Work Noticed by India, Israel

At some time in 1981, Pakistan begins digging some tunnels under the Ras Koh mountains. The work is apparently related to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, which begins preparation for a cold test of a nuclear weapon this year (see Shortly After May 1, 1981). This work is noticed by both India and Israel, who also see other signs that work is continuing on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Tunnels in these mountains will be used when Pakistan tests nuclear weapons in 1998 (see May 28, 1998). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 86, 275]

1985: Secretary of State Schulz Says Pakistan Will Not Get Bomb, but Knows They Already Have Nuclear Program

George Schulz, secretary of state in the Reagan administration, says, “We have full faith in [Pakistan’s] assurance that they will not make the bomb.” However, the US, including the State Department, is already aware that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program (see 1983 and August 1985-October 1990). [GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007]

August 1985-October 1990: White House Defies Congress and Allows Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program to Progress

In 1985, US Congress passes legislation requiring US economic sanctions on Pakistan unless the White House can certify that Pakistan has not embarked on a nuclear weapons program (see August 1985 and August 1985). The White House certifies this every year until 1990 (see 1987-1989). However, it is known all the time that Pakistan does have a continuing nuclear program. For instance, in 1983 a State Department memo said Pakistan clearly has a nuclear weapons program that relies on stolen European technology. Pakistan successfully builds a nuclear bomb in 1987 but does not test it to keep it a secret (see 1987). With the Soviet-Afghan war ending in 1989, the US no longer relies on Pakistan to contain the Soviet Union. So in 1990 the Pakistani nuclear program is finally recognized and sweeping sanctions are applied (see June 1989). [GANNON, 2005]Journalist Seymour Hersh will comment, “The certification process became farcical in the last years of the Reagan Administration, whose yearly certification—despite explicit American intelligence about Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons program—was seen as little more than a payoff to the Pakistani leadership for its support in Afghanistan.” [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993] The government of Pakistan will keep their nuclear program a secret until they successfully test a nuclear weapon in 1998 (see May 28, 1998).

1987: Pakistan Secretly Builds Nuclear Weapon

Pakistan successfully builds a nuclear weapon around this year. The bomb is built largely thanks to the illegal network run by A. Q. Khan. Pakistan will not actually publicly announce this or test the bomb until 1998 (see May 28, 1998), partly because of a 1985 US law imposing sanctions on Pakistan if it were to develop nuclear weapons (see August 1985-October 1990). [HERSH, 2004, PP. 291]However, Khan will tell a reporter the program has been successful around this time (see March 1987).

March 1987: A. Q. Khan Says Pakistan Has Nuclear Weapons, then Retracts Claims

A. Q. Khan. [Source: CBC]A. Q. Khan, father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, tells an Indian reporter that the program has been successful (see 1987). “What the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct,” he says, adding, “They told us Pakistan could never produce the bomb and they doubted my capabilities, but they now know we have it.” He says that Pakistan does not want to use the bomb, but “if driven to the wall there will be no option left.” The comments are made during a major Indian army exercise known as Brass Tacks that Pakistanis consider a serious threat, as it is close to the Pakistani border. In fact, at one point the Indian commanding general is reported to consider actually attacking Pakistan—an attack that would be a sure success given India’s conventional superiority. According to reporter Seymour Hersh, the purpose of the interview is “to convey a not very subtle message to the Indians: any attempt to dismember Pakistan would be countered with the bomb.” This interview is an embarrassment to the US government, which aided Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan War, but has repeatedly claimed Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons (see August 1985-October 1990). Khan retracts his remarks a few days later, saying he was tricked by the reporter. [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

June 1989: Bush Administration Decides to Cut Off Aid to Pakistan over Nuclear Weapons Program Next Year

President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker decide that the US will cut off foreign aid to Pakistan because of its nuclear weapons program. Pakistan was a major recipient of foreign aid during the Soviet Afghan war, when the US channeled support to the mujaheddin through it, but Soviet forces began withdrawing from Afghanistan in February (see February 15, 1989). It is decided that aid will be provided for 1989, but not for 1990 (see October 1990). [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

August 4, 1989: Analyst of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program Alleged to Be ‘Security Risk’ and Fired from Pentagon

Richard Barlow, an analyst who has repeatedly insisted that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program (see July 1987 or Shortly After and Mid-1989), is fired from his position at the Pentagon. Barlow will later say, “They told me they had received credible information that I was a security risk.” When he asks why he is thought to be a security risk, “They said they could not tell me as the information was classified,” but “senior Defense Department officials” are said to have “plenty of evidence.” His superiors think he might leak information about Pakistan’s nuclear program to congressmen in favor of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He spends the next eighteen months in the Pentagon personnel pool, under surveillance by security officers. Apparently, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby and two officials who work for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz are involved in the sacking. It is also rumored that Barlow is a Soviet spy. Barlow’s conclusions about Pakistan’s nuclear program are unpopular with some, because if the US admitted the nuclear program existed, this would lead to a break between the US and Pakistan and endanger US aid to the anti-Soviet mujaheddin and US arms sales (see August 1985-October 1990 and August-September 1989). After he is fired, rumors are started saying that Barlow is a tax evader, alcoholic, adulterer, and in psychiatric care. As his marriage guidance counseling is alleged to be cover for the psychiatric care, the Pentagon insists that investigators be allowed to interview his marriage guidance counselor. Due to this and other problems, his wife leaves him and files for divorce. [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993; GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007] Barlow will later be exonerated by various investigations (see May 1990 and Before September 1993).

Fall 1990: US Tells Pakistan to Destroy Nuclear Weapon Cores, but It Does Not Do So

In a letter handed to Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, the US demands that Pakistan destroy the cores of its nuclear weapons, thus disabling the weapons. Pakistan does not do so. The US then imposes sanctions on Pakistan (see October 1990), such as cutting off US aid to it, due to the nuclear weapons program. However, it softens the blow by waiving some of the restrictions (see 1991-1992). [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993] The US has known about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program for some time, but continued to support the Pakistanis during the Soviet-Afghan War (see August 1985-October 1990).

October 1990: US Imposes Sanctions on Pakistan

Since 1985, US Congress has required that sanctions be imposed on Pakistan if there is evidence that Pakistan is developing a nuclear weapons program (see August 1985-October 1990). With the Soviet-Afghan war over, President Bush finally acknowledges widespread evidence of Pakistan’s nuclear program and cuts off all US military and economic aid to Pakistan. However, it appears some military aid will still get through. For instance, in 1992, Senator John Glenn will write, “Shockingly, testimony by Secretary of State James Baker this year revealed that the administration has continued to allow Pakistan to purchase munitions through commercial transactions, despite the explicit, unambiguous intent of Congress that ‘no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan.’” [INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 6/26/1992] These sanctions will be officially lifted a short time after 9/11.

September 10, 1996: UN Adopts Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; US First to Sign

The United Nations adopts the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) banning the testing of nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly votes 158-3 to adopt the CTBT, with India (see June 20, 1996), Bhutan, and Libya voting against it, and Cuba, Lebanon, Syria, Mauritius, and Tanzania abstaining. US President Bill Clinton will be the first to sign the treaty, followed by 70 other nations, including Britain, China, France, and Russia. By November 1997, 148 nations will sign the treaty. [NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, 4/2003; FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, 12/18/2007] In 1999, the Times of India will observe that from the US’s viewpoint, the CTBT will primarily restrict India and Pakistan from continuing to develop their nuclear arsenals (see May 11-13, 1998 and May 28, 1998), and will delay or prevent China from developing more technologically advanced “miniaturized” nuclear weapons such as the US already has. It will also “prevent the vertical proliferation and technological refinement of existing arsenals by the other four nuclear weapons states.” [TIMES OF INDIA, 10/16/1999] Two years later, the US Senate will refuse to ratify the treaty (see October 13, 1999).

May 11-13, 1998: India Tests Five Nuclear Devices

India, which has refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) banning nuclear testing (see September 10, 1996), shocks the world by testing five nuclear devices over the course of three days. The largest is a 42-kiloton thermonuclear device. [FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, 12/18/2007] India’s rival Pakistan will conduct its own nuclear tests two weeks later (see May 28, 1998). Indian political scientist and nuclear critic Kanti Bajpai will later say: “Whatever Indians say officially, there is a status attached to the bomb. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council are all nuclear powers.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/4/2003]

May 28, 1998: Pakistan Tests Nuclear Bomb

Pakistan’s first nuclear test take place underground but shakes the mountains above it. [Source: Associated Press]Pakistan conducts a successful nuclear test. Former Clinton administration official Karl Inderfurth later notes that concerns about an Indian-Pakistani conflict, or even nuclear confrontation, compete with efforts to press Pakistan on terrorism. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003] Pakistan actually built its first nuclear weapon in 1987 but kept it a secret and did not test it until this time for political reasons (see 1987). In announcing the tests, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declares, “Today, we have settled the score.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/4/2003]

May 30, 1998: Pakistan Conducts Last of Six Nuclear Bomb Tests, Plutonium Possibly Used

Pakistan conducts the sixth and last of a series of nuclear bomb tests that started two days earlier (see May 28, 1998). Samples taken by US aircraft over the site indicate that the test may have involved plutonium, whereas uranium bombs were used for the other five. After the US learns that the tests are witnessed by Kang Thae Yun, a North Korean involved in that country’s proliferation network (see Early June 1998), and other North Korean officials, it will speculate that the final test was performed by Pakistan for North Korea, which is better known for its plutonium bomb program. Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will comment, “In terms of nuclear readiness, this placed North Korea far ahead of where the CIA had thought it was, since [North Korea] had yet to conduct any hot tests of its own.” [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 278]

July 1998: US Unfreezes Agricultural Aid to Pakistan

The US again begins to provide agricultural aid to Pakistan, although its provision had been frozen in the wake of Pakistani nuclear weapons tests in May (see May 28, 1998 and May 30, 1998). The US will again begin to provide military and technological assistance three months later (see October 1998). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 286]

July 15, 1998: Rumsfeld’s Ballistic Missile Committee Says Chief Threat to US Is from Iran, Iraq, and North Korea

Congressional conservatives receive a second “alternative assessment” of the nuclear threat facing the US that is far more to their liking than previous assessments (see December 23, 1996). A second “Team B” panel (see November 1976), the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, led by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and made up of neoconservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz and Stephen Cambone, finds that, contrary to earlier findings, the US faces a growing threat from rogue nations such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, who can, the panel finds, inflict “major destruction on the US within about five years of a decision.” This threat is “broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly” than previously believed. The Rumsfeld report also implies that either Iran or North Korea, or perhaps both, have already made the decision to strike the US with nuclear weapons. Although Pakistan has recently tested nuclear weapons (see May 28, 1998), it is not on the list. Unfortunately for the integrity and believability of the report, its methodology is flawed in the same manner as the previous “Team B” reports (see November 1976); according to author J. Peter Scoblic, the report “assume[s] the worst about potential US enemies without actual evidence to support those assumptions.” Defense analyst John Pike is also displeased with the methodology of the report. Pike will later write: “Rather than basing policy on intelligence estimates of what will probably happen politically and economically and what the bad guys really want, it’s basing policy on that which is not physically impossible. This is really an extraordinary epistemological conceit, which is applied to no other realm of national policy, and if manifest in a single human being would be diagnosed as paranoia.” [GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007; SCOBLIC, 2008, PP. 172-173] Iran, Iraq, and North Korea will be dubbed the “Axis of Evil” by George W. Bush in his 2002 State of the Union speech (see January 29, 2002).

October 1998: US Unfreezes Military and Technological Assistance to Pakistan

The US again begins to provide Pakistan with military and technological aid, which had been frozen in the wake of Pakistani tests of nuclear weapons in May (see May 28, 1998 and May 30, 1998). The US also froze agricultural aid after the tests, but began to provide it again in July (see July 1998). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 286]

December 2, 1998: Clinton Meets Pakistani Leader but Bin Laden Not Top Priority

Nawaz Sharif meeting with US Defense Secretary William Cohen at the Pentagon on December 3, 1998. [Source: US Department of Defense]Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif comes to Washington to meet with President Clinton and other top Clinton administration officials. The number one issue for Clinton is Pakistan’s nuclear program, since Pakistan had recently illegally developed and exploded a nuclear weapon (see May 28, 1998). The second most important issue is Pakistan’s economy; the US wants Pakistan to support free trade agreements. The third most important issue is terrorism and Pakistan’s support for bin Laden. Author Steve Coll will later note, “When Clinton himself met with Pakistani leaders, his agenda list always had several items, and bin Laden never was at the top. Afghanistan’s war fell even further down.” Sharif proposes to Clinton that the CIA train a secret Pakistani commando team to capture bin Laden. The US and Pakistan go ahead with this plan, even though most US officials involved in the decision believe it has almost no chance for success. They figure there is also little risk or cost involved, and it can help build ties between American and Pakistani intelligence. The plan will later come to nothing (see October 1999). [COLL, 2004, PP. 441-444]

March 14, 2003: President Bush Waives Last Remaining US Sanctions on Pakistan

President Bush waives the last set of US sanctions against Pakistan. The US imposed a new series of sanctions against Pakistan in 1998, after Pakistan exploded a nuclear weapon (see May 28, 1998), and in 1999, when President Pervez Musharraf overthrew a democratically elected government (see October 12, 1999). The lifted sanctions had prohibited the export of US military equipment and military assistance to a country whose head of government has been deposed. Some other sanctions were waived shortly after 9/11. Bush’s move comes as Musharraf is trying to decide whether or not to support a US-sponsored United Nations resolution which could start war with Iraq. It also comes two weeks after 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was captured in Pakistan (see February 29 or March 1, 2003). [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 3/14/2003]

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NONPROLIFERATION — THE PRESSLER AMENDMENT

December 14, 1993

The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is the most critical national security issue facing the United States today. I take President Clinton at his word that he agrees with this proposition. However, some in his administration are undermining his commitment.

In 1985 Congress passed and President Reagan signed into law Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This created a blanket prohibition on civilian and military aid to Pakistan unless the president certifies “that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device.” This amendment, which bears my name, remains the most effective tool the United States has employed to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The State Department, however, has indicated informally to Congress that it wants the president to have authority to waive the amendment (although the administration says it has no intention of exercising any possible waiver authority at present).

The Post, although claiming that my amendment has “failed in Pakistan” {editorial, Nov. 30} — an assessment with which I don’t agree — says that to soften it would convey “the symbolic message that the United States doesn’t care enough about new bombs.”

I’d go farther than that. In my view, granting such a waiver would be detrimental to the national security interests of the United States. The Pressler Amendment has served our interests well and continues to do so.

First, it identifies nuclear proliferation as the top priority in our relations with Pakistan. Second, it makes clear to countries other than Pakistan that there is a heavy penalty associated with the decision to go nuclear. A number of countries around the world have the capacity to initiate a nuclear weapons program. Many also happen to be aid recipients or otherwise have important ties to the United States. The existence of the Pressler Amendment and its possible extension to other countries undoubtedly has been a key consideration in the decision-making of these countries’ political leadership when the question of pursuing a nuclear weapons program has come up for discussion. The fact that these countries have not gone forward with a serious nuclear weapons program, or in one case dismantled an existing program, is probably not accidental.

With specific regard to Pakistan, the Pressler Amendment performed the useful service of buying time until that country could become more democratic. In general, democratic countries do not attack each other.

Moreover, there is the question of restraining an overt as opposed to a covert nuclear program in South Asia. Pakistan has never actually exploded a nuclear device, although we believe it has the capacity to do so. If it had followed India’s lead and exploded such a device, that act would have had a powerful impact on public opinion in South Asia. Inevitably, it would have led to a more serious nuclear arms race in the region.

This is not the first time the State Department has attempted to subvert or repeal the Pressler Amendment. In 1991, under the previous administration, a proposed repeal was defeated by more than 100 votes in the House of Representatives. There is no reason to believe such a move today would be any more popular among my colleagues. LARRY PRESSLER U.S. Senator (R-S.D.) Washington

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1993/12/14/nonproliferation-the-pressler-amendment/1562bf06-f317-4154-a839-ddd0d58fa9ee/?utm_term=.ef534d8f7ddf

Context of ‘August 1985: Pressler Amendment Passed, Requiring Yearly Certification that Pakistan Does Not Have Nuclear Weapons’

1983-7: US Sells Forty F-16 Fighters to Pakistan, Possibly Reconfigured to Carry Nuclear Weapons

The US sells forty F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan. One of the contractual preconditions of the sale is that Pakistan does not configure them to drop a nuclear bomb. However, US analyst Richard Barlow will conclude that in fact all of them are configured to carry nuclear weapons. [GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007]

(Early 1985): High-Ranking Pakistani Officials Decide to Proliferate Nuclear Weapons

Pakistani officials decide to try to sell the nuclear weapons technology and expertise they have acquired in the last decade to other countries. The decision is taken because the Pakistanis’ nuclear weapons project is extremely expensive and they realize that the US money and goodwill that is keeping it alive is finite. Former Pakistani foreign minister Agha Shahi will say: “[Pakistani President Muhammad] Zia [ul-Haq] began to see the truth in something I had long argued. We were now deep inside the US pocket. Pakistan needed to win independence so as not to suffer when the inevitable happened and the US dropped us. Pakistan needed to broker new alliances and develop a revenue stream that was dependable and outside the scope of the US-run Afghan war.” Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will write: “KRL [Khan Research Laboratories] was Pakistan’s money pit, costing hundreds of millions of dollars to maintain, but it was also potentially a cash cow, [A. Q.] Khan’s advances in the field of uranium enrichment being unique and extremely valuable. Out of the handful of countries that had mastered enrichment technology, including China, France, Pakistan, the US, and the Soviet Union, only China and Pakistan were free to share it, having refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).… This technology was worth millions if Pakistan was able to sell it.” Therefore Zia and senior cabinet members begin a series of “highly secretive meetings to explore trading KRL’s skills and assets.” The urgency of this project increases further after the Soviet Union decides to end the Afghan war in 1986 (see November 1986-November 1987). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 132-133]

August 1985: Pressler Amendment Passed, Requiring Yearly Certification that Pakistan Does Not Have Nuclear Weapons

Senator Larry Pressler. [Source: Public domain]The US Congress passes the “Pressler Amendment,” requiring the president to certify that Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons every year. The amendment was championed by Senator Larry Pressler (R-SD). If the president does not issue such certification, Pakistan cannot not get any foreign aid from the US. Presidents Reagan and Bush will falsely certify Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons several times (see August 1985-October 1990). Journalist Seymour Hersh will later comment: “There is indisputable evidence that Pakistan has been able to escape public scrutiny for its violations of the law because senior officials of the Reagan and the Bush administrations chose not to share the intelligence about nuclear purchases with Congress. The two Republican administrations obviously feared that the legislators, who had voted for the Solarz (see August 1985) and Pressler Amendments, would cut off funds for the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It was yet another clash between a much desired foreign-policy goal and the law.” [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

After August 1985-1990: Reagan and Bush Administrations Fail to Properly Brief Congressmen about Pakistan Nuclear Program

Despite the passage of two amendments dealing with Pakistan’s nuclear program in August 1985 (see August 1985 and August 1985), the Reagan and Bush administrations will fail to keep Congress properly informed of incidents related to Pakistan’s acquisition of components for its nuclear program, even though such notification is required by law. Senator John Glenn (D-OH), chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, and Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY), Chairman of the House Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, will later say that they are not formally briefed about any significant Pakistani procurement, with the exception of one case (see July 1987 or Shortly After), during this period. For example, Glenn will later say he should have been briefed about a nuclear scare involving Pakistan and India in 1990 (see January-May 1990) [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

November 1986-November 1987: Soviet Union Decides to End Afghan War, US Learns of Decision

Edvard Shevardnadze. [Source: US Defense Department]The Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party decides that the Soviet-Afghan War should end “within one year or two.” This follows on from a tentative and secret agreement within the Politburo the previous year to eventually withdraw from Afghanistan. The withdrawal will be formalized in an agreement signed in Geneva in April 1988 (see April 1988) and the last troops with leave Afghanistan in February 1989 (see February 15, 1989). Soviet Foreign Minister Edvard Shevardnadze will inform US Secretary of State George Shultz of the decision the year after it is taken and the CIA will learn of it by November 1987. [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 132-3, 486]

1987-1989: US Continues to Certify Pakistan Does Not Have Nuclear Weapon, Despite Intelligence that It Does

Ronald Reagan and Pakistani dictator Zia ul-Haq. [Source: Bettmann / Corbis]President Ronald Reagan in 1987 and 1988 and President George Bush in 1989 continue to certify that Pakistan does not have a nuclear weapon, a condition of continuing aid to Pakistan under the law (see August 1985). These certifications began in 1985 (see August 1985-October 1990) and are thought to be important because Pakistan is a key base for the CIA-backed Afghan mujaheddin, and cutting off aid to Pakistan might curtail CIA support for the anti-Soviet forces. According to journalist Seymour Hersh, the rationale behind the certifications is that there is “no specific evidence that Pakistan [has] indeed done what it was known to be capable of doing,” and produced a nuclear weapon. In addition, it is apparently thought that if the US continues to supply conventional weapons, Pakistan will not need a nuclear bomb, although Hersh says this is “a very thin argument, as everyone involved [knows].” However, CIA officer Richard Kerr will later say, “There is no question that we had an intelligence basis for not certifying from 1987 on.” By this time there is mounting evidence of Pakistan’s nuclear program (see 1987, (1987), and July 1987 or Shortly After). [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

July 1987 or Shortly After: Stormy Hearing Exposes Pakistan’s Nuclear Program to Congress

Following an incident where a Pakistani procurement agent was arrested in the US trying to buy components for a nuclear weapon (see Before July 1987), there is a serious row about it between a CIA manager and a CIA analyst at a Congressional hearing. The hearing is called by Stephen Solarz (D-NY), chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, to vet intelligence concerning Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. CIA manager General David Einsel says it is “not cut and dried” that the arrested Pakistani, Arshad Pervez, and his handler, Inam ul-Haq, are agents of the Pakistani government. Richard Barlow, a CIA analyst there to help Einsel, is surprised by the false answer, as it is a criminal offense to lie to Congress. He realizes, “Einsel’s testimony was highly evasive, and deliberately so.” He will also later comment: “These congressmen had no idea what was really going on in Pakistan and what had been coming across my desk about its WMD program. They did not know that Pakistan already had a bomb and was shopping for more with US help. All of it had been hushed up.” When Barlow is asked the same question, he says it is “clear” Pervez is working for Pakistan, at which point Einsel screams, “Barlow doesn’t know what he’s talking about.” Solarz then asks whether there are any more cases involving the Pakistan government. Einsel says there are not, but Barlow replies, “Yes, there have been scores of other cases.” Barlow is then hustled out of the room and returns to CIA headquarters. A senior government official not cleared to attend the briefing comes in and tries to repair the damage, saying that Barlow was referring to intelligence reports, but “not all intelligence reports are accurate.” The official will later indicate that he is not proud of what he does, saying, “I didn’t know what I was getting into.” [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993; GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007] Barlow will subsequently be forced out of the CIA because of this hearing (see August 1987-1988).

August 1987-1988: Analyst of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program Forced Out of CIA after Telling Truth to Congress

Following a stormy Congressional subcommittee hearing where he contradicted CIA manager David Einsel about Pakistan’s nuclear program (see July 1987 or Shortly After), analyst Richard Barlow is forced out of the CIA. Barlow will later say that he leaves because Einsel makes his job impossible: “Einsel went crazy. I was told that my personal behavior at the hearing had been unprofessional. I was accused of being unpatriotic and almost scuttling the Afghanistan program. I was viewed as being disloyal.” [GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007] He will also say: “These people were determined that nothing like this was ever going to happen ever again—no more arrests, no more truth to the Congress.… I was targeted by some in the Directorate of Operations; they made my life miserable.” [RAW STORY, 4/30/2007] Commenting on his position during the Cold War, he will add: “We had to buddy-up to regimes we didn’t see eye-to-eye with, but I could not believe we would actually give Pakistan the bomb. How could any US administration set such short-term gains against the long-term safety of the world?” Barlow’s job description is re-written six weeks after the hearing, removing him from work on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and he leaves the CIA for the Customs Service a year later. [GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007]

September 30-November 11, 1987: US Symbolically Cuts Off Aid to Pakistan for Six Weeks Due to Arrest of Agent

The US Congress suspends aid to Pakistan for six weeks, due to arguments related to the arrest of a Pakistani agent attempting to buy material for its nuclear weapons program (see Before July 1987 and July 1987 or Shortly After). Congress suspects that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program, but the administration denies this, as do the Pakistanis, even though they are both well aware that the program is a reality. The suspension is symbolic, as it only lasts six weeks and does not affect aid that has already been agreed upon, but not yet provided. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/30/1987; NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

December 18, 1987: Congress Approves Hundreds of Millions of Dollars for Pakistan, Despite US Knowledge of Nuclear Weapons Program

Although the US is already aware that the Soviet Union intends to withdraw from Afghanistan (see November 1986-November 1987) and a formal agreement on the Soviet withdrawal will be signed in four months (see April 1988), the US Congress approves aid of $480 million for Pakistan, despite its nuclear weapons program. Legislation has been passed that automatically cuts off aid to countries with illicit nuclear weapons programs (see August 1985 and August 1985), but this legislation is not invoked. Despite apparently knowing of the Pakistani program, Congress decides that supporting the war in Afghanistan is more important (see July 1987 or Shortly After and Late 1980s). Some lawmakers and officials will later say that at this time “everybody in Congress” knows that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program (see Late 1980s), and anti-proliferation Senator John Glenn (D-OH) will later say the threat of nuclear proliferation “is a far greater danger to the world than being afraid to cut off the flow of aid to Afghanistan,” adding, “It’s the short-term versus the long-term.” [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

Late 1980s: ’Everybody in Congress’ Knows Pakistan Has Nuclear Weapons

US ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley. [Source: Terry Mitchell / Public domain]According to some accounts, by this time it is common knowledge in certain Washington circles that Pakistan has nuclear weapons. Despite this, the US government and Congress continues to pretend that Pakistan does not have such weapons, so that aid to Pakistan and the anti-Soviet mujaheddin based there can continue (see 1987-1989). A former top-level Reagan Administration official will later question the integrity of members of Congress who outwardly pretended to be tough on nuclear proliferators, but did not really want the aid to be cut off: “All this morality horse****. We were caught in a dilemma, and I didn’t know how to solve it: there was no way to stop the Pakistanis.… All this talk about breaking the law—it’s just a morality play. Of course everybody in Congress knew. The Administration was carrying out a popularly based policy in Afghanistan. If we’d cut off the aid to Pakistan, would we have been able to withstand the political heat from Congress?”
Former Ambassador: Congress ‘Acquiesced’ to Pakistani Program – According to the New Yorker, “many former members of the Reagan and Bush Administrations,” such as former ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley, will say that the essential facts about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program were known fully at this time to Congress, whose members “acquiesced” to the program, because of the Soviet-Afghan War and the popularity of Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in the US. Journalist Seymour Hersh will later comment, “Oakley’s point seemed to be that passive approval by Congress of bad policy somehow justified bad policy.”
Glenn: Nonproliferation Initiatives Thwarted – Senator John Glenn (D-OH) will say that most lawmakers did not want to know anyway: “I always thought in terms of the bigger picture—the nonproliferation treaty… We made a commitment that we’d cut off aid to transgressors, and we had to keep faith with those Third World people who signed with us. I didn’t think I had any option but to press for enforcement of the law against Pakistan.” He adds: “The Administration would always come to me and say how important it is to keep the arms flowing through to Afghanistan. I’d take my case on nonproliferation to the floor and lose the vote.”
Solarz: Balancing Concerns between Pakistan, Afghan War – Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY), one of the strongest opponents of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program during the Soviet-Afghan War, will admit that he and others who cared about non-proliferation constantly tried to balance that concern with a desire to support the anti-Soviet effort, which was based in Pakistan. “There were legitimate concerns that the Afghan war might spill over to Pakistan, and I felt we needed to give the President flexibility,” Solarz will say. “I didn’t want us to be in a worst-case scenario in case the Soviets moved across the border. I thought I was being responsible at the time.” Referring to allegations made by former State Department, CIA, and Pentagon analyst Richard Barlow that the administration was well-aware of the program and constantly lied to Congress (see July 1987 or Shortly After), he adds, “If what Barlow says is true, this would have been a major scandal of Iran-Contra proportions, and the officials involved would have had to resign. We’re not dealing with minor matters. Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is one of the major foreign-policy issues of the nation—not to mention the law of the land.” [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

April 1988: Soviet Union Announces It Will Withdraw All Troops from Afghanistan

In an agreement signed in Geneva, Switzerland, the Soviet Union pledges to withdraw all of its troops from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989. They will end up withdrawing the last of their soldiers on that exact date (see February 15, 1989). At the time, the Soviets have slightly over 100,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. [NEW YORK TIMES, 2/16/1989]

After November 16, 1988: Prime Minister Bhutto Not Much Involved in Pakistan’s Nuclear Program

A. Q. Khan (right) and Benazir Bhutto (center). [Source: CBC] (click image to enlarge)After becoming prime minister of Pakistan following the victory of the Pakistan People’s Party in elections, Benazir Bhutto does not play a large role in Pakistan’s nuclear policy, according to US analysts. It is unclear whether she chooses not to do so, or is cut out of it by the military. In her absence the two senior figures overseeing the program are President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and army head General Aslam Beg. [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

February 15, 1989: Soviet Forces Withdraw from Afghanistan

A convoy of Soviet tanks leaving Afghanistan. [Source: National Geographic]Soviet forces withdraw from Afghanistan, in accordance with an agreement signed the previous year (see April 1988). However, Afghan communists retain control of Kabul, the capital, until April 1992. [WASHINGTON POST, 7/19/1992] It is estimated that more than a million Afghans (eight per cent of the country’s population) were killed in the Soviet-Afghan War, and hundreds of thousands had been maimed by an unprecedented number of land mines. Almost half of the survivors of the war are refugees. [NEW YORKER, 9/9/2002] Richard Clarke, a counterterrorism official during the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations and the counterterrorism “tsar” by 9/11, will later say that the huge amount of US aid provided to Afghanistan drops off drastically as soon as the Soviets withdraw, abandoning the country to civil war and chaos. The new powers in Afghanistan are tribal chiefs, the Pakistani ISI, and the Arab war veterans coalescing into al-Qaeda. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 52-53]

June 1989: US Briefs Bhutto on Pakistan Nuclear Program, Says Aid Will Be Cut Off

The US briefs Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on Pakistan’s nuclear program, and says it has decided to cut off aid to Pakistan in 1990, because US law does not permit aid to nuclear proliferators (see August 1985 and June 1989). However, current President George Bush and his predecessor Ronald Reagan falsely certified that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons during the Soviet-Afghan war (see August 1985-October 1990 and 1987-1989). The initial briefing is provided by CIA Director William Webster and contains new information for Bhutto, who receives only limited information about her own country’s nuclear program (see After November 16, 1988). To dramatize the extent of American knowledge, Webster arranges for Bhutto to be shown a mockup of a Pakistani nuclear bomb. Mark Siegel, an associate of Bhutto, will later say she experienced feelings of disbelief: “The briefing was more detailed” than any information she had received from her own military and “showed that the military was doing it behind her back.” The next day, President George Bush tells her that in order to continue to receive US aid, she must assure the White House that her government will not take the final step of producing nuclear-bomb cores. Bush says he will still allow the sale of sixty more F-16 planes needed by to Pakistan, even though Pakistan has fitted such planes with nuclear weapons in the recent past, despite promising not to do so (see 1983-7). Despite this, the sale will not go through. [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

June 7, 1989: Prime Minister Bhutto Tells US Congress Pakistan Does Not Have Nuclear Weapon

Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 1991. [Source: BBC]Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto tells a joint session of the US Congress: “[W]e do not possess nor do we intend to make a nuclear device. That is our policy.” The statement receives “thunderous cheers” from members of both houses. However, Bhutto has been aware of Pakistan’s nuclear program for some time (see After November 16, 1988) and recently received a detailed briefing on it from the CIA (see June 1989). [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

Mid-1989: Pentagon Analyst Pressured to Change Conclusions about Pakistan’s Nuclear Program, He Refuses, but Report Is Amended Behind his Back

Richard Barlow, a WMD analyst at the Pentagon, is commissioned to write an intelligence assessment for Defense Secretary Dick Cheney about Pakistan’s nuclear program. The report is apparently “stark,” indicating that the program is ongoing and Pakistan has configured US-made fighters to drop nuclear bombs, despite promising not to do so. Barlow also says that Pakistan is still trying to procure components and will start selling its technology to other nations (note: it is already doing so—see 1987). Barlow’s analysis is supported by a separate Defense Intelligence Agency study, which reaches the same conclusion. Barlow will later say, “Officials at the [Office of the Secretary of Defense] kept pressurizing me to change my conclusions.” When he refuses to do so, however, files start to go missing from his office and a secretary tells him a senior official has been intercepting his papers. In July, one of the Pentagon’s top salesmen criticizes him for trying to scupper a forthcoming deal to sell another 60 F-16s to Pakistan (see August-September 1989). Barlow refuses to change the report, but after he is fired he finds that it has been rewritten to say that continued US aid to Pakistan will ensure the country stops its WMD program. [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993; GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007]

August-September 1989: US Agrees to Sell Pakistan 60 More F-16s, Despite Nuclear Weapons Program

Arthur Hughes. [Source: Middle East Institute]The US agrees to sell Pakistan 60 more F-16 fighter jets in a deal worth $1.5 billion. The US previously sold forty F-16s to Pakistan and Pentagon analyst Richard Barlow believes they were adapted to carry nuclear weapons, in conflict with a promise made by the Pakistanis (see 1983-7). Despite this, shortly before the sale goes through, the Pentagon falsely claims to Congress, “None of the F-16s Pakistan already owns or is about to purchase is configured for nuclear delivery.” Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Hughes also tells Congress that the nuclear wiring has been removed from the planes and that to equip them to deliver nuclear bombs, “it first would be necessary to replace the entire wiring package of the aircraft.”
Testimony Known to Be False – However, this is contradicted by Pentagon analysis and the US intelligence community is well aware that the Pakistani air force has already practiced delivery of nuclear weapons by F-16s. [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993; GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007] Barlow will later say the US intelligence community was certain Pakistan had nuclear weapons (see 1987): “The evidence was unbelievable. I can’t go into it—but on a scale of 1 to 10, in terms of intelligence evidence, it was a 10 or 11. It doesn’t get any better than that.” Regarding the F-16 fighters, he will add: “All the top experts had looked at this question in detail for years, and it was a cold hard engineering question. There was no question about it—the jets could easily be made nuke-capable, and we knew that Pakistan had done just that.” [RAW STORY, 4/30/2007] Barlow therefore urges that the testimony be corrected, but he is fired from his position two days later (see August 4, 1989). The US should not agree to the sale, as it has passed a law saying it will not sell such equipment to countries that obtain nuclear weapons, but President Reagan has repeatedly and falsely certified that Pakistan does not have a nuclear device, so the contract is signed. However, the deal will collapse the next year when President Bush fails to certify that Pakistan does not have a nuclear weapon (see October 1990). [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993; GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007]
Motivation Said to Be Profit – Given that the Soviet-Afghan War is over and there is therefore no need to be friendly with Pakistan to ensure it supports the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, Barlow believes that Hughes is lying not to support US national interests, but simply for the profits to be made by the planes’ manufacturer. “They sold out the world for an F-16 sale,” Barlow will comment. [RAW STORY, 4/30/2007]

August 4, 1989: Analyst of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program Alleged to Be ‘Security Risk’ and Fired from Pentagon

Richard Barlow, an analyst who has repeatedly insisted that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program (see July 1987 or Shortly After and Mid-1989), is fired from his position at the Pentagon. Barlow will later say, “They told me they had received credible information that I was a security risk.” When he asks why he is thought to be a security risk, “They said they could not tell me as the information was classified,” but “senior Defense Department officials” are said to have “plenty of evidence.” His superiors think he might leak information about Pakistan’s nuclear program to congressmen in favor of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He spends the next eighteen months in the Pentagon personnel pool, under surveillance by security officers. Apparently, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby and two officials who work for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz are involved in the sacking. It is also rumored that Barlow is a Soviet spy. Barlow’s conclusions about Pakistan’s nuclear program are unpopular with some, because if the US admitted the nuclear program existed, this would lead to a break between the US and Pakistan and endanger US aid to the anti-Soviet mujaheddin and US arms sales (see August 1985-October 1990 and August-September 1989). After he is fired, rumors are started saying that Barlow is a tax evader, alcoholic, adulterer, and in psychiatric care. As his marriage guidance counseling is alleged to be cover for the psychiatric care, the Pentagon insists that investigators be allowed to interview his marriage guidance counselor. Due to this and other problems, his wife leaves him and files for divorce. [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993; GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007] Barlow will later be exonerated by various investigations (see May 1990 and Before September 1993).

January-May 1990: India and Pakistan Come Close to Nuclear Attack on Each Other

Tensions rise in India and Pakistan due to a crisis in Indian-held Kashmir, and the situation escalates to such a degree that strikes with nuclear weapons are considered. In January, Indian police open fire on pro-independence demonstrators in the province, killing fifty, which prompts the Pakistani government to step up support for pro-Pakistani militants operating there. There are also large protests and India blames Pakistan for the unrest, a charge which is partially correct and leads Indian authorities to try to suppress the protesters. India also moves offensive units to the Pakistan border, prompting the Pakistani army to mass on the other side. A US official will later say that the Pakistani military knew it could not hold out against the Indian army using conventional means: “The only way for the Pakistanis to deal with the Indians is to be able to take out New Delhi.… There’s no way that sending ten F-16s with conventional bombs is going to do it. Only the nukes could strike back.” Richard Kerr, a deputy director at the CIA, will later comment: “It was the most dangerous nuclear situation we have ever faced since I’ve been in the US government. It may be as close as we’ve come to a nuclear exchange. It was far more frightening than the Cuban missile crisis.” [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993] The crisis is resolved by National Security Council member Robert Gates, who persuades the two sides to disengage (see May 1990).

May 1990: US Embassies Underestimate Risk of Nuclear War Due to Suppressed Intelligence

Staff at the US embassies in India and Pakistan underestimate the seriousness of a crisis between the two countries (see January-May 1990), because they have been given manipulated intelligence about Pakistan’s nuclear capability. As they think Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons, they assume the crisis will not escalate into war. The US has been aware that Pakistan does have a nuclear weapons program and a nuclear weapon for some time (see 1987-1989 and May 1990), but has been suppressing this knowledge so that it could continue to support anti-Soviet mujaheddin and sell fighters to Pakistan (see August-September 1989). An example of the way the seriousness of the crisis is not appreciated is that US ambassador to India William Clark learns that the Pakistani air force is practicing dropping nuclear bombs, but is wrongly told that this is not important because the intelligence suggests Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons. The CIA, State Department, Pentagon, and White House are actually aware that this is a serious warning sign (see May 1990), but the intelligence has been altered to indicate Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons. For example, a report to Defense Secretary Dick Cheney by Pentagon analyst Richard Barlow was completely rewritten and Barlow’s conclusions were reversed to say Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons (see Mid-1989). Barlow was later fired from his job due to his opposition to an arms deal (see August 4, 1989). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 209-210]

June 1990-March 1993: Details of US Success in Averting Nuclear War between India and Pakistan Remain Secret for Almost Three Years

After the US successfully resolves a crisis that could have led to nuclear war between Pakistan and India (see January-May 1990 and May 1990), essential details of the affair remain secret until March 1993, when they are revealed in a New Yorker article by Seymour Hersh. Hersh will comment, “Stopping a nuclear exchange seemed made to order for the public-relations machinery of the White House.” However, what reports there are at the time in the US and British press are dismissed as exaggerations by the Bush administration. Hersh will say: “An obvious explanation for the high-level quiet revolves around the fact, haunting to some in the intelligence community, that the Reagan administration had dramatically aided Pakistan in its pursuit of the bomb.… [The administration] looked the other way throughout the mid-nineteen-eighties as Pakistan assembled its nuclear arsenal with the aid of many millions of dollars’ worth of restricted, high-tech materials bought inside the United States.” [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

Fall 1990: US Tells Pakistan to Destroy Nuclear Weapon Cores, but It Does Not Do So

In a letter handed to Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, the US demands that Pakistan destroy the cores of its nuclear weapons, thus disabling the weapons. Pakistan does not do so. The US then imposes sanctions on Pakistan (see October 1990), such as cutting off US aid to it, due to the nuclear weapons program. However, it softens the blow by waiving some of the restrictions (see 1991-1992). [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993] The US has known about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program for some time, but continued to support the Pakistanis during the Soviet-Afghan War (see August 1985-October 1990).

October 1990: US Imposes Sanctions on Pakistan

Since 1985, US Congress has required that sanctions be imposed on Pakistan if there is evidence that Pakistan is developing a nuclear weapons program (see August 1985-October 1990). With the Soviet-Afghan war over, President Bush finally acknowledges widespread evidence of Pakistan’s nuclear program and cuts off all US military and economic aid to Pakistan. However, it appears some military aid will still get through. For instance, in 1992, Senator John Glenn will write, “Shockingly, testimony by Secretary of State James Baker this year revealed that the administration has continued to allow Pakistan to purchase munitions through commercial transactions, despite the explicit, unambiguous intent of Congress that ‘no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan.’” [INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 6/26/1992] These sanctions will be officially lifted a short time after 9/11.

1991-1992: US Allows Pakistan to Buy American Arms Despite Prohibited Nuclear Weapons Program

President George Bush allows Pakistan to buy US-made weapons from commercial companies, despite having invoked the Pressler amendment (see August 1985) the previous year due to the Pakistanis’ nuclear weapons program. The Pressler amendment provided for sanctions against Pakistan, such as the suspension of foreign aid, if the US president failed to certify Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapon, which President Bush did not do in 1990 (see October 1990). Journalist Seymour Hersh will later comment that this permission “nullif[ies] the impact of the law.” [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

Before September 1993: Inspectors General Clear Nuclear Analyst of All Charges, but Report Is Rewritten

A combined inquiry by the inspectors general of the Defense Department, CIA, and State Department finds that numerous charges made against Richard Barlow (see 1981-1982 and August 4, 1989), a former analyst of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program for all three agencies, are without merit. However, the report is re-written before it is published. Lead inspector Sherman Funk finds that the accusation that Barlow is a traitor is “an error not supported by a scintilla of evidence,” adding, “The truth about Barlow’s termination is, simply put, that it was unfair and unwarranted.” Funk calls the whole affair “Kafka-like” and says Barlow was fired for “refusing to accede to policies which he knew to be wrong.” Despite this, the report is rewritten before it is published. The new version exonerates the Pentagon and says that Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons, although the US is well aware it does (see July 1987 or Shortly After). [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993; GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007] Funk will comment: “Yesterday, I received a copy of the Barlow report I had co-signed. Reviewing it I was startled and dismayed to realize that the summary of conclusions had not been revised to reflect the changes we had made.” [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 233, 507]
Fabricated Evidence – Commenting on an earlier version of the Pentagon inspector general’s report, one of Barlow’s former bosses, Gerald Oplinger, said that it contained evidence fabricated by the inspector general’s office. The report alleges that Oplinger deliberately inflated his annual evaluation of Barlow in order to avoid “an unpleasant personnel situation.” However, in a sworn affidavit Oplinger says this charge is “devoid of merit,” and also denies ever having spoken to anyone from the inspector general’s office, even though an interview with him is listed as one of the sources for the report.
‘Many’ Colleagues Support Barlow – Journalist Seymour Hersh previously interviewed “many” of Barlow’s former CIA and State Department colleagues and they confirmed Barlow’s essential allegation—that the full story of the Pakistani purchases was deliberately withheld from Congress, for fear of provoking a cut-off in military and economic aid that would adversely affect the Soviet-Afghan War. [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

September 21, 1995: Senate Lifts Some US Sanctions on Pakistan

The US Senate votes to lift some sanctions that were imposed on Pakistan due to its nuclear weapons program (see August 1985 and October 1990). The measure does not allow the US to sell Pakistan embargoed F-16 fighters, but, according to authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, only leads to “a few million dollars being dispatched to a handful of Pakistan-based charities.” The amendment was proposed by Hank Brown (R-CO), chairman of a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The measure is opposed by John Glenn and other like-minded senators strongly against nuclear proliferation, but passes by one vote. Levy and Scott-Clark will comment, “It [the measure] was not a remedy and did nothing to bolster the fragile [Pakistani] democracy that had gone 10 rounds in the ring with the military and its ISI.” [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 265, 513]

http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0885pressleramendment&scale=2#a0885pressleramendment

Clinton Plans Change in the Law Banning Military Aid to Pakistan

By STEVEN A. HOLMES,

Published: November 27, 1993

WASHINGTON, Nov. 26— The Clinton Administration is proposing the repeal of a law that has barred American military aid to Pakistan because of that country’s efforts to develop a nuclear bomb. But State Department officials insisted today that they did not intend to lift sanctions against Pakistan.

The Administration proposal, in a draft of a new foreign aid bill recently sent to Congress, would repeal the so-called Pressler Amendment, which bans military aid to Pakistan unless the President can certify that Pakistan neither possesses nuclear weapons nor is trying to develop them.

In place of the amendment, named after Senator Larry Pressler, Republican of South Dakota, the Administration would substitute generic language in which no specific country is named. Inspections Are Sought

The provision would ban American assistance to any “nonnuclear weapon states” that have equipment capable of enriching or reprocessing fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, unless the country submits to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency to insure that the reprocessing is for civilian purposes.

Pakistan would still not qualify for American aid under the proposed change.

“Pakistan remains under Pressler Amendment sanctions in accordance with U.S. law,” the State Department said today in a statement. “Even if a new foreign assistance act without specific language on Pakistan were passed, we would continue to apply Pressler standards to Pakistan.”

But some in Congress note that the proposed bill allows the President to waive economic sanctions against a country that may be building a nuclear bomb if he determines it is in the national interest to do so. Those critics say the Administration’s proposal thus weakens the Pressler Amendment, which contains no waiver provision. ‘Wonderful Smokescreen’

“It’s a wonderful smokescreen,” said an aide to Mr. Pressler. “The State Department has always wanted to get rid of the Pressler Amendment because it has no waiver.”

The Pressler Amendment, enacted in 1985, states that as long as Pakistan has a nuclear bomb or the main components of a bomb, “no technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan.”

For five years, the Reagan and Bush Administrations certified that Islamabad did not possess the cability to detonate a nuclear bomb, a finding widely considered to be a good will effort toward a country that was helping guerrillas fight Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

In 1990, after Soviet soldiers had withdrawn from Afghanistan, the Bush Administration stopped protecting Pakistan from the amendment’s sanctions and the aid was cut off. Rapid Ability Estimated

Central Intelligence Agency analysts have estimated that Pakistan has the ability to assemble a nuclear bomb relatively quickly.

Clinton Administration officials say the proposal to repeal the Pressler Amendment arises from a desire to eliminate references to specific countries in the foreign aid bill to give the Administration more flexibility in conducting foreign policy. This year, Congress did eliminate most of the wording known as “earmarks,” references to specific countries in the bill. “Pressler got caught up in a general cleansing of foreign assistance legislation,” one State Department official said in reference to the amendment. “In fact, Pressler was the one item that we thought the hardest about, because we understood how important it was to certain members of Congress, and the importance of the issue of proliferation.”

Some State Department officials note that the proposal is contained in what is termed a “discussion draft” of the foreign aid bill.

The bill is a kind of trial balloon in which the Administration is floating a number of ideas to gauge Congressional reaction. One official said that if the proposal to repeal the Pressler Amendment touched off a storm of criticism in Congress, the amendment probably would be retained.

http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/27/world/clinton-plans-change-in-the-law-banning-military-aid-to-pakistan.html

Timeline: History of US-Pakistan relations

 

DAWN.COM — PUBLISHED Jul 04, 2012 03:43am

United States of America remains one of the first countries to have established diplomatic ties with Pakistan. Although the relationship dates back to October 20, 1947, it can be extrapolated that the relations have been based strictly on military and economic support.

During the initial years of Pakistan, the country had the options of building allegiance with Soviet Union or United States, however, Pakistan opted for the latter.

1950-1953: Pakistan’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan visited United States to meet president Harry S Truman. It is alleged that during PM Khan’s first visit to US, president Truman requested Pakistan’s premier to let the CIA formulate a base in Pakistan, strictly to keep an eye on the activities of Soviet Union—a request which was not granted by Khan.

Throughout the course of these years many officials from Pakistan such as commander-in-chief Ayub Khan, foreign minister Zafrullah Khan, foreign secretary Ikramullah, finance minister Ghulam Muhammad, defence secretary Sikander Mirza and special envoy Mir Laiq Ali visited US, aiming to receive financial aids from the country.

1954: Pakistan signed Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States in May. Under the agreement, many Pakistani soldiers went to United States for training whereas US also established a Military Assistance Advisory Group (Maag) in Rawalpindi.

1956: President Dwight Eisenhower requested prime minister Suhrawardy to lease Peshawar Air Station to the American Army for keeping an eye on soviet Union and its ballistic missile programme. The request was granted by the prime minister.

1960s: During the decade, the pro-American sentiments in Western side of Pakistan were at an all time high. However, the military and financial assistance was directed more towards West Pakistan, which caused an uproar and feeling of distrust in East Pakistan.

Ayub Khan allowed United States to fly spy mission to Soviet Union from Pakistan’s territory and accompanied by his daughter visited United States of America.

United States increased the amount of aid Pakistan was designated to receive from the consortium of Pakistan, half a billion dollars of which were lost in 1965’s Indo-Pakistan war—war staged to cause a rebel in Indian occupied Kashmir. The war also led US to place economical and military embargoes on Pakistan, which resulted in an economic collapse.

1971-1974: Being an important ally for US during the cold war, United States supported Pakistan, despite the arms embargo. Pakistan also assisted president Richard Nixon in making his first visit to Peoples’ Republic of China.

During 1971’s war, US is speculated to have provided Pakistan with arms and military aid, in order to discourage India from penetrating further into the cities of Pakistan because losing Pakistan meant losing an important ally in the soviet war.

Moreover, as per the elections result, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was elected as the president of Pakistan and later on became the prime minister in 1974.

Although Bhutto was considered a socialist, he was a close and respected friend of president Nixon, which went in Pakistan’s favour.

1976-1979: President Jimmy Carter, an anti-socialist, won the presidential election of US and announced to seek a ban on nuclear weapons.

Bhutto lost the favours he enjoyed whilst Nixon was US president as Carter did not appreciate his policies and tightened already placed embargoes on Pakistan. However, Bhutto managed to procure items to enhance his atomic bomb project. President Carter and his administration allegedly threatened Bhutto to disrupt the process of atomic proliferation and research to which the latter did not agree, leading to his differences with the Americans.

1979-1988: During Zia ul Haq’s regime, Pakistan and United States enjoyed a warm and congenial relationship, which was primarily based on military ties and advancements. During the decade, US, along with CIA and ISI, launched billions of dollars worth of operations to prevent Soviet forces from further advancing into the region.

It is during this period that United States granted billions of dollars to Pakistan in the name of military and economical aid. By the year 1981, Pakistan was discussing a $3.2-billion aid package with United States and in 1987 Pakistan became the second largest recipient of aid after Israel.

However, by the end of General Zia’s regime, Congress adopted Pressler amendment. The amendment banned major military and economical aid to Pakistan unless the state was able to justify and provide sufficient evidence that the funds are not being used for nuclear proliferation.

However it is alleged that although Pakistan disclosed that it could enrich uranium and assemble a nuclear device in 1984 and 1987 respectively, the sanctions were not imposed till 1990.

1990: US, under the Pressler amendment, imposed sanctions on Pakistan, as the country by then had lost its strategic importance in soviet war.

1992: The relations between US and Pakistan plummeted further when US ambassador Nicholas Platt, warned Pakistan of being included into state sponsors of terrorism list, in case it continued to support militants causing trouble in India.

1995: Benazir Bhutto visited United States and requested president Bill Clinton to lift the embargoes on Pakistan and launch a joint operation to eradicate militancy from the region. As a reaction to Bhutto’s proposal, Brown amendment, which provided for the delivery of $368 million of military equipment purchased but not received by Pakistan before the imposition of Pressler amendment sanctions in 1990, was passed; however, the sanctions on arms were not lifted.

1998: Prime minister Nawaz Sharif conducted nuclear test in Balochistan, in retaliation to similar tests conducted by India, which invited the wrath of Clinton’s administration on both the countries. President Clinton imposed sanctions under Glenn amendment on India as well as Pakistan.

Glenn amendment included suspension of aid, including economic development assistance, credits and credit guarantees by the US government, US bank loans to the governments of India and Pakistan, loans from international financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, and exports of dual-use nuclear or missile items.

However, in July of 1998, US lifted the sanctions on both the countries for purchasing agricultural products from US farmers. Later in the year President Clinton exercised his waiver on lifting restrictions on the activities of US banks in Pakistan.

2001: After the 9/11 attacks and US’s invasion in various countries to eradicate militancy, Pakistan became one of the most important strategic allies for United States.

Initially Pakistan tried to strike a negotiation deal with Taliban and al Qaeda members to handover Osama bin Laden to American authorities. However, when negotiations failed, Pakistan allowed American army to use its military bases for launching attacks on Afghan soil.

However, President Pervez Musharraf confessed that the country had no option but to support United States as it had threatened Pakistan of “bombing it into stone age” if it did not join the fight against al Qaeda.

Simultaneously in 2001, US officials introduced a bill to lift all the sanctions, previously imposed on Pakistan under Pressler and Glenn amendments.

2003: United States officially forgave $1 billion worth of loan it had granted to Pakistan in a goodwill gesture and appreciation for Pakistan’s cooperation.

2004: President George Bush officially declared Pakistan as a non-Nato ally granting it the authority to purchase strategic and advanced military equipments.

Since 2004, US army has launched various drone strikes on the north-western side of the country. The drone strikes aim to target Pakistani Taliban and supporters of al Qaeda, however, the strikes have also resulted in latge civilian deaths and caused much opposition from Pakistanis.

2007: A report was issued in which Pakistan was accused of using aid money provided by US to Pakistan for its cooperation on war on terror, for strengthening its defence against India.

2008: The trust, on both sides, has been missing since the war on terror started as US on several occasions has accused Pakistan Army to tip the Taliban and pro-Taliban factions off on US operations.

In the June of 2008, an air strike by the US Army killed 11 paramilitary soldiers of Pakistan Army Frontier Corps, along with eight Taliban. The strike and deaths instigated a fierce reaction from Pakistani command calling the act to have shaken the foundations of mutual trust and cooperation.

2009: President Musharraf confessed that the billions of dollars of aid that Pakistan received from United States, for being a partner in war against terror, were diverted and channelled in order to build better defence mechanism against India.

The famous Kerry-Lugar Bill, which invited much controversy and criticism, was passed in the October of 2009. The bill entailed the approval of granting $7.5 billion of non-military aid, if the command of the country accepted certain condition. The bill clearly showed US’s distrust in Pakistan’s military command and considered Pakistani Taliban more threatening than Afghan Taliban, amongst many other essential points.

2010: In the beginning of the year, Pakistan Army in a joint operation with US intelligence agencies captured Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a famous Taliban commander, from the tribal belt of Pakistan. The success of the operation was hailed by the United States and Pakistan was praised for its utmost cooperation.

2011: In the beginning of 2011, Raymond Davis, a CIA agent in Pakistan killed two Pakistani men in Lahore, claiming that they came to rob him. Davis was taken into custody for killing civilians, however, American officials claimed that he was entitled to diplomatic immunity and must be released immediately.

Raymond Davis was later acquitted of the murder charges and was sent to United States.

In the May of 2011, Osama bin Laden was killed in an operation conducted by US Navy Seals in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

President Barrack Obama claimed that the information pertaining to the operation conducted in Abbottabad was not shared with Pakistan Army. However, ISI claimed that the operation was conducted jointly, a claim which was blatantly denied by President Asif Ali Zardari.

Since the war on terror started in 2001, Pakistan has received an estimated amount of $20 billion from United States; however, in the wake of OBL’s raid US withheld $800 million of aid to Pakistan.

US-Pakistan relations plummeted again when 24 Pakistani soldiers died in an air strike by the US Army. Afghan and US officials claimed that the firing was a result of the attack launched from the Pakistani side of the border, however, the Pakistani military and government denied the claims.

As a result of the attack, Pakistani government ordered US army to evacuate Salala air base which was being used to launch offensive on Taliban and militants. Moreover, the government also halted Nato supplies for United Sates.

2012: Since the beginning of 2012, various political parties along with the military command of the country, met and held discussions on restoring Nato supplies. Diplomats from United States also tried to reduce the friction.

Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said that the supplies were blocked without any pressure and will be restored with consensus.

Moreover, Nato Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen urged Pakistan to reopen Nato ground supply routes to Afghanistan. However, Rasmussen also said that Pakistan had not been invited to the crucial 25th Nato summit to be held in May in Chicago.

Simultaneously, US Senator John Kerry, a leading proponent of US aid for Pakistan, said that Pakistan needs to be more cooperative, in order to eliminate Taliban sanctuaries from the country.

However, top Pakistani leaders decided to meet on May 15,  in order to discuss ending a blockade of foreign military supply routes into Afghanistan and repairing US relations, signaling a rapprochement ahead of a Nato summit.

Simultaneously, in a sudden shift in events, Nato, on May 15, said that it will invite President Zardari to the alliance’s summit in Chicago, after the country’s foreign minister proposed reopening its Afghan border to Nato military supplies. President Zardari accepted the invitation and decided to attend the summit.

However, on May 18, US lawmakers in the House of Representatives debating the National Defence Authorisation Act voted 412-1 for an amendment that could block up to $650 million in proposed payments to Pakistan unless Islamabad lets coalition forces resume shipment of war supplies across its territory.

However, on the same day, four containers laden with supplies for the US Embassy in Kabul crossed into Afghanistan from Pakistan via Torkham border post.

A local official while confirming supplies to the US Embassy via Torkham said he could not say when the cargo had been transported.

“Pakistan government has never put restriction on the transportation of supplies for the diplomatic missions, including the American Embassy in Kabul,” a senior official, who was dealing with the matter, said.

“Ban on the transportation of Nato supplies is still intact.”

Simultaneously President Zardari arrived in Washington on May 19 to attend the Nato summit in Chicago. However, both the countries were unable to strike a conclusive deal on the restoration of Nato supplies as the summit ended.

In a fresh warning to Pakistan, a Senate panel on May 23 approved a foreign aid budget for next year that slashes US assistance to Islamabad by more than half and threatens further reductions if it fails to open supply routes to Nato forces in Afghanistan.

Sen Patrick Leahy, a Democrat and the chairman of the subcommittee, and the panel’s top Republican, Sen Lindsey Graham, said money for Pakistan was cut 58 per cent as lawmakers questioned Islamabad’s commitment to the fight against terrorism.

Moreover, the Senate Appropriations Committee, on May 24, voted to cut aid to Pakistan by a symbolic $33 million – $1 million for each year of jail time handed to Shakil Afridi, a Pakistani doctor who allegedly assisted the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in finding Osama bin Laden.

However, the United States agreed to reimburse $1.18 billion or almost 75 per cent of the claims Pakistan has submitted for the expenses incurred in the fight against militants along the Afghan border.

The approval showed that despite increased tensions, the US financial assistance to Pakistan has continued although it is becoming increasingly difficult to get congressional support for helping Pakistan.

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, on June 7, said that the United States was running out of patience with Pakistan over safe havens of insurgents who attack US troops across the border in Afghanistan.

Panetta spoke after talks with Afghan Defence Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak on the latest leg of an Asian tour that has taken him to India, but not Islamabad in a sign of how dire US-Pakistan relations are.

On June 8, US Assistant Defence Secretary Peter Lavoy arrived in Islamabad, in a fresh attempt to bring an end to a six-month blockade on Nato supplies, crossing into Afghanistan.

However, on June 11, the United States withdrew negotiators from Pakistan after talks failed to produce a deal on reopening vital Nato supply routes into Afghanistan. Sherry Rehman, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, still sounded optimistic and said that the return of an American negotiating team from Islamabad, where it worked with Pakistani counterparts on revival of the Nato supply routes, does not represent an institutional US pullout.

Moreover,  Panetta ruled out an apology over an air strike last year that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers and badly set back efforts to improve US-Pakistani ties, saying it was “time to move on.”

Gen John Allen, the top commander of American and Nato forces in Afghanistan, visited Pakistan on Wednesday, amidst heightened tensions between the two countries.

The agenda of the talks remained to restore Nato supply routes and cross-border attacks launched on Pakistani soil from Afghanistan.

Pakistan, on July 3, agreed to reopen key supply routes into Afghanistan ending a bitter stand-off after US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said she was sorry for the loss of life in a botched air raid.

A US official said that as part of the deal Washington will release about $1.1 billion to the Pakistani military from a US “coalition support fund” designed to reimburse Pakistan for the cost of counter-insurgency operations.

Moreover, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on July 8 that the United States and Pakistan were putting past tensions behind them to focus on the future, after meeting her Pakistani counterpart Hina Rabbani Khar in Tokyo.

It was the first meeting between Clinton and Khar since the two countries last week struck a deal to re-open supply routes, closed for seven months following a US attack in which 24 Pakistani soldiers died.

President Barack Obama, on July 17, named Richard G Olson to be the US ambassadors to Pakistan, tasking him with shaping highly sensitive relationships after US troops pull out.

The US commander in Afghanistan Gen John Allen visited GHQ to hold talks in Pakistan on August 2 for the first time since Islamabad ended a seven-month blockade on Nato supplies destined for the 10-year war effort.

Moreover, Pakistan received $1.1 billion dollars from the United States for its fight against militants, the first installment of its kind since December 2010 on the same day.

The agenda of the meeting was focused on improving security along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States Sherry Rehman met with Congressman Dan Burton on August 3, a Republican from Indiana, and discussed ways to enhance Pakistan-US relationship.

The United States and Pakistan reached an understanding on joint operations against the Haqqani network on August 5, However a joint decision could not be agreed upon.

The sources said the issue of cross-border attacks, by the Haqqani network into Afghanistan and by TTP into Pakistan, was discussed in a series of meetings between senior US and Pakistani officials during the week.

The US State Department confirmed on August 23 that an American diplomat had a meeting with Pakistani officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Islamabad as Pakistan lodged its first formal protest with the United States over drone strikes.

http://www.dawn.com/news/731670

Declassified Papers Shed Light on US Role in Liaquat’s Murder

Author:

Syed Rashid Husain, Arab News

Publication Date:

Tue, 2006-07-18

ALKHOBAR, 18 July 2006 — Oil, Iran and air bases, seem to be issues of recent times. Not indeed. It was some 55 years back that these issues were very much in play and a recently declassified document indicates that these were the reasons behind the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan’s first prime minister on Oct. 16, 1951.

Like a number of other high-profile killings, the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, has also remained a mystery. Conspiracy theories abound, yet are difficult to substantiate.

A recent declassified document from the US State Department brings to light some interesting facts. According to the document, a telegram was sent by the American Embassy in New Delhi on Oct. 30, 1951.

“Is Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination a result of a deep-laid American conspiracy?” The telegram from the US Embassy in New Delhi carried the summary of an article published in the Urdu daily of Bhopal, “Nadeem” on Oct. 24, 1951, charging the US with the responsibility of Khan’s death.

The summary then points to the facts raised in the Nadeem article, “It was neither a local incident nor connected with the Pashtoonistan movement (as some may have believed then). It had behind it a deep-rooted conspiracy and recognizable hand.”

The article then says that the then Afghan government “knew about the conspiracy and the assassin was an Afghan, yet, the plot was hatched neither in Kabul nor in Karachi (the then capital of Pakistan).”

The declassified document reveals that the day before assassination, the secretary to the American ambassador in Karachi absent-mindedly jotted down “holiday” for Oct. 19 in a table diary and then immediately struck it off.

Following the secretary’s departure, Mohammad Hussain, a Pakistani employee at the American Embassy in Karachi asked the secretary’s British clerk about the holiday. The clerk described it as a possible slip. “Mistake meaningful,” however, because “the secretary knew the embassy would be closed (on) Oct. 17 (sic) although no American or Pakistani holiday was scheduled then to fall that day.

The story in Nadeem then points to another fact, as given in the declassified document. The American ambassador (in Karachi) offered condolences to Liaquat’s wife (Raana Liaquat Ali Khan) on the phone, some three and a half minutes before even the Governor General of Pakistan Khawaja Nazimuddin managed to offer his condolences. This was despite the fact that the governor general was the first to be informed (of the killing) by the Rawalpindi authorities. Indeed with no mobile connection, no live transmissions, even no TV, those were different days and the flow of information was much slower than today. The question that the newspaper article thus tried to raise was how did the American ambassador come to know of the assassination before the governor general of Pakistan found out?

The newspaper article, as summarized by the declassified US document, then discusses the possible reason for the disenchantment of the US and the UK governments with the Pakistan prime minister and his government. Liaquat was not ready to toe the US line, the newspaper pointed out and hence the US wanted him eliminated.

“While the UK was pressing Pakistan for support on the issue of Iran, the US demanded Pakistan use its influence in Tehran and persuade it to transfer control of its oil fields to the US (oil apparently has remained a major issue with the Americans ever since, especially while Mohammad Mosaddeq was in power in Tehran then).

According to the article, Liaquat Ali Khan declined to accede to the request. “The US then threatened to annul the secret pact on Kashmir (between Pakistan and the US). Liaquat replied that Pakistan has annexed half of Kashmir without American support and would be able to take the other half too.” Not only that, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan also demanded that the US vacate air bases in Pakistan.

“Liaquat’s demand was a bombshell for Washington. Americans who had been dreaming of conquering Soviet Russia from Pakistan air bases were flabbergasted,” the article emphasized. And hence the plot to kill Liaquat was hatched, says the article.

However, “the US wanted a Muslim assassin, so as to obviate international complications. The US could not find a traitor in Pakistan (apparently for the reason that the new country was then brimming with nationalistic pride and hope for future),” the article added.

The US then turned to Kabul. “Washington contacted the US Embassy in Kabul. They in turn got in touch with Pashtoonistan leaders, pointing to Liaquat as their only hurdle and assuring them that if some of them could kill Liaquat, the US would undertake the task of establishing Pashtoonistan by 1952.”

At this the “Pashtoon leaders induced Akbar to take the job and also made arrangements for him to be killed immediately after so as to conceal the conspiracy. The Pakistani currency recovered from the assassin’s body also reveal that others were also involved. Due to already strained relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan no currency exchange was then taking place between the two countries. Hence only the “American Embassy (in Kabul) could have supplied the Pakistani currency notes to the assassin,” the summary argued.

The article also mentioned that the cartridges recovered from the body of the assassinated Pakistani premier were US made. The type of bullet used to kill the Pakistani prime minister were in “use by high-ranking American officers”, and were “not usually available in the market”. The rest is for us to deduce.

The article then summarized that all these facts prove that the real culprit behind the killing was the US, which had committed similar acts in the Middle East as well.

There are many parallels between then and now. And all this could not be just a matter of chance. Oil, assassinations, dollars, Iran, air bases, all these sound familiar even today. Fifty years have passed, yet things may not have really changed.

http://www.arabnews.com/node/287940

India biggest recipient of US economic assistance over 66-year period: USAID

DAWN.COM — UPDATED JUL 14, 2015 10:01AM

The United States, over the period 1946-2012, has given India the largest amount of economic assistance, while providing Israel the greatest quantity of military assistance over the same interval, according to data compiled by USAID.

The US also gave Israel the greatest total foreign assistance over the 66-year period, at $199 billion.

The data, which is inflation adjusted, shows India received approximately $65.1bn in economic assistance from 1946 until 2012, followed closely by Israel, which was given $65bn.

With $44.4bn received as economic assistance from the US, Pakistan is also among the top five countries to receive economic assistance out of a total of 200 countries and regions.

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Top 10 countries receiving US economic assistance from 1946-2012

1. India: $65.1bn
2. Israel: $65bn
3. United Kingdom: $63.6bn
4. Egypt: $59.6bn
5. Pakistan: $44.4bn
6. Vietnam: $41bn
7. Iraq: $39.7bn
8. South Korea: $36.5bn
9. Germany: $33.3bn
10. France: $31bn

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Indian economic aid is spread out over various sectors and programs, including child survival and health, development assistance, HIV/AIDS initiatives, migration and refugee assistance, food aid, and narcotics control. The bulk of this aid ($26bn) is provided to various USAID programmes.

A majority of Israel’s $65bn economic assistance was given to its Economic Support Fund and Security Support Assistance, with $56.5bn alone attributed to these programmes.

In comparison, of the $44.4bn provided to Pakistan in economic assistance, $13.8bn is given to USAID programmes, while $13.7bn is attributed to the Economic Support Fund and Security Support Assistance.

Israel received $134bn in military assistance over 1946-2012 ─ a figure which far outnumbers military assistance provided to the the second entrant on the list, Vietnam, at $77.9bn.

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Top 10 countries receiving US military assistance from 1946-2012

1. Israel: $134bn
2. Vietnam: $77.9bn
3. Egypt: $62bn
4. Afghanistan: $48.3bn
5. Turkey: $42.2bn
6. South Korea: $41.1bn
7. France: $33bn
8. Greece: $29.5bn
9. China: $26.3bn
10. Iraq: $24.7bn

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Pakistan just misses being on the top 10 list, coming in at twelfth place with $12.9bn in military assistance from the US. India, however, is placed at 47 out of a list of 193 countries, receiving $897 million in military assistance.

It is pertinent to mention here that Pakistan received most of the military assistance from the US during the superpower’s involvement in Afghanistan during the 1980s and then after 2001.

The US non-military aid to Pakistan for the period 1991-2001 averaged just $75 million per year, while the total military aid during the eleven-year period was a paltry $7 million.

Pakistan also falls short of the list of countries receiving the greatest amount of total foreign assistance form the US ─ but India and Israel both make the list, with the latter in the top spot.

Pakistan comes in at eleventh place on the list, with $57.3bn in total foreign assistance ─ over $100bn less than the amount received by the top position holder on the list.

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Countries receiving greatest total foreign assistance

1. Israel: $199.5bn
2. Egypt: $121.6bn
3. Vietnam: $118.9bn
4. South Korea: $77.6bn
5. Afghanistan: $76.9bn
6. United Kingdom: $71.5bn
7. India: $66bn
8. Turkey: $64.4bn
9. Iraq: $64.3bn
10. France: $64bn

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All figures have been rounded off to the nearest decimal place.

http://www.dawn.com/news/1194228

Sixty years of US aid to Pakistan: Get the data

As the US announces it is to withhold military aid to Pakistan, find out how much money America has given to the country since 1948

• Get the data

A Pakistan soldier mans a machine gun in the north-western Bajur region in Pakistan. Photograph: Anwarullah Khan/AP

The Obama administration has announced it will withhold more than one-third of all military assistance to Pakistan – an aid envelope worth some $800m (£498m). The withheld aid includes funding for military equipment and reimbursements for selected Pakistani security expenditures – including a payment of $300m for counterinsurgency programmes.

US aid to Pakistan has a long political history and this is not the first time money has been withheld. Here we’ve pulled out all the figures for both US military aid and economic assistance (including development assistance) to Pakistan between 1948 and 2010.

The dataset comes from Wren Elhai, at the Washington-based Center for Global Development (CGD), who in May published a report along with Nancy Birdsall and Molly Kinder analysing the long-term impact of US aid to Pakistan. The numbers – which come from the US Overseas Grants and Loans database and the Congressional Research Service – have been adjusted for inflation and are presented in terms of the value of the US$ in 2009.

US aid to Pakistan, 1948-2010

Some highlights:

• US economic assistance to Pakistan peaked in 1962, at over $2.3bn

• in 2010, military assistance to Pakistan totalled $2.5bn – including $1.2bn in coalition support funds

• US assistance to Pakistan reached its lowest level in the 1990s, after President George H.W. Bush suspended aid flows over Pakistan’s emerging nuclear programme

• US military assistance dropped dramatically during and immediately after the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971

• in the 1970s, President Carter suspended all aid to Pakistan (except food aid) in response to Pakistan’s decision to construct a uranium enrichment facility

• although US assistance (both economic and military) to Pakistan has fluctuated considerably over the last 60 years, it has risen steadily since 2001

Pakistan has historically been among the top recipients of US aid – since 1948, the US has sent more than £30bn in direct aid to the country. Nearly half of this has been for military assistance. However, since Osama bin Laden was discovered and killed in Abbottabad earlier this year, US president Barack Obama has come under increasing pressure to justify US aid spending in the country.

Although military assistance is currently the only form of US aid to Pakistan to be withheld, Congress has considered other – as yet unsuccessful – bills to also block US economic assistance, and civilian aid to Pakistan will no doubt be up for debate again next year, as the 2012 budget battles get underway.

What can you do with the data?

Data summary

Summary of US aid to Pakistan 1948-2010

Click heading to sort table. Download this data

Year	Economic Assistance, Total	Economic Assistance (through USAID)	Military Assistance, Total	Coalition Support Funds
Note: All figures are in US$ (millions). Figures are adjusted for inflation and presented in 2009 constant dollars Source: Wren Elhai, Center for Global Development, 2011
1948	0.77	0	0
1949	0	0	0
1950	0	0	0
1951	2.89	0	0
1952	74.25	73.55	0
1953	748.29	286.23	0
1954	156.95	152.24	0
1955	733.15	477.18	266
1956	1065.67	700.89	1086.5
1957	1079.65	619.9	437.59
1958	968.22	589.59	533.13
1959	1367.93	985.25	366.81
1960	1689.84	1181.35	230.39
1961	989.53	780.04	260.47
1962	2334.65	1446.28	549.02
1963	2066.77	1063.68	292.31
1964	2222.66	1334.16	187.55
1965	1928.9	1041.58	77.38
1966	816.28	691.28	8.4
1967	1213.36	719.38	26.33
1968	1501.68	672.5	25.98
1969	541.76	504.31	0.5
1970	968.32	570.93	0.87
1971	474.25	31.21	0.73
1972	692.87	261.87	0.42
1973	715.35	387.63	1.24
1974	381.97	219.13	0.95
1975	614.34	326.02	0.92
1976	644.1	336.78	1.28
1977	319.16	209.4	0.92
1978	214.92	55.49	1.52
1979	128.81	23.31	1.2
1980	137.53	0	0
1981	164.16	0	0
1982	400.6	200.07	1.2
1983	534.18	383.29	499.77
1984	568.05	415.84	555.9
1985	607.26	447.53	583.53
1986	623.56	460.91	545.82
1987	599.07	469.53	534.54
1988	769.14	635	430.69
1989	559.72	421.27	367.06
1990	548.07	422.37	283.44
1991	149.59	141.78	0
1992	27.14	0.57	7.2
1993	74.19	7.98	0
1994	68.43	0	0
1995	23.13	10.1	0
1996	22.79	0	0
1997	57.17	0	0
1998	36.32	0	0
1999	102.14	6.72	0.22
2000	45.72	0	0
2001	228.02	0.54	0
2002	937.34	744.74	1739.7	1386.06
2003	377.93	284.81	1760.23	1450.98
2004	406.12	316.56	891.39	794.11
2005	490.42	374.04	1397.06	1050.15
2006	689.43	488.46	1246.1	916.13
2007	688.62	498.91	1079.72	755.74
2008	614.48	392.05	1378.32	1014.9
2009	1353.65	1076.25	1114.26	685
2010	1867.13	1529.53	2524.61	1220.5

http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/11/us-aid-to-pakistan