Context of ‘1987: Pakistan Secretly Builds Nuclear Weapon’

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May 18, 1974: India Tests First Nuclear Device

India detonates a nuclear device in an underground facility. The device had been built using material supplied for its ostensibly peaceful nuclear program by the United States, France, and Canada. The test, and this aspect of India’s nuclear program, is unauthorized by global control mechanisms. India portrays the test as a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” and says it is “firmly committed” to using nuclear technology for only peaceful purposes.
Kissinger: ‘Fait Accompli’ – Pakistan, India’s regional opponent, is extremely unhappy with the test, which apparently confirms India’s military superiority. Due to the obvious difficulties producing its own nuclear bomb, Pakistan first tries to find a diplomatic solution. It asks the US to provide it with a nuclear umbrella, without much hope of success. Relations between Pakistan and the US, once extremely close, have been worsening for some years. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tells Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington that the test is “a fait accompli and that Pakistan would have to learn to live with it,” although he is aware this is a “little rough” on the Pakistanis.
No Punishment – No sanctions are imposed on India, or the countries that sold the technology to it, and they continue to help India’s nuclear program. Pakistani foreign minister Agha Shahi will later say that, if Kissinger had replied otherwise, Pakistan would have not started its own nuclear weapons program and that “you would never have heard of A. Q. Khan.” Shahi also points out to his colleagues that if Pakistan does build a bomb, then it will probably not suffer any sanctions either.
Pakistan Steps up Nuclear Program – Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto then decides that his country must respond to this “grave and serious threat” by making its own nuclear weapons. He steps up Pakistan’s nuclear research efforts in a quest to build a bomb, a quest that will be successful by the mid-1980s (see 1987). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 11-14; ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 39-40]

1981: Pakistan Begins Digging Tunnels for Nuclear Program; Work Noticed by India, Israel

At some time in 1981, Pakistan begins digging some tunnels under the Ras Koh mountains. The work is apparently related to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, which begins preparation for a cold test of a nuclear weapon this year (see Shortly After May 1, 1981). This work is noticed by both India and Israel, who also see other signs that work is continuing on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Tunnels in these mountains will be used when Pakistan tests nuclear weapons in 1998 (see May 28, 1998). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 86, 275]

1985: Secretary of State Schulz Says Pakistan Will Not Get Bomb, but Knows They Already Have Nuclear Program

George Schulz, secretary of state in the Reagan administration, says, “We have full faith in [Pakistan’s] assurance that they will not make the bomb.” However, the US, including the State Department, is already aware that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program (see 1983 and August 1985-October 1990). [GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007]

August 1985-October 1990: White House Defies Congress and Allows Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program to Progress

In 1985, US Congress passes legislation requiring US economic sanctions on Pakistan unless the White House can certify that Pakistan has not embarked on a nuclear weapons program (see August 1985 and August 1985). The White House certifies this every year until 1990 (see 1987-1989). However, it is known all the time that Pakistan does have a continuing nuclear program. For instance, in 1983 a State Department memo said Pakistan clearly has a nuclear weapons program that relies on stolen European technology. Pakistan successfully builds a nuclear bomb in 1987 but does not test it to keep it a secret (see 1987). With the Soviet-Afghan war ending in 1989, the US no longer relies on Pakistan to contain the Soviet Union. So in 1990 the Pakistani nuclear program is finally recognized and sweeping sanctions are applied (see June 1989). [GANNON, 2005]Journalist Seymour Hersh will comment, “The certification process became farcical in the last years of the Reagan Administration, whose yearly certification—despite explicit American intelligence about Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons program—was seen as little more than a payoff to the Pakistani leadership for its support in Afghanistan.” [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993] The government of Pakistan will keep their nuclear program a secret until they successfully test a nuclear weapon in 1998 (see May 28, 1998).

1987: Pakistan Secretly Builds Nuclear Weapon

Pakistan successfully builds a nuclear weapon around this year. The bomb is built largely thanks to the illegal network run by A. Q. Khan. Pakistan will not actually publicly announce this or test the bomb until 1998 (see May 28, 1998), partly because of a 1985 US law imposing sanctions on Pakistan if it were to develop nuclear weapons (see August 1985-October 1990). [HERSH, 2004, PP. 291]However, Khan will tell a reporter the program has been successful around this time (see March 1987).

March 1987: A. Q. Khan Says Pakistan Has Nuclear Weapons, then Retracts Claims

A. Q. Khan. [Source: CBC]A. Q. Khan, father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, tells an Indian reporter that the program has been successful (see 1987). “What the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct,” he says, adding, “They told us Pakistan could never produce the bomb and they doubted my capabilities, but they now know we have it.” He says that Pakistan does not want to use the bomb, but “if driven to the wall there will be no option left.” The comments are made during a major Indian army exercise known as Brass Tacks that Pakistanis consider a serious threat, as it is close to the Pakistani border. In fact, at one point the Indian commanding general is reported to consider actually attacking Pakistan—an attack that would be a sure success given India’s conventional superiority. According to reporter Seymour Hersh, the purpose of the interview is “to convey a not very subtle message to the Indians: any attempt to dismember Pakistan would be countered with the bomb.” This interview is an embarrassment to the US government, which aided Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan War, but has repeatedly claimed Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons (see August 1985-October 1990). Khan retracts his remarks a few days later, saying he was tricked by the reporter. [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

June 1989: Bush Administration Decides to Cut Off Aid to Pakistan over Nuclear Weapons Program Next Year

President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker decide that the US will cut off foreign aid to Pakistan because of its nuclear weapons program. Pakistan was a major recipient of foreign aid during the Soviet Afghan war, when the US channeled support to the mujaheddin through it, but Soviet forces began withdrawing from Afghanistan in February (see February 15, 1989). It is decided that aid will be provided for 1989, but not for 1990 (see October 1990). [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]

August 4, 1989: Analyst of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program Alleged to Be ‘Security Risk’ and Fired from Pentagon

Richard Barlow, an analyst who has repeatedly insisted that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program (see July 1987 or Shortly After and Mid-1989), is fired from his position at the Pentagon. Barlow will later say, “They told me they had received credible information that I was a security risk.” When he asks why he is thought to be a security risk, “They said they could not tell me as the information was classified,” but “senior Defense Department officials” are said to have “plenty of evidence.” His superiors think he might leak information about Pakistan’s nuclear program to congressmen in favor of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He spends the next eighteen months in the Pentagon personnel pool, under surveillance by security officers. Apparently, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby and two officials who work for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz are involved in the sacking. It is also rumored that Barlow is a Soviet spy. Barlow’s conclusions about Pakistan’s nuclear program are unpopular with some, because if the US admitted the nuclear program existed, this would lead to a break between the US and Pakistan and endanger US aid to the anti-Soviet mujaheddin and US arms sales (see August 1985-October 1990 and August-September 1989). After he is fired, rumors are started saying that Barlow is a tax evader, alcoholic, adulterer, and in psychiatric care. As his marriage guidance counseling is alleged to be cover for the psychiatric care, the Pentagon insists that investigators be allowed to interview his marriage guidance counselor. Due to this and other problems, his wife leaves him and files for divorce. [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993; GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007] Barlow will later be exonerated by various investigations (see May 1990 and Before September 1993).

Fall 1990: US Tells Pakistan to Destroy Nuclear Weapon Cores, but It Does Not Do So

In a letter handed to Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, the US demands that Pakistan destroy the cores of its nuclear weapons, thus disabling the weapons. Pakistan does not do so. The US then imposes sanctions on Pakistan (see October 1990), such as cutting off US aid to it, due to the nuclear weapons program. However, it softens the blow by waiving some of the restrictions (see 1991-1992). [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993] The US has known about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program for some time, but continued to support the Pakistanis during the Soviet-Afghan War (see August 1985-October 1990).

October 1990: US Imposes Sanctions on Pakistan

Since 1985, US Congress has required that sanctions be imposed on Pakistan if there is evidence that Pakistan is developing a nuclear weapons program (see August 1985-October 1990). With the Soviet-Afghan war over, President Bush finally acknowledges widespread evidence of Pakistan’s nuclear program and cuts off all US military and economic aid to Pakistan. However, it appears some military aid will still get through. For instance, in 1992, Senator John Glenn will write, “Shockingly, testimony by Secretary of State James Baker this year revealed that the administration has continued to allow Pakistan to purchase munitions through commercial transactions, despite the explicit, unambiguous intent of Congress that ‘no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan.’” [INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 6/26/1992] These sanctions will be officially lifted a short time after 9/11.

September 10, 1996: UN Adopts Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; US First to Sign

The United Nations adopts the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) banning the testing of nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly votes 158-3 to adopt the CTBT, with India (see June 20, 1996), Bhutan, and Libya voting against it, and Cuba, Lebanon, Syria, Mauritius, and Tanzania abstaining. US President Bill Clinton will be the first to sign the treaty, followed by 70 other nations, including Britain, China, France, and Russia. By November 1997, 148 nations will sign the treaty. [NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, 4/2003; FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, 12/18/2007] In 1999, the Times of India will observe that from the US’s viewpoint, the CTBT will primarily restrict India and Pakistan from continuing to develop their nuclear arsenals (see May 11-13, 1998 and May 28, 1998), and will delay or prevent China from developing more technologically advanced “miniaturized” nuclear weapons such as the US already has. It will also “prevent the vertical proliferation and technological refinement of existing arsenals by the other four nuclear weapons states.” [TIMES OF INDIA, 10/16/1999] Two years later, the US Senate will refuse to ratify the treaty (see October 13, 1999).

May 11-13, 1998: India Tests Five Nuclear Devices

India, which has refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) banning nuclear testing (see September 10, 1996), shocks the world by testing five nuclear devices over the course of three days. The largest is a 42-kiloton thermonuclear device. [FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, 12/18/2007] India’s rival Pakistan will conduct its own nuclear tests two weeks later (see May 28, 1998). Indian political scientist and nuclear critic Kanti Bajpai will later say: “Whatever Indians say officially, there is a status attached to the bomb. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council are all nuclear powers.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/4/2003]

May 28, 1998: Pakistan Tests Nuclear Bomb

Pakistan’s first nuclear test take place underground but shakes the mountains above it. [Source: Associated Press]Pakistan conducts a successful nuclear test. Former Clinton administration official Karl Inderfurth later notes that concerns about an Indian-Pakistani conflict, or even nuclear confrontation, compete with efforts to press Pakistan on terrorism. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003] Pakistan actually built its first nuclear weapon in 1987 but kept it a secret and did not test it until this time for political reasons (see 1987). In announcing the tests, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declares, “Today, we have settled the score.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/4/2003]

May 30, 1998: Pakistan Conducts Last of Six Nuclear Bomb Tests, Plutonium Possibly Used

Pakistan conducts the sixth and last of a series of nuclear bomb tests that started two days earlier (see May 28, 1998). Samples taken by US aircraft over the site indicate that the test may have involved plutonium, whereas uranium bombs were used for the other five. After the US learns that the tests are witnessed by Kang Thae Yun, a North Korean involved in that country’s proliferation network (see Early June 1998), and other North Korean officials, it will speculate that the final test was performed by Pakistan for North Korea, which is better known for its plutonium bomb program. Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will comment, “In terms of nuclear readiness, this placed North Korea far ahead of where the CIA had thought it was, since [North Korea] had yet to conduct any hot tests of its own.” [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 278]

July 1998: US Unfreezes Agricultural Aid to Pakistan

The US again begins to provide agricultural aid to Pakistan, although its provision had been frozen in the wake of Pakistani nuclear weapons tests in May (see May 28, 1998 and May 30, 1998). The US will again begin to provide military and technological assistance three months later (see October 1998). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 286]

July 15, 1998: Rumsfeld’s Ballistic Missile Committee Says Chief Threat to US Is from Iran, Iraq, and North Korea

Congressional conservatives receive a second “alternative assessment” of the nuclear threat facing the US that is far more to their liking than previous assessments (see December 23, 1996). A second “Team B” panel (see November 1976), the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, led by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and made up of neoconservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz and Stephen Cambone, finds that, contrary to earlier findings, the US faces a growing threat from rogue nations such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, who can, the panel finds, inflict “major destruction on the US within about five years of a decision.” This threat is “broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly” than previously believed. The Rumsfeld report also implies that either Iran or North Korea, or perhaps both, have already made the decision to strike the US with nuclear weapons. Although Pakistan has recently tested nuclear weapons (see May 28, 1998), it is not on the list. Unfortunately for the integrity and believability of the report, its methodology is flawed in the same manner as the previous “Team B” reports (see November 1976); according to author J. Peter Scoblic, the report “assume[s] the worst about potential US enemies without actual evidence to support those assumptions.” Defense analyst John Pike is also displeased with the methodology of the report. Pike will later write: “Rather than basing policy on intelligence estimates of what will probably happen politically and economically and what the bad guys really want, it’s basing policy on that which is not physically impossible. This is really an extraordinary epistemological conceit, which is applied to no other realm of national policy, and if manifest in a single human being would be diagnosed as paranoia.” [GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007; SCOBLIC, 2008, PP. 172-173] Iran, Iraq, and North Korea will be dubbed the “Axis of Evil” by George W. Bush in his 2002 State of the Union speech (see January 29, 2002).

October 1998: US Unfreezes Military and Technological Assistance to Pakistan

The US again begins to provide Pakistan with military and technological aid, which had been frozen in the wake of Pakistani tests of nuclear weapons in May (see May 28, 1998 and May 30, 1998). The US also froze agricultural aid after the tests, but began to provide it again in July (see July 1998). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 286]

December 2, 1998: Clinton Meets Pakistani Leader but Bin Laden Not Top Priority

Nawaz Sharif meeting with US Defense Secretary William Cohen at the Pentagon on December 3, 1998. [Source: US Department of Defense]Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif comes to Washington to meet with President Clinton and other top Clinton administration officials. The number one issue for Clinton is Pakistan’s nuclear program, since Pakistan had recently illegally developed and exploded a nuclear weapon (see May 28, 1998). The second most important issue is Pakistan’s economy; the US wants Pakistan to support free trade agreements. The third most important issue is terrorism and Pakistan’s support for bin Laden. Author Steve Coll will later note, “When Clinton himself met with Pakistani leaders, his agenda list always had several items, and bin Laden never was at the top. Afghanistan’s war fell even further down.” Sharif proposes to Clinton that the CIA train a secret Pakistani commando team to capture bin Laden. The US and Pakistan go ahead with this plan, even though most US officials involved in the decision believe it has almost no chance for success. They figure there is also little risk or cost involved, and it can help build ties between American and Pakistani intelligence. The plan will later come to nothing (see October 1999). [COLL, 2004, PP. 441-444]

March 14, 2003: President Bush Waives Last Remaining US Sanctions on Pakistan

President Bush waives the last set of US sanctions against Pakistan. The US imposed a new series of sanctions against Pakistan in 1998, after Pakistan exploded a nuclear weapon (see May 28, 1998), and in 1999, when President Pervez Musharraf overthrew a democratically elected government (see October 12, 1999). The lifted sanctions had prohibited the export of US military equipment and military assistance to a country whose head of government has been deposed. Some other sanctions were waived shortly after 9/11. Bush’s move comes as Musharraf is trying to decide whether or not to support a US-sponsored United Nations resolution which could start war with Iraq. It also comes two weeks after 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was captured in Pakistan (see February 29 or March 1, 2003). [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 3/14/2003]

http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a87paksgetnukes&scale=1#a87paksgetnukes

A leaf from history: Defending Kahuta

SHAIKH AZIZPUBLISHED JUL 26, 2015 07:16AM

In early 1984, based on some reports the Pakistani authorities got convinced that India, in collusion with Israel, had planned to tear down Pakistan’s nascent nuclear research facility in Kahuta. The Indians and the Israelis had reportedly propagated the fear that Pakistan was building an “Islamic” bomb, which could be used by a Muslim country or even by some terrorist organisation, to unleash terror and endanger the entire human race. Even in the midst of domestic pressures and politics in Pakistan, this was an emergency like no other.

Pakistan’s nuclear programme began in earnest in 1975, a year after India detonated its first nuclear device in Pokhran. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto drew nuclear scientist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan from the Almelo Uranium Enrichment Facility, Netherlands and asked him to undertake a similar nuclear project for Pakistan.

Bhutto had initially deputed Dr Khan to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), which was headed by Munir Ahmad at the time. Owing to differences in perception between Khan and Ahmad, no progress could be made that year.

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As India, Israel plan attack on Kahuta, Pakistan threatens to retaliate with attack on Indian nuclear research facility

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The prime minister wanted greater strides forward, at a more rapid pace: in July 1976, Dr Khan was installed in an autonomous position, tasked with creating a uranium enrichment project. The words uttered by Bhutto at the time still reverberate inside the corridors of power: “Pakistanis would eat grass but they will make their bomb.” Dr Khan would now be answerable to the prime minister alone.

With Bhutto’s unequivocal backing, Dr Khan began by first establishing the Engineering Research Laboratories in Kahuta. The project was launched on July 31, 1976, and within five years, it was taken to fruition. On May 1, 1981, in recognition of his services, the facility was renamed Dr A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory.

But was the facility secure from foreign attack?

As it turned out, protecting Kahuta became a key priority after the Pakistani government realised that it had left its most sensitive installation vulnerable to attack.

In 1979, as reports surfaced that India might attack the research facility in Kahuta, Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) General Ziaul Haq sought the counsel of Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal Anwar Shamim regarding available options to beef up security. But the prognosis received was not encouraging: “The Indian aircraft can reach the facility in three minutes whereas the PAF would take eight minutes,” said the air chief, “[This will] allow the Indians to attack the facility and return before the PAF can defend it.”

Because Kahuta was close to the Pakistan-India border, it was decided that the best way to deter an Indian attack would be to upgrade air defence and procure new, advanced fighter jets and weaponry for the purpose. If India did go ahead and attack Kahuta, the new aircraft could be used to mount a retaliatory attack on India’s nuclear research facilities in Trombay. The generals decided that the most suitable aircraft for the purpose would be the F-16 Fighting Falcon.

In ordinary times, Pakistan might not have received these modern aircraft, but the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan had allowed Pakistan to leverage its relationship with the United States to its benefit. As part of the assistance being provided to Pakistan, the Americans had offered $400 million in assistance. Gen Zia had flatly rejected the proposed first tranche, calling it “peanuts” and not reflective of the costs being incurred by Pakistan on the war.

But the year 1983 opened with an appreciable gesture, when the US began sending military hardware to Pakistan. Initially, the US offered F-5Es and 5-Gs aircraft which Pakistan refused. Later the US agreed to sell F-16s; an agreement was inked in December 1981, whereby America was to sell 40 F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan. The first batch of three F-16 fighter jets reached Pakistan on Jan 15, 1983.

Meanwhile, a new phase of Indo-Israel bilateral ties had also begun, whereby the two countries were to extensively cooperate in all fields. Israel now wanted to eliminate Pakistan’s nuclear capability, like it did in Osiraq, Iraq in 1981. In their book Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Nuclear Conspiracy (2007), noted investigative journalists Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott Clark reveal that Indian military officials secretly travelled to Israel in Feb 1983 to buy equipment that could neutralise Kahuta’s air defences.

The plan that India and Israel finally settled on took on an operation mode: Israel would attack Kahuta from Indian bases, with Levy and Clark claiming that Indira Gandhi signed off on the Israeli-led operation in March, 1984. With tensions simmering, India and Israel were forced to back off after the US State Department warned India that “the US will be responsive if India persists.”

But this retreat did not owe it all to the American response; Pakistan also sent out messages through world capitals that if India were to attack Pakistan’s nuclear facility in Kahuta, the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Trombay will be attacked in retaliation and the magnitude of devastation would be far greater than in Pakistan.

Air Marshal M. Anwar Shamim, during the launch of his memoirs Cutting age PAF: a former air chief’s reminiscences of a developing air force (2010), narrated that while talk of the India-Israel nexus was still in the air, he requested Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan to declare at an appropriate time Pakistan’s intention of retaliating if any action was taken against the country’s nuclear assets.

During this time, Munir Hussain, the then secretary of science and technology, told his Indian counterpart at a science conference that there would be absolute devastation if India undertook such an attack. “No brother, we know your capability and we will not undertake such a mission,” was the reply received from the Indian delegate

But perhaps even more emphatic was the communication between the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre: Islamabad would attack Mumbai if Kahuta was attacked. The threat of retaliation was perhaps the biggest and the most effective deterrent needed.

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, July 26th, 2015

https://www.dawn.com/news/1195904

Nuclear Pakistan

Nuclear

Last Updated: April, 2016

In the mid-1970s Pakistan embarked upon the uranium enrichment route to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, shortly after India‘s nuclear tests, declaring itself a nuclear weapon state. Pakistan currently possesses a growing nuclear arsenal, and remains outside both the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Capabilities

Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris characterize Pakistan as having, “the world’s fastest-growing nuclear stockpile.” [1] According to the SIPRI 2015 Yearbook, Pakistan possesses between 100 and 120 nuclear weapons. [2] However, the International Panel on Fissile Materials concluded in 2015 that Pakistan possesses fissile material sufficient for over 200 weapons. Islamabad has stockpiled approximately 3.1 ± .4 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and produces enough HEU for perhaps 10 to 15 warheads per year. Pakistan currently has a stockpile of about 190 kg of weapons-grade plutonium, with the ability to produce approximately 12 to 24 kg per year. In addition, the Chashma reprocessing plant is nearing completion, which the IPFM estimated in 2015 would expand Pakistan’s plutonium production capability by 50-100 kg per year. [3] Pakistan has completed work on all four reactors at the Khushab facility, where the Khan Research Laboratories greatly increased its HEU production capacity by employing more efficient P-3 and P-4 gas centrifuges. Satellite imagery of the fourth and last reactor at Khushab from January 2015 verified the complete external construction, including the presence of steam, a signature of its operation. [4]

History

Establishing a Nuclear Program: 1956 to 1974
Pakistan asserts the origin of its nuclear weapons program lies in its adversarial relationship with India; the two countries have engaged in several conflicts, centered mainly on the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan began working on a nuclear program in the late 1950s,and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was established in 1956. [5] President Z.A. Bhutto forcefully advocated the nuclear option and famously said in 1965 that “if India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.” [6] After the December 1971 defeat in the conflict with India, Bhutto issued a directive instructing the country’s nuclear establishment to build a nuclear device within three years. [7] Although the PAEC had already created a taskforce to work on a nuclear weapon in March 1974, India’s first test of a nuclear bomb in May 1974 played a significant role in motivating Pakistan to build its own. [8]

A.Q. Khan’s Contribution: 1975 to 1998
The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, headed by Munir Ahmad Khan, focused on the plutonium route to nuclear weapons development using material from the safeguardedKarachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), but its progress was inefficient due to the constraints imposed by the nuclear export controls applied in the wake of India’s nuclear test. [9] Around 1975 A.Q. Khan, a metallurgist working at a subsidiary of the URENCO enrichment corporation in the Netherlands, returned to Pakistan to help his country develop a uranium enrichment program. [10] Having brought centrifuge designs and business contacts back with him to Pakistan, Khan used various tactics, such as buying individual components rather than complete units, to evade export controls and acquire the necessary equipment. [11] By the early 1980s, Pakistan had a clandestine uranium enrichment facility, and A.Q. Khan would later assert that the country had acquired the capability to assemble a first-generation nuclear device as early as 1984. [12]

Pakistan also received assistance from states, especially China. Beginning in the late 1970s Beijing provided Islamabad with various levels of nuclear and missile-related assistance, including centrifuge equipment, warhead designs, HEU, components of various missile systems, and technical expertise. [13] Eventually, from the 1980s onwards, the Khan network diversified its activities and illicitly transferred nuclear technology and expertise to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. [14] The Khan network was officially dismantled in 2004, although questions still remain concerning the extent of the Pakistani political and military establishment’s involvement in the network’s activities. [15]

Pakistan as a Declared Nuclear Power: 1998 to the Present
On May 11 and 13, 1998, India conducted a total of five nuclear explosions, which Pakistan felt pressured to respond to in kind. [16] Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif decided to test, and Pakistan detonated five explosions on May 28 and a sixth on May 30, 1998. In a post-test announcement Sharif stressed that the test was a necessary response to India, and that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were only “in the interest of national self-defense… to deter aggression, whether nuclear or conventional.” [17]

With these tests Pakistan abandoned its nuclear ambiguity, stating that it would maintain a “credible minimum deterrent” against India. [18] In 1998, Pakistan commissioned its first plutonium production reactor at Khushab, which is capable of producing approximately 11 kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually. [19] Through analysis of the cooling system of the heavy water reactors at Khushab, Tamara Patton, of the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, estimated the thermal capacity and thus the plutonium production capacity of Khushab-2 and Khushab-3 to be around 15 kg and 18 kg of plutonium, respectively, per year. [20] Satellite imagery of the fourth plutonium production reactor at Khushab appeared complete and operational as of January 2015. [21] Patton estimates that “if Khushab-4 has at least an equivalent thermal capacity as Khushab-3, the entire complex could be capable of producing 64 kg of plutonium per year or enough fissile materialfor anywhere from 8–21 new warheads per year depending on their design.” [22] Associated facilities and their associated security perimeters are also being expanded, including the plutonium separation facilities at New Labs, Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology, to reprocess spent fuel from the new reactors at Khushab. [23]

Islamabad has yet to formally declare a nuclear doctrine, so it remains unclear under what conditions Pakistan might use nuclear weapons. [24] In 2002 then- President Pervez Musharraf stated that, “nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India,” and would only be used if “the very existence of Pakistan as a state” was at stake. General Khalid Kidwai further elaborated that this could include Indian conquest of Pakistan’s territory or military, “economic strangling,” or “domestic destabilization.” [25] Because of India’s conventional military superiority, Pakistan maintains the ability to quickly escalate to the use of nuclear weapons in case of a conventional Indian military attack. [26]

In October 2015, Islamabad declared that it had developed tactical nuclear weapons. The Pakistani government has clarified that these would be used only in the event of a conflict with India. However, even though Pakistan had been suspected of building tactical nuclear weapons for many years, the official announcement has caused concern within the international community, especially in the United States. The weapons’ small size and yield have ignited concern over their possible destabilizing effects in a potential conflict with India. [27]

Disarmament and Nonproliferation Policies

Pakistan is not a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and is the sole country blocking negotiations of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Pakistanis argue that in the face of India’s increasing conventional capability, it is unreasonable to expect Pakistan to cap its fissile materials production. Furthermore, Pakistan argues that the FMCT legitimizes India’s fissile material stocks. [28] At the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in January 2011, Pakistan reiterated its opposition to the commencement of negotiations towards an FMCT. [29] While declaring its opposition to the FMCT in its current format at the CD in January 2010, Islamabad called for the CD’s agenda to be enlarged to consider aspects of regional conventional arms control and a regime on missile-related issues, while also maintaining its opposition to a treaty that did not cover fissile stocks retroactively. [30]

In general, Pakistan’s position on nuclear disarmament is that it will only give up nuclear weapons if India gives up its own nuclear arsenal, and in 2011 the National Command Authority “reiterated Pakistan’s desire to constructively contribute to the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons.” [31] However, given Islamabad’s objective of balancing India’s conventional military and nuclear superiority, Pakistan is unlikely to consent to a denuclearization agreement. [32] Islamabad has also consistently refused to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and from 2009 to 2010 official Pakistani statements indicated that even if India signed the treaty, Islamabad would not necessarily follow suit. [33]

Pakistan is a member of some multilateral programs, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Islamabad has also put into place more stringent export controlmechanisms, including the 2004 Export Control Act and the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) to regulate exports of nuclear, biological, and missile-related products. [34] The Export Control (Licensing and Enforcement) Rules were published in 2009, and in July 2011 Islamabad issued an updated control list including nuclear and missile-related dual-use goods to bring its restrictions in line with those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Australia Group (AG). [35] Pakistan acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in 2000. Additionally, Pakistan has been involved in the U.S. government’s Secure Freight Initiative through the stationing of systems at Port Qasim to scan containers for nuclear and radiological materials. [36]

Nuclear Weapons Security

The security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons has been of significant concern to the international community in recent years, with increased terrorist and insurgent violence and expanded geographical areas of the country under Taliban control. Sparked by al-Qaeda affiliate Abu Yahya al-Libi’s pamphlet, “Sharpening the Blades of Battle Against the Government and Army of Pakistan,” in early 2009 forums associated with al-Qaeda called for attacks on Pakistani nuclear facilities in order that the the group might gain control of the weapons. In June 2009, Saaed al-Masri, allegedly Al-Qaeda’s chief of finance, expressed hope that the Pakistani Taliban would gain control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and use the weapons against the United States. [37] Such developments increase the likelihood of scenarios in which Pakistan’s nuclear security is put at risk. Since 2007, Taliban-linked groups have successfully attacked tightly guarded government and military targets in the country. Militants carried out small-scale attacks outside the Minhas (Kamra) Air Force Base in 2007, 2008, and 2009, and gained access to the site during a two-hour gunfight in August 2012. [38] Pakistani officials have repeatedly denied claims that the base, which houses the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, is also used to store nuclear weapons, and a retired army official asserted that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are stored separately from known military bases. [39] However, several Pakistani nuclear facilities, including the Khushab facility and the Gadwal uranium enrichment plant, are in proximity to areas under attack from the Taliban. [40] Additionally, there have been attempts to kidnap officials and technicians working at nuclear sites in western Pakistan, although suspected parties and intentions are unclear. [41]

Nevertheless, Islamabad has consistently asserted that it has control over its nuclear weapons, and that it is impossible for groups such as the Taliban or proliferation networks to gain access to the country’s nuclear facilities or weapons. After September 11, 2001 and the exposure of the A.Q. Khan network, Pakistan has taken measures to strengthen the security of its nuclear weapons and installations and to improve its nuclear command and control system. [42] The National Command Authority (NCA), composed of key civilian and military leaders, is the main supervisory and policy-making body controlling Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and maintains ultimate authority on their use. [43] In November 2009, then-Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari announced that he was transferring his role as head of the National Command Authority to the Prime Minister, Yusuf Gilani. [44] The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) is the secretariat of the NCA, and is responsible for operationalizing nuclear doctrine and strategy, managing nuclear safety and security, and implementing the command and control system. [45]

Pakistan has also strengthened its personnel reliability program (PRP) to prevent radicalized individuals from infiltrating the nuclear program, although various experts believe that potential gaps still exist. [46] Pakistani analysts and officials state that they have developed a version of “permissive action links” or PALs to safeguard the warheads, and have not relied on U.S. assistance for this technology. [47] Satellite imagery also shows increased security features around Khushab-4. [48] In recent years, the United States has provided various levels of assistance to Pakistan to strengthen the security of its nuclear program. [49] According to reports in April 2009, with the expansion of Taliban control in western Pakistan, Islamabad shared some highly classified information about its nuclear program with Western countries in order to reassure them of the country’s nuclear security. [50] At the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague in 2014, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced that Pakistan was considering ratifying the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). [51] On March 24, 2016, Pakistan announced that it had ratified the amendment. The amendment needs seven additional states to ratify it before it can enter into force. [52]

Civilian Nuclear Cooperation

Pakistan has been critical of the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement, but at the same time has periodically sought a similar arrangement for itself, a demand Washington has so far turned down. [53] In 2008 Islamabad pushed for a criteria-based exemption to the rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which unlike the country-based exception benefiting only India could have made Pakistan eligible for nuclear cooperation with NSG members. Despite its reservations about the India special exception, Islamabad joined other members of the Board of Governors in approving India’s safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in August 2008. [54] At the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010, Islamabad again sought “non-discriminatory access” to civilian nuclear technology, while also offering nuclear fuel cycleservices covered by IAEA safeguards to the international community. [55] At the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague in 2014, Pakistan called for its inclusion in international export control regimes. [56]

Recent Development and Current Status

In response to the U.S.-India deal, Pakistan has sought to increase its civilian nuclear cooperation with China. Under a previous cooperation framework China had supplied Pakistan with two pressurized water reactors, CHASNUPP-1 and CHASNUPP-2, which entered into commercial operation in 2000 and 2011 respectively. [57] In April 2010, reports confirmed long-standing rumors that the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) had agreed to supply two additional 650-MW power reactors to Pakistan, CHASNUPP-3 and CHASNUPP-4. [58]

With the four reactors at the Khushab facilities completed and in full operation, plutonium output can be estimated at 24-48 kg per year, with each reactor producing 6-12 kg. With the exception of the first reactor which generates 50 MWt, the remaining three reactors are estimated to be capable of producing double the amount of weapons-grade plutonium per year. [59]

Sources:
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[2] SIPRI Yearbook 2015 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015).
[3] “Global Fissile Material Report 2015,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, December 2015, http://www.fissilematerials.org.
[4] Mark Hibbs, “Pakistan Developed More Powerful Centrifuges,” Nuclear Fuel, January 29,  2007, 1, 15-16; Jeffrey Lewis, “P3 and P4 Centrifuge Data,” Arms Control Wonk, February 15, 2007, http://armscontrolwonk.com; David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, “Pakistan’s Fourth Reactor at Khushab Now Appears Operational,” Institute for Science and International Security, January 6, 2015, http://isis-online.org.
[5] “History of PAEC,” Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, December 13, 2011, http://www.paec.gov.pk/paec-hist.htm.
[6] Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).
[7] George Perkovich, “Could Anything Be Done to Stop Them? Lessons from Pakistan’s Proliferating Past,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War, Henry D. Sokolski, ed., (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008).
[8] Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks, (International Institute for Strategic Studies: London, 2007).
[9] Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 100.
[10] Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks, (International Institute for Strategic Studies: London, 2007).
[11] Bruno Tertrais, “Not a ‘Wal-Mart’, but an ‘Imports-Exports Enterprise’: Understanding the Nature of the A.Q. Khan Network,” Strategic Insights, Vol. VI, Issue 5, August 2007.
[12] “Interview with Abdul Qadeer Khan,” The News(Islamabad), May 30, 1998, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org.
[13] T.V. Paul, “Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Ties and the Balance of Power,” The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2003.
[14] Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007).
[15] Bruno Tertrais, “Kahn’s Nuclear Exports: Was There a State Strategy?” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War, Henry D. Sokolski, ed., (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008).
[16] Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam, “When Mountains Move – The Story of Chagai,” The Nation, http://www.defencejournal.com.
[17] “Text of Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif Statement at a Press Conference on Pakistan Nuclear Tests,” Islamabad, May 29, 1998, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org.
[18] Scott D. Sagan, “The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” in Inside Nuclear South Asia, Scott D. Sagan, ed., (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 219-220.
[19] Tamara Patton, “Combining Satellite Imagery and 3D Drawing Tools for Nonproliferation Analysis: A Case Study of Pakistan’s Khushab Plutonium Production Reactors,” Science & Global Security, 20:2-3, p. 137.
[20] Tamara Patton, “Combining Satellite Imagery and 3D Drawing Tools for Nonproliferation Analysis: A Case Study of Pakistan’s Khushab Plutonium Production Reactors,” Science & Global Security, 20:2-3, p. 137.
[21] David Albright and Robert Avagyan, “Construction Progressing Rapidly on the Fourth Heavy Water Reactor at the Khushab Nuclear Site,” Institute for Science and International Security, May 21, 2012, http://isis-online.org; David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, “Pakistan’s Fourth Reactor at Khushab Now Appears Operational,” Institute for Science and International Security, January 16, 2015, http://isis-online.org.
[22] This estimate will vary depending on operating time of each reactor. Tamara Patton, “Combining Satellite Imagery and 3D Drawing Tools for Nonproliferation Analysis: A Case Study of Pakistan’s Khushab Plutonium Production Reactors,” Science & Global Security, 20:2-3, p. 137.
[23] David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Pakistan Expanding Plutonium Separation Facility Near Rawalpindi,” Institute for Science and International Security, May 19, 2009, http://www.isis-online.org; David Albright and Robert Avagyan, “Construction Progressing Rapidly on the Fourth Heavy Water Reactor at the Khushab Nuclear Site,” Institute for Science and International Security, May 21, 2012, http://isis-online.org.
[24] Peter R. Lavoy, “Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War, Henry D. Sokolski, ed., (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008).
[25] Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 351-352.
[26] Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace?” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3, Winter 2009/10.
[27] Mohammad Ilyas Khan, “Why Pakistan Is Opening Up Over Its Nuclear Program,” BBC, October 21, 2015, http://www.bbc.com.
[28] Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 386.
[29] “Pakistan Warns against India Nuclear Support,” Dawn, January 25, 2011, http://www.dawn.com; Narayan Lakshman, “Top U.S. Official Says Pakistan Holding up FMCT Negotiations,” The Hindu, February 1, 2011; Brian Rose, “Bleak Outlook for 2011 Conference on Disarmament,” USIP Peace Brief 78, January 28, 2011, http://www.usip.org.
[30] “Pakistan Blocks Agenda at UN Disarmament Conference,” The Daily Times, January 20, 2010, http://www.dawn.com; “Pakistan Rejects Atom Bomb Material Cut-Off Talks, Cites Danger From India,” Reuters, January 25, 2010, http://www.reuters.com.
[31] “Pakistan Ready to Phase Out Nukes If India Does So,” The Daily Times, May 24, 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk; and National Command Authority Press Release No. PR166/2011-ISPR, Inter Services Public Relations, July 14, 2011, http://www.ispr.gov.pk.
[32] “Country Perspectives on the Challenges to Nuclear Disarmament,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2010, http://www.fissilematerials.org.
[33] “Pakistan Rules Out Test Ban Treaty Endorsement,” Global Security Newswire, June 19, 2009, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org; “No Proposal to Sign Nuclear Ban Treaty,” Global Security Newswire, January 1, 2010, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org.
[34] “Pakistan Joins Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Establishes Strategic Export Control Division,” International Export Control Observer, June/July 2007, p. 3, http://www.nonproliferation.org.
[35] IAEA, “Communication of October 17, 2011 from the Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the Agency concerning the Export Control Policies of the Government of Pakistan and a Statutory Regulatory Order,” INFCIRC/832, November 30, 2011, http://www.iaea.org.
[36] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Radiation Detection Testing Underway at Two Foreign Sea Ports,” Press Release, April 11, 2007, http://www.dhs.gov.
[37] Abdul Hameed Bakier, “Jihadis Discuss Plans to Seize Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal,” Terrorism Monitor, May 26, 2009, Vol. VII, Issue 14, pp. 4-5, http://www.jamestown.org; “Al-Qaeda Commander Threatens U.S.,” AlJazeera.Net, June 22, 2009, http://english.aljazeera.net.
[38] Declan Walsh, “Militants Attack Pakistani Air Force Base,” The New York Times, August 16, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com.
[39] Shaiq Hussain, “Militants Storm Pakistan Air Base; 10 Killed,” The Washington Post, August 15, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com.
[40] Simon Tisdall, “Pakistan Nuclear Projects Raise U.S. Fears,” The Guardian, May 3, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
[41] “Pakistan Nuclear Staff Go Missing,” BBC News, February 12, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk; “Pakistan ‘Nuclear Kidnap’ Foiled,” BBC News, January 15, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
[42] Michelle Marchesano, “Meeting the Nuclear Security Challenge in Pakistan,” Partnership for Global Security, Conference Report, April 2008, http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org.
[43] Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service Report RL 34248, November 30, 2011, http://www.fas.org.
[44] “NA Passes National Command Authority Bill 2009,” The Daily Times, January 29, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.
[45] Peter R. Lavoy, “Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War, Henry D. Sokolski, ed., (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008); Khalid Banuri and Adil Sultan, “Managing and Securing the Bomb,” The Daily Times, May 30, 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk.
[46] Peter Wonacott, “Inside Pakistan’s Drive to Guard Its A-Bombs,” The Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2007, http://online.wsj.com.
[47] Mark Thompson, “Does Pakistan’s Taliban Surge Raise a Nuclear Threat,” Time, April 24, 2009.
[48] David Albright and Robert Avagyan, “Construction Progressing Rapidly on the Fourth Heavy Water Reactor at the Khushab Nuclear Site,” Institute for Science and International Security, May 21, 2012, http://isis-online.org.
[49] Sharad Joshi and Togzhan Kassenova, “Pakistan and Cooperative Threat Reduction,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Issue Brief, August 4, 2008, http://www.nti.org.
[50] Farhan Bokhari and James Lamont, “Obama Says Pakistan Nukes in Safe Hands,” The Financial Times, April 29, 2009, http://www.ft.com.
[51] “Pakistan-PM Remarks at First Plenary Session on Mar 24, 2014,” Nuclear Security Summit 2014, March 24, 2014, http://www.nss2014.com.
[52] “Pakistan Deposits Instrument of Ratification of Amendment to Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in Vienna,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Government of Pakistan, March 24, 2016, http://www.mofa.gov.pk.
[53] Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Expectations for civilian nuclear deal dampened by US,” Dawn, April 9, 2010, http://www.dawn.com.
[54] “UN Endorses India-US Nuclear Pact,” The Australian,August 4, 2008, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au.
[55] “Pakistan Seeks Equal Access to Civil Nuclear Technology,” Dawn, April 12, 2010, http://www.dawn.com; Louis Charbonneau, “Pakistan Offers Global Nuclear Fuel Services Again,” Reuters,April 13, 2010, http://www.reuters.com.
[56] “Pakistan-PM Remarks at First Plenary Session on Mar 24, 2014,” Nuclear Security Summit 2014, March 24, 2014, http://www.nss2014.com.
[57] “Nuclear Power in Pakistan,” World Nuclear Association, updated August 2011, http://www.world-nuclear.org.
[58] Mark Hibbs, “Pakistan Deal Signals China’s Growing Nuclear Assertiveness,” Nuclear Energy Brief, April 27, 2010, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.carnegieendowment.org.
[59] David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, “Pakistan’s Fourth Reactor at Khushab Now Appears Operational,” Institute for Science and International Security, January 16, 2015, http://isis-online.org; Global Fissile Material Report 2014, International Panel on Fissile Materials,http://fissilematerials.org.

http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/pakistan/nuclear/

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program

The Beginning

If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no other choice. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – 1965

Last changed 2 January 2002

By Carey Sublette

Historical Background

Since the dawn of civilization modern day Pakistan has been an integral part of India. The Indus River valley, now in Pakistan, was the center where ancient Indian civilization was founded, spreading through the plain of the Ganges, and into southern India. Pakistan has also been the principal corridor into India from the Mediterranean and Central Asian worlds. Islam entered India though Pakistan in the century after Islam’s founding and soon converted the Sindh area on the lower Indus. Centuries later Central Asian Islamic empires invaded, sacked, proselytized, and ruled northwestern India through the Pakistani corridor. This entry point, closely connected to the Islamic world of the Middle East, became heavily Muslim in time but remained an integral part of Indian society. Islam was hardly confined to this region, converts were found throughout India but were also concentrated particularly in the impoverished floodplain of the Brahmaputra River in eastern India.

India was always divided into a number of separate states throughout its history, becoming unified for the first and only time under the British Raj in the 18th Century. The origin of Pakistan’s identity distinct and separate from the rest of India is quite recent. It arose after the beginning of the Twentieth Century, indeed well after World War I. In hindsight it hardly seems to have been predestined. The modern state of Pakistan is the construct largely of one man – Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

During three decades of growing Indian agitation for independence a rift developed and steadily grew between the predominantly Hindu Brahmin leaders of the movement and Ali Jinnah, the leading Muslim nationalist. In 1917 Hindu and Muslim (as well as Parsi and Sikh) nationalists were united behind the program expressed in the Lucknow Pact which demanded national self-determination and also specified proportional legislative representation for the various religious communities. This principle – that Muslims would be guaranteed representation proportionate to their numbers in government – set a standard that Jinnah would judge all future proposals. The Hindu-dominated All Indian Congress dropped this principle in favor of at-large voting with no set-asides for minority communities in the 1920s, a policy seemingly neutral and “ethnically blind” on its face, but one that naturally favored the Hindu majority. This issue crops in multi-ethnic societies the world over, such as in recent debates about affirmative action in the US. Jinnah and the Muslim League split with the Congress over this issue at the December 1928 All-Parties Conference.

From then on the inevitable differences and tensions that arise between social groups differentiated by religion and economics pulled the two sides apart without any tendency for rapprochement. Partly it was due to the tendency of Hindu leaders to favor the members of their own religion, castes and families to the detriment of the minority Muslims, a tendency that had led to the 1928 fracture. Partly it was due to a deliberate strategy of the Raj to divide the nationalist movement so as to weaken it and perhaps keep India British. Partly it was the rise of Islamic consciousness that forms a major theme in 20th Century history. But mostly it was the growing convictions of Jinnah, fed by all these influences. It did not help that the leading figure of the Hindu-based independence movement (the satyagraha), Mohandas K. Gandhi, chose to adopt the trappings and pose of a sadhu, a Hindu holy man, a posture that did not appeal at all to Muslim Indians.

In 1930 the concept of a separate Muslim state was proposed for this first time, instead of merely a guaranteed political base within a unified Indian state. This hypothetical state was given a hypothetical name “Pakistan” meaning “land of the pure”.

The last chance for avoiding partition was a proposal developed by a three-man commission sent by the British cabinet in 1946. The proposal was for a three-tier federal structure with a large degree of self-rule for regions devised along communal lines. Jinnah and the League accepted the proposal, even though it was less than the independent Muslim state they now preferred. But true to form, the Congress leaders – particularly Jawaharlal Nehru – found nothing but difficulty with it, leaving partition as the only option.

So it was that less than 19 years after that fateful Conference, the history of India was irrecovably altered when at midnight on 14-15 August 1947 the calamitous partition of British India into the modern states of India and Pakistan took place.

It is clear to everyone that the legacy of partition is a key driving force behind the nuclear standoff that now exists between India and Pakistan. Partition split apart a region that had been united for millennia amid communal massacres on a scale never before seen, leaving in its wake the unresolved issue of contested Kashmir – a Muslim-majority region held by Hindu-majority India under dubious political and legal circumstances. The skirmishing that has continued now for over fifty years, punctuated by outbreaks of full-scale war (in 1947, 1965, and 1971), and limited war (1999), have given both nations ample motivation to develop potent weapons to gain advantage over — or restore balance with — the other.

Origin of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapon Program

Unlike India’s nuclear weapons program, that traces back to an early but indefinite time, actual initiation of Pakistan’s program can be assigned a very definite date – 24 January 1972. On this date President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto committed Pakistan to acquiring nuclear weapons at a secret meeting held in Multan in the wake of the country’s devastating defeat in the 1971 Bangladesh war.

This was meeting, and the program that resulted from it, were initiated by Bhutto himself, the enactment of a long-standing personal agenda executed at the earliest opportunity he had. A proper study of this program thus must trace the history of Ali Bhutto himself, and his developing interest in the nuclear option for Pakistan.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was born on 5 January 1928 into an aristocratic family of the Rajput nobility, which possessed (and possesses) near-feudal power in the Sindh region of what is now Pakistan. Bhutto was very much to the manor born — his father was prominent in the Raj, the British colonial government, and was even knighted. Bhutto was educated at the best Western universities: Berkeley and Oxford. Brilliant and charismatic, Bhutto felt early that he was a man of destiny. After practicing law and lecturing in England, he returned to Pakistan in 1953 to practice law in Karachi. In 1957 he served as a delegate to the United Nations, and after Mohammad Ayub Khan took control of the government in a coup, Bhutto became a cabinet minister at only 30.

By that time Pakistan had already initiated a national nuclear program, a relatively early date, though later than India. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was set up in 1956 so that it could participate in the Atoms for Peace program announced by the Eisenhower administration, but development was slow in its early years.

Things began to pick up in 1960. The nuclear program acquired a new patron — the Minister of Mineral and Natural Resources, named Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In 1960 Dr. Ishrat H. Usmani was appointed Chairman of the PAEC. Usmani would be responsible for setting in motion many of the critical programs and institutions that would later give Pakistan nuclear weapons. Usmani started Pinstech (full name variously given as the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Sciences and Technology, and the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology) and the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant. One of Usmani’s most momentous achievement is said to be the training program under which brilliant young Pakistanis were selected and sent for training abroad. Between 1960 and 1967 some six hundred were selected of whom 106 eventually returned with doctorate degrees.

Also in 1960 the US gave Pakistan a $350,000 grant to help prepare Pakistan for its first research reactor which the United States agreed to supply two years later. This reactor, a 5 MW light-water research reactor known as the Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor (PARR-1), began operating in 1965 at Pinstech in Nilore.

In 1963 Bhutto became Foreign Minister, carrying his interest in nuclear capabilities into office with him. He watched with growing concern as China moved closer to nuclear capability, and in response India’s domestic rhetoric on the subject grew more bellicose.

During 1964, when China’s first nuclear test seemed imminent, factions in India including India’s most politically prominent scientist (Homi Bhabha, who also led India’s nuclear program), were openly agitating for nuclear weapons. Evidence suggests that India’s new interest in the nuclear option was of great concern to Pakistan. Reports from the fall of 1964 into mid 1965 indicate considerable concern by President Ayub Khan, and his Foreign Minister, who was none other than Ali Bhutto [Pervkovich 1999, p. 108]. In March both men met with Chou En-lai in Beijing, a meeting both felt had very positive results and developed Chinese support for Pakistan. It was shortly after this, in mid-1965, that Bhutto uttered his famous and prophetic oath about matching India’s nuclear capability (see at the top of this page).

Bhutto elaborated his views on anti-colonialism and the future of Pakistan in his book The Myth of Independence, finished in 1967 and published in 1969. One of the theses of the book was the necessity for Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons to be able to stand against the industrialized states, and against a nuclear armed India.

But Bhutto did not have the means to put his views into practice then. That would have to wait until he became Prime Minister, which he became on 20 December 1971, 3 days after the end of the Bangladesh War.

This war developed when the bi-regional state of Pakistan, split into East and West Pakistan on either side of India, held its first national election in December 1970. The dominant party of the more populous East Pakistan won a majority of the seats in parliament, but West Pakistan, accustomed to monopolizing political and military power, responded by ignoring the election result. And on 25 March 1971 West Pakistan forces arrested the winner Mujibur Rahman, and launched a campaign brutal military repression on the Bengalis of East Pakistan. This resulted in tens of millions of refugees spilling into India, some of whom took up arms against the Pakistani government. By autumn the Indian-East Pakistani border had become something close to a combat zone, with India and Pakistan trading intense firing across the border, while armed rebels operated from safe havens in India. In late November PM Gandhi authorized Indian forces to cross the border to “pursue” Pakistani forces. Pakistan responded by a massive strike against Indian air bases in western India on 3 December, and declaring war on 4 December. India had spent months preparing for this escalation, indeed had deliberately provoked it, and launched an overwhelming 3-pronged attack into East Pakistan. Unable to hold back the Indian invasion, Pakistan attempted to counter with an attack in Kashmir, gaining several miles of territory before being halted by Indian forces. The Indian army on the other hand had surrounded Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan by 15 December, and its garrison surrendered the next day. On 17 December a cease-fire was accepted by both sides, effectively ending the war.

The war had been a crushing defeat for Pakistan, which had lost more than half its population. Despite the close relationship with China that had developed over the previous decade, Chinese support for Pakistan during the most extreme crisis of Pakistan’s existence came to nought. China failed to provide any significant assistance for Pakistan, such as applying pressure on India’s border. The net result was that Pakistan suffered both a serious military defeat, demonstrating its inferiority to India in military terms, and a permanent irreparable loss in its strategic position by the new found independence of East Pakistan. And the much feared (by India) Pakistan-China axis had turned out to be a “paper tiger”.

Bhutto held the meeting at Multan on 24 January 1972, scarcely more than a month after taking office. The story of the Multan meeting was first made public by journalists Weissman and Krosney for the BBC show Panorama in 1980, and later recounted in their book The Islamic Bomb. Originally organized at Quetta, this convocation by the new Prime Minister brought together Pakistan’s top scientists – including the internationally known (and later Nobel Prize winning) Abdus Salam; Ishrat Usmani, head of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission; and future PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan [Weissman and Krosney 1981; pp. 41-44]. When accommodations proved unsuitable at Quetta, the Pakistan Air Force flew the attendees to Multan in Punjab, near the Indian border. Bhutto’s objective in holding the meeting was not to consult with the scientists, Bhutto was already set on pursuing nuclear weapons, rather it was to inspire them to committing themselves to the quest. Bhutto addressed the scientists directly, engaging them and exciting them about his vision of a nuclear weapons project.

Bhutto had been concerned with India’s pursuit of the “nuclear option” for several years, and this was the first opportunity he had to put his declaration of 1965 into effect. A key motivation for this program was concern over India’s well known progress toward having its own nuclear option, and the public declarations by key leaders in India that they must acquire nuclear arms. Years later, after India’s 1974 nuclear test, when Pakistan’s nuclear program became public knowledge persistent attempts were made to paint the weapons program as a response to the test. It was a response to India’s developing nuclear challenge, but not to the Pokhran test per se. To the extent that it was a response to a specific event, it was a response to India’s conventional arms superiority as manifested in its victory during the Bangladesh War.

Although Pakistan did not know it at the time, when Ali Bhutto made his decision to proceed with a weapons program in 1972, an Indian team had already been engaged for a few years in developing a prototype nuclear explosive device. In fact, at that moment the basic design for India’s first nuclear device was already complete.

The Bangladesh War also helped create a relationship between Pakistan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) or “North Korea” which would later help Pakistan considerably in acquiring delivery systems for its nuclear arsenal in the 90s.

During mid-1971 Bhutto approached North Korea in an effort to obtain critically needed weapons. An agreement was quickly reached and on 18 September 1971 the first arms shipment from the DPRK arrived in Karachi. On 9 November 1972, only one day after withdrawing from SEATO, Pakistan announced that it was establishing formal diplomatic relations with the DPRK. Military assistance to Pakistan continued through the late 1970s, with the DPRK providing artillery, multiple rocket launchers, ammunition, and a variety of spare parts [Bermudez 1998b].

Support for the nuclear weapons program was far from unanimous among the scientists who assembled at Multan, though it was very broad. Salam in particular did not support the objective, and it was found necessary to neutralize his opposition by concealing the weapons objective of later nuclear projects. Usmanli, the director of the PAEC, also did not support it, but on pragmatic grounds – Pakistan did not have the technology or infrastructure to tackle such a project. As a result Usmanli was soon replaced by a alumnus of Argonne National Laboratory, and a long time staffer at the IAEC, Munir Ahmad Khan [Weissman and Krosney 1981; pp. 46-47].

Acquiring the Means

The foundation of any nuclear weapons program is the production of the special nuclear materials required for weapons – plutonium or highly enriched uranium for a basic program for producing fission weapons. Without these materials no weapons can be made. The initial direction taken by Pakistan was to pursue the use of plutonium.

Whether by intention to prepare a “nuclear option” or not, decisions made in the 1960s already provided a valuable basis for establishing a weapons program. In 1971 the Canadian General Electric Co. completed a 137 MW (electrical) CANDU power reactor for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) which went critical in August 1971 and began commercial operation in October 1972. CGEC also provided a small heavy water production facility. These facilities had been contracted for in the mid-60s, thus predating Bhutto’s drive for nuclear weapon capability, but perhaps influenced by him in a ministerial capacity. The technology for KANUPP was the same natural uranium/heavy water technology used in the Indian Cirus and later Dhruva reactors used by India for producing weapons plutonium. The facilities were under IAEA safeguards, and have remained so, nonetheless it was the initial intent of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program to use plutonium from this reactor as the key ingredient in their nuclear arsenal [Weissman and Krosney 1981; pp. 67]. But to do that Pakistan required a means of separating plutonium from spent fuel. Some advance preparation had occurred here also. In the late 1960s Pakistan had contracted with both British Nuclear Fuels Limited and Belgonucléaire to prepare studies and designs for pilot plutonium separation facilities. The BNFL design, capable of separating up 360 g of fuel a year. The plans for this plant was completed by 1971 [Weissman and Krosney 1981; pp. 81-82].

As soon as he had come to power Bhutto had reached out to the rest of the Islamic world, particularly the nouveau riche oil states of the Middle East, for financial support. During 1973 and 1974 Bhutto held discussions with Libya and other states such as Saudi Arabia to line up financing for a nuclear weapons program. Bhutto and Libya’s Colonel Qaddafi finally met and reached an agreement for a Libyan financed Pakistani weapons program in February 1974 [Weissman and Krosney 1981; pp. 59-62]. In the early seventies billions of dollars also flowed from Iran and Saudi Arabia to Pakistan, most of it for purposes other than the nuclear weapons program, but some of these funds were probably also diverted to support the pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Through at least 1975 there is every reason to believe that Pakistan’s intended principal route to the bomb remained the obvious one using plutonium. The centerpiece of their program at this time was the effort to acquire a reprocessing plant to separate plutonium from the fuel of KANUPP. The first step after Multan was to build a pilot reprocessing facility called the “New Labs” at Pinstech. This facility was a larger and more ambitious project than the original BNFL plan. It was built in the early 70s by Belgonucléaire and the French corporation Saint-Gobain Techniques Nouvelles (SGN).

The pilot plant was followed by a contract signed with SGN in March 1973 to prepare the basic design for a large-scale reprocessing plant, one with a capacity of 100 tons of fuel per year, considerably more than KANUPP would generate. SGN was the world’s chief exporter of reprocessing technology and had previously built military plutonium facilities for France, the secret plutonium plant at Dimona in Israel, and contracted to provide similar plants to Taiwan, South Korea, and (later) Iraq. The Chashma plant, as it was known, would have the capability to produce 200 kg of weapons grade plutonium a year, if sufficient fuel were available to feed it. It would have provided Pakistan with the ability to “break safeguards” and quickly process accumulated fuel from KANUPP when it decided to openly declare itself a nuclear armed state. The initial design contract was followed by one for the final detailed design and construction on 18 October 1974. The original contract for this project did not include significant safeguards to discourage diversion of the separated plutonium, or controls on the technology [Weissman and Krosney 1981; pp. 75, 171].

India’s first nuclear test, known variously as “Smiling Buddha”, the PNE (for “Peaceful Nuclear Explosive”), and most recently Pokhran-I, occurred on 18 May 1974. It provided an additional stimulus to the Pakistani weapons program, which had made little headway up to that point. Bhutto increased the funding for the program after the Indian test, but since arrangements to secure lavish funding had been underway for more than a year this would have occurred anyway. One consequence of the test was ironically to hamper Pakistan’s program as the test sharply escalated international attention to proliferation and led to increased restrictions on nuclear exports to all nations, not just India. Over the next three years, these restrictions would change the entire course of the Pakistani nuclear program. On the other hand the US also boosted aid to Pakistan, including restarting military aid, which helped to improve Pakistan’s conventional military position and released domestic funds for other purposes.

In the fall of 1974 a new avenue for obtaining fissile material opened up. Pakistan began receiving invaluable intelligence about uranium enrichment technology, and the most sophisticated such technology in the world at that.

The intelligence was about the gas centrifuge technology developed by the European uranium enrichment consortium URENCO, made up of Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands. The source of the intelligence was a German-educated Pakistani metallurgist named Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who could be called the father of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal for without his expertise and assistance the uranium enrichment process would have been beyond Pakistan’s means. In addition to being the indispensable source of detailed plans about the technology, he also provided the equally indispensable information on the parts suppliers for URENCO, and later became the driving force behind its development into an industrial scale process in Pakistan. Despite Khan’s fame and flair for publicity and self-promotion, which has often led observers to conclude otherwise, he was never the overall leader of the Pakistani nuclear program and was not in charge of the development and testing of Pakistan’s actual nuclear weapons.

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan in 1993

A. Q. Khan was employed from 1972 to 1975 by the Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory (FDO) in Amsterdam, which was a subcontractor to Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland (UCN). UCN, located in Almelo, Netherlands, was the Dutch partner of the tri-national European uranium enrichment centrifuge consortium URENCO, made up of Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands. While at FDO/UCN Khan worked with two early centrifuge designs, the CNOR and SNOR machines. In 1974 UCN asked Khan to translate classified design documents for two advanced German machines, the G-1 and G-2.

Shahid-ur-Rehman relates in his book The Long Road to Chagai that Khan wrote to the Prime Minister in September 1974 offering his services to Pakistan. Evidence of the effect of Khan’s passing of information on centrifuge technology and design, and on the URENCO component suppliers, to Pakistan can be seen in the initiation of the Pakistani purchase of components for the uranium enrichment program beginning in August 1975.

In January 1976 Khan left the Netherlands for Pakistan abruptly. A.Q. Khan initially worked under the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), headed by Munir Ahmad Khan. Friction quickly developed and in July 1976 Bhutto gave Khan autonomous control of the uranium enrichment project, reporting directly to the Prime Minister’s office, an arrangement that has continued since. A. Q. Khan founded the Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL) on 31 July 1976 at Kahuta near Islamabad, with the exclusive task of indigenous development of Uranium Enrichment Plant. Construction on Pakistan’s first centrifuges began that year. The PAEC under M. A. Khan went on to develop Pakistan’s first generation of nuclear weapons in the 1980s [Perkovich 1999; pp. 308-309].

During 1975 and 1976, uranium enrichment was probably seen as a backup or at most a co-equal program for fissile material production. Having two different technologies for production would Pakistan more resistant to efforts to restrain its program, and producing both U-235 and plutonium would give Pakistan greater flexibility in weapon design.

The developing anti-proliferation regime quickly showed the value of not putting all of Pakistan’s eggs in one basket.

The reaction of the nuclear weapons states to India’s nuclear test, made using technology imported from abroad for ostensibly peaceful purposes, led to the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, or “London Club”, in 1975. In November of that year the group drafted a list of restricted nuclear exports called the “Guidelines for Nuclear Transfer”. The primary focus of proliferation control efforts at this time were focused on technology applicable to plutonium production, and emphasized restrictions on complete systems for production – such as reprocessing plants, or in the case of enrichment technology complete gas centrifuges.

The French government began to show increased concern about the Chashma plant during 1976. A safeguards agreement for the plant was brought before the IAEA by France in February 1976, with was approved on 18 March and signed by Pakistan. This at least ensured that the plant would have monitoring so that diversion to military purposes could be made with impunity.

Disturbing developments occurred in Pakistan during 1977 and 1978. As had happened in 1971, an attempt to conduct national elections led to chaos and military action. Though PM Bhutto remained popular, in 1977 the country grew restive under his continuing rule by decree which had continued since the catastrophe of the Bangladesh War (he had for example placed his predecessor under house arrest without charges). As a result Bhutto agreed to hold elections in March 1977, which his party (the Pakistan Peoples Party or PPP) won decisively. The opposition charged him with fraud, and irregularities did occur, though it is doubtful that Bhutto owed his victory to them. Nonetheless, the dispute led to continuing disorder. In April Bhutto declared martial law in three major cities; in June this order was declared illegal by the supreme court and was rescinded, new elections were scheduled for October; on 5 July 1977 in which Army General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq launched a coup that took over the government. The military quickly took control of the nuclear weapons program, control it is maintained to the present day – placing Pakistan’s nuclear arms outside of the authority of the civilian government (when it has had one).

The replacement of the man who had instigated the nuclear program did nothing to divert its course. Zia ul-Haq continued the project unabated, and continued to press the French to fulfill the Chashma contract. But France had begun gradually turning against the reprocessing plant. In late 1977 the French proposed to Pakistan to alter the design of the plant so that it would produce a mixture of uranium and plutonium rather pure plutonium. This modification would not affect the plant’s suitability for its declared purpose – producing mixed oxide fuel for power reactors – but would prevent its direct use for producing plutonium for weapons. Pakistan refused to accept the modification. But by that time Pakistan had received 95 percent of the detailed plans for the plant, and was thus in a position to secure components and build the plant itself [Weissman and Krosney 1981; pp. 166-169].

The showdown over Chashma finally occurred in 1978. A precursor was the decision in November 1977 by the CEA (the French atomic energy agency) to buy controlling interest in SGN, which had a long history of aggressively pushing international sales of its technology, and thus be able to dictate its policies. On 15 June 1978 the Council on Foreign Nuclear Policy formally decided to abrogate the contract [Weissman and Krosney 1981; pp. 169-171], preventing SGN from completing the plant.

For its part, Canada had decided on 23 December 1976 to break off its nuclear relationship with Pakistan because it had refused to submit to Canadian demands to sign the NPT and accept IAEA safeguards on its entire nuclear program, not just the Canadian supplied facility. This resulted in Canada cutting off supplies of nuclear fuel, heavy-water, spare parts, and technical information. This lack of support may be responsible in part for KANUPP’s lifetime energy availability factor being one of the worst in the world (28.6% through the end of 1997).

As the prospect of acquiring Chashma slipped away, the importance of the ultracentrifuge project inevitably grew. In July 1975 physicist-turned-diplomat S.A. Butt, who had been an ardent and outspoken convert to Bhutto’s vision at Multan, was posted to the Pakistani embassy to Belgium in charge of science and technology, where he became the center of the purchasing program for the centrifuge project. The first inquiries were made the following month, for the high frequency inverters required to control the centrifuge motors to a company in the Netherlands.

The purchasing program truly took off in 1976. Pakistan found that it could purchase numerous critical components for a gas centrifuge plant openly, in many cases without even having to conceal the intended end use. Under existing export rules, support equipment and individual components were not controlled, even if the device they assembled to make was.

Many of the components for constructing the centrifuges themselves were purchased from suppliers in the Netherlands. Van Doorne Transmissie received an order for 6500 tubes of specially hardened steel, other Dutch manufacturers received orders for large numbers of high strength aluminum and extremely strong martensitic steel, the for the crucial centrifuge rotors. Critical support components and subsystems were purchased from Switzerland (high vacuum valves from Vakuum Apparat Technik of Haag, Switzerland; uranium hexafluoride gassification units from CORA Engineering), and Germany (vacuum pumps and gas purification equipment from Leybold Heraeus of Hanan, Germany; plus thousands of specially formed aluminum parts).

Attempts to purchase yellowcake, refined uranium ore, through Germany failed in 1976, but by this Pakistan has discovered uranium deposits in western Punjab and had begun to exploit them [CIA 1978].

The next year, in 1977, orders were placed in France for 10,000 metal bellows, whose only use was to stabilize the gas centrifuge rotor. France prohibited the sale, but the company shipped part of order through a subcontractor in Belgium, which did not interfere, along with the dies so that Pakistan could make the bellows themselves. Dozens of high frequency inverters were purchased from a British subsidiary of Emerson Electric, which had the same specifications as those used to control uranium enrichment centrifuges by the British Atomic Energy Authority. These were shipped to Pakistan in 1978 [Weissman and Krosney 1981; pp. 182-188].

It was not until July 1978 that this vast and audacious purchasing campaign began to receive systematic scrutiny from intelligence and anti-proliferation agencies. A declassified 1978 CIA analysis shows that the CIA had become aware of nuclear weapon design group operating in Pakistan. The study focuses entirely on Pakistan’s potential for producing plutonium (particularly KANUPP) with no attention to the possibility of uranium enrichment as an option (although one entire page was redacted so the possibility of passing mention cannot be excluded) [CIA 1978]. It soon became apparent that unlike many abortive nuclear projects initiated in other nations, Pakistan’s program was huge, lavishly funded, well organized, and likely to succeed. It has been reported that a CIA analyses of Pakistan’s huge purchasing program showed that they had succeeded in obtaining at least one of almost every component needed to build a centrifuge enrichment plant [Weissman and Krosney 1981; pp. 190].

Due to Khan’s efforts, the slow recognition of the program by western intelligence, and the weak export controls at the time, Pakistan made rapid progress in developing U-235 production capability. According to Khan in a 1998 interview, the first enrichment was done at Kahuta on 4 April 1978. The plant was made operational in 1979 and by 1981 was producing substantial quantities of uranium.

In recognition of A.Q. Khan’s contributions the ERL was renamed the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) by President Zia ul-Haq on 1 May 1981.

Khan was convicted of espionage in the Netherlands in 1983 in absentia and sentenced to four years in prison. The conviction was later overturned in 1985 for failure to properly deliver a summons to him.

Pakistan also made an effort at applying the same approach for acquisition to obtain components for the canceled Chashma plutonium separation plant. This was made easier by France’s approval for SGN to complete the building for the plant, which enabled Pakistan to work on outfitting the plant for production without the work being externally observable. Some of the components had already been delivered to Pakistan, and Pakistan had complete detailed plans for the plant. After the contract cancellation S.A. Butt continued dealing directly with subcontractors, staying on good terms, and attempting to arrange delivery of the materials, even though what he was asking for would now be a violation of French law to provide. One company that made vessels for the chemical processes, Bignier Schmid-Laurent (BSL), attempted to fill an order for 26 vessels by having them made by an Italian subsidiary called Alcom, though the deal was uncovered and quashed before they could be delivered. Going in to the eighties Pakistan was still evidently trying to complete the Chashma plant [Weissman and Krosney 1981; pp. 190; 195-208]. It is not known that the plant has ever reached operational status (as of 2002), although in the intervening 2 decades Pakistan presumably could have developed the capabilities to manufacture any components they lacked, and U.S. intelligence agencies have believed that they are working on this [Koch and Topping 1997].

Preparing to Build the Bomb

Pakistani work on weapon design began even before the start of work on uranium enrichment, under the auspices of the PAEC. In March 1974, Munir Ahmad Khan called a meeting to initiate work on an atomic bomb. Among those attending the meeting were of Hafeez Qureshi, head of the Radiation and Isotope Applications Division (RIAD) at Pinstech, Dr. Abdus Salam, then Adviser for Science and Technology to the Government of Pakistan and Dr. Riaz-ud-Din, Member (Technical), PAEC. The PAEC Chairman informed Qureshi that he was to work on a project of national importance with another expert, Dr. Zaman Sheikh, then working with the Defence Science and Technology Organization (DESTO). The word “bomb” was never used in the meeting but Qureshi exactly understood the objective. Their task would be to develop the design of a weapon implosion system. The project would be located at Wah, appropriately next to the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), in the North-West Frontier Province and conveniently close to Islamabad.

The work at Wah began under the undescriptive codename Research and Qureshi, Zaman and their team of engineers and scientists came to be known as “The Wah Group”. Initial work was limited to research and development of the explosive lenses to be used in the nuclear device. This expanded however to include chemical, mechanical and precision engineering of the system and the triggering mechanisms. It procured equipment where it could and developed its own technology where restrictions prevented the purchase of equipment [Azam 2000].

The first preparations for eventual nuclear tests also started early – in 1976. Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad, Member (Technical) and Dr. Ahsan Mubarak of the PAEC were dispatched to Baluchistan to conduct helicopter reconnaissance of potential test sites with the assistance of the army 5 Corps located at Quetta. Over a span of three days, the PAEC scientists made several reconnaissance tours of the area between Turbat, Awaran and Khusdar in the south and Naukundi-Kharan in the east.

The PAEC requirement was for a mountain with a completely dry interior capable of withstanding an internal 20 kt nuclear explosion. A likely site was found in the form of a several hundred meter tall granite mountain Koh Kambaran in the Ras Koh range (also referred to as the Ras Koh Hills). The Ras Koh in the Chagai Division of Baluchistan rise at their highest point to 3009 meters. After a one year survey of the site, completed in 1977, plans were finalized for driving a horizontal tunnel under Koh Kambaran for a future test. [Azam 2000]. (It is interesting to note that Azam cites an incorrect height for Koh Kamabaram of 185 m. Comparing the prominent white band on the mountain, which satellite photography shows is 520 m long, to photographs of the actual mountain show that it is over 500 m high.)

Brig. Muhammad Sarfraz, who had provided support to the PAEC survey team, was tasked by (now) President Zia ul-Haq in 1977 with creating and leading the Special Development Works (SDW) which was entrusted with the task of preparing the nuclear test sites. The SDW was formally subordinate to the PAEC but directly reported to the (now) Chief of the Army Staff Sarfraz. Meetings between SDW and PAEC officials and ul-Haq led to the decision to prepare a second site for a horizontal shaft. The site selected was located at Kharan, in a desert valley between the Ras Koh Hills to the north and Siahan Range to the south. Subsequently, the Chagai-Ras Koh-Kharan areas became restricted entry zones and were closed to the public, prompting rumors that Pakistan had given air bases to the United States. The fact that US-AID had set up an office in Turbat, Baluchistan only added fuel to such rumors [Azam 2000].

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakOrigin.html