Flashback to 1971

Javed Hussain

December 20, 2015

BY not respecting the verdict of the people in the 1970 elections and by launching the Pakistan Army against its own people in East Pakistan, the military leadership had created a crisis of frightening magnitude.

Having decided to solve a political issue through military means, they should have foreseen war with India and prepared for it, first by ensuring the defence of Dhaka, the focal point of strategy for both armies, and then invoking the perfectly sound concept of defending the east from the west as neither army was strong enough to fight on two fronts some 1,600 kilometres apart. Therefore, the Indian army had rightly adopted a strategic defensive posture in the west and a strategic offensive posture in the east.

The Indian army had correctly identified Dhaka as their objective, but knew that it would be difficult to capture quickly if it was defended in strength as the terrain around it favoured the defender. Therefore, something had to be done to force the Pakistanis to uncover Dhaka. In this they were helped no end by Lt Gen Niazi’s obsession with the ridiculous strategic thought of defending every inch of East Pakistan.

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Yahya Khan let East Pakistan and Kashmir pass into history.

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Consequently, commencing Nov 20, 1971, the Indian army, in line with Niazi’s obsession, launched small-scale offensive operations all along the 2700km border, to impose on Pakistan’s Eastern Command an exaggerated forward defensive posture. Niazi took the bait and rushed his limited forces towards the border. In the event, he diluted his forces in space and uncovered Dhaka.

Resultantly, on Dec 14, the Indian troops entered Dhaka unopposed. By the end of November 1971, the eastern front was in tatters. Niazi’s strategy of holding space everywhere led him to lose all control of events. If he had shortened the front in time he would have had enough regular troops to defend Dhaka for at least six months.

The Indian army’s build-up in the east began in July 1971 which also entailed shifting some formations from the west.

This build-up constituted aggression and called for a pre-emptive strike in the west, in much the same way as Israel had done in 1967 following the build-up of Arab forces in Sinai.

Consequently, in September 1971, when the Indian defences in the west had not yet been fully energised, a strategic offensive in Ravi-Chenab corridor could have cut off India-held Kashmir from the Indian mainland by securing line Samba-Madhopur Headworks, then exploiting towards Jammu.

From the geo-strategic, operational and logistics standpoint, this was the most suitable corridor for the offensive which would have altered the course of war. Gen Yahya Khan could have mustered four infantry divisions, three armoured brigades, and elements of SSG for the offensive, while keeping two infantry divisions, two armoured divisions and elements of SSG as army reserves.

But when he opened the western front on Dec 3, 1971 he wasted three infantry divisions and an armoured brigade on operations that had no strategic significance (a division each against Chhamb, Jaisalmer and Poonch, and an armoured brigade in Chhamb).

All three operations failed, as did the counter-attacks against the foothold gained by India’s 1 Corps in Jarpal-Barapind area in Shakargarh salient in Ravi-Chenab corridor, also with tragically heavy losses. When the war ended on Dec 16, 1971, the army reserves in the west, acquired at great cost to the country, remained unutilised, which in a short duration war is an unpardonable act.

By launching a timely pre-emptive offensive Yahya Khan stood a good chance of taking Kashmir and salvaging East Pakistan. By not acting in time, he stood no chance at all. He let this opportunity pass, and with it, let East Pakistan and Kashmir pass into history. That afternoon in Dhaka the Pakistan forces had lost its honour in battle.

Wars are won by those whose job it is to take superior strategic decisions at the right time and by those whose job it is to translate these decisions into superior tactical actions at the right point in time and space. The military leadership that can achieve this harmony between strategy and tactics will seldom lose.

Sadly, the hidebound Pakistani leadership that planned and directed the 1965 and 1971 wars and conducted battles was found wanting in this. They lacked dynamism, flexibility, resilience and initiative, and were steeped in conformism and convention. Hence, the mistakes made by them were paid for in blood.

Yahya Khan, who was wholly responsible for the failure of Operation Grand Slam in 1965, had squandered away the opportunity to fight and win the most important battle of his career — the battle for Pakistan.

The writer is a former armour and SSG officer.

Published in Dawn, December 20th, 2015

Why did Pakistan lose the war of 1971? — I

Ahmad Faruqui

SEPTEMBER 12, 2017

In prior columns, I addressed the issue of whether Pakistan won the war of 1965. When the discussion turns to the war of 1971, there is no doubt that Pakistan lost that war. However, many Pakistanis have absolved their military for the loss of East Pakistan in 1971, placing the blame instead on the squabbling politicians of West and East Pakistan.

As I did in the discussion of the 1965 war, I am going to cite from some experts whose objectivity about Pakistan’s capabilities is beyond reproach.

Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan: Its Army, and the Wars Within, Oxford University Press, 2008.

Contrary to popular belief, 1971 witnessed not one but three major conflicts in the subcontinent: one was a civil war within Pakistan. Another was a war with India… (and the third was) a Pakistani riposte from West Pakistan into Indian territory that began on 3 December 1971. (T)he result for Pakistan was abject failure, as the military regime blundered from a muddled campaign in the Eastern Wing to a fruitless adventure in the west. Lack of a clear and attainable goal for the war in the west reflected another failure of command and execution. … (Besides the HRC report, commissioned by President Bhutto) The Pakistan Army did commission its own review of the war… it was not distributed widely… The review was very critical and incisive… Unequivocally, the GHQ declared that ‘(T)he war on the West Pakistan borders was started much too late to influence the battle of East Pakistan. By 3 Dec(ember) 1971, (the) enemy had gained a firm foothold on the soil of East Pakistan, destroyed our air force in that sector and paralysed all communications in that wing… Had a more broad based policy formulation machinery existed, a timely and correct decision may have been taken which may have helped either to avert total disaster in East Pakistan or may have put us in a better bargaining position.’ … The gap between perception and reality is epitomized in General Yahya’s statement to the Hamoodur Rehman Commission and in his deposition to the Lahore High Court of 1978… (he) maintains firmly that India launched the attacks on the western front on 3 December, and that with ‘regard to the military defence of Pakistan, the strategy was framed with the proposition that fight shall take place with India on the borders of both wings. Our main aim was to continue fighting… A detailed analysis of the air, sea and land operations by the GHQ’s own team also lead to some broad conclusions that were devastating… Air support was deemed inadequate and delays in provision of ground support for the Pakistan Army did allow it to fight defensive battles.

‘Most of the formations have complained that it had taken 4 to 6 hours for their air requests to be met.’ The critique did not spare the army’s own operations… (The) lack of training of armour and infantry to fight as a cohesive team showed in almost all aspects… Commanders and staff at all levels in the army were unaware of the capabilities of armour… The infantry was ill-trained, under-equipped, and not ready for war. New battalions were sent into action within six months of training… No wonder then that the Pakistan Army failed to live up to expectations in its area of expertise. As usual, a cloak of secrecy was placed over the Pakistan Army’s shortcomings, whereas public discussion and debate would have allowed lessons to be learned and applied.

Brian Cloughley, “A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections,” Fifth Edition, Carrel Books, 2016.1

(After it became clear that East Pakistan would fall to Indian forces in late November 1971, Pakistan opened another front in the border between West Pakistan and India.) The campaign (in the West) was a disaster for Pakistan. Poor planning; indecision about deployment; hasty and countermanded regrouping; inadequate or even non-existent coordination between formations; inability to seize the moment for exploitation; lack of cooperation between GHQ and air HQ; bungling of movement control procedures — the list of failures is long.

Had nothing been done in the years 1965-71 to hone the skills of the Pakistan Army? It certainly seemed so.

Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, Stanford University Press, 2012.

A Pakistani military crackdown on March 25, 1971 would prove to be the proverbial last straw. The strike on Bengali dissidents morphed into a civil war, and refugees poured into India… Delhi finally intervened militarily, resulting in a major war in November and December 1971… (T)he Pakistani army launched an attack from West Pakistan in the hope of reversing the Indian advances. It did not succeed… The war now was reaching a peak and spreading in both wings of Pakistan. The Indian navy successfully conducted a blockade of all ports of East Pakistan and in the west, effectively attacking the Pakistani coastline and destroying key targets around Karachi and other Pakistani lifelines. Within three days the Indian Air Force was able to establish air superiority, and both wings of Pakistan’s territory were strategically dissected and isolated. The only choice left to Pakistan was to launch a riposte with the last reserves of the its strike corps in West Pakistan… India then launched the final assault on the capital of East Pakistan on December 15. The next day (General) Niazi surrendered.

Contrary to popular belief, 1971 witnessed not one but three major conflicts in the Subcontinent: one was a civil war within Pakistan… Another was a war with India… (and the third was) a Pakistani riposte from West Pakistan into Indian territory that began on December 3, 1971

(General Yahya Khan was a) controversial military leader. Pakistan lost the 1971 war for several reasons, including strategic blunders, poor leadership, and weak military strategies.

Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country, Penguins Books, 2011.

A common definition of tragedy is that of a noble figure betrayed and destroyed by some inner flaw. The Pakistani military is in some ways an admirable institution, but it suffers from one tragic feature which has been with it from the beginning, which has defined its whole character and world view, which has done terrible damage to Pakistan and which would in some circumstances destroy and its army altogether. This is the military’s obsession with India in general, and Kashmir in particular. Speaking of the average Pakistani officer of today, General Naqvi told me:

“He has no doubt in his mind that the adversary is India, and that the whole raison d’etre of the army is to defend against India. His image of Indians is of an anti-Pakistani, anti-Muslim, treacherous people. So he feels that he must be always ready to fight against India.” (Defense analyst Ziad Hamid’s) views were the following: “We say that if India tries to break up Pakistan by supporting insurgents like the Baloch nationalists then our response should be to break up India. In any case, we owe them payback for what they did do to us in East Pakistan… India is not nearly as strong as it looks. The fault lines of the Indian Federation are much deeper than those of Pakistan.”

Carey Schofield, Inside the Pakistan Army: A Woman’s Experience on the Frontline of the War on Terror, Biteback Publishing, 2011.

Throughout my time with the Pakistan Army the 1971 war, which led to the loss of half the country … was the elephant in the room, the extraordinary issue that (almost) no one mentioned… (The elections of 1970 had given the dominant role to the East Pakistanis). The nightmare — long foreseen — was upon the country now. West Pakistan was simple unable to countenance political domination by the despised Bengalis. After futile attempts at compromise, Yahya suspended the Assembly, and the East went on strike. Yahya and his generals treated the Bengali problem as an insurgency, rather and clamped down brutally in March 1971.

Accounts of Pakistan Army savagery reverberated around the world. Inevitably, civil war broke out, resulting in the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of people. In November, flooded by nine million refugees, India declared war on Pakistan and fighting erupted on the western border. Within six weeks, Pakistan suffered a catastrophic defeat with 90,000 of its men taken prisoner. The Army was trautamised and was forced to sign an instrument of surrender — the formal act of surrender in the East Wing.

The Pakistan Army lost more than face. The independent state of Bangladesh was born. Pakistan was humiliated, losing 54 percent of its population, valuable raw materials, and much of its cultural diversity… (Decades later) Morale was shattered by the Abbottabad Affair (to kill Osama bin Laden). The Army feels publicly humiliated, and it needs to find a way to regain public confidence… There is another difficulty with the Pakistan Army. Officers, even fairly senior people, are disposed to believe wild conspiracy theories. Thousands … truly believe that the West wants to dismember Pakistan… Hardly any believe that Osama bin Laden masterminded the 9/11 attacks.

Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan, MacMillan Press Ltd, 2000.

(In 1971, a civil war broke in East Pakistan out after the Government of Pakistan, based in the West, decided on 25 March to take military action against the party that had won the national elections. By the second week of April, the Army was able to assert its control over the major cities but not in the rural areas.) The initial success of the Army was not sustained for a number of reasons. First, the Army authorities lacked public support… Second, the military action transformed the resistance movement into a war of liberation. … Third, India’s role was critical to sustaining the insurgency and contributed to tilting the balance against Pakistan… Pakistan began a desperate search for political settlement in August-September, primarily on the advice of friendly countries including China, the US and Iran. … By November, India had come to the conclusion that it would have to undertake direct military action to dislodge the Pakistan military from East Pakistan… (India’s) strategy was to build enough pressure on the Pakistan Army so that it would make a retaliatory move on the West Pakistan-India border, thereby giving a justification for an all-out invasion of East Pakistan. This strategy paid off (and Pakistan walked right into the trap). On 3 December, Pakistan launched an air and ground attack in the west to relieve pressure on its troops in the east. This led to a full-fledged war in both the regions.

The Pakistani troops — outnumbered, outgunned and outmaneuvered — could not withstand the well-coordinated and massive Indian advance in the east… For all practical purposes, the Pakistani troops had no air cover. Similarly, the performance of the Pakistani navy was dismal… On 16 December, the Pakistani commander surrendered to his Indian counterpart… and Bangladesh came into being.

The Yahya rule was the most turbulent period in Pakistan’s history. He assumed power as a caretaker ruler with a promise to restore civilian and democratic rule. (Instead, he ended up plunging) the country into a bloody civil war and presid(ing) over the break-up of Pakistan.

 

The writer is a defence analyst and economist. He has authored “Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan” (Ashgate Publishing, 2003)

 

 

Published in Daily Times, September 12^th 2017.

https://dailytimes.com.pk/117343/why-did-pakistan-lose-the-war-of-1971-i/

Blunders of the 1971 war

December 03, 2009

ON March 25, 1971, Gen Yahya Khan ordered the army to restore the writ of the state in East Pakistan. On Dec 16, 1971, East Pakistan was no more.

That afternoon in Dhaka, the Pakistan Army lost its honour on the battlefield when Lt Gen A.A.K. Niazi (Tiger) and his Eastern Command surrendered to the Indian Eastern Command — honour that can be regained only on the battlefield. Until then, the ignominious defeat will continue to haunt the armed forces and succeeding generations in Pakistan.

After he chose to solve a political problem by military means, Yahya Khan should have foreseen that at some point in the foreseeable future, India would intervene to achieve its longstanding aim — the breakup of Pakistan. Consequently, he should have prepared for war by focusing on defending Dhaka at all cost, and on invoking the concept of defending the east from the west. He did neither.

On the other hand, the Indian Army, in line with their aim, had chosen to adopt a strategic defensive posture in the west, and a strategic offensive posture in the east. They had correctly identified Dhaka as their objective and subordinated all other considerations to the accomplishment of this single aim. But the aim could not be accomplished quickly if Dhaka, the terrain around which favoured the defender, was defended in strength. Therefore, something had to be done to induce the Pakistanis to uncover Dhaka. Thus started the Indian psychological operations to delude the Pakistanis into thinking that the Indian military aim was limited to the capture of a small chunk of Pakistani territory adjacent to the international border, from which an independent state of Bangladesh would be proclaimed.

To reinforce this impression, on Nov 20, they launched small-scale offensive operations all along the border, aimed at drawing the Pakistani forces outwards and imposing on them an exaggerated forward defensive posture. Niazi obliged them by ordering his forces to deploy along the 1,700-mile long border — as a consequence, he diluted his forces in space and uncovered Dhaka. East Pakistan, as it stood on Dec 3, 1971, was ready to fall like a ripe plum. And fall it did when on Dec 14, the Indian troops marched into Dhaka unopposed as there were no Pakistani regulars available to defend it.

The Pakistani concept of defending the east from the west was fashioned by geographic compulsions. It was a sound concept as the armed forces, like their adversary, were not strong enough to fight a war on two fronts 1,000 miles apart, for any attempt to do so would have denuded them of strategic offensive capability on both fronts.

“In war, opportunities come but once, the great art is to seize them,” said Napoleon. The first opportunity to implement this concept came in September 1971 when the Indian defences in the west had not yet been fully energised. At this point, a strategic offensive in the Ravi-Chenab corridor, centred on armoured forces, could have severed Indian Kashmir from the mainland by securing line Samba-Madhopur Headworks, then exploiting towards Jammu. From the geo-strategic, operational and logistics standpoint, this was the most suitable corridor for an offensive that could not only salvage the forces in the east, but also recompense for the probable loss of East Pakistan, given that the people there had risen in rebellion against the Pakistani state.

In mid-October, while the strike formation of India’s 1 Corps, under Lt Gen K.K. Singh, was being inducted into the Ravi-Chenab corridor, Singh commented, “Our weakest hour is now; another four days and Yahya would have missed the opportunity.” On Dec 5, his corps started its tactical offensive in the eastern half of the corridor between Degh Nadi in the west and Ravi in the east.

The second opportunity came a week later when this corps was fully committed and struggling to make headway. At this point, the western half of the corridor, which was lightly held, presented an opening which went unnoticed by Yahya and his war directing team. A counter-offensive through this opening could have turned the western flank of the corps and created a critical situation for them.

On Dec 3, Yahya Khan opened the western front and frittered away three infantry divisions and an armoured brigade on operations that had no strategic significance. In what was essentially a defensive offensive, an infantry division and an armoured brigade were launched against Chhamb. Another infantry division was tasked to capture Jaisalmer, which entailed traversing 60 miles of desert; while moving towards the border the division’s vehicles got stuck in the sand, and the only unit that managed to cross the border was a T 59 tank unit, but as the area was outside PAF’s fighter range, it was devastated by relentless air attacks.

It was a criminal offence to assign a mission in desert terrain to a foot mobile division — a mission that could only be undertaken by armoured forces with assured air support.

Another infantry division was tasked to capture Poonch in Indian Kashmir. It planned to do this in two phases. In Phase 1 a corridor would be created through which, in Phase 2, the remaining force would pass to secure their objectives. Phase 1 failed, yet Phase 2 was launched, which also failed — in the process, 100 officers and men lost their lives.

In yet another tragic operation, an armoured brigade was ordered to eliminate a foothold Singh’s corps had gained across the defensive minefield in the area of Jarpal. It was said to hold a tank squadron (14 tanks) and an infantry battalion. On Dec 16, as the first unit moved forward it was devastated by tank fire. The second unit then attacked from another direction and met the same fate. It later transpired that there were four tank squadrons (60 tanks) and an infantry brigade in the foothold. Moreover, although 16 artillery batteries were available, only three were used to support the piecemeal attack.

In the most tragic of all operations, an infantry battalion was ordered to capture Jarpal which, 24 hours earlier had decimated an armoured brigade. When its request to delay the attack by 24 hours was denied, at 530 am on Dec 17, the battalion attacked — without artillery fire support. It was mown down.

The commanders and their staff at army, corps, division and brigade headquarters were guilty of crass incompetence. As for the soldiers who fought and died bravely, ‘theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and die’!

The writer is a retired brigadier.

https://www.dawn.com/news/506298

Six-point Programme

Six-point Programme a charter of demands enunciated by the awami league for removing disparity between the two wings of Pakistan and to put an end to the internal colonial rule of West Pakistan in East Bengal.

The Indo-Pak War of 1965 ended with the execution of Taskent Treaty. To the old grievances of economic disparity added the complain of negligence and indifference of central government towards the defence of East Pakistan. Bangabandhu sheikh mujibur rahman was vocal on this issue.

The leaders of the opposition parties of West Pakistan convened a national convention at Lahore on 6 February 1966 with a view to ascertain the post-Taskent political trend. Bangabandhu reached Lahore on 4 February along with the top leaders of Awami League, and the day following he placed the Six-point charter of demand before the subject committee as the demands of the people of East Pakistan. He created pressure to include his proposal in the agenda of the conference. The subject committee rejected the proposal of Bangabandhu. On the day following, the newspapers of West Pakistan published reports on the Six-point Programme, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was projected as a separatist. Consequently Sheikh Mujib abandoned the conference.

The Six-point Programme along with a proposal of movement for the realisation of the demands was placed before the meeting of the working committee of Awami League on 21 February 1966, and the proposal was carried out unanimously. A booklet on the Six-point Programme with introduction from Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Tajuddin Ahmad was published. Another booklet titled Amader Banchar Dabi: 6-dafa Karmasuchi (Our demands for existence: 6-points Programme) was published in the name of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and was distributed in the council meeting of Awami League held on 18 March 1966.

Six Points

1.	The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in its true sense on the Lahore Resolution, and the parliamentary form of government with supremacy of a Legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise.
2.	The federal government should deal with only two subjects: Defence and Foreign Affairs, and all other residuary subjects shall be vested in the federating states.
3.	Two separate, but freely convertible currencies for two wings should be introduced; or if this is not feasible, there should be one currency for the whole country, but effective constitutional provisions should be introduced to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Furthermore, a separate Banking Reserve should be established, and separate fiscal and monetary policy be adopted for East Pakistan.
4.	The power of taxation and revenue collection shall be vested in the federating units and the federal centre will have no such power on the issue. The federation will be entitled to a share in the state taxes to meet its expenditures.
5.	There should be two separate accounts for the foreign exchange earnings of the two wings; the foreign exchange requirements of the federal government should be met by the two wings equally or in a ratio to be fixed; indigenous products should move free of duty between the two wings, and the Constitution should empower the units to establish trade links with foreign countries.
6.	East Pakistan should have a separate militia or paramilitary force.

The opposition leaders of West Pakistan looked at Mujib’s Six-point Programme as a device to disband Pakistan, and hence they rejected his proposal outright. The Ayub government projected Sheikh Mujib as a separatist and later instituted the agartala conspiracy case against him. He was arrested and put on trial. The case led to widespread agitation in East Pakistan culminating into the mass uprising of early 1969. Under public pressure, the government was forced to release him unconditionally on 22 February 1969.

The Awami League sought public mandate in favour of the Six-point Programme in the general elections of 1970 in which Sheikh Mujib received the absolute mandate from the people of East Pakistan in favour of his Six-point. But Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto refused to join the session of the National Assembly scheduled to be held on 3 March 1971 unless a settlement was reached between the two leaders beforehand. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his party sat in a protracted dialogue from 15 March 1971. The dialogue failed to produce any positive result. The army crackdown of 25 March sealed the fate of the Six-point including the fate of Pakistan. [Ashfaq Hossain]

http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Six-point_Programme

Recalling Six Points

Syed Badrul Ahsan

June 7 remains a milestone in the history of Bangladesh.
On this day in 1966, the people of what was then East Pakistan observed a general strike in the province in support of the Awami League’s Six-Point programme of autonomy announced a few months earlier by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

The strike, in the course of which a number of individuals were killed in police firing and a number of others were injured, was a powerful instance of the Bangalees making their displeasure about their place in Pakistan known to the authorities.

But even as the general strike, or hartal, kept the province in its grip throughout the day, the central leaders of the Awami League — Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Tajuddin Ahmed, Syed Nazrul Islam and others — stayed behind bars. The strike would be spearheaded by two young Awami League politicians, Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury and Amena Begum.
Mujib, who would not become Bangabandhu till three years later, had been placed in detention under the Defence of Pakistan Rules on 8 May 1966. The reason was not hard to understand: Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, president of Pakistan, had made clear his opinion on the Six Points. He told the country that the purveyors of the Six Points would be dealt with in the language of weapons.

Ayub Khan was not the only individual who spotted a threat to Pakistan’s unity should the Six Points be acknowledged. His soon-to-be-out foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto challenged Mujib early in the year to a public debate at Dhaka’s Paltan Maidan on the Six Points. It was Tajuddin Ahmed who accepted the challenge on Mujib’s behalf. In the event, Bhutto did not turn up.

The Six-Point programme included the following:

1. Pakistan would have a federal structure of government based on spirit of the Lahore Resolution of 1940, with a parliament elected on the basis of universal adult franchise;

2. The central government would have authority only in defence and foreign affairs and all other subjects would be handled by the federating units of the state of Pakistan;

3. There would be two freely convertible currencies for the two wings of Pakistan or two separate reserve banks for the two regions of the country;

4. The power of taxation and revenue collection would be vested in the federating units;

5. There would be two separate accounts for foreign exchange reserves for the two wings of Pakistan;

6. East Pakistan would have a separate militia or paramilitary force as a measure of its security.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman planned to announce the Six Points at a conference of opposition political parties in Lahore in early February 1966. He was not permitted to do so by the other participants, including the chief of the Awami League at the time, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan. They found the plan too incendiary to be articulated. Rebuffed, Mujib announced the plan at a news conference in Lahore the following day, February 5, 1966.

Mujib’s move raised howls of protest all over Pakistan. The civil-military bureaucracy and politicians straddling both government and opposition circles were quick to dub the Six Points as a secessionist plot to dismember Pakistan. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s arrest in May 1966, followed by the 7 June strike, swiftly led to circumstances where the Pakistan government opted for repression in East Pakistan. Tofazzal Hossain Manik Mia, the respected editor of the Bangla daily Ittefaq, was arrested on June 16 over his support for the Six Points. The next day, a ban was clamped on his newspaper.

Events would move fast after June 1966. In January 1968, Mujib would be charged with conspiracy to break up Pakistan. The case, which would become notorious as the Agartala Conspiracy Case, would eventually be withdrawn under public pressure on February 22, 1969.

A day after his release, Mujib would be honoured as Bangabandhu (friend of Bengal) at a historic rally in Dhaka.

http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-237295

A leaf from history: Operation Searchlight

From Inpaper Magazine February 18, 2012

Crucial moments were drawing closer by March 1971. The postponed meeting between Yahya Khan and Shaikh Mujib was held on March 20 and 21. When the President and Awami League head were in a meeting on March 21, Bhutto landed in Dhaka. He could assess the gravity of the situation. Leading a team of 15 leaders he was straightaway driven to the President House. Bhutto knew that Yahya and Mujib had been meeting, thus, the contents of those meetings were first conveyed to him by Yahya.

Bhutto was told that a general understanding had taken place between Yahya and Mujib agreeing on immediate end to martial law; establishment of federal and provincial ministries; assemblies empowered to legislate; and East Pakistan granted more provincial autonomy. According to the agreement, Yahya Khan was to continue as president for the time being and a coalition cabinet would be formed comprising all political parities.

It was also agreed that the power at the Centre would not be immediately transferred but the powers to the provinces would be delegated to the majority party of the respective province and martial law would be lifted on the day provincial cabinets took oath. These points, in fact, were to form the basis of the future constitution.

A draft statement covering all these points was also prepared for making public and was released to the Press in the evening by the official news agency. But after a couple of hours, the news agency withdrew the statement with the advice that no substitute would follow.

It later transpired that when the draft was shown to Bhutto, he disagreed saying that lifting of martial law would create a vacuum nullifying the proposed constitutional structure. He emphasised that to avoid that lacuna the approval of the constitution should bear the support of members of the assemblies of both wings.

On March 22, the three —Yahya, Mujib and Bhutto — met, but that proved very unfortunate. At this meeting Bhutto said that his party was examining various clauses of the agreement prepared by Mujib and agreed by Yahya. The same evening a crucial development took place which was an indicator to what may happen in the next few days or hours.

Shaikh Mujib and his confidant, Tajuddin Ahmad, met Yhaya Khan without any previous schedule. At this meeting Mujib in clear terms rejected the proposal of a coalition cabinet insisting that he being the leader of the majority would not take other parties on board. Mujib and Tajuddin thought that to defuse the situation, power should be transferred to both wings.

At the same time, Dr Kamal Hussain, a lawyer and activist of the Awami League, who later became the law minister in Shaikh Mujib’s government, met aides of Yahya and presented a draft constitution prepared by the Awami League experts. In the background of the history of constitution making, this draft was a formal announcement of granting a separate constitutional status or making Pakistan a country with two constitutions. Kamal Husain insisted that the draft be announced in the form of a proclamation within two days. There was no immediate response but it made clear what was to follow.

A day later, Pakistan Day was to be celebrated to mark the adoption of the Lahore Resolution. On the eve of March 23 Mujib announced that it would be observed as Resistance Day. The day began with the hoisting of the then Bangladesh flag over the house of Shaikh Mujib. Armed processions were taken out in Dhaka and other cities. Mujib went to every building where the Bangladesh flag was being unfurled. On one occasion Mujib was reported as saying that a new country had emerged on the map of the world.

Disturbances had taken over East Pakistan. Reports of arson, looting and killing were pouring in from all corners. What measures had been planned to face the new situation were not known to the people. President Yhaya left for Karachi in the afternoon. Bhutto had also sent some of the members of his team to Karachi, himself staying behind with Ghulam Mustafa Khar and J A Rahim. Bhutto was told that the meeting between Khar and Mujib was of no use.

Mujib announced another protest day for March 26 — the day Bhutto and his party’s men had booked their seats for Karachi. Most of the West Pakistani leaders were staying at a hotel. Soon they saw a huge crowd outside shouting pro-Bangla slogans. The leaders saw Dhaka in flames. Tanks were rolling on the roads and the thud of firing could be heard all over.

Tikka Khan’s Operation Searchlight had begun.

https://www.dawn.com/news/696561

A leaf from history: After Operation Searchlight

From Inpaper Magazine March 03, 2012

Soon after the military operation ‘Searchlight’ began in former East Pakistan on March 25, 1971, the uprising became the subject of discussion all over the world. Chained by censorship, West Pakistan newspapers did not give a single word to their readers about what was happening in the Eastern wing; hence only foreign news radio was heard and believed. BBC’s were the most popular broadcasts.

March and April saw the worst. Roads were literally littered with garbage and bodies. The latter included Bengalis and non-Bengalis, Muslims and Hindus, without discrimination. In the absence of evidence it is still a bitter controversy as to who did most of the killing. The estimate of deaths swing between 300,000 to three million.

Reports say that some 220,000 girls and women were raped and after gaining independence a UN team was sent to help them. Some foreign agencies reported that more than 10 million refugees fled to India. Confirmed reports could not be obtained owing to the fact that in the absence of independent sources the information remained murky at best. However, most writers believe that there were over three million deaths between March 1971 and December 1971.

Repression by the Pakistan armed forces had begun from the moment the announcement of establishing Bangladesh was made. Due to the situation, the country faced acute shortage of food and medicines. Atrocities continued making headlines in the international media. Many reported ghastly nature of killings; some said that many women were mutilated before they were killed.

Mukti Bahini activists helped by India did not hide their identity in committing inhuman deeds either, but they were quickly countered by a number of civilian volunteer groups who were armed by the army to get organised and stage encounters. History will record with disgust the role of such organisations which undertook arson, looting and dishonouring not only of pro-Awami League people but also of innocent Bengalis.

They included members and supporters of the right-wing parties, led by Jamat-i-Islami. They had been routed by Awami League in 1970 elections and now wanted to take full revenge by calling the AL anti-Islam. The most active were three armed groups, Al Shams, Al Badar and the Razakar. These and other similar groups were accused of working as thunder squads, looting and disgracing Bengalis who were labelled as non-Muslim. Reports said that before action, these groups used to prepare plans and lists of those who were to be taken to task.

Bengali nationalist armed groups responded by unleashing their fury on Beharis and other non-Bengalis.

It is hard to understand why Yahya Khan seemed so confident about the success of his Operation Searchlight and thought that peace had been restored as thousands succumbed to death. In the beginning of April 1971 he was told by his cronies that the situation had improved.

Generals Hamid, M Pirzada, Omar and Rao Farman Ali even told him that the issue of East Pakistan had been resolved.

Banking on their advice former judge Justice Corneillius was asked to prepare a constitution for the country which should grant maximum provincial autonomy to East Pakistan while remaining a part of Pakistan. In fact the situation had gone contrary to all that. Politicking continued in West Pakistan. Bhutto kept meeting Yahya and his men, however Yahya appeared to be losing the reins. On May 24, at a press conference in Karachi, Yahya painted a very gloomy picture of the country’s affairs and said that the economy had fallen to the lowest ebb.

His answers to newsmen were irrelevant and sometimes off the subject.

His approach towards the East Pakistan crisis seemed to have changed, and he appeared to evolve some positive solution. What made Yahya Khan change his stance is anybody’s guess, but on June 28, he announced the appointment of a team of experts to form a constitution and pledged that transfer of power would take place in four months. He had the misconception that holding by-elections and making the Assembly functional would cool down the people.

While Mujib languished in Mianwali jail, Bhutto continued to meet Yahya. He visited Iran and wanted to visit Afghanistan with the aim of impressing upon Yahya that he was still popular with these countries. However during his visit to Iran Bhutto gave an interview to BBC in which he said that the crisis had not risen due to Mujib, but then quickly denied having said that. Perhaps he had second thoughts leading him to a new proposition.

https://www.dawn.com/news/699975

Dec 16, 1971: any lessons learned?

Ayaz Amir December 16, 2005

IF we had drawn any lessons from the events of 1971, we would have forsworn military rule forever, indeed consigned the very memory of coups d’etat to a never-to-be-opened hall of national shame.

For it was military rule and the legacy of folly it accumulated which led, almost inexorably, to the tragedy of 1971: dismemberment of Pakistan and the humiliating surrender of our forces in the east.

We have done nothing of the sort. Far from forgetting military rule, we have almost embraced it as a national way of life. After ‘71 Pakistan’s brief experiment with elective democracy (although much mangled by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) was snuffed out in 1977, leading to the long night of Zia’s dictatorship, whose consequences we have still not outlived. And if that wasn’t enough, there was another coup in 1999 from whose shadows the nation has yet to emerge.

Indeed, in one of those ironies in which history abounds, the loss of East Pakistan, far from weakening the spirit of militarism, as ideally it should have, went about strengthening it. Although the army, the bureaucracy and Punjab all conspired to give East Pakistan a rough deal — treating it little better than a colony — the people of East Pakistan brought noise and colour to Pakistani politics.

Punjab’s forte was, perhaps still is, bending the knee before the status quo. That is why Punjab has welcomed every conqueror and, in our own day, paid homage to every tinpot dictator. Bengal, west and east, always has had a streak of anarchy about it. Small wonder if oratory and a flair for agitation have been hallmarks of the Bengali political character. This was good for us while united Pakistan lasted because Punjab on the one hand and Urdu-language chauvinism on the other were leavened by East Pakistani turbulence. We were the richer for this balance and mix.

There were no surprises in West Pakistan largely acquiescing in Ayub’s dictatorship. Like we have a Q-League now, we had a Convention League then and like the Q-League, in keeping with Punjab’s famous temperament, draws most of its support from Punjab, the Convention League drew most of its support from West Pakistan. Conversely, what there was of an opposition drew most of its strength and fire from East Pakistan. It is sobering to remember that in the 1965 National Assembly there were only two opposition members from the whole of West Pakistan, Hasan A. Shaikh from Karachi and Mian Arif Iftikhar from Kasur-Lahore.

East Pakistan gone — we saw to it that it went — clamping military rule on the country and maintaining it has become so much easier. The present military order has been around for six years (and a bit more) and although its achievements are more impressive on paper than in reality, it sits comfortably in the saddle largely because there is not a spark of life in the opposition.

Oh, if this had been united Pakistan, what sounds of commotion and turbulence would have come from Dhaka. We can only indulge in nostalgia now because given the political class we are left with, there is nothing much to expect of it.

I have mentioned this before. I seek indulgence for repeating it (for the last time). On his way to Shimla for talks with Mrs Gandhi in 1972, Bhutto called a meeting of PPP assembly members (national and provincial) in Lahore to sound them out on their views. When the discussion got a bit long, my father, also an MNA, said: ‘…why are you asking these people? Mrs Gandhi can come at the head of her tanks and they will stand in line to receive her. So do what you have to and rest assured that they will clap when you return.’ (Words to that effect of course.) He wasn’t far wrong.

Seeing the performance of the eastern command, and indeed the performance of the army on the western front (where too we lost territory to India) we should have cut military flab, reduced the amount of heavy brass, and made the military into a more fit and professional fighting force. I don’t know about the professionalism but there is more flab and heavy brass in the army today than ever before, with the system of privileges — officer housing societies and jobs for senior ranks after retirement — more entrenched than ever. Officers need housing. So do soldiers and NCOs. Are there any colonies for soldiers? As for officer colonies, we all know the money being made from them.

I suppose there is a logic to all this. The armies of Myanmar, Indonesia and the Philippines-to quote only three examples, although the list can be much longer — are (perish the thought) not meant to fight any external enemies. Their purpose is to maintain internal control. We seem well advanced down the same road.

Today the size of the combined military, Allah be praised, is almost three times what it was in 1971. As for the weight of brass — the number of generals, admirals and air marshals — they must be four or five times the number then. Who says we’ve made no progress?

There is nothing unique or strange about defeat itself. The strongest are not immune to it, defeat coming the way of the greatest captains of war and happening to the mightiest empires. But nations with life in them, in whose veins real blood flows, learn from their defeats. Why put it so modestly? Defeat is a great teacher, in its crucible resolve and fortitude being tempered. What’s our record?

After 1971, we should have left juvenility behind and entered the realm of adulthood. As a mark of growing up we should finally have discarded the myths and shibboleths accumulated since 1947 in the name of that fuzzy concept, the ideology of Pakistan. Far from doing anything of the kind, we are more confused, our hatreds more virulent. Pakistan must be one of the few countries in the world still agonizing over the meaning of its creation and birth, no other subject triggering such a frenzy of self-serving mythology. As for hatred, for all its other shortcomings, and there were many, pre-1971 Pakistan was not the citadel of religious intolerance it was to become later.

I suppose intolerance in the name of religion was always present beneath the surface. But it was prevented from flowering because of a larger national canvas. Geography shrinking with the loss of East Pakistan, some of our vision, our capacity for thinking large thoughts, was also lost. Defeat should have opened our eyes. Instead, it served to close them a bit more.

Dec 71 should have made us wiser about the United States. The Yahya junta was of course foolish and there was nothing in the world that could have rescued it from its chosen path of folly. But the Nixon White House added to its confusion by promising help it was in no position to deliver — offering illusions which Yahya and coterie took for reality.

But we learned nothing. In the 1980s we became foot soldiers in an American crusade against the Soviet Union. American strategic objectives secured, America walked away from Afghanistan. We were left holding the dishes. In 2001 we allowed ourselves to be recruited in another American crusade avowedly against “terror” but in reality for the higher interests of the American empire. This crusade was meant to secure peace. It has fomented strife and turbulence.

The surrender ceremony at Race Course Ground, Dhaka, on this day should have left a lasting impression on our minds about the need to respect constitutional norms because not respecting them, or rather not having any norms to respect, is what led to Pakistan’s December tragedy in the first place. But if we look back at the last 34 years, our most spectacular flouting, our most flagrant disrespect, has been reserved for the Constitution framed in the aftermath of the ‘71 war. This doesn’t say much for our learning capability.

https://www.dawn.com/news/1073092

1970 polls: When election results created a storm

From Inpaper Magazine January 08, 2012

Twenty-four political parties prepared to land in the election arena of 1970, held under Gen Yahya Khan’s martial law. Every party had its programme but two parties — the Awami League and the Pakistan People’s Party — were being eyed by the electorate as the winners. The presence of established ruling families posed a formidable force to be broken but the approach of the leadership of the said parties began setting directions of the election results at an early date.

On January 4, 1970, on his 42nd birthday Zulfikar Ali Bhutto launched his election campaign by addressing a public meeting at Nishtar Park, Karachi and in his forceful style he told the people that they were his ‘Round Table Conference’. In Punjab he started from Rawalpindi’s Liaquat Bagh. After Punjab he entered Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then NWFP).

In East Pakistan Shaikh Mujibur Rahman, through his emotional and livid speeches, spoke about the injustices meted out to Bengalis since the inception of Pakistan and told them that the only solution lay in his six-point programme. With a few skirmishes among various party supporters, electioneering continued. Nomination papers for the National Assembly were filed on October 14 and for provincial assemblies the following day.

While Mujib put up a few candidates in West Pakistan, Bhutto completely ignored East Pakistan. In the western wing 1,070 candidates filed papers for 138 NA seats while in the eastern wing there were 870 candidates contesting 162 seats. In East Pakistan the Awami League fielded 162 candidates out of which two seats were conceded — one of Nurul Amin for whom Mujib had asked the workers to allow a few votes for the grand old man and the other of Raja Tridevrai as a minority member.

However, in West Pakistan the People’s Party could not achieve a similar sweep as did Mujib in the East; the PPP bagged 81 seats against a total of 138 seats (62 from Punjab’s 82 seats, 18 of 27 seats from Sindh). The results showed the Awami League as the largest party without a seat from West Pakistan. Similar was the case with the PPP which had no seat in East Pakistan. This created a situation whereby Yahya Khan sent congratulatory messages to both the party leaders, but addressed Mujib as the future prime minister.

The result was more disquieting for Yahya Khan who had in a pre-poll assessment been told that no party could take a clear lead and there would be a coalition government which could be easily handled by Yahya from the top. With all pre-poll predictions gone wrong the rightists could manage only 37 seats in a house of 300.

A tormenting situation arose for Yahya. While Mujib sat in Dhaka discussing the future government’s priorities, Yahya saw himself in a quandary. He had pledged that the constitution would be prepared within 120 days or the assemblies would stand abolished; and now time was racing away. On December 17, 1970 Mujib said that no one could stop the creation of Bangladesh. Bhutto readily replied that no constitution could be framed, nor government run at the centre, without his party’s cooperation.

To find a solution Yahya visited Karachi on December 28 where among others he met Bhutto. No independent source disclosed what transpired at the meeting but the following day a proclamation was issued that the first session of the Assembly would be held at Dhaka. After the results the two leaders had taken a rigid stand on their viewpoints. Mujib wanted Dhaka to take a pivotal role and everyone who wanted to meet Mujib should come to Dhaka.

Before Yahya could make another move, Mujib addressed a public meeting at the Ramna Racecourse grounds on January 3, in which all elected members were sworn to accept no less than Bangladesh. Yahya wanted to break the impasse and arrived at Dhaka on January 12, 1971; he held in-depth talks with Mujib. When he returned to Karachi he said that Mujib would be the next prime minister but then he (Yahya) would not be there.

Yahya had something to discuss with Bhutto and called on him at Larkana during which Yahya advised Bhutto to visit Dhaka and talk to Mujib. As Yahya and Bhutto discussed the situation various options, including the formation of a coalition government with smaller parties came up for discussion. But as we know that was not to be.

https://www.dawn.com/news/686541/1970-polls-when-election-results-created-a-storm

A leaf from history: Advice that went down the drain

From Inpaper Magazine January 29, 2012

As February 1971 was drawing to a close, Yahya Khan became conscious that after undertaking the arduous exercise of holding the polls, he had failed to transfer power to a consensus civilian government. But he decided that it should not be the end of the ‘mission’. It could be sluggish but he would not allow himself to be cornered by two power-seekers, Mujibur Rahman in East and Z A Bhutto in West Pakistan. He decided to act. The dissolution of the federal cabinet was the next step on February 21.

The next day, he summoned a meeting of close aides at Rawalpindi, which was attended by the Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Abdul Hamid, all provincial governors and his Principal Staff Officer, Lt-Gen S G M Pirzada. From the very composition of the meeting the agenda and possible outcome became predictable. However, a report said that the participants, especially Governor Admiral Ahsan, were told in clear terms that if Mujib did not show flexibility on his six-point programme, the planned action should follow. For that purpose extra troops were promised.

Apparently there was no hope left for any change at a stage when the Bengali people only knew Joye Bangla (long live Bengal). East Pakistan’s Governor Ahsan, a British army veteran and a former military secretary to Quaid-i-Azam, met Mujib next. Though the meeting remained futile, it shook Mujib. After the meeting he appeared depressed and speechless. Perhaps Ahsan illustrated what army action meant. He could foresee destruction all around.

While leaders in West Pakistan were making various predictions, the situation in East Pakistan was very disconsolate. Mujib feared the worst and had expressed some kind of flexibility but the Awami League (AL) activists were overzealous and hoped that with street power they would cow down Islamabad. They continued working on the proposed constitution and, showing the federal government their roadmap, announced the draft constitution on February 27.

Unlike previous constitutions prepared in West Pakistan, the AL draft was almost new in all respects. For instance, the name of the country was suggested as Federal Republic of Pakistan; two capitals Dhaka and Islamabad were named; East Pakistan was to be renamed as Bangladesh and the NWFP as Pakhtunistan; headquarters of the armed forces were to be shifted to Dhaka; departments of foreign affairs, defence and currency were to stay with Centre while the rest with the provinces, and the Centre would take a share from provincial taxes. The draft constitution was striking but no political leader openly reacted to it.

Instead, it was all doom and gloom. On February 28, Bhutto reiterated his decision of not attending the NA session if a meeting between him and Mujib was not held before the session; he said he would launch a movement from Khyber to Karachi. However, the same day Mujib told businessmen at Dhaka that reasonable recommendations would be accepted, but did not mention Bhutto’s objection to his six-point programme.

The next morning no earthshaking change was expected, but it appeared that some unsolicited happening was approaching. On March 1, Yahya announced postponement of the National Assembly session indefinitely. This shocked East Pakistanis. Dhaka turned into a frenzied mob showing anguish and hatred. Even Shaikh Mujib’s press conference at his Dhanmondi residence had become impossible as angry Awami League workers besieged the venue. The event was marked by pro-Bangladesh slogans. When the press conference was over the town had already been taken over by protesters who spared nothing. Arson, looting and all kinds of lawlessness ruled the city.

What Yahya aimed at was not clear as the communication credibility had been lost in the polarisation; yet it is said that Yahya had a feeling that in the case of an army action in the province, Admiral Ahsan might not be very effective as he was a proven friend of Mujib’s. Perhaps this was not so. Anyhow, the admiral was replaced by General Yaqoob Ali Khan, who had already served in the eastern wing. Immediately after taking over Gen Yaqoob suggested that Yahya settle things politically and not militarily. Perhaps he was the first army general who had thought of settling political issues in their right perspective.

Paradoxically, this very earnest advice went down the drain. The suggestion was rejected, perhaps with condescension. Gen Yaqoob found an honourable escape and quit the job on March 4, before it became too rowdy. The next day also proved unfortunate as Begali radicals took to the streets shattering the town. Similar processions were reported from other parts of the province. They were also joined by Maulana Bhashani and Prof Muzaffar Ahmed’s groups known for their separatist intentions.

https://www.dawn.com/news/691639/a-leaf-from-history-advice-that-went-down-the-drain