Myth-busting the Bangladesh war of 1971

An author discusses her new book about the historical narratives of the 1971 civil war that broke up East Pakistan.

by

Sarmila Bose

Sarmila Bose is Senior Research Associate, Centre for International Studies, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford.

Guerilla fighters of the Mukti Bahini prepare to bayonet men who allegedly collaborated with the Pakistani army during East Pakistan’s fight to become the independent state of Bangladesh [GALLO/GETTY]

Last month, Al Jazeera published an article entitled Book, film greeted with fury among Bengalis. Here, Sarmila Bose, author of Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War, responds to the criticism levelled at her work.

In all the excitement about the “Arab spring” it is instructive to remember the 1971 war in South Asia. Then too there was a military regime in Pakistan, easily identified as the “baddies” –  and a popular uprising in its rebellious Eastern province, where Bengali nationalists were reported to be peacefully seeking freedom, democracy and human rights.

When the regime used military force to crush the rebellion in East Pakistan, India intervened like a knight to the rescue, resulting in the defeat of the bad guys, victory for the good guys and the independence of Bangladesh… Or so the story went for forty years. I grew up with it in Calcutta. It was widely repeated in the international press.

Several years ago I decided to chronicle a number of incidents of the 1971 war in-depth. I observed that many Bangladeshis were aggrieved that the world seemed to have forgotten the terrible trauma of the birth of their nation. Given the scale of the suffering, that lack of memory certainly appeared to be unfair, but there did not seem to be many detailed studies of the war – without which the world could not be expected to remember, or understand, what had happened in 1971.

My aim was to record as much as possible of what seemed to be a much-commented-on but poorly documented conflict – and to humanise it, so that the war could be depicted in terms of the people who were caught up in it, and not just faceless statistics. I hoped that the detailed documentation of what happened at the human level on the ground would help to shed some light on the conflict as a whole.

The principal tool of my study was memories. I read all available memoirs and reminiscences, in both English and Bengali. But I also embarked on extensive fieldwork, finding and talking to people who were present at many particular incidents, whether as participants, victims or eye-witnesses. Crucially, I wanted to hear the stories from multiple sources, including people on different sides of the war, so as to get as balanced and well-rounded a reconstruction as possible.

As soon as I started to do systematic research on the 1971 war, I found that there was a problem with the story which I had grown up believing: from the evidence that emanated from the memories of all sides at the ground level, significant parts of the “dominant narrative” seem not to have been true. Many “facts” had been exaggerated, fabricated, distorted or concealed. Many people in responsible positions had repeated unsupported assertions without a thought; some people seemed to know that the nationalist mythologies were false and yet had done nothing to inform the public. I had thought I would be chronicling the details of the story of 1971 with which I had been brought up, but I found instead that there was a different story to be told.

Product of research

My book Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War, the product of several years of fieldwork based research, has just been published (Hurst and Co. and Columbia University Press). It focuses on the bitter fratricidal war within the province of East Pakistan over a period of a little more than a year, rather than the open “hot” war between India and Pakistan towards the end. It brings together, for the first time, the memories of dozens of people from each side of the conflict who were present in East Pakistan during the war. It lets the available evidence tell the stories. It has been described as a work that “will set anew the terms of debate” about this war.

Even before anyone has had the chance to read it, Dead Reckoning has been attracting comment, some of it of a nature that according to an observer would make the very reception of my book a subject of “taboo studies”. “Myth-busting” works that undermine nationalist mythology, especially those that have gone unchallenged for several decades, are clearly not to be undertaken by the faint-hearted. The book has received gratifying praise from scholars and journalists who read the advance copies, but the word “courageous” cropped up with ominous frequency in many of the reviews. Some scholars praised my work in private; others told me to prepare for the flak that was bound to follow. One “myth-busting” scholar was glad my book was out at last, as I would now sweep up at the unpopularity stakes and she would get some respite after enduring several years of abuse.

Scholars and investigative journalists have an important role in “busting” politically partisan narratives. And yet, far too often we all fall for the seductive appeal of a simplistic “good versus evil” story, or fail to challenge victors’ histories.

So far the story of valiant rebels fighting oppressive dictators in the so-called “Arab spring” has had one significant blemish – the vicious sexual attack and attempted murder of CBS foreign correspondent Lara Logan by dozens of men celebrating the downfall of Hosni Mubarak in Tahrir Square in Cairo. It initially vanished from the headlines and has still not led to the kind of questioning of the representation of such conflicts that it should have generated. “Tahrir Square” became shorthand for freedom and democracy-loving people rising up against oppressive dictators.

People in other countries started to say they wanted their own “Tahrir Square”. Logan has given a brave and graphic account of what happened to her at the hands of those supposedly celebrating the fall of a dictator and the coming of freedom, democracy and human rights. Her life was saved by burqa-clad Egyptian women and she was rescued by soldiers. Her account endows “Tahrir Square” with an entirely different meaning.

It should caution us against assuming that all those opposing an oppressive regime are champions of non-violence, democracy or human rights. It should alert us to the complexities of political power struggles and civil war, and stop getting carried away by what we imagine is happening, or would like to happen, rather than what the evidence supports.

Such was the impact of the 1971 war on South Asians that the year has transformed into a shorthand for its particular symbolism: 1971, or ekattor, the number 71 in Bengali, has come to stand for a simple equation of a popular nationalist uprising presumed to embody liberal democratic values battling brutal repression by a military dictatorship. But was it really as simple as that? Over time, the victorious Bangladeshi nationalist side’s narrative of Pakistani villainy and Bengali victimhood became entrenched through unquestioned repetition.

The losing side of Pakistani nationalists had its own myth-making, comprising vast Indian plots. Pakistan had been carved out of the British Empire in India as a homeland for South Asia’s Muslims. It was a problematic idea from the start – a large proportion of Muslims chose to remain in secular and pluralistic India, for instance, and its two parts, West Pakistan and East Pakistan, were separated by a thousand miles of a hostile India. In 1971 the idea of Islam as the basis of nationhood came apart in South Asia along with the country of Pakistan, after a mere 23 years of existence. What went wrong? And what do the memories of those who were there reveal about the reality of that war?

The publication of Dead Reckoning has spoiled the day for those who had been peddling their respective nationalist mythologies undisturbed for so long. Careers have been built – in politics, media, academia and development – on a particular telling of the 1971 war. All the warring parties of 1971 remain relentlessly partisan in recounting the conflict. As the dominant narrative, which has gained currency around the world, is that of the victorious Bangladeshi nationalists and their Indian allies, they stand to lose the most in any unbiased appraisal. Unsurprisingly therefore, the protests from this section are the shrillest.

Mixed reaction

The reaction to the publication of Dead Reckoning by those who feel threatened by it has followed a predictable path. First, there has been an attempt to damn the book before it was even available. Apart from random rants on the internet – which provides opportunity for anyone to rail against anything – reports have been written by people who haven’t read the book, citing other people who also haven’t read the book. The reason for this may be summed up as the well-founded fear of “knowledge is power”.

When people read the book they will be far better informed as to what really happened in 1971. Hence the desperate attempt by those who have been spinning their particular yarns for so long to try to smear the book before anyone gets the chance to read it. A few people also seem to be trying to laud the book before reading it, an equally meaningless exercise. These commentaries are easy to dismiss: clearly, those who haven’t read the book have nothing of value to say about it.

Second, detractors of the book claim that it exonerates the military from atrocities committed in East Pakistan in 1971. In reality the book details over several chapters many cases of atrocities committed by the regime’s forces, so anyone who says it excuses the military’s brutalities is clearly lying. The question is – why are they lying about something that will easily be found out as soon as people start reading the book? The answer to this question is more complex than it might seem. Of course the detractors hope that by making such claims they will stop people from reading the book.

Part of the answer lies also in that the book corrects some of the absurd exaggerations about the army’s actions with which Bangladeshi nationalists had happily embellished their stories of “villainous” Pakistanis for all these years. But an important reason for falsely claiming that the book exonerates the military is to distract attention from the fact that it also chronicles the brutalities by their own side, committed in the name of Bengali nationalism. The nature and scale of atrocities committed by the “nationalist” side had been edited out of the dominant narrative. Its discovery spoils the “villains versus innocents” spin of Bangladeshi nationalist mythology.

A key question about the “controversy” over Dead Reckoning is why this book is stirring such passions when other works do not. One reason for this is that there are precious few studies of the 1971 war based on dispassionate research. This is the first book-length study that reconstructs the violence of the war at the ground-level, utilising multiple memories from all sides of the conflict.

Two eminent US historians, Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, published the only research-based study of the war at the diplomatic and policy level twenty years ago. Their excellent book, War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh (University of California Press, 1990), challenged the dominant narrative, but their work does not seem to be known among the general public as much as within academia.

However, a crucial reason for the special impact of Dead Reckoning has to do with who the author is. I am a Bengali, from a nationalist family in India. As Indians and Bengalis our sympathies had been firmly with the liberation struggle in Bangladesh in 1971. The dominant narrative of the 1971 war is the story as told by “my side”, as it were. My reporting of what I actually found through my research, rather than unquestioningly repeating the partisan narrative or continuing the conspiracy of silence over uncomfortable truths, is thus taken as a “betrayal” by those who have profited for so long from mythologising the history of 1971.

It is important to note that not all South Asians subscribe to the myth-making. One eminent Indian journalist thought that my “courage, disregard for orthodoxy and meticulous research” in writing Dead Reckoning made me “the enfant terrible of Indian historians”. A senior Bangladeshi scholar has found it “fitting that someone with Sarmila’s links with Bengali nationalism should demonstrate that political values cannot be furthered by distorting history.”

South Asians are prone to conjuring up all manner of conspiracy theories when faced with unpleasant realities, but those looking for one for Dead Reckoning are at a loss, as the only explanation for what it contains is that it reconstructs what really happened on the basis of available evidence.

The process of dismantling entrenched nationalist mythologies can be painful for those who have much vested in them, but the passions stirred by the publication of Dead Reckoning has sparked the debate that the 1971 war badly needed – and set on the right course the discussion of this bitter and brutal fratricidal war that split the only homeland created for Muslims in the modern world.

Sarmila Bose is Senior Research Fellow in the Politics of South Asia at the University of Oxford. She was a journalist in India for many years. She earned her degrees at Bryn Mawr College (History) and Harvard University (MPA and PhD in Political Economy and Government.)

Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War is published by C. Hurst and Co. and Columbia University Press.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

Source: Al Jazeera

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/05/20115983958114219.html

Controversial book accuses Bengalis of 1971 war crimes

• 16 June 2011
• From the sectionSouth Asia

Forty years ago Bangladesh won its independence from Pakistan in a short but brutal civil war in which it was claimed as many as three million people could have died. A book released to coincide with the anniversary has reached some highly controversial conclusions as the BBC’s Alastair Lawson has discovered.

Sarmila Bose’s book, Dead Reckoning, says that one of the bloodiest wars in the past half-century has been “dominated by the narrative of the victorious side” – Bangladeshi nationalists who won independence in 1971 from Pakistan.

She writes that both sides in the conflict “are still imprisoned by wartime partisan myths”.

The introduction of her book does not exonerate Pakistani troops from committing atrocities during Bangladesh’s bloody struggle for freedom.

But in what is certain to be viewed in Bangladesh as an extremely controversial conclusion, it says Bengalis – fighting for and against independence – also committed “appalling atrocities”.

Dr Bose, a senior research fellow at Oxford University – and a former BBC presenter – says the Pakistani army has been “demonised” by the pro-liberation side and accused of “monstrous actions regardless of the evidence”, while Bengali people have been depicted as “victims”.

“This has led to a tendency to deny, minimise or justify violence and brutalities perpetrated by pro-liberation Bengalis,” she says.

Already Bangladeshi academics at home and abroad are lining up to attack her book. One, the Dhaka and New York based writer Naeem Mohaiemen, told the BBC that she was guilty of “pushing her conclusions to an extreme” by arguing that the war was fought between two equally violent sides, “with the Pakistan army using only justified and temperate amounts of retaliatory force”.

He has accused her of lacking sufficient curiosity to unpack the more complex issues behind 1971, “such as why the killings began, why the Pakistan state behaved so brutally and why Bengalis reacted violently”.

Nevertheless, the book is one of the first by a Western author to subject the war to thorough and independent scrutiny.

Dr Bose went through published documentary evidence, travelled to remote areas of Bangladesh to interview elderly villagers and journeyed to Pakistan to question retired army officers.

‘Shocking bestiality’

Her book says the Bengali nationalist rebellion in what was then East Pakistan “turned into xenophobic violence against non-Bengalis” especially against West Pakistanis and mainly Urdu-speaking people who migrated to East Pakistan from India at the time of partition who were known as Biharis.

“In the ethnic violence unleashed in the name of Bengali nationalism, non-Bengali men, women and children were slaughtered,” Dr Bose says, arguing such atrocities took place in the towns of Chittagong, Khulna, Santahar and Jessore during and after the 10-month war.

“Non-Bengali victims of ethnic killings by Bengalis numbered hundreds or even thousands per incident… men, women and children were massacred on the basis of ethnicity and the killings were executed with shocking bestiality.”

Some of the worst brutalities were among Bengalis themselves, Dr Bose says, between those who were defending the unity of Pakistan and those who were fighting for the liberation of Bangladesh.

While “the killing of pro-liberation professionals by pro-regime death squads in the dying days of the war stands out as one of the worst crimes of the conflict… brutalisation and elimination of those with a different political viewpoint seemed to be the hallmark of nationalist Bengalis too”.

There is clear evidence, Dr Bose says, of the violence suffered by “non-Bengali victims of Bengali ethnic hatred”.

“Of the corpses reported littering the land and clogging up the rivers, many would have been Bihari… as Bengali mobs appear to have killed non-Bengalis indiscriminately while the Pakistani army appeared to target adult Bengali men.”

In one notorious incident examined by the author in the south-western town of Khulna on 28 March 1971, Bengalis “slaughtered” large numbers of Biharis in the town’s jute mills.

‘Gigantic rumour’

Dr Bose also examines the widely reported suggestion that three million Bengalis were killed by the Pakistani army. These figures are sacrosanct in Bangladesh, where the overwhelming majority of people continue to honour and respect those who died in the liberation struggle.

Describing the three million figure as a “gigantic rumour”, she says it is “not based on any accounting or survey on the ground”.

“None of the popular assertions of three million Bengalis allegedly killed by the [Pakistani] army cites any official report,” she says.

“Claims of the dead in various incidents wildly exceeding anything that can be reasonably supported by evidence on the ground – ‘killing fields’ and ‘mass graves’ were claimed to be everywhere, but none was forensically exhumed and examined in a transparent manner.”

Her conclusion over how many died has been roundly rejected by Mr Mohaiemen, who pointed out that Bangladeshis have themselves publicly dissected the problem of “numbers”, going back to 1972 when the three million number was first cited.

“Researchers like Zunaid Kazi documented 12 different media estimates of death tolls. Thus, the implied ‘hook’ of Dr Bose’s book, a claim to being the ‘first’ to dissect the death toll, rings hollow and is self-promotional.

“In any case, whether the death toll was three million or 300,000, does that make it any less of a genocide? That appears to be her intellectually indefensible conclusion.”

Dr Bose does not ignore atrocities carried out by Pakistan and its supporters – her book has several chapters on this subject – concluding its army committed political and extrajudicial killings that in some cases were “genocidal”.

She says: “Ultimately neither the numbers nor the labels matter. What matters is the nature of the conflict, which was fundamentally a complex and violent struggle for power among several different parties with a terrible human toll.”

The Bangladeshi government has so far not commented on her book – but the country’s attitude towards those who express dissenting views about the 1971 war was clearly seen in April when a film about a woman’s love affair with a Pakistani soldier during the conflict was speedily withdrawn amid suggestions it distorted history.

The Indian edition of Sarmila Bose’s book is being published by Hachette India and is due to be released in mid-June. The book is published by C Hurst and Co in the UK and by Columbia University Press in the US.

EXTRACT FROM SARMILA BOSE’S DEAD RECKONING

In the terrible violence of a fratricidal war, the victims were from every ethnic and religious group and from both sides of the political divide and so were the perpetrators…

Both sides had legitimate political arguments and their idealistic followers, along with those who indulged in opportunism, expediency and inhumanity.

Many Bengalis – supposed to be fighting for freedom and dignity – committed appalling atrocities.

And many Pakistani army officers, carrying out a military action against a political rebellion, turned out to be fine men doing their best to fight an unconventional war within the conventions of warfare…

A long-standing theme is the state of denial in Pakistan: A refusal to confront what really happened in East Pakistan.

However the study revealed a greater state of denial in Bangladesh.

NAEEM MOHAIEMEN’S RIPOSTE

The bizarre hypothesis of Sarmila Bose’s book is that Pakistani army officers are the most objective source to establish their own innocence.

In fact the interviewee list in her book reveals a distinct selection bias. In Pakistan, she interviewed 30 Pakistani army officers, and three civilians.

In addition four Pakistani army officers are listed as not agreeing to give interviews. So her pool of “expert knowledge” on the Pakistani army’s actions failed to include anyone from Pakistan who has publicly said there was a genocide.

She also relies heavily on Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, which was done by the post-1971 Pakistan government with the intention of white-washing the war.

Dr Bose takes some gaps in the popular narrative, and then pushes it to an extreme to argue that 1971 was a war between two equally violent sides, with the Pakistan army using only justified and temperate amounts of retaliatory force.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13417170

Flashback: The Martial Law of 1958

FROM INPAPERMAGAZINE — PUBLISHED OCT 08, 2011 11:16PM

Political pundits believe in the zodiac movements. Some of them attach special significance to the month of October. October 1958 and 1999 brought radical changes in Pakistan’s political setup; each move was aimed at driving democracy out. It has yet to be established if the 1958 martial law was a necessity, an abrupt decision or a predetermined action.

The proponents of military action had upheld it, calling Ayub Khan a saviour. A new system was evolved which replaced the federal parliamentary system leading to absolute dictatorship. With unfair intentions he took every step which consolidated his grip on power.

After 11 years of independence, Pakistan was going through experiments in governance, with no constitution, no democracy. The fallout of this cast deep influences on the years to come. That Ayub Khan was an ambitious person is evident from his own writings. In his autobiography, Friends, not masters, he launched a tirade of accusations against politicians. In his diary of May 22, 1958, Ayub Khan claimed that politicians were self-centred and greedy. They wanted to reach the corridors of power by any means and then begin looting without thinking about the future of the country; that unscrupulous politicians ‘… would not even hesitate to demolish the institution of Army.’

It became obvious in the beginning of 1958 that Ayub Khan had waited for an opportune time to strike. The political conditions in East Pakistan provided him the appropriate pretext and he began finalising his plans with his colleagues.

Ayub Khan had reached superannuation, and defence minister Ayub Khuhro had to recommend for extension of his service. Ayub pressed Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon for the recommendation, although the final authority of granting extension rested with President General Iskander Mirza. Noon, under pressure from President’s House got the recommendation, and on June 9, 1958 Ayub Khan was granted the extension. This was all he needed to translate his designs into reality.

Ayub met his colleagues regularly till Sept ember 25, 1958 to discuss the country’s security and economic situation. At every meeting he expressed dismay over the politicians’ role and termed it a conspiracy to derail the economy. He added that there was a feeling among the people that while witnessing such a situation, he and the army were failing in their duties.

Ayub Khan continued his visits to garrisons. On September 20, a government order banned army-like uniforms for political workers. The order became law two days later. Khan Abdul Qayoom of the Muslim League decided to defy this order on September 23. He arrived at Karachi city station to show his disregard for the law.

Here a scuffle took place between the police and the Muslim League workers. At that time Ayub Khan was in Hunza where he was informed of this by Yahya Khan.

From September 25, 1958 began the movement of army units. President’s House (presently Governor’s House, Karachi) was the centre of all political manoeuvring, where Iskander Mirza along with Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon and his cronies were drawing new lines in the sand as it were.

Karachi had a permanent camp of two brigades — an infantry and an artillery, but one more infantry brigade was called in from Quetta to camp at Jungshahi, a short distance from Karachi. The political situation was hardly conducive due to fierce inter-party differences. The fight was tri-partite — Krishak Saramak, Awami League and Muslim League. This was what Ayub Khan wanted.

On October 2, 1958, Prime Minister Noon made a last attempt to bring some kind of rapprochement but failed. He had already announced the next election for February, 1959. Every politician was trying his best to book a berth in the caretaker cabinet and many were in Karachi. The PM wanted resignations of all ministers before a new cabinet was sworn in. They all did so and a new cabinet was announced on the evening of October 7. This cabinet included Firoz Khan Noon, Syed Amjad Ali, Hamidul Haq Chaudhry, Ayub Khuhro, Sardar Abdur Rasheed, Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur, Haji Maula Bakhsh Soomro, A. K. Data, Haji Mahfoozul Haq, Mian Jaffar Shah, Abdul Aleem, Sardar Amir Adam, Besant Kumar Das and Rameezuddin.

But President Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan had already spoken about the future setup of Pakistan’s administration and arrived at some decisions. Mirza had proposed that assemblies be prorogued, constitution be abrogated, a ban be imposed on political activities and political parties, and while Ayub Khan should take over as Chief Martial Law administrator, he (Mirza) should continue as President.

On October 7, a lavish reception at the President’s House was arranged. While all guests were enjoying their drinks, Iskander Mirza seemed impatient. At eight o’clock he went inside. The army units awaiting orders outside Karachi began moving. They captured all sensitive points and buildings including Radio Pakistan, Telephone and Telegraph building, Karachi Port, airport, etc., and also blocked important thoroughfares. The guests at the reception knew nothing about what was happening outside.

After some time Ayub Khan arrived at the President’s House. Both discussed the arrangement threadbare but Mirza was overwhelmed by Ayub Khan who agreed that while Ayub Khan would handle all the affairs, Mirza would continue as nominal head of the state.

At 10:30pm a proclamation abrogating the constitution, banning all political parties and activities was signed by Mirza and handed over to Ayub Khan. It is said that Ayub Khan had already drafted the proclamation and brought it with him. Press releases were ready and sent to newspapers and agencies. The radio was to broadcast it in its 06:00am bulletin the next day.

When the people woke up they found the civilian setup gone. Owing to strict censorship no report about the actual happening could be known. I was in Hyderabad working for a Sindhi newspaper and remember that on the morning of October 8, 1958,  the post we got had been opened. That was my first experience of censorship. But more tantalising was the problem of how to bring out the newspaper. What to print and what not.

The information department, acting on behalf of the federal government, was reminding us from time to time that since martial law had been promulgated there was a complete ban on political activity, and that there should be no report flouting the ML regulations. We found refuge in crime reports and extended socio-economic issues — that too under censorship.

From that day on, martial law orders began pouring in. Punishments were announced for selling stale food, hoarding of essential commodities and even for traffic offences. Price lists were issued by the ML authorities declaring punishments for overcharging. Khan Abdul Qayoom, who wanted to violate government orders on the uniform issue was in Hyderabad with another Muslim League leader, Qazi Akbar, who sent Khan to Abbottabad in a truck camouflaged with grass. The Martial Law authorities continued to make inroads in all departments — from sanitation to road building. One day Brigadier Tikka Khan, who later became Commander-in-Chief, ordered that Sindhi should not be taught in schools as the children could not learn many languages at one time. For many years to follow no resentment came over the order.

After a few days in Karachi and deputing some of his confidantes, Ayub Khan went to Dhaka where he reviewed the system by appointing Martial Law officials. He came back on the 15th. Ayub had already decided to get rid of Mirza. On the 24th he also added the office of the prime minister to his cadre, and appointed a 12-member council of ministers which included eight civilian and four army generals: himself, General Azam Khan, General Khalid Shaikh and General Burki. The civilians included the young lawyer, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had just established his office in Karachi.

On Oct 27 Ayub decided to bid farewell to Mirza. Three generals, Burki, Azam and Khalid Shaikh, spoke to Mirza who was told that he must quit. Mirza understood the whole thing. He was asked where he wished to go, he cited London. But since at that time no flight was available, Mirza and his wife were sent to Quetta. After overnight stay there, both were given a Viscount plane which took them to London bringing an end to a chapter of the early history of Pakistan.

https://www.dawn.com/news/664894/flashback-the-martial-law-of-1958

Power and empowerment

MANZOOR CHANDIO — PUBLISHED JUN 21, 2015 07:01AM

Every time a democratic government has been overthrown, local government has been used to create an illusion of power being transferred to the grassroots

With local government a key priority, President Gen Pervez Musharraf chairs a meeting on the local government system

King James II might not have imagined that the municipal system he had exported to India in 1687 for handling civic issues such as cleanliness, water supply and sanitation would be used four centuries later by Pakistani dictators seeking legitimacy and popular support.

Through a royal charter issued on Dec 30, 1687, the King had established the Corporation of Madras as the first municipal body. Members of this body used to be selected by the East India Company while the mayor was elected by the members. The municipal corporations of Calcutta and Bombay were formed in 1726, while the system of elected municipal institutions came into being in 1882. By 1935, hundreds of local body institutions were added across India.

While the municipal bodies were not democratic in nature, they were nonetheless aimed at handling civic issues. The basic functions of the local body system throughout the British era remained water supply, sewerage, sanitation, street lights, recreation, building regulations, controlling encroachment on public places, birth and marriage registrations, and issuance of death certificates.

After Partition, India improved the system, conducted regular elections and used the local body institutions to resolve basic everyday issues of the citizens. But in Pakistan, as with many other institutions established during the colonial period, local municipal bodies did not see any continuity after Partition. The local body system was effectively abandoned.

Worse, while local body systems in other parts of the world have served as a basis for grassroots governance, in Pakistan it has historically been used to reinforce power hierarchies and create perceptions of empowerment.

Ayub Khan’s Basic Democracy

The first ‘new’ local body system was created by General Muhammad Ayub Khan under the Basic Democracies Order-1959. He was of the view that democracy was as alien a concept to the Pakistani masses as the English language, and thus, it needed to start from a very basic level.

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This line of thought was first introduced by Iskandar Mirza, who believed that “overwhelmingly illiterate masses were bound to act foolishly. Having no training in democracy, they could not run democratic institutions, but needed a controlled democracy.” Thus began the concept of experimenting with democracy.

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In fact, this line of thought was first introduced by Iskandar Mirza, who believed that “overwhelmingly illiterate masses were bound to act foolishly. Having no training in democracy, they could not run democratic institutions, but needed a controlled democracy.”

Thus began the concept of experimenting with democracy, which later on became a readymade mantra for successive dictators.

Gen Ayub Khan introduced four tiers of local governance: union, taluka, district and divisional councils. Elected union councillors (80,000) were the “basic democrats” in this system; they were to elect the president, members of the National Assembly, as well as members of the provincial assemblies (East and West wings). The rest of the country had no right to direct voting.

Ayub Khan ensured that no opponent of his was elected as a basic democrat. A number of politicians were disqualified under the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO).

Going apolitical with Zia

The local body system remained inactive till 1979, when it was revived by General Ziaul Haq, again in a quest for legitimacy. Local body elections held by his regime empowered those traditional political families who had switched loyalties and pledged support for the regime.

As with Gen Ayub before him, the Zia government disqualified all candidates who were thought to be opposition loyalists (in this case the PPP) or even sympathisers. To achieve this task, Gen Zia set up a parallel election authority for conducting local body elections, called the Local Government Election Authority (LGEA). Headed by pro-regime judges and run by pliant officials, this body superseded the Election Commission of Pakistan.

Devolution of power with Musharraf

Upon assuming power, General Pervez Musharraf unveiled a seven-point agenda to ‘fix’ the country. A key component of his scheme was the devolution of power to the local level, but in doing so, the General bypassed the federating units who are the de jure creators of the federation.

Critical to Musharraf’s plan was the creation of a coterie of loyalists at the local level. The new system was to produce a large number of councillors, nazims and naib nazims, all of whom were only effectively answerable to the General. Accountability now rested not with people’s representatives, but with the General’s person; district governments were given immense powers to the extent that they could defy provincial governments.

The local body system was so important for Gen Musharraf that he visited 18 districts in the country’s four provinces to create his clique of loyalists. The general pledged unprecedented powers to local body institutions and he was true to his word: district administrations not only enjoyed more fiscal autonomy, but even subjects that constitutionally fell under provincial domains at the time — education and revenue, for example — were handed to the districts.

Members of the Councillors Alliance, Peshawar at a protest camp outside the district council’s hall

In the 2001 local body polls, most candidates went unopposed because the General’s opponents were discouraged from filing nomination papers for the polls; there were 20,076 councillors’ seats in 18 districts and about 2,041 seats were uncontested. As a result, 3,937 candidates won unopposed.

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All dictators tweaked the system as per the needs of their time. Their survival was tied to excluding the common man from governance and decision making, even though the illusion created by all dictators was that they were now including the common man in the processes of governance… The concentration of power at the higher echelons of the government led to authoritarianism that also suited the traditional ruling class.

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There were 5,734 seats for women and no one contested the election for 3,106 seats; some 1,710 women were elected unopposed. While Musharraf’s team argued that they actually wanted to empower women, labourers and peasants, in reality, 48pc of women’s seats remained uncontested in 2001 while 65.48pc of labour seats remained vacant.

The 2001 local body polls were held in an extremely restrictive atmosphere. In an attempt to bring only loyalists to power, the military government placed a ban on normal electoral activities. Candidates were given only 10 days for electioneering. No corner meetings were allowed, displaying banners and pasting wall posters were barred too. Even the use of loudspeakers was banned. It was not possible for candidates to go door-to-door for seeking votes.

Only handbills were allowed to be circulated among masses in a country with 60-70pc illiterate people. The voting process was so confusing that in some constituencies, the majority of votes cast were cancelled or rejected.

Another dynamic to emerge from the 2001 elections was that 90pc of the nazims, naib nazims and councillors came from traditional powerful political families. In practice, Gen Musharraf’s local government system had created fiefdoms for local landlords and influential people. Several district assemblies came into being, and money was doled out directly. Many misappropriated and misused funds, but there was no auditing and monitoring system to keep any checks on this.

Delaying democracy?

There is an American aphorism which says “bad politicians are sent to Washington by good people who don’t vote”. If we change this in the Pakistani context, it should read: “Bad politicians are sent to Islamabad by good people who manoeuvre votes.” The local body systems introduced by various dictators withered away as soon as these men were dislodged from power.

No one can deny the importance of the local body system because it is a tier of the government through which the day-to-day problems of the people relating to water supply, street light and cleanliness, maintenance of recreational places, issuing birth, marriage and death certificates, etc. can be solved at the local level.

But the local body systems introduced by military regimes were flawed and self-serving. They not only created political crises but also delayed the natural growth of this very important tier of the government. The biggest drawback of the systems introduced by Gen Ayub Khan, Gen Ziaul Haq and Gen Pervez Musharraf was that power never trickled down to the people because the military regimes wanted a unitary system of governance at the national level.

Ayub Khan hinged on the idea of ‘basic democracy’, Zia spearheaded an apolitical local body system and Musharraf harped on ‘devolution of power’ to a grassroots level. Ayub, Zia and Musharraf’s local body systems brought new loyalists, proxies and protégés of old established parties but by and large excluded the masses from the political process and administrative affairs. The so-called third tier of the government that the military rulers introduced headed for disastrous consequences because of this self-centric approach of the dictators.

All dictators tweaked the system as per the needs of their time. Their survival was tied to excluding the common man from governance and decision making, even though the illusion created by all dictators was that they were now including the common man in the processes of governance. Thus they used the local body electoral landscape to forestall the entry of protagonists to the power corridors.

The concentration of power at the higher echelons of the government led to authoritarianism that also suited the traditional ruling class. The entire political discourse was lost in a maze of structural problems because of absence of the primary tier of the government.

Past experiences in local governance have also taught us that there is a strong need to improve the relationship between provincial governments and local body institutions. The military rulers’ love for over-centralisation undermined the federating units. The military rulers gave provincial powers to the local administrations and local powers to the provincial governments. During the earlier phases, there were no clear spheres of administration because the local body systems imposed by the military rulers infringed on provincial powers.

For example, during the Musharraf regime, municipal administrations were given funds to initiate mega projects like expressways, flyovers and underpasses while the provincial governments were slammed for not providing funds for garbage collection, maintenance of public recreation facilities and urban planning. Meanwhile, the city administrations absolved themselves of their responsibilities and demanded provision of more funds instead of enhancing capacity to cope with rain-related and fire emergencies.

There is a need for clear demarcation between jurisdictions of provincial and local body administrations. This is necessary because the district nazims, who mostly were influential people of their areas, victimised their political opponents. The irony was that civic amenities like public parks and playgrounds, etc. remained in shambles while the nazims kept demanding that the powers of the chief minister — for example, controlling the police — be given to them. The districts and city nazims were so powerful administratively and resourceful financially that even former MNAs and MPAs preferred to be nazims.

After the landmark 18th Amendment, the local body system has become a provincial subject. Balochistan made history in 2013 by conducting the country’s first ever local body polls on party basis. It was also the first local body election held under a political dispensation. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa held polls on May 30 with additional features of village and neighbourhood councils. Sindh and Punjab have completed necessary legislation in this connection and are planning to hold LB elections by the end of this year.

But for these systems to work, the enforcement of an effective monitoring and accountability mechanism is imperative for the strong local body system. When power is devolved from the top echelons to the lower tiers of government, there must be check and balances to know how public money was spent. And this is not possible till the local communities are made strong and local administration is run from the local body institutions, instead of from the autaqs of waderas, pirs and mirs as has been the historical practice.

The much cherished objective of good governance can be achieved when the local body system is deeply rooted among village communities and adapted to modern needs. The third tier of the government can then be a platform to improve local politics, economy, culture and society at large.

The writer is a member of staff.

He tweets @manzoor_chandio

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, June 21st, 2015

http://www.dawn.com/news/1189382

Decentralization Reforms in Pakistan During Ayub and Zia Era

ayubs-basic-democracy-system

file:///C:/Users/asder1/Downloads/1501-5912-2-PB.pdf

The Constitution of 1962

With the aim of investigating the reasons of failure of the parliamentary system in Pakistan, and to make recommendations for a new constitution, Ayub Khan appointed a Constitution Commission under the supervision of Justice Shahab-ud-din. After a number of considerations, the Commission submitted its report on May 6, 1961. Ayub Khan was not satisfied with the report and had it processed through various committees. As a result the Constitution, which was promulgated on March 1, and enforced on June 8, 1962, was entirely different from the one recommended by the Shahab-ud-din Commission.

The Constitution of 1962 consisted of 250 Articles, which were divided into 12 Parts and three Schedules. It advocated presidential form of government with absolute powers vested in the President. The President was to be a Muslim not less than 35 years of age. The term of the President was for five years and nobody could hold the post for more than two consecutive terms. The President was the head of the state as well as the head of the Government. The President had the power to appoint Provincial Governors, Federal Ministers, Advocate General, Auditor General and Chairmen and Members of various administrative commissions. As the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, the appointment of the chiefs of the forces was also his duty.

The Constitution of 1962 provided for a unicameral legislature. The National Assembly was to consist of 156 members, including six women. The Eighth Amendment later increased this number to 218. Principle of parity was retained and seats were distributed equally between the two wings of the country. Principle of Basic Democracy was introduced for the first time in the country and the system of indirect elections was presented. Only 80,000 Basic Democrats were given the right to vote in the presidential elections. The Eighth Amendment later increased this number to 120,000.

Half of them were to be from the Eastern Wing, the rest from the Western Wing of the country.

According to the Constitution of 1962, the Executive was not separated from the Legislature. The President exercised veto power in the legislative affairs and could even veto a bill passed by the National Assembly with a two-third majority. He had the power to issue ordinances when the Assembly was not in session. The ordinance needed the approval of the National Assembly within 48 days of its first meeting or 108 days after its promulgation. However, if the President enforced emergency in the country, which according to the constitution was within his jurisdictions, then the ordinances needed no approval from the legislative body.

The President had the power to dissolve the National Assembly. Federal form of government was introduced in the country with most of the powers reserved for the Central Government. There was a federal list of subjects over which the provinces had no jurisdiction. Principle of One Unit for West Pakistan was maintained and the number of seats for Punjab was curtailed to 40 percent in the Western Wing for the initial five years. Provincial Governors were to enjoy the same position in the provinces, which the President was to enjoy in the center.

Islamic clauses were included in the Constitution. These could not be challenged in any court of law. The state was named the Republic of Pakistan, but the first amendment added the word “Islamic” to the name. The word “Islam” and not “Quran and Sunnah” was used in the Islamic clauses to give a liberal touch to the Constitution. The Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology was introduced whose job was to recommend to the government ways and means to enable Muslims to live their lives according to the teachings of Islam.

The Constitution of 1962 was a written Constitution upholding the fundamental rights of the citizens. Under the Constitution, the Judiciary had little independence and the appointment of the Chief Justices and Judges of the Supreme and High Courts was in the hands of the President. The President also had the power to remove a judge after an inquiry on misconduct or on the basis of mental or physical illness.

Both Urdu and Bengali were made the national languages of Pakistan and English was declared as the official language of the country for the first ten years. The Constitution was flexible in nature and could be amended by a two-third majority in the National Assembly and with the approval of the President. In its short life of seven years, eight amendments were made in the Constitution.

When Ayub Khan handed over power to Yahya Khan, Martial Law was enforced in the country and the Constitution was terminated on March 25, 1969.

This article was last updated on Sunday, June 01, 2003

The Constitution of 1962

Begum Shaista Ikramullah

Begum Shaista Ikramullah, the first female representative of the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (1947), Pakistan’s former Ambassador to Morocco, mother-in-law of Jordan’s Crown Prince, and niece of the great leader Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, was born on July 22, 1915, at Calcutta in the prominent Suhrawardy family of West Bengal. She was educated at Calcutta and London. During that period, strict purdah environment was prevalent in the Muslim society of India. Her mother was a traditionalist while her father, an eminent surgeon and politician, was a dynamic liberal who encouraged his daughter to study.

She got married at quite a young age. Her husband was a diplomat and served as Pakistan’s first Foreign Secretary. He encouraged her pursuit of modern education. She was the first Muslim woman to obtain a doctorate from the University of London in 1940. Her doctorate thesis “Development of the Urdu Novel and Short Story” was a critical survey of Urdu novel and short stories.

In 1945, Begum Ikramullah was asked by the Government of India to attend the Pacific Relations Conference. Quaid-i-Azam convinced Begum Ikramullah not to accept the offer, as he wanted her to go as the representative of the Muslim League and to speak on its behalf. Six weeks after the establishment of Pakistan, the Quaid asked Begum Ikramullah to go as a delegate to the United Nations.

Begum Shaista Ikramullah was one of the few Muslim women to have taken an active part in the Pakistan Movement. She was totally committed to the creation, and the building of Pakistan. The first legislature of Pakistan in 1947 had two women representatives, Begum Jehan Ara Shah Nawaz and Begum Shaista Ikramullah. Together with Begum Shah Nawaz, she made untiring efforts to get the “Islamic Personal Law of Shariah” approved. Her male counterparts in the legislature had certain reservations towards this law, which recognized women’s right to inherit property in accordance with the Islamic Law. The law also guaranteed all citizens; male and female alike, equal pay for equal work, equality of status and equal opportunities. After protests by women both inside and outside the legislature, the bill was finally approved in 1948, and became effective in 1951 when Pakistan adopted its first constitution. She continued to play an active role in Pakistani politics in the critical years preceding the Martial Law.

Begum Ikramullah served Pakistan as a delegate to various international conferences and United Nation’s Conferences. She also served as Ambassador to Morocco from 1964 to 1967.

In the late 80’s, Begum Ikramullah started work on a book about the life and times of her late uncle, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy. The book, “Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy: A Biography” was completed and published in 1991. Her works in the English language include “Letters to Neena”, the much acclaimed “Behind the Veil” first published in 1953, and “From Purdah to Parliament” published in 1963. “Common Heritage” was her idea to improve ties between Pakistan and India by providing a platform to both Pakistanis and Indians who had lived in the Sub-continent before Partition.

She also completed her English translation of “Mirat-ul-Uroos”, an Urdu classic by Deputy Nazir Ahmad, and an Urdu volume on “Kahavat aur Muhavray” but unfortunately, could not see them in print.

Begum Ikramullah often regretted that a golden era of women’s struggle and achievements seemed no longer accessible to the common person and may be lost. To revive these memories, she translated her book “From Purdah to Parliament” in Urdu.

She used to contribute regularly for the magazines “Tehzeeb-i-Niswan” and “Ismat”. “Koshish-i-Natamaam”, a volume comprised of short stories, “Safarnama” and “Dilli ki Begamat key Muhawarey” are her other works in Urdu.

She passed away on December 11, 2000 in Karachi at the age of 85.

This article was last updated on Sunday, June 01, 2003

Begum Shaista Ikramullah

BEGUM RAA’ANA LIAQAT ALI KHAN

Begum Ra’ana Liaqat Ali Khan born Sheila Irene Pant was one of the leading woman figures in the Pakistan Movement along with her husband Liaquat Ali Khan, and a career economist, and prominent stateswoman from the start of the cold war till the fall and the end of the cold war. Ra’anna was one of the leading woman politicians and nationwide respected woman personalities who started her career in the 1940s and witnessed key major events in Pakistan. She was one of the leading and pioneering woman figures in the Pakistan Movement and served as the executive member of Pakistan Movement committee working under Muhammad Ali Jinnah. She also served as economic adviser to Jinnah’s Pakistan Movement Committee and later became First Lady of Pakistan when her husband Liaqat Khan Ali became Pakistan’s first prime minister. As First Lady of Pakistan, she launched programs for woman’s development in the newly founded country. Later, she would start her career as a stateswoman that would last a decade.

After the reorganisation of the Muslim League, Begum Ra’ana devoted herself to the task of creating political consciousness amongst the Muslim women society of the British Indian Empire. During this time, Ra’anna became an executive member of Jinnah’s Working Committee and served there as economical adviser. Her struggle for emancipation and support for Pakistan continued till the creation of Pakistan for Muslims of India in 1947. She lately converted into a Muslim, after her marriage.

With her husband, Ra’ana strongly opposed the Simon Commission. While a Professor of Economics, Ra’ana intensely mobilised students from her college and went to the Legislative Assembly to hear her husband’s debate carrying placards of “Simon Go Home” With Liaquat Ali Khan winning the debate, she became an instant hero with her friends. She later sold him a ticket to a stage show to raise funds for flood relief in Bihar. Ra’ana proved to be Liaquat Ali Khan’s constant partner and companion. She became politically involved with her husband and played a major role in the Pakistan Movement. She became a defining moment in Pakistan’s history when she accompanied her husband to London, United Kingdom in May 1933. There, she and Khan met with Jinnah at Hamstead Heath residence, and successfully convinced Jinnah to return to the British Indian Empire to resume the leadership of the All India Muslim League. Jinnah returned to India, and Ra’ana was appointed as an executive member of the Muslim League and the Chairperson of the Economic Division of the Party.

Ra’ana was the first First Lady of Pakistan. As First Lady, she initiated reforms for woman and child development and social progress of women, and played a major role for women’s part in Pakistan’s politics. After the assassination of her husband Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, Begum Ra’ana continued her services for the social and economic benefit of women of Pakistan till her death in 1990.[2] One of the daunting challenges for her was to organise health services for women and children migrating from India to Pakistan.

In 1947, as the refugees poured in from across the border, amidst the most pitiable of conditions with cholera, diarrhoea and smallpox being common sights everywhere, she called upon women to come forward and collect food and medical supplies from government offices. The women came forward despite the resistance they faced from certain sections of society, including certain newspapers where they were attacked in the most vicious manner by elements that did not want women to come out from their “four walls”.[2] She firmly believed that for a society to do justice to itself, it was pertinent that women played their due role in reforming society alongside the men

During this point in Pakistan’s history there weren’t many nurses in Karachi, so Begum Liaquat asked the army to train women to give injections and first aid. Women were thus trained in three to six-month courses and as such the para-military forces for women were formed. The Pakistan Army quickly established Army Medical Corps and recruited a large number of women nurses as army nurses. During this period, girls were also personally encouraged by Begum Liaquat to take up nursing as a profession. They were also taught the rifle drill, to decode ciphers, typing and a host of other duties so they could be useful in times of national crisis like the refugee crisis of 1947.

In 1949, Begum Ra’ana arranged a conference of over 100 active women from all over Pakistan. The conference announced the formation of a voluntary and non-political organisation for the social, educational and cultural uplift of the women, named All Pakistan Women’s Association (APWA).[4] She was nominated as its first president and unlike Pakistan Women National Group, the APWA continued to grow as it continuously fought for women’s rights in Pakistan. For its services, the Government of Pakistan established APWA College in Lahore as part of its struggle.

After her husband’s death, Ra’ana went on to start her career as a stateswoman that lasted more than 2 decades. In 1952, Ra’ana was the first Muslim woman delegate to the United Nations in 1952. In 1954, the Government of Pakistan had appointed her as Pakistan’s Ambassador to the Netherlands, and also was the first woman ambassador of Pakistan. She represented Pakistan in the Netherlands until 1961 and was also the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps. In June 1966, she was appointed as Pakistan’s Ambassador to Italy and stayed there until 1965. Later, she was directed to Tunisia as Pakistan’s Ambassador to Tunisia and held this position until March 1966.

http://infopak.gov.pk/brlak.aspx

Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and Partition

OFF THE SHELF
Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and Partition
V. N. Datta

Dear Mr Jinnah: Selected Correspondence and Speeches of Liaquat Ali Khan, 1937-1947

edited by Professor Roger D. Long with a foreword by Stanely Wolpert. Oxford University Press, Karachi. Pages 328. Price not stated.

This compilation of selected correspondence and speeches of Liaquat Ali Khan, that comes with a foreword by Stanely Wolpert, well-known Jinnah biographer, focuses on highly significant issues and events which proved crucial in the creation of Pakistan. Of special interest to the reader is the author’s prefatory notes. 

The period (1937-1947) chosen by Professor Long is momentous in the making of Pakistan. In the pre-1937 period, the Muslim League was a weak and inert organisation, destitute of leadership, funds and the press. It was seen as a coterie of toadies and sycophants basking in the sunshine of British patronage, passing stereotyped, mild resolutions for the protection of Muslims interests and making speeches in the Assemblies and at the Muslim League annual sessions. Mohammad Ali Jinnah then counted nowhere. He was rebuffed by the stalwart Muslim leader, Fazl-I-Husain in Punjab, and distrusted by the Congress. The British ignored him.

By 1939, the Muslim League became a strong and spirited organisation,

and in March 1940, it demanded a separate homeland, an independent, sovereign Pakistan State, and by 1945, Jinnah emerged as the sole spokesman of the Muslims, who made high bids and vetoed all constitutional proposals suggested by the Congress and the British government. He scuttled the Simla conference in June-July 1945 and asked for parity with the Congress in the Viceroy’s executive council.

Jinnah met Mahatma Gandhi on equal terms for negotiation to resolve the political stalemate at home on Malabar Hill in Bombay from September 9 to 29, 1945, and rejected his formula. He took to task the three Premieres, Sikander Hayat Khan of Punjab, Fazl-ul-Haq of Bengal, and Saadullah of Assam, for joining the National Defence Council by subverting the Muslim League resolution of September 29, 1940.

By 1945, the Muslim League succeeded in setting up its party ministry in four of the provinces, and in the fifth, it held a strong position by putting pressure on the dispirited and shrinking Unionists party in Punjab.

This work is more an exchange between Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan on matters

relating to the radicalisation of Muslim politics when both were engaged in a life-and-death struggle for the creation of Pakistan. It throws more light on Jinnah than on Liaquat Ali Khan.

There is nothing personal in these letters, despite Liaquat Ali Khan’s efforts to engage Jinnah in it. Jinnah was a hard nut to crack, icy cold, reserved, taciturn, who praised or complimented none, and yet showed no tension. He was secretive. Even though he drew up his will in 1939 and appointed Liaquat Ali Khan his trustee for it, he never told him so, and it was only after his death that the latter learnt of it.

An utterly lonely man, Jinnah was incapable of maintaining a loving relationship with anyone. It would have been a treasure trove to read Jinnah’s love letters to his wife Rattenbai Petet or to anyone, but such a document nowhere exits.

Jinnah’s relationship with his colleagues was not the kind that the Mahatma shared with his party workers. He chose no heir, though he regarded Liaquat Ali Khan as his right hand. The correspondence shows that Jinnah lived like an Englishman.

He was fabulously rich and invested a great deal of money in shares and property. On several occasions, the Muslim Legaue borrowed money from his personal coffers. It is incredible that by addressing his huge audience in English who did not understand what he was saying, he captured their hearts and imagination and fired them with a passion to throw in their lot with him.

Belonging to the well-known aristocratic family of Punjab and being son of the Nawab of Karnal, Liaquat Ali Khan inherited a huge property in Meerut. After taking BA from Oxford and Bar-at-law, he returned to India at the end of 1922 and joined the Muslim League in 1923. As an Independent, he served as Deputy Speaker in the UP Council in 1931. As a member of the United Provinces National Agricultural Party, he represented the landed interests and opposed the separate electorate before the Joint Statutory Commission which came out of the Round Table Conference in the early 1930s.

He became the General-Secretary of the Muslim League in 1936 and held this office till 1947 and slaved for the success of its mission. He became the Finance Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council in 1946 and the first Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1947. Scrupulously honest, he refused to accept property in Pakistan in exchange for his land holdings in India, and after his death, his son and his wife, a Christian, Ranana Sheila Irene Pant, had to live in a house donated by the government.

This work projects Liaquat Ali Khan as a mild, well-meaning man of moderate disposition who shunned controversies. Mediocre in intellect, his sincerity of purpose and dedication made it easier for him to inspire confidence among his party workers. This work shows how the Muslims felt threatened by Hindu majoritarianism and feared that the Federation as envisaged under the Government of India Act (1935) would complete their disaster.

By mobilising the Muslim mass support, Jinnah widened his political base to fight the Congress. One is tempted to conclude from this work that the Congress was outmanoeuvred by Jinnah’s brilliant strategy and leadership, and Liaquat Ali Khan’s famous budget speech on February 28, 1947, in the Legislative Assembly, which hit the business magnets supporting the Congress, turned the tide in the Congress in favour of Partition. On March 3, 1947, Khizar Hayat Khan was forced to resign as Chief Minister due to Muslim League pressure, and the way was clear for the creation of Pakistan.

The editing and annotation of Long’s work is superb and the explanatory notes are suavely perceptive. However, Long’s praise of Stanely Wolport’s studies of Nehru and Jinnah is unjustified; he completely ignores S. Gopal’s comprehensive biography of Nehru. He also tends to ignore the Congress viewpoint on important political situations.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20041205/spectrum/book1.htm

The Constitution of 1956

After assuming charge as Prime Minister, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali along with his team worked day and night to formulate a constitution for Pakistan. His efforts led to the first constitution that was enforced in the country on March 23, 1956. Pakistan’s status as a dominion ended and the country was declared an Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Thereupon the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan became the interim National Assembly and Governor General Iskander Mirza was sworn in as the first President of Pakistan.

The Constitution of 1956 consisted of 234 articles, which were divided into 13 parts and 6 schedules. One of the main features of the Constitution was its Islamic character. The Islamic provisions were contained in the directive principles of the state policy. Along with other Islamic provisions in the Constitution, the president, who was required to be a Muslim of at least 40 years of age, was to set up an organization for Islamic research with the aim of establishing a true Islamic society. The Objectives Resolution was, however, only made the preamble of the Constitution and not included in its main text.

The Constitution vested the executive authority of the President in the Federation. The President had the discretionary powers to make the appointment of the Chairman and members of the Election Commission, Delimitation Commission and Public Service Commission. He also had the power to appoint the Prime Minister from amongst the members of the National Assembly. However, his appointee had to take a vote of confidence from the Assembly within two months of his appointment. The President also had the power to remove the Prime Minister if he felt that the Prime Minister had lost the confidence of the majority of the National Assembly members.

The Constitution of 1956 provided for parliamentary form of government with a unicameral legislature. The only house of parliament, the National Assembly, was to consist of 300 members. The Constitution recognized the concept of One Unit, and the seats were divided equally between the two wings of the country. Thus the principle of parity was introduced. For the first ten years, five additional seats were reserved for women for each wing. National Assembly was to meet at least twice a year with at least one session at Dhaka. The Constitution offered direct elections under adult franchise. Every citizen of Pakistan with minimum age of 21 was allowed to vote in the elections.

The Constitution provided for federal form of government in the country. The provincial structure was similar to the one in the center. The pattern for the center-province relations was the same as it was in the Government of India Act, 1935. There were federal, provincial and concurrent lists of subjects. There were 30 items in the federal list, 94 items in the provincial list and 19 items in the concurrent list. The federal legislation was to get precedence over provincial legislation regarding the concurrent list. Residuary powers were vested in the provinces. In case of a conflict between center and provinces or between the two provinces, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was to act as the mediator.

The Constitution of 1956 was a written and flexible constitution. It advocated the fundamental rights of the individual. However, the President had the power to suspend these rights in case of an emergency. Judiciary was to remain independent. Urdu and Bengali were both accepted as state languages, while English was to remain the official language for the first 25 years. After ten years’ passage of the Constitution, the President was to appoint a commission with the task to make recommendation for the replacement of English as the official language.

The Constitution of 1956 proved to be short lived as on October 7, 1958, Marital Law was promulgated and the constitution was abrogated.

This article was last updated on Sunday, June 01, 2003

The Constitution of 1956

Constitution of 1956

After assuming charge as Prime Minister, Chaudhary Muhammad Ali and his team worked hard to formulate a constitution. The committee, which was assigned the task to frame the Constitution, presented the draft Bill in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on January 9, 1956. The bill was opposed by the Bengali autonomists. Bhashai, the leader of Awami League in East Pakistan, even used the threat of secession to press for autonomy and his party staged a walkout from the Assembly on February 29, when the Assembly adopted the Constitution. Later on, Awami League boycotted the official ceremonies celebrating the inauguration of the Constitution. However, in spite of their opposition, the Constitution was adopted and was enforced on March 23, 1956. With this Pakistan’s status as a dominion ended and the country was declared an Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Constituent Assembly became interim National Assembly and Governor-General Iskander Mirza sworn in as the first President of Pakistan.

The Constitution of 1956 consisted of 234 articles, divided into 13 parts and 6 schedules. Following were the chief characteristics of the Constitution:

1. Pakistan was declared as an Islamic Republic and it was made mandatory that only a Muslim could become the President of the country. President would set up an Organization for Islamic Research. Good relations with the Muslim countries became the main objective of the Foreign Policy. Objectives Resolution and Quaid’s declaration that Pakistan would be a democratic state based on Islamic principles of social justice were made the preamble of the Constitution. Steps were to be taken to enable the Muslims individually and collectively to order their lives in accordance with the teaching of Quran and Sunnah and to implement Islamic moral standards. The sectarian interpretations among the Muslims were to get due regard. Measures were to be taken to properly organize zakat, waqfs, and mosques. However, one clause relating to the elimination of riba, which was the part of the draft was eventually dropped.
2. The constitution provided for the federal form of government with three lists of subjects: federal, provincial and concurrent. The federal list consisted of 33 items, provincial of 94 items and concurrent list of 19 items.  The federal legislation was to get precedence over provincial legislation regarding concurrent list. In case of a conflict between federal and provincial governments, or between the provincial governments, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was to act as a mediator. Federal government exercised wider control in provincial matters in case of emergency.
3. Though the constitution provided for the Parliamentary form of Government, yet it declared that the executive authority of the Federation would be in the president.
4. Any Muslim citizen of Pakistan, who was at least forty years old, could be elected as the President of Pakistan for the term of five years. No one was entitled to hold this office for more than two tenures. 3/4^th members of the Assembly could impeach the president.
5. President could appoint from amongst the MNAs a Prime Minister who had to take the vote of confidence from the house in two months. The Prime Minister had to inform the president about all the decisions of the cabinet.
6. Ministers could be taken from outside the National Assembly but they were to get themselves elected within six months.
7. President had the power to summon, prorogue, and dissolve the Assembly on the advice of the cabinet. No bill imposing taxes or involving expenditure could be moved without his consent. He had partial veto power. He could give or withhold his assent to a bill passed by the Assembly.
8. Prime Minister and his cabinet were to aid and advise the president. The president was required to follow the advice of the cabinet except where he was empowered to act in his own discretion.
9. The Constitution entitled for a Unicameral Legislature. The National Assembly was to consist of 300 members. Age limit of a candidate for a seat in National Assembly was 25 years.
10. Principle of parity was accommodated in the Constitution. West Pakistan was treated as one unit and seats were divided equally between the two wings of the country. National Assembly was to meet at least twice a year. Minimum of one session should be held at Dhaka.
11. Members of the Assembly were to be elected on the basis of Direct Elections conducted on the basis of Adult Franchise. However, for the first ten years five additional seats were reserved for women from each wing. Every citizen, who was more than 21 years in age was considered as an adult.
12. The provincial structure was similar to that of the center. There were 300 members in both provincial assemblies. Ten additional seats were reserved for women. Punjab was given 40% seats in the West Pakistan Assembly.
13. It was a Written Constitution.
14. It was a Flexible Constitution and two third members of the Assembly could bring amendment in the constitution.
15. Fundamental Rights were made justiciable. However, the President had power to suspend the fundamental rights in case of emergency.
16. Elaborate provisions were made for the higher judiciary to ensure its independence.
17. Urdu and Bengali were declared as the state languages. However, for the first twenty years English was to continue as an official language. After ten years, the president was to appoint a commission to make recommendations for the replacement of English.

The constitution was never practically implemented as no elections were held. It was eventually abrogated on October 7, 1958 when Martial Law was enforced.

Constitution of 1956