By Malcolm W. Browne Special to The New York Times
Jan. 3, 1972
RAWALPINDI, Pakistan, Jan. 2—President Zulfikar All Bhutto today ordered the nationalization of major Pakistani Industries and moved to break up an “undue concentration of economic power.”
In a brief speech to the nation, President Bhutto listed 10 categories that had been selected for nationalization, They were iron and steel; basic metals; heavy engineering; heavy electrical equipment; motor vehicles; tractors; petrochemical industries; and three utilities—electricity, gas and oil refinery and cement.
The companies involved were said to be worth a total of about $200‐million.
In a separate decree today it was announced that any company worth more than 10 mill lion rupees ($2‐million) in which a single family owns more than 50 per cent of the shares would also be nationalized.
Both the President and his Finance Minister, Dr. Mubashir Hasan, said that no foreign investment would be affected.
No Further Moves Duo
Other than the 20 specific “industrial units” — or companies—listed to be taken over, they said, the Government plans no further nationalization moves.
“It’ is our firm intention,” President Bhutto said, “to have a happy blend of the public and private sectors.”
Despite the seemingly sweeping character of the nationalization moves, most corporate executives here viewed them as comparatively mild and unlikely to have much effect on the economy.
Pakistan does not have a large industrial base and most of the categories listed for nationalization involve industries already controlled by the Government.
Industries not taken over in eluded cotton textile manufacturing, the largest single industrial group in the country and its biggest earner of hard currency. Also untouched were foreign‐owned concerns such as the United States‐owned Esso Fertilizers and the British owned. Attock Petroleum Company Ltd., the only oil‐producing company ‘in the’ country.
The Pakistani economy is based on agriculture, which accounts for more than half the national. income and employs two‐thirds of the work force. Rice and wheat are the main food crops. Jute, cotton and tea are the money crops.
The decision to nationalize seemed mainly aimed at the two dozen or so ‘Pakistani families regarded is the financial elite of the nation.
The passports of members of 22 such families have been impounded and President Bhutto has demanded that holdings of foreign currency abroad be returned to Pakistan. He has threatened those who do not bring back their holdings with penalties, Including imprisonment
Two Men Anrested
Last night the Government announced it had placed two scions of these families? Ahmed Dawood and Fakhurddin Valia, under six‐month house arrest.
Pakistani business executives did not seem especially disturbed by the new measures. One businessman said:
“Some of the things being nationalized are just about bankrupt anyway and will be little more than a paper loss for anyone. As for the antimonopoly, fair trade and protection of labor provisions, such laws have been on the books here since at least 1969. My personal hope is that Mr. Bhutto intends to do something about enforcing .them this time.”
The Einince Minister, Dr. Hasan,said that in the case of the businesses being nationalized, the, Government was not actually taking over corporate shares but was merejy replacing management. Employes will be kept on, he said. The companies affected, he added, may later be handed over :to pro,yincial governments.
Dr. Hasan said there was no intention of nationalizing banks:
Leftists Seek Stronger Moves
The moderate nature of the nationalization announced to.day is, not expected to satisfy the powerful leftist wing of President Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s party. These leftists have demanded that Pakistan’s entire economy be recast along State‐ownership lines.
Mr. Bhutto is a member of a wealthy land‐owning family. He seems to have gone to great pains to convince his countrymen that he will not use his position to protect his economic status.
Mr. Bhutto took office as President and Martial‐law Administrator on ,Dec. 20. He replaced. Gen., Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan,‐ who was forced to resign largely as the result of Pakistan’s defeat by India.
Mr. Bhutto said he would serve without salary. Yesterday, he ordered that all top members of the Government, including himself, make public declarations of their financial wealth.
Yahya Khan (centre) with Lt Gen Abdul Hamid Khan (left) and Air Marshal Abdul Rahim Khan (right) in East Pakistan | Dawn file photo
The man who comprehensively lost a war against India — and thereby lost half his country — Gen Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan deserves a full and accurate telling of his story and the story of how the Pakistan Army dutifully followed him into the abyss.
This slim volume — General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan: The Rise and Fall of a Soldier 1947-1971 by Brig (Retd) A.R. Siddiqi — is not that book, especially since the author was responsible for Gen Yahya’s image-building during the critical waning period of his rule.
It brings to mind the title of the classic autobiography of Gen Sir Francis Tuker, the last British commander in Eastern India, who presided over the end of the British “watch and ward” function in the colony before its independence in 1947. While Memory Serves was Gen Tuker’s title. Brig Siddiqi, a journalist inducted by direct selection into the public relations branch of the military, and author of two previous and most useful books on the military, ends his new book with the coda “Reproduced as best as memory serves.”
Gen Tuker relied heavily on detailed contemporaneous diaries and notes; Brig Siddiqi’s book is an amalgam of anecdote and war stories without the sourcing and overarching contextual analysis that would peel back the layers of the onion that is the Pakistani military, and its fraught relationship with the country’s politics. It also appears to rely on segments of the author’s more useful and less hagiographic The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality. The result is a gap-toothed volume that provides some interesting glimpses, but leaves you wanting for more. Brig Siddiqi needed a heavy dose of fact-checking and detail on Gen Yahya and the events that brought him to the pinnacle of power and his fall from grace.
Gen Yahya belonged to the generation of the British Indian Army that acquired the habits and accent of the British. But, unlike some of his colleagues in both independent Pakistan and India, he was not a reader or deep thinker. Rather, he saw himself as a man of action. Luckily for him, he became a favourite of Gen Ayub Khan — the first Pakistani army chief — and was carried along in the wake of that relationship into key positions at different stages of his rapid rise in independent Pakistan.
President Ayub Khan reviews the war strategy in Sialkot, 1965 with his military men. Yahya Khan is first from the right | Photo courtesy Vintage Pakistan
Brig Siddiqi refers to his role in the early building of the military relationship with the United States, but fails to note that Gen Yahya, as deputy chief of general staff, was in the first key meetings that then defence secretary Iskander Mirza called to prepare for the meetings with the US military aid review team under Brig Harry Meyers.
Gen Yahya Khan was at the helm of state and the army when Pakistan was torn asunder in 1971. Both he and the armed forces deserve a more full and accurate telling of their stories
Gen Yahya was reportedly also involved in helping Gen Ayub write the plan for the reorganisation of the Pakistan Army. He was also in that small, supporting cast that descended on Karachi when Lt Gen Wajid Ali Khan Burki and others were sent on the dangerous mission to Karachi to inform Mirza that he was no longer needed as president.
Gen Ayub chose to repair to the north at that juncture. Brig Siddiqi notes that, when Gen Ayub decided to relocate the capital from Karachi to the north, Gen Yahya was chosen to lead the team that helped select the site of Islamabad and interact with Doxiadis Associates, the firm that designed the new metropolis outside Rawalpindi.
Earlier in his career, Gen Yahya was among a group of Indian officers captured by the German Afrika Korps in North Africa and handed over to the Italians as prisoners of war. Gen Yahya used to tell the story of his attempts to escape from captivity and always wrongly denigrated Sahibzada Yaqub Khan for not wanting to participate in the prison break.
He told me the same story in his hospital room in Washington DC when he was recovering from a stroke in his waning days. The author retells the story from Gen Yahya’s somewhat flawed perspective. In fact, Yaqub did try to escape and was caught and kept in an Italian camp. Gen Yahya ended up succeeding in a later escape attempt. A more detailed and accurate story of that period is contained in the detailed account by Maj Gen Syed Ali Hamid in The Friday Times.
Gen Yahya’s attitude reflected the general anti-intellectual biases that pervade the military.
Similarly, the author does not identify Maj Gen Thomas “Pete” Rees as Gen Ayub’s division commander in Burma, when Gen Ayub was sent back for “tactical timidity”, as quoted in my own book Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within and in a more recent piece in The Daily Star.
Fanboy. Yahya Khan with Madam Noor Jehan | Dawn file photo
The repeat of a risqué joke doing the rounds during the Gen Yahya period, about an alleged assignation with the actress Tarana, is also cited as an actual incident without citing a source. Brig Siddiqi was in a position to give much more of the background to events leading to the downfall of Gen Yahya and how the Pakistan Army did an accurate post-mortem after the end of the lost 1971 war with India, and then buried that report in its general headquarters’ Historical Section, keeping it away even from the new President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
Gen Yahya’s role in halting the Chamb offensive short of Akhnoor is told in general terms, but no new information is provided that would help us understand why and how Gen Yahya decided to delay the offensive by 48 hours, giving India a chance to regroup in that critical sector.
The book conveys a keyhole view of events in the public eye. For example, the aborted March 1, 1971 Yahya speech on a new constitutional arrangement for Pakistan that Gen Yahya failed to deliver himself. As mentioned in Crossed Swords, instead of simply introducing Gen Yahya before his live address on Pakistan’s state television, I was told to read the prepared text written in the first person for him. An announcer read the same text on Radio Pakistan.
Was Gen Yahya inebriated, or was there some debate among his staff about that speech? Why was an attempt made to get back the advance text of that speech from foreign journalists and me? As director of the Inter Services Public Relations Directorate, Brig Sidiqqi was in the inner circle and could have shed light on the behind-the-scenes actions that helped explain the chaotic decision-making in the Yahya cabal. For that, we need to go to other sources, often by authors inside and outside Pakistan, who trawled archives and interviewed participants to connect the dots. If the author had approached Maj Saeed Akhtar Malik, whose father was a celebrated general in the 1965 war, he would have learned the following.
Maj Saeed recounts in an email to me his visit soon after the 1971 war, with Brig Gul Mawaz, a decorated Second World War veteran then retired, when the brigadier recounted two episodes about Gen Yahya and Gen A.A.K. Niazi, the man who surrendered in Dacca [Dhaka]. Gul Mawaz and Akhtar Malik were close friends.
Gul Mawaz recalled to Saeed Akhtar Malik: “I was commanding 103 Brigade in Lahore. Niazi was commanding 5 Punjab under me. I thought he was not up to the mark. Thus, I informed him that I would be initiating a report recommending that he should be reduced in rank.
“Within a week of this, when I returned from office, my batman informed me that Brig Akhtar Malik had driven in from Pindi and was occupying the guest bedroom. In the evening, he brought up the issue of Niazi. ‘Listen, Gul,’ he said to me. ‘I know Niazi is not the most brilliant man in the army, but I assure you he is not the very worst lieutenant colonel either, so can’t you just let him be? After all, there is no danger he will end up being a general, is there?’
“I was amazed that he [Niazi] had brought to my door the only man whom he knew I could not refuse. And so I ‘let him be’, as your father put it, and see what he has wrought!
“But in all fairness, let me also relate to you another story. Yahya, your father, Hamid [whom I hated] and I were all instructors at the Staff College together. More than once, your father confided in me what bothered him about Yahya [with whom I had a deep friendship]. It was his view that Yahya was a nice man, but was so given to drink that he frequently crossed the point where he could not cope with his imbibing. He felt certain that one day he will do himself or his friends considerable harm, if not to Pakistan. But I would always brush off his observations by saying that he was being unduly harsh on good old Agha.
“But when [the 1971] war broke out on the western front, I drove over to the President’s House. It was early evening, and I found both Yahya and Hamid pretty high, in advanced stages of inebriation. I was keen to know what their plans for the western front were. Each time I asked him this, Yahya would brush away the question with a wave of his arm, saying that he was the commander-in-chief who launched his forces, and that it was now up to his generals to fight out the war!
“And then his telephone rang. He picked up the receiver, immediately covered it with his hand, and with the smile of a child who had just received the toy of his dreams, he said, ‘Gul, this is Noor Jehan. She is calling from Tokyo…’
“He then made a request that she sing to him ‘Sayeeon nee mera mahi meray bhaag jagawan aa gaya’.
“As he listened to the song, I sat there, stunned. And then disgusted, I left. I never tried to meet him again, nor to speak to him. I have since often thought over what your father warned me so many years [ago] about Yahya, also about what I had thought about Niazi and the action I was about to take with regard to him till your father dissuaded me.
“I guess, most tragically, we were both right — your father about Yahya, and I about Niazi.” Brig Siddiq mentions this call from Noor Jehan, but without the sourcing or detail and background.
The picture Brig Siddiqi paints of Gen Yahya is of a detached and distracted military chief and president, who was being manipulated by competing cliques of subordinates, and had no clear handle on the centrifugal forces that his poorly informed actions unleashed in Pakistan during his short stint as head of state.
Gen Yahya was increasingly out of his depth in terms of knowledge and intelligence from the field, especially from East Pakistan. He played favourites and allowed others to make decisions on his behalf. Some of his subordinates were involved in political machinations with politicians such as Bhutto. He was failed by his subordinates but, in the end, he was the instigator and owner of that failure. Pakistan suffered inestimable damage as a result.
Any book on the military by a retired officer should help readers and civilians in government better understand the army as the predominant institution in the country. Pakistani military officers are not in the habit of writing rigorous, introspective accounts of key historical events. A lifetime in uniform, imprisoned by strict hierarchy, trains them to expect that rank allows them to substitute assertion for arguments supported by sources and references.
Officers who have tried to write meaningful books risk incurring the wrath of the institution, if they break ranks in terms of accepted narratives or divulge stories that do not accord with the standard ‘truths’. A good example is the magisterial work on the 1965 war by Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed, a serious and well researched work that he began in 1990 and completed after retirement. The army changed the title of his superb book from Illusions of Victory to an anodyne History of Indo-Pak War 1965, and all copies were removed from the marketplace by the army. Outliers are not tolerated.
Another former director general of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Lt Gen Asad Durrani, is currently feeling the heat for his non-fiction and fiction writings. The nation as a whole is the poorer as a result of these conditions.
Brig Siddiqi’s slim volume moves the needle of knowledge about the Pakistan army only slightly forward. But, we must wait for others to come forth now on more recent history before Pakistan can recalibrate its moves to a future that strengthens centripetal forces and serves a wider national base, rather than pander to regional, linguistic or institutional biases.
Both Pakistan and its army deserve to be much better informed about themselves.
The reviewer is the founding director and Distinguished Fellow at the South Asia Centre of the Atlantic Council in Washington DC and the author of The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood and Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Withinwww.shujanawaz.com
General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan: The Rise and Fall of a Soldier 1947-1971 By Brig (Retd) A.R. Siddiqi Oxford University Press, Karachi ISBN: 978-0190701413 167pp.
Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, January 24th, 2021
At 4am on September 3, 1977, as the Bhutto family slept in their 70-Clifton residence, commandos broke the main gate open and dashed upstairs to the deposed prime minister’s bedroom. Telephone lines had already been severed. The deposed premier did not react. He knew why the commandos had arrived: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was under arrest.
Charged under sections 302 (premeditated murder), 120 (criminal conspiracy) and 109 (Abetment) for the murder of Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Kasuri, Bhutto calmly walked downstairs with the commandos. This arrest was in the making ever since Murree, when Bhutto had warned General Ziaul Haq that he had committed the act of “high treason” for toppling an elected government.
Ever since that moment, Gen Zia had become haunted by the perpetual fear of being punished by Bhutto were he and his party ever able to rule the country again. This fear was consolidated after Bhutto repeated his threat in speeches made at various railway stations during his journey home from his detention in Murree. Multitudes had gathered to see and hear Bhutto.
Now Zia had two options: either to allow a free Bhutto to contest the elections; or to have him apprehended and embroiled in cases. As an American news magazine put two years later, there was one grave and two bodies —only one had to be buried. A worried Zia thought it best not to occupy the spot.
Civil and military officials then began hunting for any substantive evidence to implicate Bhutto in some crime. The first case prepared against the deposed prime minister was that he had used government-owned tractors on his personal land; the charges did not carry enough punitive weight and the case was not persuaded.
No one believed Zia would uphold his promise of elections.
By mid-August, the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) had prepared its findings for Gen Zia: the murder of a Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) lawmaker, Dr Nazir Ahmad, was an old charge and was difficult to prove. But the murder of Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Kasuri, as per the FIA, bore sufficient evidence to implicate Bhutto.
Zia appeared content with that finding.
In the meanwhile, General F.A. Chishti, General Rao Farman Ali and General K.M. Arif appeared busy with preparations for the imminent election. Gen Zia had promised allowing political parties to resume political activities from Aug 1, 1977, but nobody took his claim seriously.
In fact, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) held its first post-ban meeting on Aug 7. At the Lahore meeting, it became clear that divisions among the PNA’s constituent parties ran quite deep. The dispute over the allocation of seats continued as a core issue. As with Gen Zia, the main issue before PNA leaders was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. On the last day of filing nominations, Aug 18, about 18,000 candidates had filed their papers — this included Bhutto, who wanted to contest from Lahore as well as Larkana, his home constituency.
Meanwhile, the Election Cell continued to meet various leaders, including those of the PPP. On Aug 30, the Cell met with JI’s Mian Tuffail Mohammad. More important was the meeting with former defence minister and former chief minister of Sindh, Muhammad Ayub Khuhro. A seasoned politician who hailed from Larkana, he was of the view that Bhutto’s arrest would not cause mass rioting and disturbances.
Khar and Jatoi, in other meetings, thought that perhaps the duo could get a chance to run the show; the two men met the Cell’s officers and told them that in the absence of Bhutto, they could run the affairs. Asghar Khan also expressed similar views, but the Cell officers did not show any interest.
As Zia’s men looked for sound evidence, Gen Chishti told Gen Zia about Masood Mahmood, an FSF man who had sought mercy and also pledged to become an approver in Nawab Kasuri’s murder case. Mahmood had already written a long confessionary statement. Convinced, Gen Zia thought that there was solid enough evidence with which Bhutto could be charged.
The moment to arrest Bhutto had finally arrived.
On Sept 2, Gen Zia called Gen Chishti at his residence, and asked him to head to Karachi and convey a message to General Arbab: arrest Bhutto in Kasuri’s murder case. Gen Chishti first declined, but was persuaded by Gen Zia to do it. Chishti flew from Chaklala air base to Karachi, where he conveyed the message. After executing the task, he flew back to Rawalpindi the same evening.
In Karachi, the FIA seemed to act very efficiently. By 10pm, all the officials and other staff had arrived at the Sindh Martial Law Headquarters. The military action was kept closely guarded; no official or staff member would know what had been planned until the last moment.
On Sept 2, Gen Zia called Gen Chishti at his residence, and asked him to head to Karachi and convey a message to Gen Arbab: arrest Bhutto in Kasuri’s murder case.
Once arrested, Bhutto was first transported to an army centre, and then flown to Lahore. In a twist of fate, Bhutto was taken to Lahore on the same Falcon aircraft that he used as prime minister. By 7.30am, the plane landed at Lahore airport. He was taken to a bungalow in the Cantonment area for a seven-day remand. From there, Bhutto was shifted to Kot Lakhpat jail.
No protest took place, as was anticipated by the Zia regime. In Sindh, Bhutto’s home province and where the PPP commanded great majority, no such protest was registered which could have forced the military government to consider the potential threat of street power.
With Bhutto arrested in Karachi, Khar and Jatoi flew to Islamabad to urgently meet with the Elections Cell. The Cell also met with some other politicians after Bhutto’s arrest, and after some consultations, decided to brief Gen Zia on the country’s law and order situation.
The Cell’s purpose was to brief Gen Zia that there was ample reason for postponing elections. When the proposal was presented to him, the General did not want to assume the entirety of this responsibility; he suggested convening a conference of all political leaders in the near future.
As the Cell officers and other relevant staff engaged into preparations, one question perturbed all: whom to invite and whom to leave out?
Next week: All parties’ moot
shaikhaziz38@gmail.com
Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, May 25th, 2014
Amidst the overhaul instituted by General Ziaul Haq’s regime, the future of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) had appeared uncertain. There were two main reasons for this: first, because of Bhutto’s ouster from government for the time being; and second, the simmering dispute among component parties over the allocation of seats in the next elections.
Asghar Khan of Tehrik-i-Istiqalal and Maulana Noorani of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam were unrelenting on their stance. They wanted a major share in government, hoping that the Military Council would be inclined towards them forming a government. Khan attended the first PNA meeting held on Aug 7 but did not show up later — this sparked the speculation that the PNA had died a natural death.
As the political scenario began to heat up, some PNA leaders tried their best to keep the alliance intact. At last, during the August 25 meeting, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam’s Mufti Mahmood had to deny those rumours. He was followed by Asghar Khan, Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, Begum Nasim Wali Khan and Pir Pagara in quelling news of infighting.
And yet, differences among the Alliance leaders were quite conspicuous.
On Aug 8, PNA chief Mufti Mahmood called on Gen Zia to seek some clarifications. Gen Zia reaffirmed that elections would be held as scheduled, that the army would be withdrawn from Balochistan one month before polling, a general amnesty would be extended to all in Balochistan and that political detainees would be acquitted and legal cases against them withdrawn.
Gen Zia then decided to address the citizenry directly to assure people that polls will be held on Oct 18, as scheduled. He chose Independence Day (Aug 14, 1977) for his address: “If any party interrupts the process of attaining the objective for which the armed forces had taken action, it would be treated as anti-state and will be dealt with severely. … My leniency should not be treated as weakness.”
Referring to an incident in Peshawar on August 11, when PPP workers had become unruly, the general warned Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that no such incidents would be tolerated in future and that political leaders would be held responsible for rowdy mobs.
On Aug 27, Bhutto called on Gen Zia — a meeting that lasted a little less than three hours, with issues such as the mechanism for holding fair and free elections sans any victimisation also on the agenda. Bhutto had of course been travelling from one town to another, speaking about the coup and the prevalent situation that the country found itself in.
By then, Gen Zia seemed to have made up his mind up regarding the country’s future: he told Bhutto that there was immense pressure on him to have legal cases against him (Bhutto) decided by the courts before the polls. Bhutto was also told that if some cases were sent to the judiciary, he should refrain from creating any hindrance. In fact, Gen Zia wanted to show that he bore no ill will towards Bhutto, but insisted that if the cases were there and needed to be decided on merit.
After the meeting, however, it appeared that all of Gen Zia’s assurances of holding election on October 18 were only meant for public consumption.
In a press interview with a US news agency on Aug 17, Gen Zia provided a hint of postponing polls: “If everything is accomplished as planned, power can be transferred by Oct 28.”
Two days later, Asghar Khan was the first to indicate that the elections were being postponed, that too indefinitely. On Aug 30, as he spoke to media representatives in Lahore, he demanded that all legal cases against Bhutto and other leaders should be decided before the elections. Mahmood Ali Kasuri supported him immediately, as others weighed the suggestion.
On Sept 1, 1977, Gen Zia called a press conference that lasted for about five hours. While tackling a range of topics — political and otherwise — Gen Zia appeared more inclined towards politics this time around. Like Ayub Khan before him, Zia, too, showed little respect for politicians and said that the nation could only be united by the army and not by politicians.
He also declared that a new law was being promulgated, through which all candidates of the provincial and national assemblies would have to declare their assets, from Jan 1, 1970 till date. They would have to furnish an affidavit to the effect that if they had held a public office, they did not use the positions for any personal gain.
Journalists were also told about fresh measures being planned to extend greater facilities to the people. These included denationalisation, more loans to farmers and lifting of the ban on trade unions.
But perhaps, more important to Gen Zia was talk of elections. He said that polls could be postponed for some days or weeks, but not months. Justifying the postponement of polls, he said, “It is not in the Holy Quran nor has it been sent as a revelation that elections will be held on Oct 18 and that nothing will happen thereafter. In my opinion, the presidential system is closer to Islam and is more suitable for Pakistan. I will put it up to the National Assembly on Oct 28, and leave the decision to the next government.”
Sardar Sherbaz Mazari and Mairaj Mohammad Khan (once a PPP stalwart) joined the chorus of “accountability first”. Asghar Khan had already demanded trial followed by elections.
There was no immediate reaction to Gen Zia’s announcement, but two days later, Maulana Maududi rejected the postponement and demanded that elections be held on Oct 18 and all legal cases against politicians decided before that. Many right-wing parties backed the postponement following Maududi’s declaration.
Next week: Bhutto’s dramatic arrest in a murder case shaikhaziz38@gmail.com
Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, May 18th, 2014
Asghar Khan’s visit to the three Islamic countries was apparently part of the scheme and aimed at showing to the heads of the friendly states the person who would be the next prime minister of Pakistan. — Courtesy photo
From the day the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) came into being, Tehreek-i-Istiqlal chief retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan’s role had been debated by his colleagues of the coalition and by political observers. He also came under the spotlight when before the coup he sent a letter (May 1977) to the armed forces asking them not to obey the orders of their superiors blindly and not to follow any unlawful commands.
When the accord between the (PNA) and the PPP was reached on July 4, 1977 and only the signatures were to be put, Asghar Khan rejected the accord and asked other members of the alliance to refuse to sign, too. He pledged with complete confidence that he would bring martial law in the country followed by general elections within 90 days. At that time, a vague question was raised: on what grounds did he give such assurance and asked the alliance to reject the accord?
After the promulgation of martial law and arrest of Bhutto, his role became markedly important. On Oct 28, 1977, he left on a visit to Iran, Libya and the United Arab Emirates. On Oct 29, he called on Shah of Iran Mohammad Raza Pahalvi and again had a meeting with the Shah the next day. At Tehran, addressing a press conference he said that elections could be held in seven or eight months, and praised Gen Zia as being honest in his pledges.
The most noticeable point was his assertion that Bhutto would not return to power. He also said that his party, Tehreek-i-Istaqlal, was thinking of leaving the alliance because it joined the PNA for ousting Bhutto from power and since the objective had been achieved, it was a good time to leave the alliance. Perhaps he remembered the pledge made by Gen Zia that after the polls he would be asked to take over as prime minister. Perhaps he thought that his PNA colleagues might demand a share.
With Bhutto incarcerated, Tehreek-i-Istiqlal bids farewell to the Pakistan National alliance
From Iran, he proceeded to Libya and the UAE. Many observers ponder over the logic of visiting friendly countries when his own country was faced with many issues. Rao Rashid, special secretary to Z.A. Bhutto as prime minister, in his work, Jo mien ne dekha, wrote that Asghar Khan was sent by Gen Zia who had previously tipped him as the next prime minister if Bhutto was removed from the scene. According to the author, there were some elements in the army who wanted to bring Asghar Khan because they thought that Bhutto was responsible for the fall of Dhaka. Rashid also said that the army could not rule the country and so Asghar Khan could be the ‘best choice’.
After Bhutto’s hanging, Asghar Khan felt satisfied as Gen Zia had put the election team in full gear and it appeared that elections were around the corner. Like many other political aspirants who were getting new sherwanis tailored, the former air chief also got some new suits made — suitable for a prime minister.
Rao mentions that at one press conference when Mahmood Ali Kasuri said that “… when we will come to power…” Asghar Khan became angry and immediately snubbed him by asking “what do you mean by saying ‘when we came to power’.” In fact, Asghar Khan had developed a feeling that he could replace Bhutto.
Much before the promulgation of martial law on July 5, 1977 Asghar Khan had shown little interest in the PNA movement. However, when it gained some momentum, he became overactive. His insistence on failing to reach an accord with the PPP was a clear indication of who he was working for. Some quarters were of the opinion that he had been in agreement with a faction of the army. He was under the impression that after the promulgation of martial law, he would contest the elections as Zia promised and would become the next prime minister. His visit to the three Islamic countries was also apparently part of the scheme and aimed at showing to the heads of the friendly states the person who would be the next prime minister of Pakistan, latently also seeking their approval. In his close circles it was generally believed that he was the next prime minister.
When Begum Nusrat Bhutto’s petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court (Nov 10, 1977) Asghar Khan felt dejected with the PNA and announced the separation of his party from the alliance. In this regard, he sent a letter to PNA chief Mufti Mahmood, in which he criticised the alliance’s policies by saying that these were part of the ambiguous programme and termed it a reactionary group with an unclear plan incompatible with the 20th century situation.
The letter said that the component parties had suffered from internal contradictions and some parties even had regional interests. At the same time it was not capable of evolving a well-coordinated programme to run a government. He also wrote that the PNA did not contradict some revelations made in the Supreme Court. He also complained that the secretary of the alliance had raised objection to his going abroad. Narrating some unimportant events he said he was quitting the PNA.
Two days later, the alliance called a meeting of the central committee to discuss the letter. As Asghar Khan broke with the alliance, some other parties such as the Pakistan Democratic Party of Sardar Sherbaz Mazari and Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan of Maulana Noorani were also thinking of parting ways.
On the day Asghar Khan severed ties with the PNA, the CMLA issued a martial law regulation banning all student unions and professional organisations; the punishment for violation was jail and lashes.
Between March and June 1977, Z.A. Bhutto had to face a protest movement against his government the kind he had himself triggered and then led 10 years earlier against the Ayub Khan regime.
But even though the movement against Bhutto in 1977 was as strong, impactful and effective as the one that ousted Ayub, this movement’s class and ideological make-up was squarely different from that of the 1968 movement.
In 1968, a wide cross-section of the society had participated — left-wing middle-class youth, blue-collar workers, peasants, etc. The1977 movement on the other hand, largely revolved around right-wing student groups, middle-class/white-collar professionals, traders and urban and semi-urban petite-bourgeoisie.
The PPP had contested the 1970 election on a populist socialist manifesto and the first three years of his regime were spent in repairing the morale of the armed forces and the civilians that was deeply damaged by the separation of East Pakistan and the defeat of Pakistani forces at the hands of the Indian army.
It was also during these years that his regime implemented large-scale populist policies that included the nationalisation of a number of industries. Also during this period, the Bhutto regime drafted a brand new constitution (1973) and managed to get it passed in the national assembly by gaining the approval of all political parties.
By 1973, the regime had also successfully managed to somewhat restore the economy. Contrary to popular perception, and according to political economists such as S. Akbar Zaidi, Asad Sayeed, V.Y. Belokrenitsky and V.N. Moskalenko, Pakistan’s economy actually rebounded after the beating that it had received during the later years of the Ayub regime and especially after the economic fall-out of the conflict in East Pakistan.
However, it is also true that the economic restoration could not withstand the stress generated by the 1973 international oil crises that raised the inflation rate in the country and Bhutto had to devalue the rupee. This got a negative response from traders and businessmen who then began to ship out their capital, creating a new economic crisis.
The incompetency and inexperience exhibited by the new managers in the nationalised industries further deepened the crisis and the Bhutto regime now decided to look towards the oil-rich Arab countries that had begun to make large profits due to the unprecedented hike in oil prices after 1973.
By 1974 Bhutto had overtly become the pragmatist that he actually was and began to ease out the hard line leftists from his cabinet. Conscious of the early moves made by oil-rich Arab states to begin funding a mainstream revival of ‘Political Islam’ in Muslim countries, Bhutto began manoeuvring a delicate balance between his socialist/populist policies and the emerging interest in Political Islam to attract ‘Petro-Dollars’ from Arab countries.
He cracked down on radical labour and student outfits (calling them ‘impractical’ and detrimental to Pakistan’s recovery), and tried to appease right-wing opposition by agreeing to address some of their demands to ‘Islamise the Constitution’.
Bhutto was sitting easy in 1976 as the petro dollars began to come in and he had quietened opposition from the left as well as the right (one through arrests and the other through pragmatic appeasement). He also seemed to have the military’s support and backing after he initiated a military operation in Balochistan against supposed Baloch separatists.
Feeling confident, he announced elections almost a year before they were due only to be left feeling surprised when he saw a fractured and battered opposition unite on single electoral platform to compete against the PPP in the 1977 election.
The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) was made-up of nine anti-PPP parties. It included three of the country’s main religious parties, some moderate conservative parties and a few small left-wing outfits.
PNA largely represented the frustrations and aspirations of those groups that had been affected the most by Bhutto’s policies. These included industrialists, businessmen, traders, shopkeepers, the anti-Bhutto landed gentry and urban middle-classes.
The PNA denounced the government for being detrimental to the cause of Islam in Pakistan and for turning Pakistan into a ‘land of sin’. They also accused Bhutto of being a ‘civilian dictator’, an ‘oppressor’ and ‘a drunkard’ who had let loose a reign of hooligans on the streets of the country.
Bhutto’s party which, by now, had toned down its socialist rhetoric and tried to prove that its Islam was more enlightened than that ‘of the capitalist and feudal mullahs of the PNA’, won the election, which were marred by allegations of rigging.
The PNA cried foul, boycotted the provincial election and decided to start a protest movement. Today, according to various analysts and historians, rigging took place on not more than a dozen seats (in the Punjab) but resentment against the regime in certain sections of the society had been brewing so strongly that the movement that Bhutto thought would fizzle out, erupted in the most devastating fashion.
According to a detailed study of the movement done (in 1980) by historian and author Ahmad B. Syeed, the main participants/protesters of the movement included disgruntled urban middle and lower-middle class youth (mostly belonging to Karachi and Lahore); traders, shopkeepers and white-collar office workers.
According to Syeed’s study, the working classes and the peasants largely remained away from the movement. The agitation against the regime and the police crackdowns mostly took place in Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi. Government buildings, police stations, homes of the members of the PPP, nightclubs, bars, cinemas and hotels were attacked by mobs demanding Nizam-i-Mustafa.
Bhutto called in the army and imposed long curfews but even this failed to stem the protests. Cops frequently opened fire on the rampaging mobs but some military personnel refused to follow the orders of their superiors to fire and this became a major concern within the military.
Wealthy industrialists who had been stripped of their perks and power by Bhutto were accused of funding the movement and the regime also alleged that the United States was bankrolling the protests. Many PPP leaders also pointed the finger towards the large amounts of Saudi Riyals that (according to them) had reached the coffers of the religious parties.
After a month of violence, Bhutto invited the PNA for talks. The PNA demanded fresh elections and the implementation of Shariah Laws. To stall the first demand, Bhutto agreed to conditionally implement the second request and in April 1977 he ordered the closure of all nightclubs and bars. He also banned the sale of alcohol (to Muslims) and replaced Sunday with the Muslim holy day (Friday) as the weekly holiday. PNA decided to stay in the talks.
More than a decade later, veteran JI leader, late Prof Ghafoor Ahmed, who played a leading role in the movement, told journalists that the talks went well and just when Bhutto had agreed to hold fresh elections, Gen Zia decided to impose the country’s third Martial Law (July 1977).
He said that most PNA leaders were happy at how the talks had gone but some leaders, such as Asghar Khan (of the moderate conservative, Tehreek-i-Istaqlal) and Begum Wali (wife of the left-wing Pukhtun nationalist, Wali Khan), desired military intervention.
When asked why then did JI join Zia’s first cabinet whereas most PNA parties opposed the Martial Law, Prof Ghafoor claimed that joining Zia was the decision of the party’s Punjab leadership.
Zia, who adopted PNA’s ‘Islamic’ rhetoric and agenda, went on to rule Pakistan for the next 11 years. Bhutto was arrested and in 1979, through a highly controversial trial, he was sentenced to death for a political murder he was alleged to have ordered, and hanged.
Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, August 31, 2014
With the announcement of election dates, the opposition parties sprang into action. It was much awaited, but the time between the official announcement and the poll date was too short — a part of Z. A. Bhutto’s strategy for giving the opposition the shortest time for electioneering. The PPP government had already begun preparations and when the date was announced the party leaders were extremely happy. There were two reasons for that: one, the United Democratic Front (UDF) still lacked coordination; secondly, every opposition party wanted to contest on every seat, dividing the opposition vote bank.
On Dec 31, 1976 Bhutto convened a meeting of all provincial governors, during which a new commission comprising chief justices of the high courts was to be formed to discuss the issue of water apportionment to prevent the opposition from exploiting the issue during electioneering.
On Jan 2, 1977, the chief election commissioner (CEC), Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan, announced the details of seats over which contests were to be held: Punjab 115 NA, 240 PA; Sindh 43 NA, 100 PA; KP (NWFP ) 26 NA, 80 PA; Balochistan 7 NA, 40 PA; Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) 8 NA, Federal Capital 1 NA. In all, 200 seats in the National Assembly and 460 seats in provincial assemblies were to be fought over.
The PPP team was sure that it would bag a two-thirds majority easily. Some opposition leaders outside the UDF were busy drawing new lines for the upcoming encounter. Among them Asghar Khan appeared very serious. But the problem with him was that he was not prepared to join the UDF. The former air force chief had opposed Bhutto since the 1970 elections. He was against Bhutto in all respects and wanted him to vanish. For that he could go to any level. This was proved later when as a result of the 1977 elections and failure of talks he asked the armed forces to act (in other words to take over). He also thought that he could prove to be a better leader than Bhutto. With that background he seemed poised to take a solo flight rather than join the UDF. If at all he could work with some party it was Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP). Behind the curtain, hectic efforts were underway to bring as many parties as possible to form a wider platform to contest the next polls; however, Asghar Khan’s standpoint proved to be a stumbling block till one day he broke down and showed his intention to sit with the other parties but with certain reservations.
Immediately after the CEC’s press conference the opposition parties began evolving a strategy on two fronts: one to create a unified platform; two, to choose suitable candidates for all 660 seats — a difficult task to attain in a few days before landing into a real electioneering campaign. Lahore became the centre of all activities. On Jan 10, 1977 when the National Assembly was dissolved, a meeting of the opposition parties took place at the residence of Rafiq Ahmad Bajawa. It was a long session with all opposition leaders deliberating upon the possible structure of a united platform, its aims, objectives and working. The main hurdle was allocation of seats to parties in a possible united front.
After a lengthy session lasting for almost the whole day, it was announced that nine parties had agreed to form a joint election forum and contest on all seats by pitching one candidate against the PPP candidate. The decision of the opposition was delayed by some reservations put forward by Asghar Khan who in consonance with the JUP demanded 50pc of the total seats and the office of the secretary general for JUP. After heated discussion these demands were conceded and both the parties joined the forum called Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), replacing the UDF. The PNA comprised: Muslim League, Jamaat-i-Islami, Tehreek-i-Istaqlal, National Democratic Party, Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, Khaksar Tehreek and the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. The nine-party alliance was called nau sitare (nine stars) and its flag too bore nine stars.
The next day all the component parties held another meeting in which the remaining details were discussed; the meeting concluded with a press conference at which Asghar Khan formally announced the formation of the PNA, its decisions, and selection of plough as the election symbol. A committee comprising Rafiq Ahmad Bajawa, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Malik Nazir Ahmad was formed to decide the hierarchy of the alliance without losing any time. On Jan 16, Mufti Mahmood of JUI was elected its President, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan as Vice President and Rafiq Bajawa of the JUP as secretary general, as pressed by Asghar Khan.
Against all assurances of the secret agencies which were assigned the task of keeping the PNA parties away from getting closer, Bhutto was quite annoyed at the speed with which the alliance had come into being. To calm him down, the Rao Rashid team assured him that the PNA would soon fall apart.
THE agreement on bilateral relations between the governments of India and Pakistan, signed by president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and prime minister Indira Gandhi at Simla, is probably the only international agreement to bear a wrong date — July 2, 1972.
It was actually signed at 00.40 am the next day. A small matter; but it symbolises the false myths that grew up and the false claims that were later made over the accord.
Now, 40 years later, it is not only appropriate but necessary to dispel the myths and expose those claims. Especially since relations between the two countries have improved to a significant degree. The core dispute on Kashmir reached the gates of a settlement in 2006-07 but it was denied entry by a quirk of circumstances.
One might begin with putting aside the controversy over a ‘tacit understanding’ which P.N. Dhar, Indira Gandhi’s principal secretary claimed was reached between the two leaders at Simla. According to P.N. Dhar, the understanding was reached between the two leaders at the last minute and thus facilitated the accord. Thereafter Aziz Ahmad and he settled the text for signature. Abdul Sattar, later foreign minister of Pakistan, flatly rejected the claim. P.N. Dhar and Abdul Sattar are the only two surviving witnesses to the parleys at Simla. P.N. Dhar’s book Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’ and Indian Democracy and Abdul Sattar’s book on Pakistan’s Foreign Policy contain detailed expositions of their respective views. Aziz Ahmad was then secretary general of the foreign ministry.
Dhar’s own account renders a detailed analysis unnecessary. He wrote: “The tacit understanding, no doubt was that gradually the Line of Control would emerge as an international border, and thus the Kashmir question would be settled. But this remained only a tacit understanding.”
A few pages earlier, Dhar spelt out in direct quotes the terms of that understanding — “the line would be gradually endowed with the characteristics of an international border (his [Bhutto’s] words)”. Thus, there was no accord on an immediate partition of Kashmir. It was to be a ‘gradual’ process.
More to the point. The ceasefire line or the Line of Control was not accepted as an international border proper. The claimed promise was to endow it with the ‘characteristics’ of such a border. To say that A has the characteristics of B is, indeed, to assert that A is not B but has its characteristic. An integral part of this claimed understanding was free movement across the line, which never happened.
Para 6 of the accord is crucial. It says: “Both governments agree that their respective heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalisation of relations, including the question of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations.”
Neither the ‘heads’ nor their ‘representatives’ met in order to arrive at ‘a final settlement’ of the Kashmir issue as Para 6 required. On Dec 18, 1972, Bhutto repeated his appeal to Indira Gandhi to visit Pakistan. Dhar provides a clue to her refusal. “We had thought of a second summit after reaching an accord with Sheikh Abdullah.” The Indira Gandhi-Sheikh Abdullah accord was concluded only in February 1975. By then the situation had changed. It was unwise to think that an accord with the Sheikh would have silenced Pakistan. Progress in recent talks on Kashmir was possible only when this approach was discarded.
Indira Gandhi insisted that, as the agreement required, all disputes should be settled bilaterally; but only to add that the Kashmir question was already settled. Pakistani foreign minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan said on June 3, 1986, that neither country had proposed a discussion on Kashmir in pursuance of the pact. Pakistan’s first formal proposal for a meeting “to initiate negotiations on the settlement of Jammu and Kashmir in terms of Article 6 of the Simla Agreement” was made in a letter which prime minister Nawaz Sharif wrote on July 14, 1992 to prime minister Narsimha Rao after militancy had erupted in Kashmir.
On Oct 28, 1993, the US assistant secretary of state Robin Raphel said: “It is a simple fact that the Simla Agreement has not been very effective up to this point … it’s fine to discuss the Kashmir dispute under the Simla accord, but it needs to happen and it hasn’t thus far. Therefore … it has not been very effective” — 20 years after it was concluded, an eloquent comment on its irrelevance to a solution.
The agreed text of the Agra Declaration of July 16, 2001, on which the Vajpayee government backed out, did not make even a ritual obeisance to the Simla pact either in the preamble or in the text proper. The pact was now history. The provisions on restoration of the status quo before the war were worked out. The rest fell by the wayside.
The UN Charter did not preserve global peace. The US — Soviet balance of power did that contrary to the myth, it is not the Simla Agreement which preserved the peace between Pakistan and India in these last 40 years but the good sense of their leaders and the military balance, including the nuclear deterrent.
The crises of Exercise Brasstacks (1987), the military build-up (1990), Kargil (1999) and India’s massing of troops along the Line of Control in Kashmir in 2001-2002 and along the international boundary were resolved by sensible diplomacy and also a measure of international mediation sought and accepted by both sides. So much for the bilateral cordon sanitaire of the agreement.
Gen Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh did not chant the mantra “Simla, Simla as they made such impressive progress in the talks from 2004-2007. In the days ahead it is not that accord of 1972 but the understanding that grew up between the leaders and completion of the unfinished work, which the two countries so courageously undertook since 2004, that will help in arriving at a settlement of the Kashmir dispute which the people yearn for; especially the hapless people of Kashmir.
The writer is an author and a lawyer based in Mumbai.
At Simla Bhutto and Indira were cautious in handling the situation. Both were aware of the people who would question their political prudence in dealing with the problems. While Indira feared a vocal parliament and an unfriendly opposition, Bhutto had to be more careful about the situation at home. Official level talks were held but no side was prepared to budge; various formats were discussed but without result. In the evening of the first day Mrs Gandhi hosted a dinner but none spoke on the issues. Everybody at Simla appeared depressed.
On July 1, 1972, Bhutto and Indira held a meeting with their respective delegations — prominent among them were Indian foreign minister Swaran Singh, and Foreign Secretary Triloki Nath Kaul; Pakistan’s Secretary General Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmad, and Foreign Secretary, Aftab Ahmad — presumably to find some mechanism or the basis of further talks in a bid to break the ice. At the end, it appeared that no result had been achieved. By now it had become evident that the summit was moving towards a deadlock. Bhutto sensed it immediately and spelled out his intentions clearly: “We are not going to shut it.”
July 2, presumably the last day meant for the summit, was a hectic day as members of both the teams worked hard to draft a declaration denoting the outcome: whether it was to be a deadlock or whether there would be some breakthrough. The main point was preparation of the text of the declaration.
In the evening a dinner had been hosted; as soon as it finished both the leaders set off for a stroll on the breezy lawns of Simla Governor House. It was a one-to-one meeting. After some time, the two leaders returned to the main hall and called the officials. Here too, no one was allowed to join. The text of the agreement had been vaguely drafted earlier and now a final touch was to be given. India’s P N Dhar and Pakistan’s Aziz Ahmad sat over the draft. A document was read out to both the leaders and, after making some changes, this was finally accepted and consequently set for signatures. Finally, the rest of the participants were called in to witness the ceremony. The accord was signed at 40 minutes past midnight on the morning of July 3, 1972, (erroneously mentioned in historical documents as July 2).
The most important point in the accord was that no settlement had been reached on the Kashmir issue, but it mentioned ‘a final solution of Jammu and Kashmir’ as one of the outstanding questions for settlement. Secondly, it stated that ‘the Line of Control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations’.
The agreement did not make any mention of POWs; however, after the second agreement signed at Delhi, two years later, India released over 93,000 POWs including 195 accused of war crimes.
At Simla, the 17-point agreement reaffirmed the principles and purposes of the Charter of United Nations to ‘govern the relations between the two countries.’ It also emphasised the importance of the use of peaceful means, ‘…the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means by bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organisation, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peace and harmonious relations’.
A more important issue, which was the point of delay between the two leaders, was ‘the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedevilled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means’ — an obvious pointer to the Kashmir dispute. It was also agreed that ‘Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their sides of the international border … the withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days. The agreement will have to be ratified by both the countries and will come into force as soon as documents of ratification are exchanged’.
It also mentioned such steps that could restore and normalise relations between the two countries other than political issues. These were: ‘cooperation in communications, postal & telegraphic services, facilitaing sea, land (including border posts) and air links and over-flights. Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the (two) countries. Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible. Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted.’
How did both the leaders agree to reach the agreement in the last moments and what brought such a sudden change in their policy which could not be resolved in three days? This was an intriguing mystery and political observers and analysts mulled over this question for quite some time.
The following is an excerpt from a declassified document released online by America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as part of a searchable database on its website Reading Room. Declassified documents were previously only available to the public at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland.
In a weekly summary compiled by the Office of Current Intelligence and dated 19 February 1972, Pakistan gets a mention in an analysis of then President Zulfikar Bhutto and threat he faces from the military.
The author of the document prepared by US officials maintains (on page 12) that Bhutto has moved “skilfully” to gain public support in his first weeks in office, but that he is beginning to feel the burden of economic discontent and social agitation.
“Civilian demands are coupled with competing claims from the military for a larger share of economic resources. Bhutto’s decisions will be closely scrutinised by the army, which remains the strongest organised element in Pakistan and may be tempted to seize power again if Bhutto falters.”
The report also highlights Bhutto’s continuation of martial law as “one of the most contentious issues” for his government.
The report reads, “His [Bhutto’s] unwillingness to set a definite date antagonises his political opponents, who realise that government by proclamation gives Bhutto time to consolidate his power.Furthermore, retention of extraordinary powers could enable Bhutto to present the national assembly, when eventually summoned, with a fait accompli on a variety of controversial matters that the assembly might not readily accept, despite the substantial majority of his Pakistan’s People’s Party.”
“Consequently, disparate political opposition groups appear to be coalescing around Wali Khan’s National Awamy Party/Revisionist. They are united at least momentarily by a determination to press Bhutto to set a date for convening the national assembly and begin drafting a new constitution.”
Along with the political complexities, the intelligence report also highlights the “faltering economy”.
It notes that the loss of the East Pakistan market and the halt in new foreign aid have contributed to the growing uncertainty, production cutbacks, labour unrest, and crippling strikes.
“The business community is particularly unhappy with the labour unrest, while labour, which enthusiastically jumped on the anti-industrialist bandwagon started by President Bhutto, is unhappy with the recently announced limited labour reforms by the government.”
The abovementioned document is part of a database of 930,000 previously-confidential files released by the CIA on January 17, 2017. The CIA had disseminated historical declassified documents to its CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) since 1999.
khalidriazblog 